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THE  PRINCIPLES  OF 
AMERICAN   DIPLOMACY 


BY 

JOHN  BASSETT  MOORE,  LL.D. 

PROFESSOR   OF   INTERNATIONAL   LAW  AND   DIPLOMACY,    COLUMBIA   UNIVERSITY, 

NEW   YORK;    MEMBER   OF    THE    PERMANENT   COURT    AT    THE   HAGUE; 

SOMETIME    COUNSELOR   FOR    THE    DEPARTMENT    OF    STATE    OF 

THE    UNITED    STATES 

AUTHOR   OF 

"A   DIGEST   OF   INTERNATIONAL  LAW,"    "A   HISTORY   AND   DIGEST 

OF   INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATIONS,"    ETC.,   ETC. 


f 


HARPER  fcf  BROTHERS   PUBLISHERS 

NEW  YORK   AND    LONDON 


HARPER'S   CITIZENS   SERIES 

Edited  by  William  F.  Willoughby 

Director  of 

the  Institute  for  Government  Research 

A  new  and  most  important  series  defining  and  applying  the 
principles  of  such  vital  subjects  as  Labor  Legislation,  the  Ad- 
ministration of  Justice,  Public  Service  Regulation,  Statis- 
tics! American  Diplomacy,  and  other  themes  of  immediate 
concern  to  every  intelligent  student  and  citizen.  These  books, 
which  are  being  written  by  leading  authorities,  are  prepared 
to  meet  the  increasing  needs  of  colleges,  and  they  will  also 
meet  requirements,  not  now  supplied,  of  readers  interested 
in  the  most  immediate  subjects  of  our  times. 

PRINCIPLES  OF  LABOR  LEGISLATION.  By  John  R. 
Commons,  Professor  of  Political  Economy,  University  of 
Wisconsin,  and  John  B.  Andrews,  Secretary  of  the  Ameri- 
can Association  for  Labor  Legislation. 

PRINCIPLES  OF  CONSTITUTIONAL  GOVERNMENT. 
By  Frank  J.  Goodnow,  President  of  the  Johns  Hopkins 
University. 

PRINCIPLES  OF  AMERICAN  DIPLOMACY.  By  John 
Bahsett  Moore,  Professor  of  International  Law  and 
Diplomacy  at  Columbia  University.  Formerly  Counselor 
for  the  Department  of  State,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State, 
etc.,  member  of  the  Permanent  Court  at  the  Hague. 
Enlarged  and  revised  from  Prof.  Moore's  "American  Di- 
plomacy." 

HARPER  &   BROTHERS,  NEW  YORK 

Established   1817 


The  Principles  op  American  Diplomacy 

Copyright.    1005.   i°i8.   by   Harper   &   Brother* 
Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 


LIBRARY 

UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA 

SANTA  BARBARA 


CONTENTS 

CHAP.  PAGE 

Introduction vii 

I.  The  Beginnings i 

II.  The  System  of  Neutrality I    .  33 

III.  Freedom  of  the  Seas .  103 

IV.  Fisheries  Questions       135 

V.  The  Contest  with  Commercial  Restrictions     .    .  159 

VI.  Non-Intervention  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine  .    .  197 

VII.  The  Doctrine  of  Expatriation 270 

VIII.  International  Arbitration 306 

IX.  The  Territorial  Expansion  of  the  United  States  339 

X.  Pan  Americanism 365 

XL     Influence  and  Tendencies 420 

Bibliography 447 

Index 455 


INTRODUCTION 

The  present  work  incorporates  substantially  the 
entire  text,  with  few  alterations  or  amendments,  of 
the  volume  published  by  the  author  in  1905  under 
the  title  American  Diplomacy:  Its  Spirit  and  Achieve- 
ments. The  narrative  in  that  volume,  however, 
embraces  few  incidents  that  occurred  later  than  1903. 
The  years  that  have  since  elapsed  have  been  marked 
by  important  events,  some  of  which  are  destined  to 
be  highly  influential  in  shaping  the  future  course  of 
the  foreign  policy  of  the  United  States.  The  present 
work  brings  the  history  of  that  policy  down  to  date. 

The  object  of  the  author  in  the  preparation  of  the 
original  work,  as  well  as  in  its  revision,  has  been  to 
set  forth  and  explain  the  fundamental  principles  by 
which  the  diplomacy  of  the  United  States  has  been 
governed.  Domestic  policy  and  foreign  policy  are 
seldom  wholly  diverse,  and  foreign  policy  is  in  the 
main  profoundly  influenced  by  local  interests  and 
ideals.  Consequently,  just  as  the  internal  develop- 
ment of  each  nation  presents  some  distinctive  phase 
or  phases,  so  we  may  expect  its  foreign  policy  to  bear 
distinctive  marks  by  which  it  can  be  identified. 

The  United  States  after  its  advent  into  the  family 

vii 


INTRODUCTION 

of  nations  promptly  satisfied  that  expectation.  In 
grave  and  critical  conjunctures  its  foreign  policy 
became  identified  with  certain  definite  principles, 
enunciated  by  the  founders  of  the  government,  by 
whom  its  course  was  then  guided.  The  promulgation 
of  those  principles  formed  an  epoch  in  international 
relations;  and  as  they  were  conceived  to  be  con- 
genial with  the  spirit  of  American  institutions,  and 
were  found  to  be  beneficent  in  their  operation,  they 
were  afterwards  preserved  and  developed  with  re- 
markable consistency  and  intelligence  of  purpose. 
Down  to  a  comparatively  recent  time  they  were  re- 
garded as  practically  immutable. 

Of  these  principles  the  first  and  foremost  was  that 
of  "non-intervention."  This  term  was  used  in- 
clusively in  a  twofold  sense.  It  embraced,  in  the 
first  place,  non-interference  in  the  internal  affairs 
of  other  nations.  In  this  sense,  while  betokening  the 
revolutionary  origin  of  the  government  of  the  United 
States,  it  was  also  intended  reciprocally  to  concede 
to  other  nations  the  right  to  determine  their  form 
of  government  and  otherwise  to  manage  their  do- 
mestic concerns,  each  for  itself  and  in  its  own  way. 
In  the  second  place,  it  embraced  non-participation 
in  the  political  arrangements  between  other  govern- 
ments, and  above  all  strict  abstention  from  any  part 
in  the  political  arrangements  of  Europe. 

Of  the  principle  of  non-intervention  the  system  of 
neutrality  was  a  logical  derivative,  as  was  also  the 
recognition  of  governments  as  existing  entities,  and 

viii 


INTRODUCTION 

not  as  legitimate  or  illegitimate,  or  as  lawful  or  un- 
lawful, under  the  local  constitution.  The  Monroe 
Doctrine  itself  was  but  the  correlative  of  the  prin- 
ciple of  non-participation  in  European  affairs.  ' '  Our 
first  and  fundamental  maxim,"  said  Jefferson,  should 
be  "never  to  entangle  ourselves  in  the  broils  of 
Europe;  our  second,  never  to  suffer  Europe  to  in- 
termeddle with  cis-Atlantic  affairs."  By  preserv- 
ing these  principles,  it  was  believed  that  the  United 
States  would  best  contribute  to  the  preservation  of 
peace,  abroad  as  well  as  at  home,  and  to  the  spread 
of  liberty  throughout  the  world. 

While  the  text  of  the  present  volume  is  not  made 
up  of  a  continuous  recital  of  events  in  chronological 
order,  yet  that  order  is  followed  in  the  development 
of  each  principle;  and  all  the  essential  or  important 
incidents  in  the  diplomacy  of  the  United  States  are 
given.  This  method  has  commended  itself  to  the 
author  as  a  means  of  communicating  to  the  reader 
and  to  the  student  something  more  than  a  dry  detail 
of  names,  dates,  and  places.  For  the  most  part  it  is 
believed  that  the  study  of  the  past  yields  little  beyond 
a  certain  familiarity  with  those  elements,  which  are 
in  themselves  of  little  value.  The  element  of  real 
value  is  the  motives,  the  thoughts  and  purposes  by 
which  events  are  inspired. 

While  an  attempt  is  made  in  the  text  to  describe 
and  explain  transactions  with  sufficient  fullness  to 
enable  the  reader  readily  to  grasp  their  significance, 
there  are  added,  at  the  end  of  each  chapter,  citations 

ix 


INTRODUCTION 

of  sources  in  which  the  study  of  the  subjects  treated 
can  be  further  pursued. 

In  view  of  the  importance  attached  to  the  relations 
of  the  United  States  with  the  other  countries  of  this 
hemisphere,  a  special  chapter  has  been  added  to  the 
present  work,  on  the  subject  of  Pan-Americanism. 
The  idea  of  Pan-Americanism  is  obviously  derived 
from  the  conception  that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  an 
American  system;  that  this  system  is  based  upon 
distinctive  interests  which  the  American  countries 
have  in  common;  and  that  it  is  independent  of  and 
different  from  the  European  system.  To  the  extent 
to  which  Europe  should  become  implicated  in  Amer- 
ican politics,  or  to  which  American  countries  should 
become  implicated  in  European  politics,  this  dis- 
tinction would  necessarily  be  broken  down,  and  the 
foundations  of  the  American  system  would  be  im- 
paired; and  to  the  extent  to  which  the  foundations 
of  the  American  system  were  impaired,  Pan-Amer- 
icanism would  lose  its  vitality  and  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  its  accustomed  and  tangible  meaning.  I 
say  this  on  the  supposition  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is,  both  geographically  and  politically,  American, 
its  object  being  to  safeguard  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere against  territorial  and  political  control  by  non- 
American  powers.  Of  this  limited  application  I 
would  adduce  as  proof  not  so  much  the  fact  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  although  conceived  in  terms  of 
colonial  emancipation,  has  not  prevented  the  United 
States  and  other  American  governments  from  forcibly 

x 


INTRODUCTION 

extending  their  territorial  limits  at  one  another's 
expense,  as  to  the  fact  that  it  has  been  regarded  by 
the  United  States  as  justifying  the  latter' s  recent 
enforcement  in  Nicaragua,  Haiti,  Santo  Domingo, 
and  elsewhere,  of  precisely  such  measures  of  super- 
vision and  control  as  it  is  understood  to  forbid  non- 
American  powers  to  adopt  in  American  countries. 
Indeed,  it  has  even  been  maintained  that  the  United 
States  was  required  so  to  act  for  the  reason  that  non- 
American  powers  were  precluded  from  seeking  the 
redress  of  grievances  or  the  amelioration  of  conditions 
by  such  means.  Still  less  has  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
been  assumed  to  affect  the  non-American  relations 
of  non- American  powers,  or  to  touch  the  relations  of 
independent  states  generally.  Such  spheres  can  be 
penetrated  only  with  other  doctrines,  on  each  of 
which  should  be  bestowed  an  appropriate  title. 
Although  the  poet  tells  us  that  the  rose  by  any  other 
name  would  smell  as  sweet,  he  does  not  assure  us  that 
any  flower,  if  called  a  rose,  would  become  one. 

Before  proceeding  to  the  body  of  the  work,  it  may 
be  convenient  to  say  something  as  to  the  mechanism 
of  American  diplomacy  and  the  organs  through  which 
it  has  been  conducted. 

Prior  to  ^the  adoption  of  the  Constitution,  the 
executive  as  well  as  the  legislative  power  of  the 
United  States  resided  in  the  Congress.  On  Decem- 
ber 29,  1775,  the  Continental  Congress  appointed  a 
committee  of  five,  called  the  Committee  of  Secret 
Correspondence,  for  the  purpose  of  communicating 

xi 


INTRODUCTION 

with  the  friends  of  the  colonies  in  other  parts  of  the 
world.  This  committee  was  superseded,  on  April  17, 
1777,  by  the  Committee  for  Foreign  Affairs.  The 
committee  plan  proved  to  be  altogether  inefficient. 
Partly  because  of  the  irregular  attendance  of  mem- 
bers upon  Congress,  it  was  difficult  to  get  the  mem- 
bers of  the  committee  together.  In  order  to  remedy 
the  defect,  there  was  created,  on  January  10,  1781, 
the  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  be  presided 
over  by  a  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs.  The  first 
person  to  fill  this  office  was  Robert  R.  Livingston,  of 
New  York,  who  was  elected  to  it  on  August  10,  1781. 
He  entered  upon  his  duties  October  20,  1781,  and 
served  till  June  4,  1783.  He  was  succeeded  by 
John  Jay,  who  assumed  charge  of  the  office  on  Sep- 
tember 2 1 ,  1 784.  By  the  act  of  Congress  of  July  27, 
1789,  under  the  Constitution,  the  Department  of 
Foreign  Affairs  was  reorganized  and  expanded,  while 
by  the  act  of  September  15,  17S9,  its  name  was 
changed  to  the  Department  of  State  and  the  title 
of  the  head  became  Secretary  of  State.  Jay,  al- 
though he  had  been  appointed  Chief  Justice  of  the 
United  States,  remained  in  charge  of  foreign  affairs, 
under  his  commission  as  Secretary  of  Foreign  Af- 
fairs, till  March  22,  1790,  when  Jefferson  entered 
upon  his  duties  as  Secretary  of  State. 

A  list  is  given  below  of  the  Presidents  and  Secre- 
taries of  State.  It  will  be  observed  that  there  are 
frequent  gaps  between  the  terms  of  service  of  the 
.Srrrrtnries  of  State.     These  gaps  wore  filled  by  the 


INTRODUCTION 


ad  interim  designation  of  some  one,  perhaps  a  mem- 
ber of  the  cabinet,  or  the  chief  clerk  of  the  Depart- 
ment of  State,  or  later  an  assistant  secretary,  or  the 
counselor,  to  perform  the  duties  of  the  office. 

The  Presidents  and  their  Secretaries  of  State  fol- 
low in  order  of  date: 


Presidents 

George  Washington,  April  30 
1789,  to  March  3,  1797. 


John  Adams,  March  4, 1797, 
March  3,  1801. 


to 


Thomas  Jefferson,  March  4, 
1801,  to  March  3,  1809. 

James  Madison,  March  4, 1809, 
to  March  3,  1817. 


James  Monroe,  March  4,  18 17, 
to  March  3,  1825. 


John  Quincy  Adams,  March  4, 
1825,  to  March  3,  1829. 

Andrew  Jackson,  March  4, 
1829,  to  March  3,  1837. 


Secretaries  of  State 

Thomas  Jefferson,  commission- 
ed Sept.  26,  1789;  entered 
on  duties  March  22,  1790; 
served  till  Dec.  31,  1793. 

Edmund  Randolph,  Jan.  2, 
1794,  to  Aug.  20,  1795. 

Timothy   Pickering,   Dec.    10, 

1795,— 

Timothy  Pickering  (continued) 
to  May  12,  1800. 

John  Marshall,  May  i3,i8oo,to 
March  4,  1801. 

James  Madison,  March  5, 1801, 
to  March  3,  1809. 

Robert  Smith,  March  6,  1809, 
to  April  1,  1 81 1. 

James  Monroe,  April  2,  181 1, 
to  March  3,  1817. 

John  Quincy  Adams,  commis- 
sioned March  5,  1817;  en- 
tered on  duties  Sept.  22, 
181 7;  served  to  March  3, 
1825. 

Henry  Clay,  March  7,  1825,  to 
March  3,  1829. 
,     Martin  Van  Buren,  March  6, 
1829,  to  May  23,  1831. 

Edward  Livingston,  May  24, 
1831,  to  May  29,  1833. 

Louis  McLane,  May  29,  1833, 
to  June  30,  1834. 

John  Forsyth,  June  27, 1834,— 


INTRODUCTION 


Presidents 


Secretaries  of  State 


Martin  Van  Buren,  March  4, 
1837,  to  March  3,  1841. 

William  Henry  Harrison,  Mch. 
4,  1841,  to  April  4,  1841. 

John  Tyler,  April  6,  1841,  to 
March  3,  1845. 


James  K.  Polk,  March  4,  1845, 
to  March  3,   1S40. 


Zachary  Taylor,  March  5, 
1840,  to  July  9,  1850. 

Millard  Fillmore,  July  10,1850, 
to  March  3,  1853. 


Franklin  Pierce,  March  4, 1853, 

to  March  3,  1857. 
James    Buchanan,    March    4, 

1857,  to  March  3,  1861. 


Abraham  Lincoln,  March  4, 
1861,  to  April  15,  1865. 

Andrew  Johnson,  April  15, 
1865,  to  March  3,  1869. 

Ulysses  S.  Grant,  March  4, 
1869,  to  March  3,  1877. 


Rutherford  B.  Hayes,  March  5, 
1877,  to  March  3,  1881. 


John   Forsyth    (continued)   to 

March  3,  1841. 
Daniel     Webster,     March     5, 

1841 — 
Daniel  Webster  (continued)  to 

May  8,  1843. 
Abel  P.  Upshur,  July  24,  1843, 

to  Feb.  28,  1844. 
John   C.    Calhoun,    March   6, 

1844,  to  March  10,  1845. 
James  Buchanan,  commission- 
ed March  6,  1845;   enter- 
ed on  duties   March    10, 

1845;  served  to  March  7, 

1849. 
John   M.   Clayton,   March   7, 

1849,— 
John  M.  Clayton  (continued) 

to  July  22,  1850. 
Daniel  Webster,  July  22,  1850, 

to  October  24,  1852. 
Edward  Everett,  Nov.  6,  1852, 

to  March  3,  1853. 
William  L.  Marcy,  March  7, 

1853,  to  March  6,  1857. 
Lewis  Cass,  March  6,  1857,  to 

Dec.  14,  i860. 
Jeremiah   S.   Black,    Dec.    17, 

i860,  to  March  6,  1861. 
William  H.  Seward,  March  5, 

1861  — 
William  H.  Seward  (continued) 

to  March  4,  i860. 
Elihu  B.  Washburne,  March  5, 

1869,  to  March  16,  1869. 
Hamilton  Fish,  commissioned 

March   11,   1869;    entered 

on  duties  March  17,  1869; 

served  to  March  12,  1877. 
William  M.  Evarts,  March  12, 

1877,  to  March  7,  1881. 


XIV 


INTRODUCTION 


Presidents 


Secretaries  of  State 


James  A.  Garfield,  March  4, 
1881,  to  Sept.  19,  1881. 

Chester  A.  Arthur,  Sept.  20, 
1881,  to  March  3,  1885. 


Grover  Cleveland,  March  4, 
1885,  to  March  3,   1889. 

Benjamin  Harrison,  March  4, 
1889,  to  March  3,  1893. 


Grover   Cleveland,    March   4, 
1893,  to  March  3,  1897. 


William  McKinley,  March  4, 
1897,  to  Sept.  14,  1 901. 


Theodore  Roosevelt,  Sept.  14, 
1901,  to  March  3,  1909. 


William  H.  Taft,  March  4, 
1909,  to  March  3,  1913. 

Woodrow  Wilson,  March  4, 
1913  — 


James  G.  Blaine,  commissioned 
March  5, 1 881;  entered  on 
duties  March  7,  1881, — 

James  G.  Blaine  (continued)  to 
Dec.  19,  1881. 

Frederick  T.  Frelinghuysen, 
commissioned  Dec.  12, 
1 881;  entered  on  duties 
Dec.  19,  1881;  served  to 
March  6,  1885. 

Thomas  F.  Bayard,  March  6, 
1885,  to  March  6,  1889. 

James  G.  Blaine,  March  5, 
1889,  to  June  4,  1892. 

John  W.  Foster,  June  29,  1892, 
to  Feb.  23,  1893. 

Walter  Q.  Gresham,  March  6, 
1893,  to  May  28,  1895. 

Richard  Olney,  June  8,  1895, 
to  March  5,  1897; 

John  Sherman,  March  5,  1897, 
to  April  27,  1898. 

William  R.  Day,  April  26, 1898, 
to  Sept.  16,  1898. 

John  Hay,  Sept.  20,  1898, — 

John  Hay  (continued)  to  July 
1,  1905. 

Elihu  Root,  July  7,  1905,  to 
Jan.  27,  1909. 

Robert  Bacon,  Jan.  27,  1909, 
to  March  5,  1909. 

Philander  C.  Knox,  March  5, 
1909,  to  March  5,  1913. 

William  Jennings  Bryan,  March 
5,  1913,  to  June  9,  1915. 

Robert  Lansing ,  June  24,1915, — 
(Mr.  Lansing,  who  was 
promoted  from  the  post  of 
counselor,  had  an  ad  in- 
terim designation  as  Sec- 
retary of  State  from  June 
9  to  June  23.) 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


THE   PRINCIPLES   OF 
AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

We  hazard  nothing  in  saying  that  not  only  the 
most  important  event  of  the  past  two  hundred  years, 
but  one  of  the  most  important  events  of  all  time,  was 
the  advent  of  the  United  States  into  the  family  of 
nations.  Its  profound  significance  was  not  then 
unfelt,  but  in  the  nature  of  things  its  far-reaching 
effects  could  not  be  foreseen.  Even  now,  as  we 
survey  the  momentous  changes  of  the  last  few  years, 
we  seem  to  stand  only  on  the  threshold  of  American 
history,  as  if  its  domain  were  the  future  rather  than 
the  past.  But,  if  we  would  understand  the  di- 
plomacy of  the  United  States,  the  principles  by 
which  it  has  in  the  main  been  guided,  and  the  dis- 
tinctive influence  which  it  has  heretofore  exerted, 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

we  must  recur  to  the  work  of  the  original  builders. 
Many  nations  have  come  and  gone,  and  have  left 
little  impress  upon  the  life  of  humanity.  The 
Declaration  of  American  Independence,  however, 
bore  upon  its  face  the  marks  of  distinction,  and 
presaged  the  development  of  a  theory  and  a  policy 
which  must  be  worked  out  in  opposition  to  the 
ideas  that  then  dominated  the  civilized  world.  Of 
this  theory  and  policy  the  key-note  was  freedom; 
freedom  of  the  individual,  in  order  that  he  might 
work  out  his  destiny  in  his  own  way;  freedom  in 
government,  in  order  that  the  human  faculties  might 
have  free  course;  freedom  in  commerce,  in  order 
that  the  resources  of  the  earth  might  be  developed 
and  rendered  fruitful  in  the  increase  of  human 
wealth,  contentment,  and  happiness. 

When  our  ancestors  embarked  on  the  sea  of  in- 
dependence, they  were  hemmed  in  by  a  system  of 
monopolies.  It  was  to  the  effects  of  this  system 
that  the  American  revolt  against  British  authority 
Was  primarily  due ;  and  of  the  monopolies  under 
which  they  chafed,  the  most  galling  was  the  com- 
mercial. It  is  an  inevitable  result  of  the  vital  con- 
nection between  bodily  wants  and  human  happiness 
that  political  evils  should  seem  to  be  more  or  less 
speculative  so  long  as  they  do  not  prevent  the  in- 
dividual from  obtaining  an  abundance  of  the  things 
that  are  essential  to  his  physical  comfort.  This 
truth  the  system  of  commercial  monopoly  brutally 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

disregarded.  From  the  discovery  of  America  and 
of  the  passage  to  the  Eastern  seas,  colonies  were 
held  by  the  European  nations  only  for  purposes  of 
selfish  exploitation.  Originally  handed  over  to  com- 
panies which  possessed  the  exclusive  right  to  trade 
with  them,  the  principle  of  monopoly,  even  after 
the  power  of  the  companies  was  broken,  was  still 
retained.  Although  the  English  colonies  were  some- 
what more  favored  than  those  of  other  nations,  yet 
the  British  system,  like  that  of  the  other  European 
powers,  was  based  upon  the  principle  of  exclusion. 
Foreign  ships  were  forbidden  to  trade  with  the  colo- 
nies, and  many  of  the  most  important  commodities 
could  be  exported  only  to  the  mother  -  country. 
British  merchants  likewise  enjoyed  the  exclusive 
privilege  of  supplying  the  colonies  with  such  goods 
as  they  needed  from  Europe.  This  system  was  ren- 
dered yet  more  insupportable  to  the  American  colo- 
nists by  reason  of  the  substantial  liberty  which  they 
had  been  accustomed  to  exercise  in  matters  of  local 
government.  Under  what  Burke  described  as  a 
policy  of  "wise  and  salutary  neglect,"  they  had  to  a 
great  extent  been  permitted  to  follow  in  such  matters 
their  own  bent.  But  this  habit  of  independence, 
practised  by  men  in  whom  vigor  and  enterprise  had 
been  developed  by  life  in  a  new  world,  far  from 
reconciling  them  to  their  lot,  served  but  to  accent- 
uate the  incompatibility  of  commercial  slavery  with 
political  freedom.     The  time  was  sure  to  come  when 

3 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

colonies  could  no  longer  be  treated  merely  as  markets 
and  prizes  of  war.  The  American  revolt  was  the 
signal  of  its  appearance. 

But  there  was  yet  another  cause.  The  American 
revolt  was  not  inspired  solely  by  opposition  to  the 
system  of  commercial  monopoly.  The  system  of 
colonial  monopoly  may  in  a  sense  be  said  to  have 
been  but  the  emanation  of  the  system  of  monopoly 
in  government.  In  1776  Europe  for  the  most  part 
was  under  the  sway  of  arbitrary  governments. 
Great  mutations  were,  however,  impending  in  the 
world's  political  and  moral  order.  The  principles 
of  a  new  philosophy  were  at  work.  With  the  usual 
human  tendency  to  ascribe  prosperity  and  adversity 
alike  to  the  acts  of  government,  the  conviction  had 
come  to  prevail  that  all  the  ills  from  which  society 
suffered  were  ultimately  to  be  traced  to  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  divine  right  of  kings,  on  which  exist- 
ing governments  so  generally  rested.  Therefore,  in 
place  of  the  principle  of  the  divine  right  of  kings, 
there  was  proclaimed  the  principle  of  the  natural 
rights  of  man;  and  in  America  this  principle  found 
a  congenial  and  unpreoccupied  soil  and  an  oppor- 
tunity to  grow.  The  theories  of  philosophers  be- 
came in  America  the  practice  of  statesmen.  The 
rights  of  man  became  the  rights  of  individual  men. 
Hence,  our  forefathers  in  their  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence at  the  outset  declared  "these  truths  to  be 
self-evident:    that  all  men  are  created  equal;    that 

4 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

they  are  endowed  by  their  Creator  with  certain  in- 
alienable rights;  that  among  these  are  life,  liberty, 
and  the  pursuit  of  happiness,"  and  that  "to  secure 
these  rights,  governments  are  instituted  among  men, 
deriving  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed." 

When  the  United  States  declared  their  inde- 
pendence they  at  once  undertook  to  fulfil  one  of  the 
necessary  conditions  of  national  life  by  endeavoring 
to  enter  into  diplomatic  relations  with  other  powers. 
Indeed,  even  before  that  event,  steps  were  taken 
towards  the  establishment  of  such  relations.  On 
March  3,  1776,  the  Committee  of  Secret  Corre- 
spondence of  the  Continental  Congress  instructed 
Silas  Deane,  of  Connecticut,  to  proceed  to  France  in 
the  character  of  a  secret  agent,1  and  if  possible  to  as- 

1  Deane,  who  was  for  some  time  after  his  arrival  in  France  to  be 
"engaged  in  the  business  of  providing  goods  for  the  Indian  trade," 
was  to  preserve  the  character  of  a  merchant,  it  being  assumed  that 
the  French  court  would  not  like  it  to  be  known  that  an  agent  of  the 
colonies  was  in  the  country.  But,  with  a  letter  furnished  by 
Franklin,  he  was  promptly  to  gain  an  introduction  to  "a  set  of 
acquaintance,  all  friends  to  the  Americans,"  by  conversing  with 
whom  it  was  supposed  that  he  would  have  "a  good  opportunity  of 
acquiring  Parisian  French."  Meanwhile,  through  one  of  them 
who  understood  English,  he  was  to  seek  an  immediate  audience  of 
M.  de  Vergennes,  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs,  to  whom,  after  ex- 
hibiting his  "letter  of  credence,"  he  was  in  the  first  instance  to 
make  application  for  a  supply  of  arms  and  ammunition.  In  so 
doing  he  was  to  represent  the  opportunity  that  might  ensue  for  the 
development  of  a  large  and  profitable  commerce.  (Wharton,  Dip. 
Cor.  Am.  Rev.  II,  78.) 

5 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

certain  whether,  if  the  colonies  should  be  forced  to 
form  themselves  into  an  independent  state,  France 
would  probably  acknowledge  them  as  such  and  en- 
ter into  a  treaty  or  alliance  with  them  for  commerce 
or  defence,  or  both,  and  if  so  on  what  conditions. 
These  instructions  were  signed  by  Benjamin  Frank- 
lin, Benjamin  Harrison,  John  Dickinson,  Robert 
Morris,  and  John  Jay. 

Deane's  mission  was  by  no  means  fruitless;  but, 
after  the  Declaration  of  Independence,  measures  of 
a  more  formal  kind  were  taken.  On  September  17, 
1776,  Congress  took  into  consideration  the  subject 
of  treaties  with  foreign  nations,  and  adopted  a  plan 
of  a  treaty  of  commerce  to  be  proposed  to  the  King 
of  France.  Comprehensive  in  scope  and  far-reach- 
ing in  its  aims,  this  remarkable  state  paper  stands 
as  a  monument  to  the  broad  and  sagacious  views  of 
the  men  who  framed  it  and  gave  it  their  sanction. 
Many  of  its  provisions  have  found  their  way,  often 
in  identical  terms,  into  the  subsequent  treaties  of 
the  United  States;  while,  in  its  proposals  for  the 
abolition  of  discriminating  duties  that  favored  the 
native  in  matters  of  commerce  and  navigation,  it 
levelled  a  blow  at  the  exclusive  system  then  pre- 
vailing, and  anticipated  by  forty  years  the  first 
successful  effort  to  incorporate  into  a  treaty  the 
principle  of  equality  and  freedom  on  which  those 
proposals  were  based.  On  the  other  hand,  as  if 
with  prophetic  instinct,   care  was  taken  that  the 

6 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

expansion   of   the   United    States   in   the   western 
hemisphere  should  not  be  hampered.     The  new  gov- 
ernment, in  turning  to  France  for  aid,  did  not  labor 
under  misconceptions.     It  little  detracts  from  our 
obligations  to  France,  for  support  afforded  us  in  the 
hour  of  peril  and  need,  to  say  that  that  support  was 
not  and  could  not  have  been  given  by  the  French 
monarchy  out  of  sympathy  with  the  principles  an- 
nounced by  the  American  revolutionists.     No  mat- 
ter what   incipient   tendencies   may   have   existed 
among  the  French  people,  there  could  be  on  the  part 
of  the  French  government  no  such  sentiment.     In 
one  point,  however,  the    French  government  and 
the  French  people  were  in  feeling  completely  united, 
and  that  was  the  determination  if  possible  to  undo 
the  results  of  the  Seven  Years'  War,  as  embodied 
in  the  peace  of  Paris  of  1763.     Under  that  peace 
France  had  given  to  Great  Britain  both  Canada  and 
the  Island  of  Cape  Breton,  and  had  practically  with- 
drawn her  flag  from  the  Western  Hemisphere.     To 
retrieve  these   losses  was  the  passionate  desire  of 
every  patriotic  Frenchman ;  and  it  was  believed  by 
the   better  -  informed    among    our    statesmen   that 
France  would  overlook  the  act  of  revolt  and  em- 
brace the  opportunity  to  deal  a  blow  at  her  victo- 
rious rival.     Nevertheless,  in  the  plan  of  a  treaty 
to  be  proposed  to  France  it  was  expressly  declared 
that  the  Most  Christian  King  should  never  invade 
nor  attempt  to  possess  himself  of  any  of  the  coun- 

7 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tries  on  the  continent  of  North  America,  either  to 
the  north  or  to  the  south  of  the  United  States,  nor 
of  any  islands  lying  near  that  continent,  except  such 
as  he  might  take  from  Great  Britain  in  the  West 
Indies.     With  this  exception,  the  sole  and  perpetual 
possession  of  the  countries  and  islands  belonging  to 
the  British  crown  was  reserved  to  the  United  States. 
When  this  plan  was  adopted,   Franklin,   Deane, 
and  Jefferson  were  chosen  as  commissioners  to  lay 
it  before  the  French  government ;  but  Jefferson  de- 
clined the  post,  and  Arthur  Lee,  who  was  already 
in  Europe,  was  appointed  in  his  stead.     On  Decem- 
ber 4,   1776,  Franklin,  wreak  from  the  effects  of  a 
tedious  voyage,  touched  the  coast  of  Brittany.     He 
had  just  reached  the  Psalmist's  first  limit  of  age,  and 
was  no  stranger  to  suffering ;  but,  serene  in  the  faith 
that  sustained  him  in  trials  yet  to  come,  he  entered 
upon  that  career  which  was  to  add  to  his  earlier  re- 
nown and  shed  upon  his  borrowed  years  the  lustre 
of  great  achievements.     As  soon  as  his  health  was 
sufficiently  re-established,  he  hastened  to  Paris,  where 
he  met  his  colleagues  in  the  mission;  and  on  De- 
cember 23  they  jointly  addressed  to  the  Count  Ver- 
gennes,  then  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs  of  France, 
the  first  formal  diplomatic  communication  made  on 
behalf  of  the  United  States  to  a  foreign  power. 

The  plan  of  a  commercial  treaty  which  the  com- 
missioners were  instructed  to  submit  proved  to  be 
unacceptable  to  France;  nor  was  this  strange.     The 

8 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

French  government,  while  maintaining  a  show  of 
neutrality,  had  indeed  opened  its  treasury  and  its 
military  stores  to  the  Americans,  under  the  guise  of 
commercial  dealings  carried  on  through  the  dram- 
atist, Beaumarchais,  in  the  supposititious  name  of 
a  Spanish  firm.  Nevertheless,  France  was  still  in  a 
state  of  peace,  her  commerce  unvexed  by  war,  while 
America  was  invaded  by  a  hostile  army  and  her  in- 
dependence was  yet  to  be  established.  She  was 
free  at  any  moment  to  become  reconciled  to  Eng- 
land, and  such  a  reconciliation  was  not  deemed  im- 
probable either  in  England  or  in  France.  Even  in 
America  there  were  not  wanting  those  who  expected 
it.  But  the  course  of  events  swept  the  two  coun- 
tries rapidly  along.  The  American  commissioners, 
soon  after  they  met  in  France,  were  authorized  to 
abandon  the  purely  commercial  basis  of  negotiation 
and  to  propose  both  to  France  and  to  Spain  a  po- 
litical connection — to  the  former,  in  return  for  her 
aid,  the  conquest  of  the  West  Indies;  and  to  the 
latter,  the  subjugation  of  Portugal.  These  new  in- 
structions disclosed  on  the  part  of  the  United  States 
a  conviction  of  the  necessity  of  foreign  aid  of  a  more 
direct  and  extensive  kind  than  could  possibly  be 
rendered  within  the  limits  of  neutrality.  While  the 
French  government  was  still  hesitating,  there  came 
the  news  of  the  surrender  of  Burgoyne  at  Saratoga. 
The  report  reached  France  early  in  December,  1777. 
The  signal  success  of  the  American  arms  was  the 

9 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


top 


(oact&n*,^  -/tC^-^a^t  tyfyt-ArfW  **** 


THE    FIRST    FORMAL    DIPLOMATIC    COMMUNICATION     MADE    ON 
10 


THE    BEGINNINGS 


BEHALF    OF    THE    UNITED     STATES     TO    A    FOREIGN    POWER 

II 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

turning-point  in  the  negotiations.  The  American 
commissioners  at  once  assumed  a  bolder  front.  They 
formally  proposed  a  treaty  of  alliance,  and  insisted 
on  knowing  the  intentions  of  the  French  court. 
The  answer  of  France  came  on  December  17.  On 
that  day  the  American  commissioners  were  informed, 
by  order  of  the  King,  that  his  Majesty  had  deter- 
mined to  acknowledge  the  independence  of  the 
United  States  and  to  make  with  them  a  treaty.  The 
negotiations  then  rapidly  proceeded;  and  on  Feb 
ruary  6,  1778,  there  were  signed  two  treaties,  one  of 
commerce  and  the  other  of  alliance.  The  commer- 
cial treaty  was  the  one  first  signed,  and  it  thus  be- 
came the  first  treaty  concluded  between  the  United 
States  and  a  foreign  power.  The  treaty  of  alliance 
was  signed  immediately  afterwards.  The  table  on 
which  these  acts  were  performed  is  still  preserved 
in  the  French  Foreign  Office. 

In  the  treaty  of  commerce,  the  original  views  of 
the  United  States  as  to  the  opening  of  the  colonial 
trade  and  the  abolition  of  discriminating  duties 
were  by  no  means  carried  out ;  but  the  terms  actual- 
ly obtained  embodied  the  most-favored-nation  prin- 
ciple, and  were  as  liberal  as  could  reasonably  have 
been  expected.  The  treaty  of  alliance  was,  how- 
ever, of  a  totally  different  nature,  and  established 
between  the  two  countries  an  intimate  association 
in  respect  of  their  foreign  affairs.  No  one  doubted 
that  the  conclusion  of  the  alliance  meant  war  be- 

12 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

tween  France  and  Great  Britain.  France's  recogni- 
tion of  the  independence  of  the  United  States  was 
on  all  sides  understood  to  be  an  act  of  intervention, 
which  the  British  government  would  resent  and 
oppose;  for,  while  the  United  States  had  declared 
their  independence,  they  were  still  in  the  midst  of 
the  struggle  actually  to  secure  it.  This  fact  was  ac- 
knowledged in  the  treaty  itself.  Its  "  essential  and 
direct  end  "  was  avowed  to  be  "to  maintain  effectu- 
ally the  liberty,  sovereignty  and  independence,  abso- 
lute and  unlimited,  of  the  United  States,  as  well  in 
matters  of  government  as  of  commerce  " ;  and  it  was 
agreed  that,  if  war  between  France  and  Great  Brit- 
ain should  ensue,  the  King  of  France  and  the  United 
States  would  make  it  a  common  cause  and  aid  each 
other  mutually  with  their  good  offices,  their  coun- 
sels, and  their  forces.  The  American  idea  as  to  ter- 
ritorial expansion  was,  however,  preserved.  The 
United  States,  in  the  event  of  seizing  the  remaining 
British  possessions  in  North  America  or  the  Bermuda 
Islands,  were  to  be  permitted  to  bring  them  into 
the  confederacy  or  to  hold  them  as  dependencies. 
The  King  of  France  renounced  them  forever,  reserv- 
ing only  the  right  to  capture  and  hold  any  British 
islands  in  or  near  the  Gulf  of  Mexico.  In  addition 
to  these  engagements,  the  United  States  guaranteed 
to  France  the  latter's  existing  possessions  in  America 
as  well  as  any  which  she  might  acquire  by  the  future 
treaty  of  peace,  while  France  guaranteed  to  the 

13 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

United  States  their  independence  as  well  as  any 
dominions  which  they  might  obtain  from  Great 
Britain  in  North  America  or  the  Bermuda  Islands 
during  the  war.  In  conclusion,  the  contracting  par- 
ties agreed  to  invite  or  admit  other  powers  who  had 
received  injuries  from  England  to  make  common 
cause  with  them.  This  stipulation  particularly  re- 
ferred to  Spain,  France's  intimate  ally. 

The  French  alliance  was  beyond  all  comparison 
the  most  important  diplomatic  event  of  the  Amer- 
ican Revolution.  It  secured  to  the  United  States, 
at  a  critical  moment,  the  inestimable  support  of  a 
power  which  at  one  time  controlled  the  destinies  of 
Europe  and  which  was  still  the  principal  power  on 
the  Continent.  Only  one  other  treaty  was  obtained 
by  the  United  States  prior  to  the  peace  with  Great 
Britain,  and  that  was  the  convention  of  amity  and 
commerce,  signed  by  John  Adams,  with  representa- 
tives of  their  "High  Mightinesses,  the  States-General 
of  the  United  Netherlands,"  at  The  Hague,  on  Oc- 
tober 8,  1782;  but  the  Netherlands  were  then  also 
at  war  with  Great  Britain,  and  their  recognition, 
though  most  timely  and  helpful,  was  not  of  vital 
import.  The  failure,  however,  to  make  other  trea- 
ties was  not  due  to  any  lack  of  effort.  Agents  were 
accredited  by  the  Continental  Congress  to  various 
courts  in  Europe.  John  Jay  and  William  Car- 
michael  were  sent  to  Spain;  Ralph  Izard  was  ap- 
pointed to  Tuscany ;  William  Lee  was  directed  to  test 

H 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

the  disposition  of  Vienna ;  Arthur  Lee  was  author- 
ized to  sound  various  courts,  including  that  of  Prus- 
sia ;  Francis  Dana  was  bidden  to  knock  at  the  door 
of  Russia;  Henry  Laurens  was  commissioned  to  the 
Netherlands.  The  fortunes  and  misfortunes  of  some 
of  these  agents  form  a  curious  chapter. 

There  exists  a  popular  tendency  to  overrate  the 
delights  and  to  underrate  the  hardships  of  the  diplo- 
matic life;  but,  however  much  opinions  may  differ 
on  this  point,  there  can  be  no  doubt  that  the  office 
of  an  American  diplomatist  in  the  days  of  the  Revo- 
lution was  no  holiday  pastime.  If  he  was  not  al- 
ready in  Europe,  his  journey  to  his  post  was  beset 
with  perils  graver  than  those  of  the  elements.  In 
the  eyes  of  British  law,  American  revolutionists  were 
simply  "rebels,"  the  reprobation  of  whose  conduct 
was  likely  to  be  proportioned  to  their  prominence 
and  activity;  and  the  seas  were  scoured  by  British 
cruisers,  the  dreaded  embodiment  of  England's  mari- 
time supremacy.  Deane  went  abroad  secretly  before 
independence  was  declared;  but  when  his  presence 
in  France  became  known,  the  British  government 
asked  that  he  be  seized  and  delivered  up  into  its 
custody.  Franklin  sailed  for  France  on  a  small 
vessel  of  war  belonging  to  Congress,  called  the  Re- 
prisal. On  the  way  over  she  took  two  prizes,  and 
more  than  once,  descrying  a  suspicious  sail,  cleared 
for  action.  Had  she  been  captured  by  the  British, 
Franklin  would  have  had  an  opportunity  to  test 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  truth  of  his  remark  to  his  associates  in  Congress, 
that  they  must  "either  hang  together  or  hang 
separately."  Not  long  after  bearing  Franklin  to 
France,  the  Reprisal  went  down  with  her  gallant 
commander,  Captain  Wickes,  off  the  banks  of  New- 
foundland. John  Adams,  on  his  first  journey,  took 
passage  on  an  American  vessel;  on  his  second,  he 
embarked  in  the  French  frigate  Sensible,  and  landed 
at  Ferrol,  in  Spain.  Jay  committed  his  fate  to  the 
American  man-of-war  Confederacy,  and,  like  Adams 
and  Franklin,  reached  his  destination.  Less  fortu- 
nate was  Henry  Laurens. 

Laurens  was  elected  minister  to  the  Netherlands 
in  October,  1779,  but,  owing  to  the  vigilance  of  the 
British  watch  of  the  American  coasts,  did  not  sail 
till  August,  1780,  when  he  took  passage  on  a  small 
packet-boat  called  the  Mercury,  under  the  convoy 
of  the  sloop-of-war  Saratoga.  When  off  the  banks 
of  Newfoundland,  the  Mercury,  then  abandoned  by 
her  convoy,  was  chased  and  seized  by  the  British 
cruiser  Vestal.  During  the  pursuit,  Laurens's  pa- 
pers were  hastily  put  into  a  bag,  with  "a  reasonable 
weight  of  iron  shot,"  and  thrown  overboard.  The 
weight,  however,  was  not  sufficient  to  sink  them, 
and  they  fell  into  the  hands  of  the  captors,  by  whom 
they  were  "hooked  up"  and  delivered  to  the  Brit- 
ish government.  Laurens  himself  was  imprisoned 
in  the  Tower  of  London.  Never  did  consequences 
more  momentous  flow  from  a  confused  effort  to  sup- 

16 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

ply  the  want  of  previous  precautions.  Among  the 
papers  there  was  a  tentative  plan  of  a  commercial 
treaty  between  the  United  States  and  the  Nether- 
lands, which  William  Lee  had,  on  September  4, 
1778,  agreed  upon  with  Van  Berckel,  Grand  Pension- 
ary of  Amsterdam,  who  had  been  authorized  by  the 
burgomasters  to  treat.  Obviously  this  act  was  in 
no  wise  binding  upon  the  States-General,  and  Van 
Berckel  had  formally  declared  that  the  treaty  was 
not  to  be  concluded  till  the  independence  of  the 
United  States  should  be  recognized  by  the  English. 
But  trouble  had  long  been  brewing  between  the 
English  and  the  Dutch ;  and  the  British  minister  at 
The  Hague  was  instructed  to  demand  the  disavowal 
of  the  treaty,  and  the  punishment  of  Van  Berckel 
and  his  "accomplices"  as  "disturbers  of  the  public 
peace  and  violators  of  the  law  of  nations."  This 
demand  the  Dutch  declined  to  grant;  and  on  De- 
cember 20,  1780,  the  British  government  proclaimed 
general  reprisals. 

While  the  persons  of  our  representatives  were 
safe  from  seizure  upon  the  Continent,  they  obtained 
no  substantial  recognition  outside  of  France  and 
the  Netherlands.  In  1777  Arthur  Lee  was  stopped 
by  the  Spanish  government  when  on  his  way  to 
Madrid.  Jay  and  William  Carmichael  were  after- 
wards allowed  to  reside  there,  but  only  as  private 
individuals.  In  the  early  days  of  the  Revolution, 
Spain  had  given  some  pecuniary  aid  at  the  solicita- 
»  17 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tion  of  France.  That  Congress  expected  to  obtain 
from  her  further  assistance  may  be  inferred  from 
the  circumstance  that  Jay  had  scarcely  left  the 
United  States  when  bills  were  drawn  upon  him  to  a 
large  amount.  But,  with  the  exception  of  an  in- 
significant sum,  insufficient  to  enable  him  to  meet 
these  bills,  which  Franklin  had  ultimately  to  take  up, 
Jay  obtained  no  aid  and  made  no  progress.  With 
regard  to  the  Mississippi,  Spain  demanded  an  ex- 
clusive navigation;  but,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that 
Congress,  against  Jay's  warning  that  such  a  course 
would  render  a  future  war  with  Spain  unavoidable, 
eventually  offered  in  return  for  an  alliance  to 
concede  this  demand  from  310  of  north  latitude 
southward,  his  mission  failed.  Spain  ultimately 
went  to  war  against  Great  Britain,  but  for  her  own 
purposes.  With  a  presentiment  not  unnatural,  she 
to  the  end  regretted  the  independence  of  the  United 
States.  In  a  prophetic  paper  submitted  to  the 
Spanish  King,  after  peace  was  re-established,  Count 
d'Aranda,  who  was  Spanish  ambassador  at  Paris  dur- 
ing the  American  Revolution,  said:  "The  indepen- 
dence of  the  English  colonies  has  been  recognized. 
It  is  for  me  a  subject  of  grief  and  fear.  France  has 
but  few  possessions  in  America,  but  she  was  bound 
to  consider  that  Spain,  her  most  intimate  ally,  had 
many,  and  that  she  now  stands  exposed  to  terrible 
reverses.  From  the  beginning,  France  has  acted 
against  her  true  interests  in  encouraging  and  sup- 

18 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

porting  this  independence,  and  so  I  have  often  de- 
clared  to  the  ministers  of  that  nation." 

While  the  attitude  of  Spain  towards  the  Revo- 
lution was  affected  by  considerations  of  her  par- 
ticular interests,  it  was  to  a  great  extent  shared  by 
most  of  the  powers  of  Europe.  William  Lee  went 
to  Vienna,  but  was  not  received  there.  Dana  resided 
for  two  years  at  St.  Petersburg  as  a  private  individ- 
ual, and  obtained  nothing  beyond  one  informal  in- 
terview with  the  Minister  of  Foreign  Affairs.  Izard 
was  dissuaded  by  the  minister  of  Tuscany,  at  Paris, 
from  attempting  to  visit  that  country,  and  ended 
his  diplomatic  career  in  unhappy  discontent  at  the 
French  capital.  But  the  greatest  misfortune  of  all 
was  that  which  befell  Arthur  Lee  at  the  Prussian 
capital. 

Diplomacy,  in  the  course  of  time,  had  lost  much 
of  its  idle  pomp  and  ceremony,  but  had  gained  little 
in  scrupulousness  and  delicacy.  Bribery  was  still 
one  of  its  most  formidable  weapons ;  but  in  its  treat- 
ment of  Lee  it  also  employed  methods  the  burgla- 
rious grossness  of  which  was  mollified  only  by  the 
histrionic  air  that  pervaded  the  whole  transaction. 
Great  concern  was  felt  by  England  as  to  the  pos- 
sible course  of  Prussia;  and  when,  early  in  May, 
1777,  the  British  government  received,  through  one 
of  its  ubiquitous  agencies,  a  report  that  Lee  and 
Carmichael  were  about  to  proceed  from  Paris  to 
Berlin,  the  Earl  of  Suffolk  directed  Hugh  Elliot,  the 

19 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

British  minister  at  the  latter  capital,  to  "give  every 
proper  attention  to  their  conduct,  and  the  impression 
which  it  may  make."  His  lordship  added,  with  that 
completeness  and  accuracy  of  information  which 
characterized  all  his  communications,  that  Car- 
michael  had  "the  best  abilities,"  but  that  Lee  was 
more  immediately  in  the  commission  of  Congress. 
At  the  end  of  May,  his  lordship  wrote  that  a  Mr. 
Sayre,  and  not  Carmichael,  would  accompany  Lee  to 
Berlin;  and  Sayre  he  described  as  "a  man  of  des- 
perate private  fortune,  but  with  the  disposition 
rather  than  the  talents  to  be  mischievous."  Sayre 
was  in  fact  one  of  those  adventurers  with  whom 
Lee,  through  bad  judgment,  permitted  himself  often 
to  be  associated,  with  unhappy  results.  Meanwhile, 
before  Elliot  could  have  received  his  lordship's  sec- 
ond letter,  all  diplomatic  Berlin  was  agog  over  the 
arrival  of  Lee  and  a  "Mr.  Stephens,"  such  being 
the  patronymic  under  which  Sayre,  whose  Christian 
name  was  Stephen,  then  travelled,  while  he  assumed 
the  character  of  a  banker.  Elliot,  however,  was  not 
deceived;  and,  with  the  ardent  desire  of  a  young 
man  of  twenty-four  to  show  his  mettle,  he  set  about 
his  task  with  diligence  and  enthusiasm.  His  sus- 
picions were  soon  inflamed  by  learning  that  Lee  had 
had  a  private  interview  with  Count  Schulenburg 
and  was  in  correspondence  with  him,  and  that  Herr 
Zegelin,  formerly  Prussian  minister  at  Constanti- 
nople, who  was  supposed  to  be  much  employed  by 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

Frederick  the  Great  in  confidential  negotiations,  had 
come  to  Berlin  "unexpectedly,"  and  taken  lodgings 
not  only  in  the  same  inn  with  Lee  and  Sayre,  but 
even  on  the  same  floor.  Nor  was  Elliot  reassured 
when  Count  Schulenburg,  on  a  certain  occasion, 
turned  the  conversation  to  the  "report"  of  the  ar- 
rival of  the  "Americans,"  for  the  purpose  of  saying 
that  he  knew  nothing  of  it ;  nor  when,  still  later,  he 
admitted  that  they  had  proposed  to  sell  some  tobac- 
co at  a  low  price,  but  declared  that  the  King  was 
"entirely  ignorant  of  their  being  at  all  connected 
with  the  rebels  in  America."  Elliot,  however,  had 
determined  to  get  authentic  information  at  first 
hand.  Through  a  German  servant  in  his  employ, 
he  "gained,"  as  he  expressed  it,  the  co-operation 
of  the  servants  at  the  inn  and  of  the  landlord's  wife. 
By  this  means  he  learned  that  Lee  kept  his  papers, 
including  a  journal  of  each  day's  transactions,  in  a 
portfolio  which  was  usually  laid  away  in  a  bureau. 
He  therefore  had  false  keys  made,  both  to  the  door 
of  the  chamber  and  the  bureau ;  and  having  learned 
that  on  a  certain  day  Lee  and  Sayre  were  going  into 
the  country,  where  they  usually  stayed  till  eleven 
at  night,  he  sent  his  German  servant  to  bring  away 
the  papers.  When  the  servant  reached  the  inn, 
some  strangers  had  just  arrived,  and  as  he  could  not 
enter  the  door  without  being  seen,  he  got  into  Lee's 
room  through  a  window.  He  returned  with  the 
portfolio  about  four  o'clock.     Elliot  was  at  dinner, 

21 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

duly  provided  with  four  guests,  "who  were  all  en- 
joined to  the  most  sacred  secrecy,  and  set  to  copy- 
ing instantly,"  while  he  himself  went  about  to  pay 
visits  and  show  himself.  He  was  still  thus  engaged 
when,  calling  about  eight  o'clock  at  the  inn  on  pre- 
tence of  seeing  a  fellow-countryman,  Lord  Russ- 
borough,  he  found  that  Lee  and  Sayre  had  just  ar- 
rived. He  then  assumed  the  most  difficult  part  of 
his  task.  Knowing  that  the  papers  had  not  been 
returned,  he,  in  company  with  Russborough,  joined 
Lee  and  Sayre  and  endeavored  to  amuse  them  with 
conversation,  which  he  did  for  nearly  two  hours, 
without  any  introductions,  or  any  disclosure  of 
names,  but  merely  as  one  who  had  happened  to 
meet  persons  speaking  the  same  language.  At  ten 
o'clock,  however,  Lee  retired,  saying  that  he  must 
go  to  his  room  and  write.  Soon  afterwards  Elliot 
heard  a  "violent  clamor"  in  the  house  of  a  "rob- 
bery" and  "loss  of  papers."  He  then  drove  home, 
and,  finding  most  of  the  papers  copied,  disguised 
himself  and  took  them  to  the  mistress  of  the  house, 
who,  being  in  the  plot,  told  the  story  that  they 
were  left  at  the  door  by  some  one  who  announced 
their  return  through  the  keyhole  and  then  ran  off. 
Lee  appealed  to  the  police,  and  an  inquiry  was 
promptly  set  on  foot.  It  soon  led  to  the  German 
servant.  Elliot,  who  was  not  unprepared  for  this 
contingency,  immediately  sent  him  out  of  the  coun- 
try, and  made  to  the  Prussian  government,  as  well 

22 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

as  to  his  own,  an  official  explanation  of  the  incident. 
According  to  this  version,  the  affair  was  altogether 
an  accident,  due  to  his  own  imprudence  in  saying 
in  the  presence  of  an  over-officious  servant,  that  he 
would  give  a  large  sum  of  money  to  see  Mr.  Lee's 
papers;  but,  as  soon  as  the  "unwarrantable  action" 
of  the  servant  was  discovered,  the  papers  were  re- 
turned. This  account  naturally  found  little  cre- 
dence, although  diplomatic  opinion  of  the  merits 
of  the  transaction  was  said  to  be  much  "divided." 
But  the  knowledge  of  the  fact  that  the  British  gov- 
ernment had  obtained  copies  of  Lee's  papers  put  an 
end  to  the  attempt  privately  to  negotiate  with  the 
Prussian  government,  and  frustrated  the  plans  for 
obtaining  supplies  from  Prussian  ports. 

In  the  narration  of  the  course  of  our  Revolution- 
ary diplomacy,  there  yet  remains  to  be  mentioned 
one  name,  that  of  Charles  William  Frederick  Dumas. 
To  the  people  of  the  United  States  it  is  to-day  prac- 
tically unknown;  but  I  do  not  hesitate  to  affirm 
that,  with  the  exception  of  Adams,  Franklin,  and 
Jay,  he  rendered  to  the  American  cause  in  Europe 
services  more  important  than  did  any  other  man. 
A  native  of  Switzerland,  though  he  spent  most  of 
his  life  in  the  Netherlands ;  a  man  "  of  deep  learning, 
versed  in  the  ancient  classics,  and  skilled  in  several 
modern  languages";  the  author  and  translator  of  a 
large  number  of  works,  some  of  which  related  to 
America,  and  the  editor  of  an  edition  of  Vattel,  with 

23 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

a  preface  and  copious  notes—he  felt  at  the  very  be- 
ginning the  inspiration  of  the  American  cause,  and 
from  thenceforth  dedicated  his  all  to  its  advance- 
ment. When  the  first  report  of  the  Revolution  was 
heard  in  Europe,  he  began  to  employ  his  pen  in  its 
support.  Besides  publishing  and  circulating  an  ex- 
planation of  its  causes,  he  translated  and  spread 
abroad  the  proceedings  of  the  Continental  Congress. 
Towards  the  end  of  1775,  his  services  were  solicited 
by  Franklin,  in  the  name  of  the  Committee  of  Secret 
Correspondence,  as  an  agent  of  the  American  colo- 
nies in  the  Netherlands.  He  accepted  the  commis- 
sion with  the  promise  of  "a  hearty  good- will  and  an 
untiring  zeal,"  adding:  "This  promise  on  my  part  is 
in  fact  an  oath  of  allegiance,  which  I  spontaneously 
take  to  Congress."  Never  was  oath  more  faithfully 
kept.  His  voluminous  reports  to  Congress,  some  of 
which  have  been  published,  attest  his  constant  ac- 
tivity. He  journeyed  from  city  to  city,  and  from 
state  to  state,  in  the  Low  Countries,  as  the  apostle 
of  American  independence.  He  lent  his  aid  to 
Adams  as  secretary  and  translator,  and  later  acted 
as  charge  d'affaires,  exchanging  in  that  capacity  for 
the  United  States  the  ratifications  of  the  treaty  which 
Adams  had  concluded  with  the  Dutch  government. 
And  if,  when  the  treaty  was  made,  it  represented  not 
merely  a  perception  of  material  interests,  but  the 
sentiment  of  fraternity  commemorated  in  the  medals 
of  the  time,  the  fact  was  in  no  small  measure  due 

24 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

to  the  untiring  devotion  of  this  neglected  advocate 
of  the  American  cause,  to  whom  some  memorial 
should  yet  be  raised  in  recognition  of  his  zeal,  his 
sacrifices,  and  his  deserts. 

We  have  seen  that  in  diplomacy,  in  spite  of  its 
supposed  precautions,  chance  often  plays  an  im- 
portant part.  So  it  happened  in  the  case  of  the 
negotiations  between  England  and  America  for 
peace.  In  the  winter  of  1781-82,  a  friend  and 
neighbor  of  Franklin's,  Madame  Brillon,  met  at 
Nice  a  number  of  the  English  gentry.  Among  these 
was  Lord  Cholmondeley,  who  promised  while  on  his 
return  to  England  to  call  upon  Franklin  and  drink 
tea  with  him  at  Passy.  On  March  21,  1782,  Frank- 
lin received  a  note  from  his  lordship,  who,  in  the  in- 
terview that  followed,  offered  to  bear  a  note  to  Lord 
Shelburne,  who,  as  he  assured  Franklin,  felt  for  him 
a  high  regard.  Franklin  accepted  the  suggestion 
and  wrote  a  brief  letter,  in  which  he  expressed  a 
wish  that  a  "  general  peace  "  might  be  brought  about, 
though  he  betrayed  no  hope  that  it  would  soon  take 
place.  But  at  this  moment  the  political  situation 
in  England  was  somewhat  tumultuous.  The  Amer- 
ican war  was  becoming  more  and  more  unpopular; 
and  on  March  20th  Lord  North  resigned.  In  this 
emergency  George  III.  sent  for  Lord  Shelburne. 
Shelburne  advised  that  Lord  Rockingham  be  called 
to  the  head  of  the  cabinet,  and  declared  the  recogni- 
tion of  American  independence  to  be  indispensable. 

25 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Rockingham  was  made  Prime-Minister,  and  Shel- 
burne  became  Secretary  for  Home  and  Colonial  Af- 
fairs. The  Foreign  Office  was  given  to  Charles  James 
Fox.  Franklin's  letter  to  Shelburne  was  written 
without  knowledge  of  the  significant  change  then 
taking  place  in  the  British  ministry.  Soon  after- 
wards news  came  of  Shelburne 's  entrance  into  the 
cabinet ;  but  Franklin  thought  no  more  of  his  letter 
till  the  second  week  in  April,  when  a  neighbor  ap- 
peared and  introduced  a  Mr.  Oswald,  who  after 
some  conversation  handed  Franklin  two  letters,  one 
from  Shelburne  and  the  other  from  Henry  Laurens. 
The  letter  from  Shelburne,  besides  commending  Os- 
wald as  an  honest  and  capable  man,  expressed  his 
lordship's  desire  to  retain  between  himself  and 
Franklin  the  same  simplicity  and  good  faith  which 
had  subsisted  between  them  in  transactions  of  less 
importance. 

Although  Fox  has  always  been  regarded  with 
affection  in  America  as  a  friend  of  the  colonists,  it 
was  fortunate  that  the  negotiations  fell  into  the 
hands  of  Shelburne.  Associated  in  his  earlier  ca- 
reer with  men  of  reactionary  tendencies,  he  after- 
wards became  an  eminent  representative  of  the 
liberal  economic  school  of  which  Adam  Smith  was 
the  founder.  As  often  happens,  this  change  in  his 
position  gave  rise  to  suspicions  as  to  his  sincerity. 
Lacking  the  vehemence  which  characterized  Fox,  and 
which  gives  even  to  the  most  flexible  conduct  the 

26 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

air  of  passionate  sincerity,  Shelburne  was  a  man  of 
high  intellectual  power,  who  followed  the  dictates 
of  reason  rather  than  the  impulses  of  feeling.  No 
better  evidence  could  be  adduced  of  the  sincerity 
of  his  desire  to  treat  on  the  most  liberal  basis  than  his 
choice  of  Richard  Oswald  as  a  negotiator.  Ingen- 
uous and  impulsive,  in  the  end  the  British  cabinet 
was  obliged  to  send  an  assistant  to  withdraw  some 
of  his  concessions.  On  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
authority  to  negotiate  for  peace  had  been  given  to 
Adams,  Franklin,  Jay,  and  Laurens.  Jay  arrived 
in  Paris  late  in  June,  1782,  and  for  a  time  thereafter, 
owing  to  the  illness  of  Franklin,  the  negotiations  fell 
chiefly  into  his  hands.  But  on  July  6th  Franklin 
presented  to  Oswald  certain  propositions,  three  of 
which  were  put  forward  as  necessary,  and  two  as 
advisable.  The  former  were  (1)  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  independence,  (2)  a  settlement  of  the  boun- 
daries, and  (3)  freedom  of  fishing ;  the  advisable  stipu- 
lations were  (1)  free  commercial  intercourse  and  (2) 
the  cession  of  the  province  of  Canada  to  the  United 
States,  partly  in  payment  of  war  claims  and  partly 
to  create  a  fund  for  the  compensation  of  loyalists 
whose  property  had  been  seized  and  confiscated. 
The  negotiations  continued  substantially  on  these 
lines  till  Adams,  fresh  from  his  triumphs  in  the 
Netherlands,  joined  his  associates  in  the  commission. 
He  arrived  in  Paris,  October  26,  1782.  The  British 
government  had  then  conceded  (1)  independence, 

27 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

(2)  a  settlement  of  the  boundaries,  (3)  the  restric- 
tion of  Canada  to  its  ancient  limits,  and  (4)  freedom 
of  fishing  on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland  and  else- 
where. There  still  remained  open  the  questions  (1) 
of  the  right  to  dry  fish  on  the  British  coasts,  (2) 
the  payment  of  debts  due  to  British  subjects  prior 
to  the  war,  and  (3)  the  compensation  of  the  loyalists. 
To  the  last  measure  Franklin  was  unalterably  op- 
posed, and  whenever  it  was  pressed  brought  up  his 
proposition  for  the  cession  of  Canada.  Adams  was 
equally  insistent  upon  the  right  of  drying  and  cur- 
ing fish  on  the  British  coasts.  The  question  as  to 
the  payment  of  debts  grew  out  of  the  acts  of  seques- 
tration passed  by  certain  States  during  the  Revo- 
lution for  the  purpose  of  causing  debts  due  to  Brit- 
ish creditors  to  be  paid  into  the  public  treasuries. 
The  lawfulness  of  this  transaction  became  a  subject 
of  controversy  in  the  peace  negotiations,  especially 
in  connection  with  the  claims  of  the  loyalists  for 
compensation  for  their  confiscated  estates.  Frank- 
lin and  Jay,  though  they  deprecated  the  policy  of 
confiscating  private  debts,  hesitated  on  the  ground 
of  a  want  of  authority  in  the  existing  national  gov- 
ernment to  override  the  acts  of  the  States.  But,  by 
one  of  those  dramatic  strokes  of  which  he  was  a 
master,  John  Adams,  when  he  arrived  on  the  scene, 
ended  the  discussion  by  suddenly  declaring,  in  the 
presence  of  the  British  plenipotentiaries,  that  he 
"had  no  notion  of  cheating  anybody";  and  that, 

28 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

while  he  was  opposed  to  compensating  the  loyalists, 
he  would  agree  to  a  stipulation  to  enable  the  Brit- 
ish creditors  to  sue  for  the  recovery  of  their  debts. 
Such  a  stipulation  was  inserted  in  the  treaty.  It  is 
remarkable  not  only  as  the  embodiment  of  an  en- 
lightened policy,  but  also  as  the  strongest  assertion 
in  the  acts  of  that  time  of  the  power  and  authority 
of  the  national  government.  The  final  concession 
as  to  the  fisheries  was  also  granted  upon  the  demand 
of  Adams,  who  declared  that  he  would  not  sign  a 
treaty  on  any  other  terms.  Before  the  close  of  the 
negotiations,  Henry  Laurens  arrived  in  Paris;  and 
there,  on  November  30th,  he  joined  his  three  col- 
leagues in  signing,  with  Richard  Oswald,  the  pro- 
visional articles  of  peace.  It  has  often  been  said 
that  of  all  the  treaties  Great  Britain  ever  made,  this 
was  the  one  by  which  she  gave  the  most  and  took 
the  least.  It  brought,  however,  upon  Shelburne 
and  his  associates  the  censure  of  the  House  of  Com- 
mons, and  caused  the  downfall  of  his  ministry. 

The  articles  were  signed  by  the  American  com- 
missioners without  consultation  with  the  French 
government.  In  taking  this  course,  the  commis- 
sioners acted  in  opposition  to  their  instructions. 
Their  action  was  due  to  suspicions  first  entertained 
by  Jay,  but  in  which  Adams,  who  besides  was  little 
disposed  to  defer  to  Vergennes,  participated.  Frank- 
lin, although  he  does  not  appear  to  have  shared  the 
feelings  of  his  colleagues,  determined  to  act  with 

29 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

them.  The  question  whether  they  were  justified  has 
given  rise  to  controversies  perhaps  more  volumi- 
nous than  important.  Every  source  of  information 
has  been  diligently  explored  in  order  to  ascertain 
whether  the  suspicions  of  Jay  were,  in  fact,  well  or 
ill  founded.  This  test  does  not,  however,  seem  to 
be  necessarily  conclusive.  In  law,  the  justification 
of  an  act  often  depends  not  so  much  upon  the  actual 
as  upon  the  apparent  reality  of  the  danger.  The 
principal  ground  of  Jay's  distrust  wras  a  secret  mis- 
sion to  England  of  Rayneval,  an  attache  of  the 
French  Foreign  Office,  and  an  especial  representative 
of  Vergennes.  Jay  suspected  that  Rayneval  had 
been  sent  to  London  to  learn  from  Shelburne  the 
views  of  the  American  commissioners,  and  to  assure 
him  of  the  support  of  France  if  he  should  reject  their 
claims  to  the  fisheries  and  the  Mississippi.  The  dis- 
closure in  recent  years  of  Rayneval's  reports  to  Ver- 
gennes has  shown  that  his  mission  had  other  ob- 
jects, though  it  is  no  doubt  also  true  that  the 
government  of  France,  mindful  of  its  own  historic 
contentions,  as  well  as  of  the  interests  of  its  other 
ally,  Spain,  regarded  the  claims  of  the  Americans 
as  excessive  and  was  indisposed  to  support  them. 
But  whether  the  conduct  of  the  American  commis- 
sioners was  or  was  not  justifiable,  it  aroused  the  in- 
dignation of  the  French  government.  "You  are 
about  to  hold  out,"  wrote  Vergennes  to  Franklin, 
"  a  certain  hope  of  peace  to  America  without  even 

3° 


THE    BEGINNINGS 

informing  yourself  of  the  state  of  negotiations  on 
our  part.  You  are  wise  and  discreet,  sir;  you  per- 
fectly understand  what  is  due  to  propriety;  you 
have  all  your  life  performed  your  duties.  I  pray 
you  to  consider  how  you  propose  to  fulfil  those 
which  are  due  to  the  King.  I  am  not  desirous  of 
enlarging  these  reflections.  I  recommend  them  to 
your  own  integrity."  No  paper  that  Franklin  ever 
wrote  displays  his  marvellous  skill  to  more  advan- 
tage than  his  reply  to  these  reproaches.  While 
protesting  that  nothing  had  been  agreed  in  the 
preliminaries  contrary  to  the  interests  of  France, 
he  admitted  that  the  American  commissioners  had 
"been  guilty  of  neglecting  a  point  of  bienseance." 
But  as  this  was  not,  he  declared,  from  want  of 
respect  to  the  King,  whom  they  all  loved  and 
honored,  he  hoped  that  it  would  be  excused,  and 
that  "the  great  work,  which  has  hitherto  been 
go  happily  conducted,  is  so  nearly  brought  to  per- 
fection, and  is  so  glorious  to  his  reign,  will  not  be 
ruined  by  a  single  indiscretion  of  ours."  And  then 
he  adds  this  adroit  suggestion :  "  The  English,  I  just 
now  learn,  flatter  themselves  they  have  already  divided 
us.  I  hope  this  little  misunderstanding  will  there- 
fore be  kept  a  secret,  and  that  they  will  find  them- 
selves totally  mistaken." 

When  the  provisional  articles  of  peace  were  signed, 
the  American  commissioners  hoped  subsequently  to 
be  able   to   conclude   a  commercial  arrangement. 

31 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

This  hope  proved  to  be  delusive.  On  September  3, 
1783,  the  provisional  articles  were  formally  con- 
verted into  a  definitive  peace.  The  old  system,  em- 
bodied in  the  Navigation  Act,  England  even  yet 
was  not  ready  to  abandon.  It  still  dominated 
Europe,  and  confined  the  New  World  outside  of  the 
United  States.  Years  of  strife  were  to  ensue  before 
it  was  to  fall  to  pieces ;  and  in  the  course  of  the  con- 
flict the  United  States  was  to  stand  as  the  exponent 
and  defender  of  neutral  rights  and  commercial  free- 
dom. 

References: 

Adam  Smith's  Essay  on  the  Colonial  System; 

Instructions  of  Committee  of  Secret  Correspondence  to  Silas 

Dcane,  March  3,  1776,  Wharton's  Dip.  Cor.  Am.  Rev.  II,  78; 
Treaty  Plan,  Sept.  17,  1776,  Ford's  Journal  of  the  Continental 

Congress,  V.  768,  Wait's  Secret  Journal,  II,  7. 

For  other  documentary  material,  and  for  comments,  see 

Works  of  Franklin  and  John  Adams; 

United  Slates  Treaties; 

Bancroft's  (Geo.)  History  of  the  Formation  of  the  Constitution 
of  the  United  States; 

Doniol's  Ilistoire  de  la  Participation  de  la  France  d  T  Etablisse- 
ment  des  Elats-Unis; 

Fauchille's  La  Liguc  des  Neulres; 

Fitzmaurice's  Life  of  Shelbume; 

Moore's  Digest  of  International  Law; 

Moore's  History  and  Digest  of  International  Arbitrations; 

Stevens's  Facsimiles  of  Manuscripts  in  European  Archives 
Relating  to  America. 

Trescot's  Diplomatic  History  of  the  American  Revolution; 

Wharton's  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  American  Revolu- 
tion (which  has  a  very  full  index) ; 

Winsor's  Narrative  and  Critical  Historv. 


II 

THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

Between  1776,  when  independence  was  pro- 
claimed, and  1789,  when  the  government  under  the 
Constitution  was  inaugurated,  the  United  States 
entered  into  fourteen  treaties  —  six  with  France, 
three  with  Great  Britain,  two  with  the  Netherlands, 
and  one  each  with  Sweden,  Prussia,  and  Morocco; 
but  a  majority  of  all  were  negotiated  and  signed  in 
France,  at  Paris  or  at  Versailles.  Eight  were  sub- 
scribed, on  the  part  of  the  United  States,  by  two  or 
more  plenipotentiaries;  and  among  their  names  we 
find,  either  alone  or  in  association,  that  of  Franklin, 
ten  times ;  the  name  of  Adams,  seven  times ;  that  of 
Jefferson,  three  times;  and  that  of  Jay,  twice.  These 
early  treaties  covered  a  wide  range  of  subjects,  em- 
bracing not  only  war  and  peace,  and,  as  did  those 
with  France,  political  alliance,  but  also  commercial 
Intercourse  and  the  rights  of  consuls.  Among  their 
various  stipulations,  we  find  provisions  for  liberty 
of  conscience,  and  for  the  removal  of  the  disability  of 
aliens  in  respect  of  their  property  and  their  business. 
Stipulations  for  the  mitigation  of  the  evils  of  war  are 
•«  33 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

numerous.  A  fixed  time  is  allowed,  in  the  unfortunate 
event  of  hostilities,  for  the  sale  or  withdrawal  of 
goods;  provision  is  made  for  the  humane  treatment 
of  prisoners  of  war;  the  exercise  of  visit  and  search 
at  sea  is  regulated  and  restrained ;  the  acceptance  by 
a  citizen  of  the  one  country  of  a  privateering  com- 
mission from  the  enemy  of  the  other  is  assimilated 
to  piracy;  and  an  effort  is  made  to  limit  the  scope 
of  belligerent  captures  at  sea.  But,  prior  to  the 
establishment  of  the  Constitution,  it  was  easier  for 
the  United  States  to  make  treaties  than  to  enforce 
them.  In  spite  of  the  engagement  of  the  treaty  of 
peace,  that  his  Britannic  Majesty  should  with  "all 
convenient  speed"  withdraw  his  "armies,  garrisons 
and  fleets"  from  the  United  States,  important  posts 
within  the  northern  frontier  continued  to  be  occu- 
pied by  the  British  forces;  and  when  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  protested,  the  British 
government  pointed  to  the  refusal  of  the  State  courts 
to  respect  the  treaty  pledge  that  British  creditors 
should  meet  with  no  lawful  impediment  to  the  re- 
covery of  their  confiscated  debts.  For  similar  rea- 
sons, the  act  of  the  United  States  in  sending  John 
Adams,  soon  after  the  peace,  as  minister  to  the  court 
of  St.  James,  remained  unreciprocated. 

The  termination  of  the  period  of  divergence  and 
of  incapacity  for  uniform  action  among  the  several 
States  came  none  too  soon.  Perils  were  close  at 
hand,  the  disruptive  impulses  of  which  the  old  con- 

34 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

federation  could  not  have  withstood.  They  were 
even  to  test  the  efficacy  of  the  new  Constitution. 
In  1789,  when  that  instrument  was  put  into  opera- 
tion, France  was  in  the  first  throes  of  the  great  revo- 
lution which  was  eventually  to  involve  all  Europe 
in  a  struggle  of  unprecedented  magnitude  and 
severity.  What  attitude  was  the  United  States  to 
hold  towards  this  impending  conflict?  Even  apart 
from  the  treaties  with  France  of  1778,  the  question 
was  fraught  with  grave  possibilities.  For  genera- 
tions, Europe  had  been  a  vast  battle-ground,  on 
which  had  been  fought  out  the  contests  not  only 
for  political  but  also  for  commercial  supremacy. 
Of  the  end  of  these  contests,  there  appeared  to  be 
no  sign;  nor,  in  spite  of  their  long  continuance,  had 
the  rights  and  duties  of  non -participant  or  neutral 
nations  been  clearly  and  comprehensively  defined. 
Indeed,  so  intricate  were  the  ramifications  of  the 
European  system  that,  when  discords  arose,  it 
seemed  to  afford  little  room  for  neutrality.  The 
situation  of  the  United  States  was  essentially  dif- 
ferent. Physically  remote  from  the  Old  World, 
its  political  interests  also  were  detached  from  those 
of  Europe.  Except  as  it  might  be  drawn  into 
disputes  affecting  the  fate  of  existing  colonies  or 
the  formation  of  new  ones  in  America,  it  was 
not  likely  to  become  embroiled  in  European  wars. 
Not  only,  therefore,  did  it  enjoy  the  opportunity 
to  be  neutral,  but  its  permanent  interest  appeared 

35 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

to  be  that  of  neutrality;   and   the   importance  of 
preserving  this  interest  was   greatly   enhanced  by 
the  necessity  of  commercial  and  industrial  develop- 
ment.    The  new  nation,  though  born,  was  yet   to 
demonstrate  to  a  world  somewhat  sceptical  and  not 
altogether  friendly  its  right  and  its  power  to   live 
and  to  grow.     It  was  easy  to  foresee  that  its  enter- 
prise would  penetrate  to  the  farthest  corners  of  the 
globe,   and  that   its   commerce,   overspreading  the 
seas,  would  be  exposed  to  hazards  and  vexations  of 
which  the  most  uncertain  and  potentially  the  most 
disastrous  were  those  arising  from  the  exorbitant 
pretensions   of  belligerents.     To   resist   these   pre- 
tensions would  fall  to  the  lot  of  a  neutral  power; 
and  upon  the  results  of  this  resistance  would  depend 
the  right  to  be  independent  in  reality  as  well  as  in 
name,  and  to  enjoy  the  incidents  of  independence. 
In  circumstances  such  as  these  it  is  not  strange 
that   Washington    and   his   advisers   watched   with 
anxiety  the  progress  of  the  French  Revolution,  as, 
growing  in  intensity  and  in  violence,  it  encountered, 
first,    the   agitated    disapprobation,    and    then    the 
frantic  opposition  of  other  powers.     It  was  not  till 
1793,  when  England  entered  into  the  conflict,  that 
the  war,  by  assuming  a  distinctively  maritime  form, 
raised  a  question  as  to  the  obligations  of  the  United 
States  under  the  treaties  with   France;  but,   long 
prior  to  that  event,  popular  feeling  in  America  was 
deeply  stirred.     Although  the  treaties  of  1778  were 

36 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

made  with  Louis  XVI. ,  yet  in  the  sounds  of  the 
French  Revolution  the  American  people  discerned  a 
reverberation  of  their  own  immortal  declaration. 
From  Boston  to  Savannah,  there  were  manifesta- 
tions of  the  liveliest  sympathy  and  enthusiasm.  To 
set  bounds  to  this  tendency,  obviously  would  require 
the  exercise  of  unusual  prudence  and  firmness  on  the 
part  of  those  intrusted  with  the  affairs  of  govern- 
ment. America  had  fought  for  freedom,  but  her 
statesmen  were  not  mere  doctrinaires.  Their  aims 
were  practical.  They  understood  that  the  peace- 
ful demonstration  of  the  beneficence  of  their  prin- 
ciples, in  producing  order,  prosperity,  and  content- 
ment at  home,  was  likely  to  accomplish  far  more  for 
the  cause  of  liberty  than  an  armed  propagandism, 
which  perchance  might  ultimately  degenerate  into 
military  despotism.  It  was  therefore  important  to 
avoid  premature  commitments.  To  a  perception 
of  this  fact  is  no  doubt  to  be  ascribed  the  appoint- 
ment by  Washington,  on  January  12,  1792,  of 
Gouverneur  Morris  as  minister  to  France.  In  his 
own  country  Morris  had  been  a  supporter  of  the 
Revolution,  a  member  of  the  Continental  Congress, 
assistant  to  Robert  Morris  in  the  management  of 
the  public  finances,  and  a  member  of  the  Constitu- 
tional Convention  of  1787.  From  the  beginning, 
however,  he  had  exhibited  a  distrust  of  the  revolu- 
tion in  France.  He  instinctively  recoiled  from  the 
excesses  that  were  committed  when  his  forebodings 

37 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

came  to  be  fulfilled.  Before  he  became  minister  of 
the  United  States,  he  offered  his  counsel  to  Louis 
XVI.,  in  a  sense  directly  antagonistic  to  the  Revo- 
lution; and  he  afterwards  sought  to  effect  that 
monarch's  escape.  Such  a  man  could  not  be  ac- 
ceptable to  the  revolutionary  leaders ;  but  he  at  any 
rate  possessed  an  intimate  knowledge  of  the  condi- 
tions and  tendencies  of  the  time,  and  was  not  likely 
to  commit  his  government  to  extravagant  policies. 
Early  in  1793  a  new  minister  was  appointed  by 
France  to  the  United  States.  His  name  was  Ed- 
mond  C.  Genet.  Of  Morris  he  was  in  many  respects 
the  precise  antithesis ;  for,  while  by  no  means  desti- 
tute of  experience,  he  was  a  turbulent  champion  of 
the  new  order  of  things.  According  to  his  own  ac- 
count, he  was  placed  at  the  age  of  twelve  years  in 
the  French  Foreign  Office,  where,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  his  father,  he  translated  into  French  a  num- 
ber of  American  political  writings.  After  spending 
seven  years  at  the  head  of  a  bureau  at  Versailles, 
under  the  direction  of  Vergennes,  he  passed  one 
year  at  London,  two  years  at  Vienna,  one  at  Berlin, 
and  five  in  Russia.  At  St.  Petersburg,  however,  he 
fell  into  difficulties.  Because  of  some  of  his  repre- 
sentations, which  were  pitched  too  high  in  the  revo- 
lutionary scale,  the  Empress  Catherine  requested  his 
recall,  and,  when  it  was  refused,  dismissed  him.  In 
reporting  his  departure  for  the  United  States,  Mor- 
ris observed  that  "  the  pompousness  of  this  embassy 

38 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

could  not  but  excite  the  attention  of  England." 
What  it  was  that  called  forth  this  remark  does  not 
appear;  but,  whatever  it  may  have  been,  there  can 
be  no  doubt  that  Genet  set  out  on  his  mission  gur- 
gling with  the  fermentation  of  the  new  wine  of  the 
Revolution;  and  he  had  scarcely  left  France  when 
Morris  reported  that  the  Executive  Council  had  sent 
out  by  him  three  hundred  blank  commissions  for 
privateers,  to  be  distributed  among  such  persons  as 
might  be  willing  to  fit  out  vessels  in  the  United  States 
to  prey  on  British  commerce. 

On  April  18,  1793,  before  this  report  was  received, 
Washington  submitted  to  the  various  members  of 
his  cabinet  a  series  of  questions  touching  the  rela- 
tions between  the  United  States  and  France.  These 
questions  were,  first,  whether  a  proclamation  of 
neutrality  should  issue;  second,  whether  a  minister 
from  the  republic  of  France  should  be  received; 
third,  whether,  if  received,  he  should  be  received 
unconditionally  or  with  qualifications  ;  fourth, 
whether  the  treaties  previously  made  with  France 
were  to  be  considered  as  still  in  force.  At  a  meet- 
ing of  the  cabinet,  on  April  19th,  it  was  determined, 
with  the  concurrence  of  all  the  members,  that  a 
proclamation  of  neutrality  should  issue,  and  that 
the  minister  from  the  French  Republic  should  be 
received.  On  the  third  question,  Hamilton,  who 
was  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  was  supported  by 
Knox,  the  Secretary  of  War,  in  the  opinion  that  the 

39 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

reception  should  be  qualified,  while  Washington,  Jef- 
ferson, his  Secretary  of  State,  and  Randolph,  the 
Attorney-General,  inclined  to  the  opposite  view; 
but  the  third  and  fourth  questions  were  postponed 
for  further  consideration.  In  a  subsequent  written 
opinion  Hamilton  argued  that  the  reception  of  Genet 
should  be  qualified  by  an  express  reservation  of  the 
question  whether  the  treaties  were  not  to  be  deemed 
temporarily  and  provisionally  suspended  by  reason 
of  the  radical  change  in  conditions  since  they  were 
formed.  He  also  thought  the  war  plainly  offensive 
on  the  part  of  France,  while  the  alliance  was  de- 
fensive. On  the  other  hand,  Jefferson  maintained 
that  the  treaties  were  not  "between  the  United 
States  and  Louis  Capet,  but  between  the  two  na- 
tions of  America  and  France,"  and  that  "  the  nations 
remaining  in  existence,  though  both  of  them  have 
since  changed  their  forms  of  government,  the 
treaties  are  not  annulled  by  these  changes."  He 
also  contended  that  the  reception  of  a  minister  had 
nothing  to  do  with  this  question. 

On  April  22,  1793,  Washington  issued  his  famous 
proclamation  of  neutrality.  On  April  8th,  just  two 
weeks  before,  Gen&t  had  arrived  at  Charleston, 
South  Carolina;  but  the  news  of  his  presence  there 
reached  Philadelphia  through  the  public  press  only 
on  the  day  on  which  the  proclamation  was  pub- 
lished. At  Charleston  he  lost  no  time  in  fitting-out 
and  commissioning  privateers ;  and,  after  having  got 

40 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

224  &{/iu/,   /7?3. 


By  the  President  of  the  United  States  of  America. 
A     PROCLAMATION. 

WHEREAS  it  appears  that  a  ftate  of  war  exifts  between  Auftria, 
Pruflia,  Sardinia,  Great-Britain,  and  the  United  Netherlands,  of  the 
one  part,  and  France  on  the  other,  and  the  duty  and  intereft  of  the  United 
States  require,  that  they  fhould  with  fmcerity  and  good  faith  adopt  and  pur- 
fue  a  conduct  friendly  and  impartial  toward  the  belligerent  powers: 

I  have  therefore  thought  fit  by  thefe  prefents  to  declare  the  difpofition  of 
the  United  States  to  obferve  the  conduff  aforefaid  towards  thole  powers 
reflectively;  and  to  exhort  and  warn  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  care- 
fully to  avoid  all  acls  and  proceedings  whatfoever,  which  may  in  any  mannei- 
tend  to  contravene  fuch  difpolition. 

And  I  do  hereby  alfo  make  known  that  whofoever  of  the  citizens  of  the 
United  States  (hall  render  himfelf  liable  to  punifhment  or  forfeiture  under  the 
law  of  nations,  by  committing,  aiding  or  abetting  hoftilities  againft  any  of 
the  faid  powers,  or  by  carrying  to  any  of  them  thofe  articles,  which  are 
deemed  contraband  by  the  modern  ufage  of  nations,  will  not  receive  the  pro- 
tection of  the  United  States,  againft  fuch  punifhment  or  forfeiture  :  and  fur- 
ther, that  I  have  given  inltruclions  to  thofe  officers,  to  whom  it  belongs,  to 
caufe  profecutions  to  be  inftituted  againft  all  perfons,  who  fhall,  within  the 
cognizance  of  the  courts  of  the  United  States,  violate  the  Law  of  Nations, 
with  refpecl  to  the  powers  at  war,  or  any  of  them. 

0In  testimony  whereof  /  hanje  caufed  the  Seal  of  the  United  States  of 
America  to  be  affixed  to  thefe  prefents,  andfigned  the  fame  --with  my  hand. 
Done  at  the  city  of  Philadelphia,  the  tzventy-fecond  day  of  April,  one  thou- 
fandftven  hundred  and  ninety-three,  and  of  the  Independence  of  the  United 
States  of  America  the  feventeenth. 


G°.    WASHINGTON 


Th:  Jefferson. 

41 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

a  number  ready  for  sea,  he  proceeded  to  the  seat  of 
the  national  government  by  land.  On  the  way  he 
incited  the  people  to  hostility  against  Great  Britain, 
and  received  such  demonstrations  of  sympathy  as 
to  strengthen  his  confidence  in  the  success  of  the 
course  on  which  he  had  entered. 

The  posture  of  affairs  between  the  United  States 
and  France  was  complicated  and  difficult.  By  the 
treaty  of  commerce  of  1778,  the  ships  of  war  and 
privateers  of  the  one  country  were  entitled  to  enter 
the  ports  of  the  other  with  their  prizes,  without 
being  subjected  to  any  examination  as  to  their  law- 
fulness, while  cruisers  of  the  enemy  were  in  like  cir- 
cumstances to  be  excluded,  unless  in  case  of  stress 
of  weather.  By  the  treaty  of  alliance,  the  United 
States,  as  has  been  seen,  had  guaranteed  to  France 
her  possessions  in  America.  For  the  moment,  how- 
ever, the  situation  was  much  simplified  by  reason 
of  the  fact  that  the  French  Republic  did  not  ask  of 
the  United  States  the  execution  of  the  territorial 
guarantee.  This  may  be  accounted  for  by  either  of 
two  reasons.  The  general  arming  of  the  whole  popu- 
lation and  the  exhaustive  devotion  of  the  resources 
of  the  country  to  military  purposes  had  caused  a 
scarcity  in  France  both  of  money  and  of  provisions. 
The  United  States,  as  a  neutral,  formed  a  source  of 
supply  of  both.  An  intimation  to  this  effect  was 
made  by  the  French  government  to  Morris  not  long 
before  the  issuance  of  Washington's  proclamation  of 

42 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

neutrality;  and  the  same  idea  was  strongly  ex' 
pressed  in  a  report  of  the  French  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  in  June,  1793,  in  which  it  was  said  that  the 
United  States  became  "more  and  more  the  granary 
of  France  and  her  colonies."  But  there  may  have 
been  yet  another  reason.  It  is  not  improbable  that 
the  National  Assembly,  while  balancing  the  ad- 
vantages of  American  neutrality  against  those  of 
the  treaty  of  alliance,  doubted  whether  the  guaran- 
tee was  precisely  applicable  to  the  conditions  then 
existing.  This  doubt  is  suggested  by  the  original 
instructions  to  Genet,  which,  although  they  were 
given  before  the  conflict  with  England  began,  were 
written  in  contemplation  of  hostilities  with  that 
country  as  well  as  with  Spain;  and  in  these  instruc- 
tions, which  looked  to  the  formation  of  a  new  com- 
mercial and  political  connection  with  the  United 
States,  adapted  to  the  conditions  which  the  French 
Revolution  had  produced,  Genet  was  directed  to 
bring  about  "a  national  agreement,  in  which  two 
great  peoples  shall  suspend  their  commercial  and 
political  interests,  and  establish  a  mutual  under- 
standing to  defend  the  empire  of  liberty,  wherever 
it  can  be  embraced." 

When  Genet  arrived  in  Philadelphia,  an  unquali- 
fied reception  was  promptly  accorded  him.  In  pre- 
senting his  letters  of  credence,  he  stated  that  his 
government  knew  that  "under  present  circum- 
stances" they  had  a  right  to  call  upon  the  United 

43 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

States  for  the  guarantee  of  their  islands,  but  de- 
clared that  they  did  not  desire  it;  in  a  subsequent 
communication,  he  proposed  that  the  two  peoples 
should,  "by  a  true  family  compact,  establish  a  com- 
mercial and  political  system"  on  a  "liberal  and 
fraternal  basis."  The  administration,  however,  was 
indisposed  to  quixotic  enterprises.  On  the  contrary, 
it  was  soon  fully  occupied  with  its  efforts  to  vindi- 
cate its  proclamation  of  neutrality,  which  was  con- 
stantly violated  by  the  fitting-out  of  privateers,  the 
condemnation  of  prizes  by  French  consuls  sitting 
as  courts  of  admiralty,  and  even  by  the  capture  of 
vessels  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States. 
These  proceedings,  in  which  he  was  himself  directly 
implicated,  Genet  defended  as  being  in  conformity 
not  only  with  the  treaties  between  the  two  countries, 
but  also  with  the  principles  of  neutrality.  When 
Jefferson  cited  the  utterances  of  writers  on  the  law 
of  nations,  Genet  repelled  them  as  "diplomatic 
subtleties"  and  as  "  aphorisms  of  Vattel  and  others." 
He  especially  insisted  that,  by  the  treaty  of  com- 
merce of  1778,  the  authorities  of  the  United  States 
were  precluded  from  interfering  in  any  manner  with 
the  prizes  brought  into  their  ports  by  the  French 
privateers.  The  United  States,  on  the  other  hand, 
denied  that  the  contracting  parties,  in  agreeing  that 
prizes  should  not  be  subject  to  examination  as  to 
their  lawfulness,  deprived  themselves  of  the  right 
to  prevent  the  capture  and  condemnation  of  vessels 

44 


THE    SYSTEM    OF     NEUTRALITY 

in  violation  of  their  own  neutrality  and  sover- 
eignty. 

In  the  correspondence  to  which  these  differences 
gave  rise,  Jefferson,  always  perspicacious  in  his  de- 
ductions from  fundamental  principles,  expounded 
with  remarkable  clearness  and  power  the  nature 
and  scope  of  neutral  duty.  Its  foundations  he  dis- 
covered in  two  simple  conceptions — the  exclusive 
sovereignty  of  the  nation  within  its  own  territory 
and  the  obligation  of  impartiality  towards  belliger- 
ents. As  it  was  "the  right  of  every  nation  to  pro- 
hibit acts  of  sovereignty  from  being  exercised  by 
any  other  within  its  limits,"  so  it  was,  he  declared, 
"the  duty  of  a  neutral  nation  to  prohibit  such  as 
would  injure  one  of  the  warring  powers."  Hence, 
"no  succor  should  be  given  to  either,  unless  stipu- 
lated by  treaty,  in  men,  arms,  or  anything  else, 
directly  serving  for  war."  The  raising  of  troops 
and  the  granting  of  military  commissions  were,  be- 
sides, sovereign  rights,  which,  as  they  pertained  ex- 
clusively to  the  nation  itself,  could  not  be  exercised 
within  its  territory  by  a  foreign  power,  without  its 
consent;  and  if  the  United  States  had  "a  right  to 
refuse  permission  to  arm  vessels  and  raise  men" 
within  its  ports  and  territories,  it  was  "bound  by 
the  laws  of  neutrality  to  exercise  that  right,  and  to 
prohibit  such  armaments  and  enlistments." 

Such,  briefly  summarized,  was  the  theory  of  neu- 
tral duty  formulated  by  Jefferson.     But  the  admin- 

45 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

istration  did  not  stop  with  the  enunciation  of  doc- 
trines. It  endowed  them  with  vitality.  Acknowl- 
edging the  obligation  of  the  government  to  make 
indemnity  for  any  losses  resulting  from  its  previous 
failure  to  cause  its  neutrality  to  be  respected,  it 
adopted  efficacious  measures  to  prevent  the  future 
fitting-out  of  privateers  in  the  ports  of  the  United 
States,  to  exclude  from  asylum  therein  any  that  had 
been  so  equipped,  and  to  cause  the  restitution  of  any 
prizes  brought  by  them  within  the  national  juris- 
diction. To  insure  the  enforcement  of  these  rules, 
instructions  were  issued  by  Hamilton  to  the  col- 
lectors of  customs;  and  on  June  5,  1794,  there  was 
passed  the  first  Neutrality  Act,  which  forbade  within 
the  United  States  the  acceptance  and  exercise  of 
commissions,  the  enlistment  of  men,  the  fitting-out 
and  arming  of  vessels,  and  the  setting  on  foot  of 
military  expeditions,  in  the  service  of  any  prince  or 
state  with  which  the  government  was  at  peace.  In 
due  season  compensation  was  made  to  British  sub- 
jects for  the  injuries  inflicted  by  French  privateers 
in  violation  of  American  neutrality.  "The  policy 
of  the  United  States  in  1793,"  says  the  late  W.  E. 
Hall,  one  of  the  most  eminent  of  English  publicists, 
"constitutes  an  epoch  in  the  development  of  the 
usages  of  neutrality.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that 
it  was  intended  and  believed  to  give  effect  to  the 
obligations  then  incumbent  on  neutrals.  But  it 
represented  by  far  the  most  advanced  existing  opin- 

46 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

ions  as  to  what  those  obligations  were ;  and  in  some 
points  it  even  went  further  than  authoritative  cus- 
tom has  up  to  the  present  day  advanced.  In  the 
main,  however,  it  is  identical  with  the  standard  of 
conduct  which  is  now  adopted  by  the  community  of 
nations." 

Against  the  course  of  the  administration  Genet 
did  not  cease  to  protest;  and,  while  he  was  himself 
its  first  victim,  his  misfortunes  may  serve  as  a 
warning  to  foreign  ministers  who  may  be  disposed 
to  reckon  upon  popular  support  in  opposing  the  gov- 
ernment to  which  they  are  accredited.  There  was 
indeed  in  his  case  much  to  mislead  a  judgment 
which,  no  matter  how  honest  it  may  have  been,  was 
not  well  balanced.  To  the  superficial  observer  it 
might  have  seemed  that  there  were  in  the  United 
States  few  Americans;  that  the  population  was  al- 
most wholly  composed  of  partisans  of  France  and 
partisans  of  Great  Britain,  the  former  constituting 
a  vast  majority  ;  and  that  the  administration,  which 
was  daily  assailed  with  a  virulence  that  knew 
neither  restraint  nor  decency,  might  safely  be 
flouted  and  defied.  But  when,  convinced  that 
the  proclamation  of  neutrality  would  be  faithfully 
enforced,  Genet  denounced  the  government  for 
the  "cowardly  abandonment"  of  its  friends,  and, 
besides  expressing  contempt  for  the  opinions  of  the 
President,  persisted  in  questioning  his  authority, 
Morris  was  instructed  to  ask  for  his  recall.     The 

47 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

French  government  not  only  granted  the  request, 
but  expressed  disapprobation  of  Genet's  "criminal 
proceedings";  and  his  successor,  M.  Fauchet,  de- 
manded his  delivery-up  for  punishment.  This  the 
United  States  refused  "upon  reasons  of  law  and 
magnanimity."  Genet  maintained,  and  with  much 
reason,  that  he  had  acted  in  conformity  with  his 
instructions,  which  in  reality  contemplated  the  or- 
ganization of  hostile  enterprises  in  the  United  States 
against  Spain  as  well  as  against  Great  Britain.  Nev- 
ertheless, he  did  not  return  to  France,  but  settled  in 
the  United  States,  where  he  married  the  daughter  of 
an  eminent  American  statesman  and  spent  the  re- 
mainder of  his  days.  It  is  only  just  to  say  that  he 
has  been  the  subject  of  much  unmerited  obloquy. 
In  circumstances  exceptionally  trying,  his  conduct 
was  ill-advised,  but  not  malevolent.  William  Cullen 
Bryant,  speaking  in  1870,  said  that  he  remembered 
Genet  very  vividly,  as  he  appeared  forty-five  years 
before,  when  he  came  occasionally  to  the  city  of  New 
York.  "He  was,"  said  Bryant,  "a  tall  man,  with  a 
reddish  wig  and  a  full,  round  voice,  speaking  English 
in  a  sort  of  oratorical  manner,  like  a  man  making  a 
speech,  but  very  well  for  a  Frenchman.  He  was  a 
dreamer  in  some  respects,  and,  I  remember,  had  a 
plan  for  navigating  the  air  in  balloons.  A  pamphlet 
of  his  was  published  a  little  before  the  time  I  knew 
him,  entitled  'Aerial  Navigation,'  illustrated  by 
an  engraving  of  a  balloon  shaped  like  a  fish,  pro- 

a8 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

pelled  by  sails  and  guided  by  a  rudder,  in  which  he 
maintained  that  man  could  navigate  the  air  as  well 
as  he  could  navigate  the  ocean  in  a  ship." 

The  authorities  of  the  French  Republic  took  ad- 
vantage of  the  request  for  Genet's  recall  to  ask 
for  Morris's  withdrawal.  Under  the  circumstances, 
this  act  of  reciprocity  was  ungrudgingly  conceded. 
Morris  was  succeeded  in  France  by  James  Monroe. 

The  Neutrality  Act  of  1794,  though  originally 
limited  in  duration,  was  afterwards  extended,  and 
was  then  continued  in  force  indefinitely.  In  order 
to  meet  conditions  arising  out  of  the  war  of  the 
Spanish  colonies  in  America  for  independence,  an 
additional  act  was  passed  in  181 7  ;  but  this,  together 
with  all  prior  legislation  on  the  subject,  was  super- 
seded by  the  comprehensive  statute  of  April  20, 
1 818,  the  provisions  of  which  are  now  embodied  in 
the  Revised  Statutes  of  the  United  States.  A  simi- 
lar act  was  passed  by  the  British  Parliament  in  the 
following  year ;  laws  and  regulations  were  from  time 
to  time  adopted  by  other  governments;  and  the 
duties  of  neutrality  became  a  fixed  and  determinate 
part  of  international  law.  The  severest  test  of  the 
system,  as  the  ultimate  standard  of  national  obliga- 
tion and  responsibility,  was  made  in  the  case  of  the 
claims  of  the  United  States  against  Great  Britain 
generically  known  as  the  "Alabama  Claims,"  grow- 
ing out  of  the  depredations  of  the  Alabama  and 
other  Confederate  cruisers  fitted  out  in  British  ports 
4  49 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

during  the  American  civil  war.  The  government  of 
the  United  States,  in  demanding  indemnities  for 
these  depredations,  could  point  to  the  precedent  of 
1793;  but  in  the  case  of  the  Alabama  claims  the 
amounts  involved  were  enormous,  and  the  British 
government  besides  denied  that  it  had  been  guilty 
of  any  neglect.  By  the  treaty  of  Washington,  of 
May  8,  1871,  the  question  was  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tion at  Geneva.  The  treaty  declared  that  a  neutral 
government  was  bound  to  use  "due  diligence"  in 
the  performance  of  its  duties.  The  tribunal  found 
that  there  had  been  negligence  on  the  part  of  the 
British  authorities  in  respect  of  three  of  the  cruisers 
— the  Alabama,  the  Florida,  and  the  Shenandoah  after 
she  left  Melbourne — and  awarded  the  United  States 
$15,500,000.  For  the  depredations  of  the  French 
privateers  in  1793  the  United  States  paid  to  the 
subjects  of  Great  Britain  $143,428.11.  The  amount 
was  relatively  small,  but  its  payment,  on  considera- 
tions of  international  obligation  and  good  faith,  es- 
tablished a  principle  incalculably  important,  and, 
like  the  seed  received  into  good  ground,  brought 
forth  a  hundredfold,  and  even  more. 

It  is  perhaps  not  generally  known  that  the  Ala- 
bama, in  spite  of  the  omission  of  the  English  customs 
authorities  to  seize  her,  might  in  the  end  have  been 
detained  but  for  an  act  of  wifely  devotion.  On  the 
226.  and  24th  of  July,  1862,  evidence  directly  incul- 
pating the  vessel  was  communicated  by  the  Amcr- 

50 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 


5i 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ican  legation  in  London  to  the  British  Foreign  Office. 
On  the  23d  and  26th  of  July  the  papers  were  referred 
to  the  law  officers  of  the  crown,  and,  as  the  law 
officers  had  no  permanent  office,  were  sent  as  usual 
to  the  senior  officer,  who  was  then  Sir  John  Dorney 
Harding,  Queen's  Advocate,  his  associates  being  Sir 
William  Atherton,  Attorney-General,  and  Sir  Roun- 
dell  Palmer,  afterwards  Lord  Selborne,  Solicitor-Gen- 
eral.   Unfortunately,  Sir  John  Harding  had  just  then 
fallen  a  victim  to  an  acute  mental  disorder,  which 
proved  to  be  fatal,  but  which  his  wife,  in  the  hope 
that  it  would  soon  pass  away,  had  kept  a  secret. 
Upon  the  decision  to  be  rendered  by  the  law  officers 
there  hung,  perchance,  the  issues  of  peace  and  war 
and  the  fate  of  nations;  but  the  papers  lay  unex- 
amined at  Sir  John's  residence  apparently  till  the 
28th  of  July,  when  the  Foreign  Office,  growing  anxious 
at  the  delay,  but  ignorant  of  its  cause,  took  steps  to 
recover  them  and  placed  them  in  the  hands  of  Sir 
William  Atherton.     On  the  evening  of  the  same  day, 
Sir  William,  perceiving  the  gravity  of  the  situation, 
which  the  papers  disclosed,  called  Sir  Roundell  Palm- 
er into  consultation  upon  them  in  the  Earl  Marshal's 
room  in  the  House  of  Lords.     They  at  once  agreed 
that  the  vessel  must  be  seized.     An  opinion  to  that 
effect  was  delivered  to  Earl  Russell  on  the  morning  of 
the  29th  of  July;  but  during  the  night  of  the  28th, 
the  Alabama,  as  if  conscious  of  what  was  impending, 
left  the  docks  in  which  she  had  been  lying.     At  ten 

52 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the  29th  she  put  to  sea. 
The  order  of  the  Foreign  Office  to  detain  her  reached 
Liverpool  in  the  afternoon. 

The  government  of  the  United  States,  in  1793, 
had  barely  entered  upon  the  performance  of  the 
duties  of  neutrality  when  it  was  swept  into  the 
vortex  of  the  great  struggle,  which  was  to  last  al- 
most unbroken  for  more  than  twenty  years,  for  the 
maintenance  of  neutral  rights.  In  this  momentous 
contest  there  was  involved  the  ever-recurrent  ques- 
tion, which  will  continue  in  some  form  to  arise  as 
long  as  wars  are  waged,  as  to  how  far  neutral  powers 
are  required  to  subordinate  the  interests  of  their 
commerce  to  the  hostile  interests  of  belligerents. 
That  powers  at  peace  were  entitled  to  trade  with 
powers  at  war  was  not  denied,  but  the  rule  was  sub- 
ject to  exceptions.  It  was  admitted  that  a  belliger- 
ent might  cut  off  all  trade  with  the  enemy's  ports 
by  blockading  them,  and  might  also  prohibit  the 
carriage  of  contraband  to  the  enemy.  For  entering 
or  attempting  to  enter  a  blockaded  port,  the  penalty 
was  confiscation  of  vessel  and  cargo,  while  the  car- 
riage of  contraband  entailed  the  loss  of  the  pro- 
hibited articles  and  the  freight,  if  nothing  more. 
There  was,  however,  no  precise  and  general  agree- 
ment either  as  to  what  constituted  a  blockade,  or 
as  to  what  articles  were  to  be  considered  as  contra- 
band. If  blockades  could  be  legally  established 
merely  by  decrees  on  paper,  without  the  application 

53 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

of  force,  or  if  the  list  of  contraband  could  be  sufn  ■ 
ciently  extended,  it  is  obvious  that  the  right  of 
neutrals  to  trade  with  belligerents  could  be  reduced 
to  the  shadow  of  a  tantalizing  supposition.  Grotius, 
often  called  the  father  of  international  law,  had 
divided  articles,  with  reference  to  the  question  of 
contraband,  into  three  classes:  First,  articles  that 
were  directly  useful  in  war,  as  arms;  second,  those 
that  were  useless  in  war ;  and  third,  those  that  could 
be  "  used  both  in  war  and  in  peace,  as  money,  pro- 
visions, ships,  and  articles  of  naval  equipment." 
Concerning  the  first  and  second  classes  there  was 
no  dispute,  except  as  to  the  possible  inclusion  or 
exclusion  of  some  particular  article;  but  as  to  the 
third  class  there  had  been  a  long  and  heated  con- 
troversy, especially  respecting  provisions. 

There  was  also  a  question  as  to  whether  the  goods 
of  an  enemy  might  be  seized  on  board  a  neutral 
ship.  It  was  conceded  that  a  belligerent  power 
might  capture  vessels  belonging  to  subjects  of  the 
enemy,  as  well  as  other  private  property  of  the 
enemy  at  sea;  but  for  many  years  an  effort  had 
been  in  progress  to  introduce  the  rule,  denoted  by 
the  phrase  "free  ships  free  goods,"  that  the  mer- 
chandise of  an  enemy  should,  unless  contraband  of 
war,  be  exempt  from  seizure  when  transported  by 
a  neutral  vessel.  In  1780,  the  Empress  Catherine 
of  Russia  issued  a  famous  declaration  concerning 
neutral   rights.     Since   the   days   when   Peter   the 

54 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

Great,  barbarian,  statesman,  and  seer,  diversified 
his  studies  in  shipbuilding  by  riding  through  Eve- 
lyn's hedges  in  a  wheelbarrow  and  pulling  the  teeth 
of  his  own  retinue,  Russia  had  aspired  to  become 
a  maritime  power.  The  declaration  of  the  Em- 
press Catherine  afforded  a  striking  manifestation  of 
that  ambition.  Affirming  the  right  of  neutrals  to 
trade  with  the  powers  at  war,  it  sought  to  limit  the 
scope  of  contraband,  declared  that  blockades  must 
be  maintained  by  a  force  sufficient  to  render  access 
to  the  blockaded  port  dangerous,  and  adopted  the 
rule  of  free  ships  free  goods.  On  this  manifesto 
there  was  based  an  alliance  of  neutral  powers,  called 
the  Armed  Neutrality,  the  formation  of  which  was 
one  of  the  most  notable  events  of  the  wars  growing 
out  of  the  American  Revolution;  and  although  the 
alliance  was  not  effectively  maintained,  the  princi- 
ples which  it  consecrated  possessed  vitality,  and 
were  destined  to  survive  an  ordeal  yet  more  severe 
than  any  to  which  they  had  ever  been  subjected. 

By  a  decree  of  the  National  Convention  of  France, 
of  May  9,  1793,  the  commanders  of  French  ships  of 
war  and  privateers  were  authorized  to  seize  mer- 
chant vessels  laden  with  provisions  bound  to  an 
enemy's  port,  or  with  merchandise  belonging  to  an 
enemy.  This  decree  was  defended  on  the  ground 
of  a  scarcity  of  provisions  in  France,  but  it  ran 
counter  to  the  views  of  the  United  States  concern- 
ing the  freedom  of  trade  as  well  as  to  treaty  stipula- 

55 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tions.  Morris  remonstrated  against  it,  and  inti- 
mated that  it  would  be  followed  with  eagerness  by 
France's  maritime  enemies.  His  prognostication 
proved  to  be  correct.  By  an  order  in  council  of 
June  8,  1793,  the  commanders  of  British  cruisers 
were  authorized  to  seize  all  vessels  laden  with  grain, 
flour,  or  meal,  bound  either  to  a  port  in  France  or 
to  a  port  occupied  by  the  French  arms.  It  is  true 
that,  by  the  terms  of  both  these  measures,  the  pro- 
visions, if  neutral-owned,  were  to  be  paid  for;  but 
the  compensation  promised  was  far  less  than  the 
cargo  would  have  brought  at  the  port  of  destination. 
Moreover,  the  order  in  council  was  followed,  as  was 
also  the  decree,  by  other  measures  yet  more  vexa- 
tious. 

Out  of  these  perilous  complications  Washington 
sought  to  find  a  way  by  negotiation.  John  Jay, 
then  Chief-Justice  of  the  United  States,  was  sent  to 
London,  where,  on  November  19,  1794,  he  concluded 
a  treaty  under  which  an  aggregate  amount  of  per- 
haps more  than  eleven  million  dollars  was  eventual- 
ly obtained  from  the  British  government  on  account 
of  maritime  captures.  The  treaty,  however,  gave 
great  umbrage  to  France,  not  only  because  it  granted 
privileges  of  asylum  to  British  ships  of  war  and  rec- 
ognized the  right  to  capture  enemies'  goods  in  neu- 
tral vessels,  but  also  because  it  definitely  fixed  the 
position  of  the  United  States  as  a  neutral.  The  re- 
sentment of  the  French  government  was  soon  made 

5* 


•THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

manifest  by  measures  which  prefigured  the  Berlin 
and  Milan  decrees  of  Napoleon.  By  a  decree  of  the 
Executive  Directory  of  July  2,  1796,  which  laid  the 
foundation  of  a  new  series,  it  was  announced  that 
the  cruisers  of  France  would  treat  neutral  vessels, 
as  to  searches,  captures,  and  confiscation,  in  the 
same  manner  as  their  governments  should  suffer 
the  English  to  treat  them.  The  French  government 
also  recalled  its  minister  from  the  United  States  and 
reduced  the  grade  of  the  mission.  Monroe,  too,  was 
recalled,  and  in  his  place  was  sent  Charles  Cotes- 
worth  Pinckney. 

When,  in  December,  1796,  Pinckney  arrived  in 
Paris,  the  Directory  refused  either  to  receive  him 
or  to  permit  him  to  stay  at  the  capital  as  a  private 
alien ;  and  he  retired  to  Amsterdam  to  await  develop- 
ments. Desirous,  however,  of  trying  all  possible 
means  of  conciliation,  President  John  Adams,  while 
recommending  to  Congress  the  consideration  of  ef- 
fectual measures  of  defence,  joined  Elbridge  Gerry 
and  John  Marshall  with  Pinckney  in  a  special  mis- 
sion. The  three  envoys  arrived  in  Paris  October 
4,  1797.  Four  days  later  they  were  unofficially  re- 
ceived by  Talleyrand,  who  was  then  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs ;  but  he  subsequently  intimated  that 
they  could  not  have  a  public  audience  of  the  Direc- 
tory till  their  negotiations  were  concluded.  Mean- 
while, they  were  waited  upon  by  three  men  who 
came  sometimes  singly  and  sometimes  together,  and 

57 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

who  professed  to  represent  Talleyrand  and  the 
Directory.  These  persons  are  known  in  the  corre- 
spondence as  X,  Y,  and  Z.  Their  approach  was  pre- 
pared by  W,  who  called  on  Pinckney  and  vouched 
for  X  as  a  gentleman  of  credit  and  reputation,  in 
whom  great  reliance  might  be  placed.  On  the 
evening  of  the  same  day  X  called,  and,  professing 
to  speak  for  Talleyrand,  suggested  confidentially  a 
plan  of  conciliation.  He  represented  that  certain 
passages  in  President  Adams's  recent  speech  to  Con- 
gress, at  which  two  members  of  the  Directory  were 
exceedingly  irritated,  would  need  to  be  softened; 
that  a  sum  of  money,  to  be  at  the  disposal  of  Talley- 
rand, would  be  required  as  a  douceur  for  the  ministry, 
except  Merlin,  the  Minister  of  Justice,  who  was  already 
making  enough  from  the  condemnation  of  vessels; 
and  that  a  loan  to  the  government  would  also  be 
insisted  on.  X  stated,  however,  that  he  communi- 
cated with  Talleyrand  not  directly,  but  through 
another  gentleman,  in  whom  Talleyrand  had  great 
confidence.  This  gentleman  proved  to  be  Y,  who 
afterwards  called  with  X  upon  the  American  pleni- 
potentiaries and  presented  the  propositions  in  writ- 
ing. Y  also  dilated  upon  the  resentment  produced 
by  the  President's  speech,  but  declared  that,  after 
the  plenipotentiaries  had  afforded  satisfaction  on 
that  point,  they  must  pay  money,  "a  great  deal  of 
money."  In  so  saying  he  referred  to  the  subject 
of  a  loan.     Concerning  the  douceur  little  was  said,  it 

58 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

being  understood  that  it  was  required  for  the  offi- 
cers of  government,  and  therefore  needed  no  further 
explanation.  An  impression  perhaps  widely  pre- 
vails that  at  this  point  Pinckney  exclaimed,  "Mill- 
ions for  defence,  but  not  a  cent  for  tribute,"  and 
broke  off  the  negotiations.  The  story  is  a  pretty 
one,  but  is  inaccurate.  The  sentiment  in  question, 
which  resembles  a  phrase  used  by  Jefferson,  when 
Secretary  of  State,  in  his  correspondence  with  the 
Barbary  powers,  was  pronounced  as  a  toast  at  a 
public  dinner  given  to  Marshall,  at  Philadelphia,  on 
his  return  from  France.  In  reality,  the  American 
plenipotentiaries,  although  they  repulsed  the  solicita- 
tions of  personal  venality  with  the  reply,  "No,  no, 
not  a  sixpence,"  offered  to  consult  their  govern- 
ment with  regard  to  a  loan,  if  the  Directory  would 
suspend  its  measures  against  American  commerce. 
This  the  Directory  refused  to  do.  Negotiations 
were  ended;  the  treaties  between  the  two  countries 
were  abrogated  by  the  United  States;  and  there 
succeeded  the  state  of  limited  war  which  prevailed 
from  1798  till  1800. 

The  respite  which  commerce  enjoyed  from  bel- 
ligerent depredations  after  the  Peace  of  Amiens  was 
of  brief  duration,  and  the  renewal  of  war,  in  1803, 
was  ere  long  followed  by  measures  which  retain  in 
the  history  of  belligerent  pretensions  an  unhappy 
pre-eminence.  The  "rule  of  the  War  of  1756,"  by 
which  Great  Britain  had  assumed  to  forbid  neutrals 

59 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

to  engage  during  war  in  a  trade  from  which  they 
were  excluded  in  time  of  peace,  was  enforced  by  the 
British  admiralty  courts  with  new  stringency  under 
cover  of  the  doctrine  of  continuous  voyages.  More- 
over, the  British  government  in  1806,  in  retaliation 
for  a  decree  of  Prussia,  which  was  issued  under  Napo- 
leonic compulsion,  excluding  British  trade  from  that 
country,  declared  the  mouths  of  the  Ems,  the  Weser, 
the  Elbe,  and  the  Trave  to  be  in  a  state  of  blockade. 
On  November  21,  1806,  Napoleon  fulminated  from 
the  imperial  camp  at  Berlin  a  decree  declaring  the 
British  Islands  to  be  in  a  state  of  blockade  and  pro- 
hibiting all  commerce  and  correspondence  with  them. 
Great  Britain  replied  by  an  order  in  council  of 
January  6,  1807,  forbidding  neutral  vessels  to  trade 
between  ports  in  the  control  of  France  or  her  allies ; 
and  by  still  another  order,  November  11,  1807,  she 
forbade  such  vessels  to  trade  with  the  ports  of 
France  and  her  allies,  or  even  with  any  port  in 
Europe  from  which  the  British  flag  was  excluded, 
without  a  clearance  obtained  in  a  British  port. 
Napoleon's  answer  was  the  Milan  decree  of  Decem- 
ber 17,  1807,  by  which  it  was  declared  that  every 
vessel  that  had  submitted  to  search  by  an  English 
ship,  or  consented  to  a  voyage  to  England,  or  paid 
any  tax  to  the  English  government,  as  well  as  every 
vessel  that  should  sail  to  or  from  a  port  in  Great 
Britain  or  her  possessions,  or  in  any  country  occu- 
pied by  British  troops,  should  be  deemed  good  prize. 

60 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

These  measures,  with  their  bald  assertions  of  paper 
blockades  and  sweeping  denials  of  the  rights  of 
neutrality,  the  United  States,  as  practically  the 
only  remaining  neutral,  met  with  protests,  with 
embargoes,  with  non-intercourse,  and  finally,  in  the 
case  of  Great  Britain,  which  was  aggravated  by  the 
question  of  impressment,  to  which  President  Madi- 
son gave  so  much  prominence  in  his  war  message, 
with  hostile  resistance,  while  from  France  a  con- 
siderable indemnity  was  afterwards  obtained  by 
treaty.  The  pretensions  against  which  the  United 
States  contended  are  no  longer  justified  on  legal 
grounds.  Since  the  Declaration  of  Paris  of  1856, 
it  has  been  universally  admitted  that  a  blockade, 
in  order  to  be  valid,  must  be  effective.  The  right 
of  neutrals  to  trade  with  belligerents  is  acknowl- 
edged, subject  only  to  the  law  of  contraband  and 
of  blockade. 

There  is  one  radical  limitation  to  belligerent  ac- 
tivities, which,  although  often  urged,  has  not  yet 
been  adopted.  This  is  the  inhibition  of  the  capt- 
ure of  private  property  at  sea.  Strongly  advocated 
by  Franklin,  it  was  introduced  into  the  first  treaty 
between  the  United  States  and  Prussia,  in  the  signa- 
ture of  which  he  was  associated  with  Adams  and  Jef- 
ferson. John  Quincy  Adams,  Henry  Clay,  William 
L.  Marcy,  and  Hamilton  Fish  are  among  the  great 
Secretaries  of  State  who  have  given  the  principle  their 
support.     President  McKinley,  in  his  annual  mes- 

61 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

sage  of  December  5,  1898,  suggested  to  Congress  that 
the  Executive  be  authorized  to  correspond  with  the 
governments  of  the  principal  maritime  powers  of  the 
world  with  a  view  to  incorporate  it  into  the  perma- 
nent law  of  civilized  nations.  This  recommendation 
was  cordially  renewed  by  President  Roosevelt  in  his 
annual  message  of  December  7,  1903,  in  which  the 
exemption,  except  as  to  contraband  of  war,  was 
advocated  not  only  as  a  matter  of  "humanity  and 
morals,"  but  also  as  a  measure  altogether  compatible 
with  the  practical  conduct  of  war  at  sea. 

The  American  delegates  to  the  first  Peace  Con- 
ference at  The  Hague,  in  1899,  although  the  subject 
was  not  on  the  program,  were  authorized  "to  pro- 
pose to  the  conference  the  principle  of  extending  to 
strictly  private  property  at  sea  the  immunity  from 
destruction  or  capture  by  belligerent  powers  which 
such  property  already  enjoys  on  land,  as  worthy  of 
being  incorporated  in  the  permanent  law  of  civilized 
nations."  The  delegation  accordingly  submitted  a 
proposition  to  "exempt  from  capture  or  seizure  on 
the  high  seas,  or  elsewhere, "  by  armed  vessels  or  by 
military  forces,  all  private  property  except  (1)  con- 
traband of  war  and  (2)  vessels  and  cargoes  attempt- 
ing to  enter  a  blockaded  port.  The  conference,  re- 
garding this  as  a  proposal  to  declare  "the  inviola- 
bility of  private  property  in  naval  warfare,"  took 
no  action  beyond  the  expression  of  a  wish  (vceu) 
that  the  subject  might  be  "referred  to  a  subsequent 
conference  for  consideration." 

62 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

On  April  28,  1904,  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States  adopted  a  resolution  expressing  the  opinion 
that  it  was  desirable  that  the  President  should  en- 
deavor to  bring  about  an  understanding  among  the 
principal  maritime  powers  for  the  incorporation  into 
"the  permanent  law  of  civilized  nations"  of  "the 
principle  of  the  exemption  of  all  private  property  at 
sea,  not  contraband  of  war,  from  capture  or  destruc- 
tion by  belligerents."  This  resolution  was  quoted 
in  Mr.  Hay's  circular  of  October  21,  1904,  suggesting 
the  calling  of  the  Second  Hague  Conference,  and  also 
in  the  instructions  given  on  May  31,  1907,  to  the 
delegates  of  the  United  States  to  that  conference, 
who  were  authorized  to  advocate  the  proposition 
submitted  by  the  American  delegation  at  the  first 
conference.  In  conformity  with  these  instructions, 
the  proposal  was  duly  presented  and  pressed,  but 
without  success.  Mr.  Scott,  the  technical  delegate 
of  the  United  States,  in  his  narration  of  the  work  of 
the  conference,  states  that  the  failure  "was  due 
solely  to  the  fact  that  large  maritime  powers  such 
as  Great  Britain,  Japan,  and  Russia,  and  in  a  lesser 
degree  France,  were  unwilling  to  renounce  the  right 
of  capture  of  private  property,  either  as  a  means  of 
preventing  a  resort  to  arms  or  of  shortening  the  war 
by  bringing  the  enemy  to  terms." 

Still  another,  and  a  somewhat  curious,  phase  of 
the  subject  is  dealt  with  in  the  report  of  the  delega- 
tion of*the  United  States.  Among  the  measures 
formulated  by  the  conference  and  signed  by  a  num- 

63 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ber  of  the  delegations,  but  not  by  that  of  the  United 
States,  is  a  convention  regulating  the  transformation 
of  vessels  of  commerce  into  vessels  of  war.  The  re- 
port states  that  the  delegation  of  the  United  States 
would,  perhaps,  have  signed  this  convention  had  not 
the  conference  regarded  it  as  a  "corollary"  of  the 
Declaration  of  Paris  of  1856,  which  undertook  to 
abolish  the  practice  of  privateering,  and  as  a  guar- 
antee against  a  return  to  that  practice.  The  dele- 
gation, in  a  formal  statement  to  the  conference, 
pointed  out  that  the  United  States  had  never  ad- 
hered to  the  Declaration  of  Paris  or  renounced  the 
right  to  resort  to  privateering,  but,  in  conformity 
with  instructions,  offered  to  vote  for  the  abolition 
of  the  practice,  in  case  the  conference  "should  es- 
tablish the  inviolability  of  private  property  on  the 
seas,"  subject,  of  course,  to  the  law  of  contraband 
and  of  blockade.  The  report  of  the  delegation  in- 
timates, however,  that  the  government  of  the  United 
States  is  under  a  disability  to  agree  by  treaty  to  the 
abolition  of  privateering,  because  the  Constitution 
confers  upon  Congress  the  power,  which  has  re- 
peatedly been  exercised,  to  "grant  letters  of  marque 
and  reprisal,"  that  is  to  say,  privateering  commis- 
sions. If  this  be  so,  it  is  not  clear  why  the  disability 
does  not  preclude  an  abandonment  of  the  thing 
authorized  to  be  done.  Letters  of  marque  and  re- 
prisal never  were  regarded  as  being,  like  trinkets  and 
ornaments,  an  end  in  themselves.  They  are  merely 
the  appropriate  documentary  evidence  of  authority 

64 


THE    SYSTEM   OF   NEUTRALITY 

to  carry  on  war  in  a  certain  way.  But  the  particular 
method  of  warfare  to  which  they  relate  is  neither 
more  sacred  nor  more  constitutional  than  any  other 
method  contained  in  the  grant  of  war  powers  to 
Congress,  which  clearly  embrace  the  capture  of 
private  property  at  sea.  On  the  contrary,  to  agree 
generally  to  forego  such  capture  would  involve  a  far 
greater  relinquishment  of  power  than  would  the 
renunciation  of  a  particular  method  of  capture. 

In  reality,  the  suggested  constitutional  difficulty 
seems  to  lack  substance.  To  say  nothing  of  the  fact 
that  the  regulation  of  methods  of  warfare  would  ap- 
pear to  be  peculiarly  within  the  treaty-making  power, 
the  principle  of  interpretation  on  which  the  doubt 
is  suggested  appears  to  be  radically  unsound  and  to 
belong  in  the  category  of  notions  which  tend  to  bring 
constitutional  law  into  disrepute.  That  the  United 
States  cannot  internationally  agree  to  forego  the 
exercise  of  any  power  which  the  Constitution  has 
conferred  on  Congress,  or  other  department  of 
government,  is  a  supposition  contradicted  by  every 
exercise  of  the  treaty-making  power  since  the  govern- 
ment came  into  existence.  When  we  reflect  upon 
the  number  and  extent  of  the  powers  conferred  upon 
the  national  government,  and  upon  their  distribu- 
tion and  the  methods  prescribed  for  their  exercise, 
it  is  obvious  that  the  attempt  to  act  upon  such  a  sup- 
position would  exclude  the  United  States  from  any 
part  in  the  progress  of  the  world  through  the  amelio- 
ration of  law  and  practice  by  international  action. 

5  65 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Immediately  on  the  outbreak  of  war  in  Europe,  in 
August,  1 9 14,  the  President  of  the  United  States 
issued  the  normal  proclamation  of  neutrality;  but 
controversial  questions  soon  arose  concerning  the 
rights  as  well  as  the  duties  of  neutrals.  The  safety 
of  ships  was  imperilled  by  the  placing  of  mines  in  the 
open  seas,  each  belligerent  charging  its  adversaries 
with  the  first  overt  act.  As  early  as  August,  1914, 
the  British  authorities  gave  warning  of  danger  from 
mines  in  the  North  Sea,  and  on  November  2d  the 
British  Admiralty,  alleging  that  the  Germans  had 
scattered  mines  there  indiscriminately,  issued  a  no- 
tice declaring  that  the  entire  North  Sea  must  be 
considered  a  "military  area,"  within  which  merchant 
shipping  would  be  exposed  to  danger  from  mines  as 
well  as  from  war-ships  searching  for  suspicious  craft. 
Sailing  directions  were  given  for  ships  wishing  to 
trade  with  Norway,  the  Baltic,  Denmark,  and 
Holland. 

The  age-long  dispute  as  to  contraband  was  re- 
vived, particularly  as  to  foodstuffs,  which  fall  in  the 
"conditional"  category  of  things  not  subject  to 
capture  unless  intended  for  the  consumption  of 
military  or  naval  forces.  An  attempt  to  deal  com- 
prehensively with  this  subject  was  made  in  the 
Declaration  of  London  (1909),  and,  although  the 
declaration  had  not  been  ratified,  the  United  States 
proposed  that  the  belligerents  should  individually 
adopt  it.  Austria-Hungary  and  Germany  sub- 
stantially   assented    on    condition    of    reciprocity. 

66 


THE    SYSTEM   OF   NEUTRALITY 

Great  Britain  conditioned  her  assent  upon  certain 
modifications  judged  "indispensable  to  the  efficient 
conduct"  of  her  naval  operations.  The  United 
States  on  October  22,  19 14,  withdrew  its  proposal, 
declaring  that  it  would  rely  on  "the  existing  rules 
of  international  law"  and  its  treaties. 

Apparently  with  a  view  to  make  a  test  case,  a 
ship  called  the  Wilhelmina  was,  early  in  191 5,  loaded 
in  the  United  States  with  foodstuffs  for  Germany. 
On  her  way  she  was  seized  by  the  British  authorities, 
and  her  cargo  sent  to  a  prize  court.  On  February 
4th  the  German  government,  while  denouncing 
Great  Britain's  conduct  of  commercial  warfare  as 
illegal,  announced  that,  just  as  England  had  de- 
clared the  North  Sea  to  be  a  "military  area"  Ger- 
many would,  in  retaliation,  treat  the  waters  sur- 
rounding Great  Britain  and  Ireland,  including  the 
entire  English  Channel,  as  a  "war  zone,"  wherein, 
after  February  18th,  every  enemy  merchant-ship 
would  be  destroyed,  and  even  neutral  ships  would  be 
exposed  to  danger  because  of  the  misuse  of  neutral 
flags  which  the  British  government  was  said  to  have 
ordered.  February  10th  the  United  States  replied 
that  if  German  vessels  of  war,  assuming  a  misuse  of 
the  American  flag,  should  "destroy  on  the  high  seas 
an  American  vessel  or  the  lives  of  American  citizens,'' 
the  United  States  would  view  the  act  "as  an  in- 
defensible violation  of  neutral  rights,"  for  which  it 
would  hold  the  German  government  "to  a  strict 
accountability";    and  an  assurance  was  requested 

*7 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

"that  American  citizens  and  their  vessels"  would  not 
be  molested  "otherwise  than  by  visit  and  search." 
On  the  same  day  the  United  States,  referring  to  the 
report  that  the  captain  of  the  British  steamship 
Lusitania,  acting  under  governmental  orders,  had 
lately  raised  the  American  flag  in  order  to  evade 
German  submarines,  requested  the  British  govern- 
ment to  endeavor  to  restrain  British  vessels  from  so 
doing  in  the  sea  area  defined  in  the  German  declara- 
tion. The  German  government,  in  reply,  justified 
its  decree  on  the  ground  that,  as  Germany,  "with  the 
toleration,  tacit,  or  protesting,"  of  neutrals,  was  il- 
legally cut  off  from  all  oversea  supplies,  it  was  her 
right  to  use  all  means  at  her  disposal  to  prevent  sup- 
plies, particularly  of  war  materials,  from  reaching 
Great  Britain  and  her  allies,  but  admitted  that  the 
measure  adopted  for  this  purpose  would  involve 
danger,  even  to  neutral  vessels,  and  expressed  the 
hope  that  the  United  States  would  forestall  all 
trouble  by  bringing  about  the  observance  of  the 
Declaration  of  London. 

Subsequently,  the  United  States  proposed  to  the 
British  and  German  governments  the  following  pro- 
visional arrangement:  Both  were  to  agree  strictly 
to  limit  the  use  of  mines,  to  refrain  from  employing 
submarines  against  merchant- vessels  except  for  visit 
and  search,  and  to  restrain  such  vessels  from  mis- 
using neutral  flags,  while,  if  Germany  agreed  that 
imported  foodstuffs  should  be  consigned  to  agencies 
to  be  designated  by  the  United  States  for  distribu- 

68 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

tion  solely  to  retail  dealers  licensed  to  sell  them  only 
to  non-combatants,  Great  Britain  was  not  to  in- 
terfere with  their  transportation.  The  German 
government,  on  March  ist,  accepted  with  certain 
reservations;  but,  on  the  same  day,  the  British  am- 
bassador at  Washington,  affirming  that  the  German 
war-zone  decree  substituted  "indiscriminate  destruc- 
tion for  regulated  capture,"  gave  notice  that  the  Brit- 
ish and  French  governments,  having  in  contempla- 
tion "retaliatory  measures,"  would  "hold  themselves 
free  to  detain  and  take  into  port  ships  carrying  goods 
of  presumed  enemy  destination,  ownership,  or  ori- 
gin." This  purpose  was  amplified  in  the  British 
order  in  council  of  March  n,  1915,  designed  "to 
prevent  commodities  of  any  kind  from  reaching  or 
leaving  Germany."  The  word  "blockade,"  which 
means  the  real  cutting  off,  by  a  sufficient  force,  as  to 
all  or  part  of  an  enemy's  coasts,  of  ingress  or  egress 
by  vessels  of  all  nations,  is  not  found  in  this  order. 
It  was  used  by  Sir  Edward  Grey  in  an  explanatory 
memorandum,  in  which  he  spoke  of  "the  measures 
of  blockade"  authorized  by  the  order;  described  its 
"object"  as  being  "to  establish  a  blockade  to  pre- 
vent vessels  from  carrying  goods  for  or  coming  from 
Germany";  and  stated  that  Great  Britain  and  her 
allies  would  not  impose  the  penalty  of  blockade, 
which  is  confiscation  of  ship  and  cargo,  but  would 
"restrict  their  claim  to  the  stopping  of  cargoes 
destined  for  or  coming  from  Germany."  The  in- 
terruption of  commerce  would,  he  said,  be  carried 

69 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

out  by  "controlling  by  a  cordon  of  cruisers  all  pas- 
sage to  and  from  Germany,"  without  sacrifice  of 
neutral  ships  or  non-combatant  lives.  The  disposi- 
tion made  of  the  cargoes  would  be  governed  by  the 
circumstances. 

May  7,  1915,  the  Lusitania  was  torpedoed  and 
sunk  off  the  Irish  coast,  without  warning,  by  a 
German  submarine.  Before  her  departure  from 
New  York  the  German  ambassador  published  in  the 
press  a  warning  to  passengers  not  to  sail  on  her. 
Over  a  hundred  American  citizens  lost  their  lives. 
The  United  States  on  May  13  th  demanded  a  dis- 
avowal of  the  act,  reparation  for  the  injuries  in- 
flicted, and  immediate  steps  to  prevent  the  recurrence 
of  such  an  event.  The  note  in  which  these  demands 
were  presented  spoke  of  "the  practical  impossibility 
of  employing  submarines  in  the  destruction  of  com- 
merce without  disregarding  those  rules  of  fairness, 
reason,  justice,  and  humanity  which  all  modern 
opinion  regards  as  imperative";  adverted  to  the 
"surprising  irregularity"  of  the  warning  published 
by  the  German  ambassador;  and  remarked  that  the 
Imperial  German  government  would  not  expect  the 
United  States  "to  omit  any  word  or  any  act  neces- 
sary to  the  performance  of  its  sacred  duty  of  main- 
taining the  rights  of  the  United  States  and  its 
citizens  and  of  safeguarding  their  free  exercise  and 
enjoyment." 

Answering  on  May  28th,  the  German  government, 
while  expressing  sorrow  for  the  loss  of  Americans, 

70 


THE    SYSTEM   OF   NEUTRALITY 

contended  that  the  Lusitania  was  in  effect  built  as 
an  auxiliary  cruiser  and  was  armed,  that  she  had 
aboard  Canadian  troops  and  a  quantity  of  ammu- 
nition whose  explosion  hastened  her  sinking,  that 
American  lives  were  sought  to  be  used  as  a  protection 
for  war  materials,  and  that  British  vessels  had  secret 
instructions  to  ram  submarines.  Before  the  reply 
of  the  United  States  was  made,  Mr.  Bryan  resigned 
as  Secretary  of  State,  explaining  his  action  upon  the 
ground  of  his  belief  that  the  position  which  the 
government  was  assuming  would  lead  to  a  conflict. 
He  was  succeeded  by  Mr.  Robert  Lansing,  who  had 
held  the  post  of  counsellor  for  the  Department  of 
State.  The  reply  of  the  United  States  to  the  Ger- 
man note  bears  date  of  June  9th.  It  did  not  repeat 
the  intimation,  made  in  the  note  of  May  13th,  that 
submarines  could  not  lawfully  be  used  as  commerce- 
destroyers,  but,  while  remarking  that  "nothing  but 
actual  forcible  resistance  or  continued  efforts  to 
escape  by  flight  when  ordered  to  stop  for  the  purpose 
of  visit"  had  ever  been  held  to  forfeit  the  lives  of  the 
passengers  and  crew  of  a  merchantman,  maintained 
that  only  "actual  resistance  to  capture  or  refusal 
to  stop  when  ordered  to  do  so  for  the  purpose  of  visit 
could  have  afforded  the  commander  of  the  submarine 
any  justification  for  so  much  as  putting  the  lives  of 
those  on  board  the  ship  in  jeopardy ' ' ;  denied  that  the 
Lusitania  was  armed;  and  declared  that  the  United 
States  could  not  admit  that  the  proclamation  of  a  war 
zone  might  be  made  to  operate  as  "an  abbreviation 

71 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

of  the  rights  either  of  American  shipmasters  or  of 
American  citizens  bound  on  lawful  errands  as  pas- 
sengers on  merchant-ships  of  belligerent  national- 
ity." Germany  (July  8th)  offered  to  instruct  her 
submarines  to  permit  the  safe  passage  of  American 
passenger-steamers,  at  the  same  time  expressing  the 
hope  that  the  United  States  would  guarantee  that 
they  did  not  carry  contraband,  and  proposed  to 
include  in  the  offer  neutral  steamers,  and  if  necessary 
four  enemy  steamers,  all  under  the  American  flag. 
The  United  States  (July  21st),  attacks  on  other  ves- 
sels having  meanwhile  taken  place,  declined  this 
offer,  expressed  the  expectation  that  the  German 
government  would  no  longer  delay  disavowal  of  the 
act  of  its  naval  commander  and  reparation  for  the 
American  lives  lost,  and  said  that  the  repetition  of 
such  acts  would  be  regarded  as  "deliberately  un- 
friendly." 

September  1,  191 5,  the  German  ambassador  gave 
the  following  assurance:  "Liners  will  not  be  sunk 
by  our  submarines  without  warning  and  without 
safety  of  the  lives  of  non-combatants,  provided  that 
the  liners  do  not  try  to  escape  or  offer  resistance." 
This  was,  he  said,  decided  upon  before  the  sinking 
of  the  Arabic,  which  the  German  government  after- 
wards (October  5th)  disavowed,  with  expressions  of 
regret  and  a  promise  of  indemnity  for  the  American 
lives  lost. 

Negotiations  subsequently  took  place  for  the  settle- 
ment of  the  case  of  the  Lusitania,  but  they  were  in- 

72 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

terrupted  by  a  new  controversy  as  to  the  position 
of  enemy  merchantmen  "armed  for  defense,"  which 
the  German  government,  claiming  that  they  were 
under  instructions  to  act  offensively,  gave  notice 
would  be  attacked  without  warning.  In  an  "in- 
formal and  confidential  letter"  sent  to  the  ambas- 
sadors of  Great  Britain,  France,  Italy,  and  Russia, 
and  the  minister  of  Belgium,  on  January  18th,  and 
to  the  ambassador  of  Japan  on  January  24,  19 16, 
Mr.  Lansing  proposed  an  arrangement  to  the  effect 
that  merchant-vessels  should  be  prohibited  from 
carrying  any  armament,  while  submarines  should 
be  required  to  adhere  strictly  to  the  rules  of  inter- 
national law  in  regard  to  visit  and  search  and  the 
safety  of  passengers  and  crews.  The  letter  stated, 
in  conclusion,  that  the  United  States  was  "impressed 
with  the  reasonableness  of  the  argument  that  a 
merchant-vessel  carrying  armament  of  any  sort,  in 
view  of  the  character  of  submarine  warfare  and  the 
defensive  weakness  of  undersea  craft,  should  be  held 
to  be  an  auxiliary  cruiser  and  so  treated  by  a  neutral 
as  well  as  by  a  belligerent  government,"  and  that  the 
United  States  was  "seriously  considering  instructing 
its  officials  accordingly." 

The  substance  of  this  letter,  the  text  of  which  was 
not  officially  published  till  the  following  August, 
appeared  in  the  press,  without  explanation,  about  the 
middle  of  February,  19 16.  The  proposal  which  it 
conveyed  was  formally  declined  by  Great  Britain 
on  the  23d  of  March.     Meanwhile,  a  movement  took 

73 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

place  in  Congress  to  pass  a  resolution  warning  citi- 
zens of  the  United  States  against  tavelling  on  armed 
enemy  merchantmen.  This  movement,  which  as- 
sumed formidable  proportions,  was  publicly  op- 
posed by  President  Wilson.  It  eventually  failed; 
and  a  memorandum  "prepared  during  March,  191 6," 
"by  direction  of  the  President,"  on  the  status  of 
armed  merchantmen,  was  made  public  by  the 
Department  of  State,  under  date  of  the  25th  of  that 
month,  as  a  statement  of  the  government's  attitude 
on  the  subject.  This  memorandum,  while  reassert- 
ing the  right  of  neutrals  to  travel  on  armed  belliger- 
ent merchantmen,  declared  that  the  determination 
by  a  belligerent  war-ship  of  the  "war-like  character" 
of  such  an  enemy  vessel  "must  rest  in  no  case  upon 
presumption,  but  upon  conclusive  evidence";  that, 
"in  the  absence  of  conclusive  evidence,"  the  belliger- 
ent must  "act  on  the  presumption  that  an  armed 
merchantman  is  of  peaceful  character,"  even  though 
the  armament  were  such  as  a  neutral  government, 
in  performing  its  neutral  duties,  might  "presume  to 
be  intended  for  aggression."  The  explanation  given 
of  this  distinction  was  that  the  belligerent  war-ship 
"can  on  the  high  seas  test  by  actual  experience  the 
purpose  of  an  armament  on  an  enemy  merchant- 
vessel,  and  so  determine  by  direct  evidence  the 
status  of  the  vessel." 

The  entire  submarine  controversy  was  brought 
to  a  head  by  the  torpedoing  by  a  German  submarine, 
in  the  English   Channel,    March   24,    1916,   of  the 

74 


THE    SYSTEM   OF   NEUTRALITY 

French  steamship  Sussex,  an  unarmed  vessel  having 
on  board  more  than  three  hundred  passengers,  about 
eighty  of  whom,  including  some  citizens  of  the 
United  States,  were  killed  or  injured.  In  the  course 
of  previous  discussions  offers  of  Germany  to  arbitrate 
various  phases  of  the  controversy  had  been  declined. 
On  a  review  of  the  case  of  the  Sussex  and  other  cases, 
the  United  States,  on  April  18th,  instructed  the 
American  ambassador  at  Berlin  to  deliver  to  the 
German  government  a  note,  which  was  in  the  nature 
of  an  ultimatum.  This  note,  after  remarking  that 
it  had  become  "painfully  evident"  that  the  position 
originally  taken  by  the  United  States  was  "in- 
evitable," namely,  that  the  use  of  submarines  as 
commerce  destroyers  was  incompatible  with  the 
"principles  of  humanity,"  the  "rights  of  neutrals," 
and  the  "immunities  of  non-combatants,"  declared 
that,  if  it  was  "still  the  purpose"  of  the  German 
government  to  prosecute  "relentless  and  indiscrim- 
inate" submarine  warfare  against  "vessels  of  com- 
merce," the  United  States  was  at  last  forced  to  the 
conclusion  that  there  was  but  one  course  to  pursue; 
and  that,  unless  that  government  should  "imme- 
diately declare  and  effect  an  abandonment"  of  its 
"present  methods"  of  submarine  warfare  against 
both  "passenger"  and  "freight-carrying"  vessels, 
the  United  States  could  "have  no  choice  but  to 
sever  diplomatic  relations  with  the  German  Empire 
altogether." 

The  German  government,  answering  on  May  4th, 

75 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

stated  that  orders  had  been  issued  to  its  naval  forces 
that,  "in  accordance  with  the  general  principles  of 
visit  and  search  and  destruction  of  merchant-vessels 
recognized  by  international  law,  such  vessels,  both 
within  and  without  the  area  declared  as  naval  war 
zone,  shall  not  be  sunk  without  warning  and  without 
saving  human  lives,  unless  these  ships  attempt  to 
escape  or  offer  resistance."  The  note  added,  how- 
ever, that  neutrals  could  not  expect  Germany,  forced 
to  fight  for  her  existence,  to  restrict,  in  their  interest, 
the  use  of  an  effective  weapon,  if  her  enemy  was 
"permitted  to  continue  to  apply  at  will  methods  of 
warfare  violating  the  rules  of  international  law"; 
that,  the  United  States  having  repeatedly  declared 
its  determination  to  restore  the  principle  of  the 
freedom  of  the  seas  from  whatever  quarter  it  had 
been  violated,  the  German  government  did  not 
doubt  that  the  United  States  would  at  once  ' '  demand 
and  insist"  that  the  British  government  "forthwith 
observe  the  rules  of  international  law  universally 
recognized  before  the  war,"  as  laid  down  in  notes 
of  the  United  States  to  that  government  of  Decem- 
ber 26,  1914,  and  November  5,  1015;  and  that,  in 
case  the  steps  taken  by  the  United  States  to  attain 
that  object  should  not  result  in  the  observance  of 
the  laws  of  humanity  by  all  belligerent  nations, 
"the  German  government  would  then  be  facing  a 
new  situation,  in  which  it  must  reserve  itself  com- 
plete liberty  of  decision." 

Responding,  on  May  8th,  Mr.  Lansing  said  that 

76 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

the  United  States,  in  "accepting"  the  German  gov- 
ernment's "declaration  of  its  abandonment"  of  the 
policy  which  had  so  seriously  menaced  the  good  re- 
lations between  the  two  countries,  would  "rely  upon 
a  scrupulous  execution  henceforth  of  the  now  al- 
tered policy"  of  that  government,  and  would  take  it 
for  granted  that  the  latter  did  "not  intend  to  imply 
that  the  maintenance  of  its  newly  announced  policy" 
was  "in  any  way  contingent  upon  the  course  or  re- 
sult of  diplomatic  negotiations"  between  the  United 
States  and  any  other  belligerent  government,  al- 
though "certain  passages"  "might  appear  to  be 
susceptible  of  that  construction";  but  that,  in 
order  to  avoid  any  possible  misunderstanding,  the 
United  States  must  notify  the  Imperial  government 
that  it  could  "not  for  a  moment  entertain,  much  less 
discuss,  a  suggestion  that  respect  by  German  naval 
authorities  for  the  rights  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States  upon  the  high  seas  should  in  any  way  or  in 
the  slightest  degree  be  made  contingent  upon  the 
conduct  of  any  other  government  affecting  the  rights 
of  neutrals  and  non-combatants." 

To  this  counter  notification,  or  reservation,  the 
German  government  did  not  reply. 

As  has  been  seen,  the  German  note  of  May  4,  191 6, 
specified  certain  notes  which  the  United  States  ad- 
dressed to  Great  Britain  on  December  26,  1914,  and 
November  5,  191 5.  In  the  former,  which  related 
to  the  seizure  and  detention  of  vessels  laden  with 
American  goods  destined  to  neutral  ports  in  Europe, 

77 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  United  States  said  it  was  reluctantly  forced  to 
conclude  that  the  policy  pursued  by  the  British 
government  in  such  matters  exceeded  the  manifest 
necessities  of  a  belligerent  and  constituted  restric-' 
tions  upon  the  rights  of  American  citizens  on  the 
high  seas  which  were  "not  justified  by  the  rules  of 
international  law  or  required  under  the  principle  of 
self -preservation,"  and  that,  if  such  things  continued, 
they  might  "arouse  a  feeling  contrary  to  that  which 
has  so  long  existed  between  the  American  and  Brit- 
ish peoples."  Sir  Edward  Grey,  in  reply  (January 
7,  191 5),  pointed  to  the  increase  of  American  trade 
with  neutral  countries,  and  stated  that  the  British 
government  were  desirous  "not  to  interfere  with  the 
normal  importation  and  use  by  the  neutral  countries 
of  goods  from  the  United  States."  The  note  of  No- 
vember 5,  191 5,  dealt  at  great  length  with  the  opera- 
tion of  the  order  in  council  of  the  nth  of  the  preced- 
ing March,  and,  after  adverting  to  the  fact  that  trade 
was  carried  on  openly  by  sea  between  the  Scandina- 
vian countries  and  Germany,  declared  that  the 
methods  sought  to  be  employed  to  obtain  and  use 
evidence  of  enemy  destination  of  cargoes  bound  for 
neutral  ports  and  to  impose  a  contraband  character 
upon  such  cargoes  were  "without  justification"; 
that  the  "blockade,"  upon  which  such  methods  were 
founded,  was  "ineffective,  illegal,  and  indefensible";1 

1  In  the  argument  of  the  case  of  the  Hakan,  before  Sir  Samuel 
Evans,  President  of  the  English  Prize  Court,  as  reported  in  Lloyd's 
List,  June  9,  1916,  there  occurred  between  the  bench  and  the  bar 
<W  following  colloquv : 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

that  the  judicial  procedure  offered  as  a  means  of 
reparation  for  an  international  injury  was  inherently- 
defective  for  the  purpose;  that  in  many  cases  juris- 
diction was  "asserted  in  violation  of  the  law  of 
nations";  and  that  the  United  States  could  not  sub- 
mit to  "the  curtailment  of  its  neutral  rights"  by 
measures  which,  being  "admittedly  retaliatory,  and 
therefore  illegal,  in  conception  and  in  nature,"  were 
"intended  to  punish  the  enemies  of  Great  Britain 
for  alleged  illegalities  on  their  part." 

As  to  the  essential  illegality  of  retaliatory  meas- 
ures, the  British  government,  in  its  reply  (April  24, 
1916),  took  issue  with  the  United  States,  maintain- 
ing that  if  one  belligerent  "is  allowed  to  make  an 
attack  upon  the  other  regardless  of  neutral  rights, 
his  opponent  must  be  allowed  similar  latitude  in 
prosecuting  the  struggle,"  and  that  in  such  case  the 
latter  should  not  be  "limited  to  the  adoption  of 
measures  precisely  identical  with  those  of  his  op- 
ponent." On  this  point  all  the  belligerents  appeared 
to  be  in  accord. 

Discussions  also  took  place  between  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  as  to  other  infractions  or 

"Mr.  Balloch  was  proceeding  to  refer  to  the  blockade,  when — 

"The  President  interrupted  to  say  that  what  was  called  a  blockade 
was  not  a  blockade  at  all,  except  for  journalistic  and  political 
purposes. 

"Mr.  Balloch:  I  notice  that  Mr.  Balfour  yesterday  spoke  of  it 
as  a  blockade,  so  that  I  am  sinning  in  very  good  company. 

"The  President:  I  do  not  know  what  Mr.  Balfour  said  yesterday, 
but  I  remember  reading  a  very  informing  article  in  which  he  pointed 
out  that  the  restrictions  we  were  imposing  were  very  much  less  oner- 
ous than  would  be  the  case  in  an  actual  blockade." 

79 


AMERICAN    D  I  P  L  O  M  A  C  Y 

curtailments  of  neutral  rights  or  privileges.  By  the 
record  it  appears  that  the  order  in  council  of  March 
ii,  191 5,  above  mentioned,  may  be  regarded  as 
constituting  the  centre  of  the  system,  enforced  by 
various  methods,  including  not  only  the  seizure  and 
detention  of  vessels  and  cargoes,  but  also  embar- 
goes, detention  and  search  of  mails,  the  blacklisting 
of  firms  in  neutral  countries,  the  withholdment  of 
cargo  space  from  non-assenting  neutral  shippers,  and 
the  denial  of  hospitalities  in  British  ports  to  non- 
assenting  neutral  vessels,  for  the  commercial  and 
financial  isolation  of  the  Central  Powers,  and  es- 
pecially of  Germany.  Through  all  these  contro- 
versies the  British  government  constantly  empha- 
sized the  distinction  between  acts  affecting  "life" 
and  those  affecting  "property."  By  the  Revenue 
Act  of  September  8,  191 6,  however,  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States  placed  in  the  hands  of  the 
President  the  power  to  adopt  and  enforce  counter- 
vailing commercial  measures.  Specifically,  when 
there  was  reasonable  ground  to  believe  that  any 
country  was,  by  "laws,  regulations,  or  practices  .  .  . 
contrary  to  the  law  and  practice  of  nations,"  re- 
stricting the  importation  of  United  States  products, 
he  was  empowered  to  prohibit  or  restrict  the  importa- 
tion of  similar  or  other  products  of  such  country  into 
the  United  States.  He  was  likewise  empowered  to 
detain  any  vessel,  American  or  foreign,  which,  "on 
account  of  the  laws,  regulations,  or  practices  of  a 
belligerent,"  was  giving  undue  or  unreasonable  pref- 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

erence  or  advantage  to  any  person  or  traffic  in  the 
United  States,  or  subjecting  any  person  or  traffic  in 

the  United  States,  or  American  citizens  in  neutral 
countries,  to  any  undue  or  unreasonable  discrimina- 
tion in  regard  to  the  reception,  delivery,  or  trans- 
portation of  freight  or  passengers.  And  finally,  to 
any  belligerent  failing  to  accord  to  American  ships 
or  citizens  the  commercial  facilities  which  its  ves- 
sels and  citizens  enjoyed  in  the  United  States,  or 
equal  privileges  or  facilities  of  trade  with  vessels 
of  other  nationality  than  its  own,  he  was  empowered 
to  deny  similar  privileges  or  facilities. 

The  German  government  assured  the  United 
States,  January  7,  19 16,  that  its  submarines  in  the 
Mediterranean  had  from  the  beginning  had  "orders 
to  conduct  cruiser  warfare  against  enemy  merchant- 
vessels  only  in  accordance  with  general  principles 
of  international  law,"  and  in  particular  to  exclude 
retaliatory  measures  such  as  were  applicable  to  the 
war  zone  around  the  British  Isles.  In  the  case  of 
the  grain-laden  American  vessel  William  P.  Frye, 
which  was  sunk,  after  taking  of!  the  crew,  by  a 
German  auxiliary  cruiser,  the  German  government, 
besides  agreeing  to  make  indemnity  in  accordance 
with  the  treaties  between  the  two  countries,  stated 
(August  19,  191 5)  that  it  had  issued  orders  for- 
bidding American  merchantmen  carrying  conditional 
contraband  to  be  destroyed,  and  that,  if  a  vessel 
carrying  absolute  contraband  were  to  be  destroyed 
by  a  submarine,  the  persons  aboard  would  not  be 

6  81 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ordered  to  the  life-boats  except  where  the  weather 
conditions  and  the  nearness  of  the  coast  afforded 
absolute  certainty  that  they  would  reach  the  nearest 
port. 

On  September  8,  1915,  the  United  States  instructed 
its  ambassador  at  Vienna  to  inform  the  government 
of  Austria-Hungary  that  its  ambassador  at  Wash- 
ington, Dr.  Dumba,  was  no  longer  acceptable. 
This  action  was  based  on  an  intercepted  letter  ad- 
dressed by  Dr.  Dumba  to  his  government,  and 
entrusted  by  him  to  a  newspaper  correspondent  for 
conveyance  to  Europe,  which  outlined  a  plan  to 
instigate  strikes  in  American  manufacturing  plants 
engaged  in  producing  munitions  of  war.  The  ques- 
tion of  the  right  of  neutral  individuals  to  manu- 
facture and  sell  arms  and  munitions  of  war  had 
formed  the  subject  of  an  extended  correspondence 
between  the  two  governments.1  The  question  of 
the  use  of  submarines  was  also  discussed  between 
them  in  the  case  of  the  Italian  steamer  Ancona, 
whose  sinking,  by  an  Austrian  submarine,  resulted  in 
the  loss  of  American  lives.  It  was  alleged  that  the 
steamer  attempted  to  escape;  but,  as  it  appeared 
that  she  was  torpedoed  after  her  engines  were  stopped 
and  when  passengers  were  still  on  board,  the  United 
States  demanded  a  disavowal  of  the  act,  the  punish- 

1  As  to  the  law  of  contraband,  see  Moore,  Digest  of  International 
Law,  VII,  656  et  seq.;  Kleen,  De  la  Contrebande  dc  Gucrra.  Italy,  in 
her  notification,  Aug.  28,  1916,  of  a  stat  e  1  i  war  with  Germany,  seems 
to  have  failed  to  discriminate  between  "  supplies  of  arms  "  and  "  in- 
struments of  war,  terrestrial  and  maritime." 

82 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

ment  of  the  responsible  officer,  and  indemnity  for  its 
citizens  who  were  killed  or  injured.  The  Imperial 
and  Royal  government,  while  reserving  for  future 
discussion  "the  difficult  questions  of  international 
law  in  connection  with  submarine  warfare,"  sub- 
stantially assented  (December  29,  191 5)  to  the  view 
"that  hostile  private  ships,  in  so  far  as  they  do  not 
flee  or  offer  resistance,  may  not  be  destroyed  without 
the  persons  on  board  having  been  placed  in  safety," 
and,  while  stating  that  the  officer  at  fault  had  been 
punished  for  exceeding  his  instructions,  agreed  to 
pay  an  indemnity.  New  demands  were  made  (June 
21,  1 916)  upon  the  Imperial -Royal  government  for 
apology  and  indemnity  for  an  attack  made  by  an 
Austrian  submarine  on  the  American  tank-steamer 
Petrolite,  but  in  this  case  the  discussion  drifted 
towards  questions  of  fact. 

On  December  12,  1916,  the  Central  Powers  sug- 
gested the  meeting,  on  neutral  ground,  of  delegates 
of  the  warring  states,  for  an  exchange  of  views  on  the 
subject  of  peace.  Six  days  later  (December  18) 
the  diplomatic  representatives  of  the  United  States 
in  all  the  belligerent  countries  were  instructed  to 
present  to  the  governments  to  which  they  were 
accredited  a  "suggestion"  which  it  was  said  that  the 
President  had  "long  had  it  in  mind  to  offer."  This 
was  that  the  belligerent  nations  should  make  such 
an  avowal  of  their  views  as  to  the  conclusion  of  the 
war  and  the  arrangement  of  a  "guaranty  against  its 
renewal  or  the  kindling  of  any  similar  conflict  in 

83 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  future,"  as  would  render  it  possible  "frankly  to 
compare  them."  The  objects  of  statesmen  on  both 
sides,  as  set  forth  in  general  terms  to  their  own 
people  and  to  the  world,  were,  it  was  observed, 
"virtually  the  same,"  embracing  security  for  the 
rights  of  small  states,  the  prevention  of  "rival 
leagues  to  preserve  an  uncertain  balance  of  power 
amidst  multiplying  suspicions,"  and  "the  formation 
of  a  league  of  nations  to  insure  peace  and  justice 
throughout  the  world."  In  the  measures  to  be 
taken  "to  secure  the  future  peace  of  the  world"  the 
people  and  government  of  the  United  States  were, 
it  was  declared,  "as  vitally  and  as  directly  inter- 
ested" as  the  governments  then  at  war;  and  they 
stood  "ready,  and  even  eager,"  to  "cooperate  in 
the  accomplishment"  of  those  ends,  when  the  war 
was  over,  "with  every  influence  and  resource  at 
their  command."  The  President,  therefore,  it'  was 
said,  felt  "altogether  justified  in  suggesting  an  im- 
mediate opportunity  for  a  comparison  of  views  as 
to  the  terms  which  must  precede  those  ultimate 
arrangements  for  the  peace  of  the  world";  in 
other  words,  an  avowal,  by  the  authoritative 
spokesmen  on  either  side,  of  the  precise  objects 
the  attainment  of  which  would  bring  the  war  to 
an  end. 

To  this  public  invitation  the  governments  ad- 
dressed publicly  responded  in  variant  senses.  The 
Central  Powers,  December  ->6,  1916,  replied  that  a 
direct  exchange  of  views  appeared  to  be  the  most 

84 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

suitable  way  of  attaining  the  desired  result,  and  in 
this  relation  referred  to  their  proposal  of  the  12  th 
of  the  month. 

The  Allies,  in  a  joint  note  of  January  10,  191 7, 
after  protesting  "in  the  most  friendly  but  in  the  most 
specific  manner  against  the  assimilation  established 
in  the  American  note  between  the  two  groups  of 
belligerents,"  and  denouncing  the  "aggressive  de- 
signs" and  war  practices  of  the  Central  Powers, 
answered  that,  while  the  objects  of  the  Allies  in  the 
war  would  not  be  made  known  in  detail  prior  to  the 
hour  of  negotiation,  yet  the  world  understood  that 
those  objects  included  "the  restoration  of  Belgium, 
of  Servia,  and  of  Montenegro,"  with  the  "indem- 
nities" due  them;  the  "evacuation  of  the  invaded 
territories  of  France,  of  Russia,  and  of  Roumania, 
with  just  reparation";  the  "reorganization  of  Eu- 
rope guaranteed  by  a  stable  regime,"  with  respect 
for  nationalities  and  liberty  of  economic  develop- 
ment; the  "restitution  of  provinces  or  territories 
wrested  in  the  past  from  the  Allies  by  force  or  against 
the  will  of  their  populations";  the  "liberation  of 
Italians,  of  Slavs,  of  Roumanians,  and  of  Tcheco- 
Slovaques  from  foreign  domination";  the  "en- 
franchisement of  populations"  subject  to  the  Turks, 
and  the  "expulsion"  of  the  Ottoman  Empire  from 
Europe.  While  it  was  intimated  that  the  Allies  also 
wished  ' '  to  liberate  Europe  from  the  brutal  covetous- 
ness  of  Prussian  militarism,"  yet  the  design  "to  en- 
compass the  extermination  of  the  German  peoples 

85 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

and  their  political  disappearance"  was  specifically 
disclaimed. 

The  views  thus  set  forth  were  supplemented  on  the 
part  of  Great  Britain  by  Mr.  Balfour,  secretary  for 
foreign  affairs,  in  a  dispatch  addressed  to  Sir  Cecil 
Spring  Rice,  British  ambassador  at  Washington,  on 
January  13,  191 7,  in  which  three  conditions  of  a 
durable  peace  were  declared  to  be,  "that  existing 
causes  of  international  unrest  should  be,  as  far  as 
possible,  removed  or  weakened,"  that  "the  aggres- 
sive aims  and  the  unscrupulous  methods  of  the 
Central  Powers  should  fall  into  disrepute  among 
their  own  peoples,"  and  that  "behind  international 
law  and  behind  all  treaty  arrangements  for  prevent- 
ing or  limiting  hostilities  some  form  of  international 
sanction  should  be  devised  which  would  give  pause 
to  the  hardiest  aggressor."  These  conditions,  said 
Mr.  Balfour,  might  be  "difficult  of  fulfilment"; 
but  they  were  believed  to  be  "in  general  harmony 
with  the  President's  ideas";  and  the  Allies  were 
confident  that  none  of  them  could  be  satisfied 
unless  a  peace  could  be  secured  on  the  lines  in- 
dicated, so  far  as  concerned  Europe,  in  the  joint 
note. 

On  January  10,  191 7,  the  day  on  which  the  allied 
note  was  dated,  a  new  order  in  council  was  issued 
by  which  the  terms  "enemy  destination"  and 
"enemy  origin,"  as  used  in  the  order  in  council  of 
March  11,  191 5,  prohibiting  all  trade  and  intercourse 
with  Germany,  were  declared  to  apply  to  all  goods 

86 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

"destined  for  or  originating  in  any  enemy  country," 
and  the  term  "enemy  property"  to  goods  belonging 
to  "any  person  domiciled  in  any  enemy  country." 
The  new  order  was  expressly  made  applicable  to 
goods  previously  discharged  at  a  British  or  allied 
port.  On  January  24th  the  Foreign  Office  gave  no- 
tice that  an  additional  area  in  the  North  Sea  adjacent 
to  the  Dutch  and  Danish  coasts,  except  territorial 
waters,  would  be  "rendered  dangerous  to  all  ship- 
ping by  operations  against  the  enemy"  and  "should 
therefore  be  avoided." 

On  January  22,  191 7,  President  Wilson  delivered 
to  the  Senate  an  address  in  which  he  undertook  to 
state  the  "conditions"  under  which  the  people  of 
the  United  States  would  "feel  free"  to  render  to 
mankind  a  "service"  which,  he  said,  they  could 
"not  in  honor  withhold"  and  which  they  did  "not 
wish  to  withhold";  a  "service,"  he  declared,  "noth- 
ing less  than  this,  to  add  their  authority  and  their 
power  to  the  authority  and  force  of  other  nations  to 
guarantee  peace  and  justice  throughout  the  world." 
The  "conditions,"  as  he  detailed  them,  embraced  "a 
peace  without  victory, "  an  "  equality  of  rights  among 
organized  nations,"  the  acceptance  of  the  principle 
that  "governments  derive  all  their  just  powers  from 
the  consent  of  the  governed"  (to  be  exemplified,  for 
instance,  by  "a  united,  independent,  and  autono- 
mous Poland"),  the  assurance  to  "every  great  people 
now  struggling  towards  a  full  development  of  its 
resources  and  its  powers"  of  "a  direct  outlet  to  the 

87 


AM  E  R  I  CAN    1)1  PLOMACY 

great  highways  of  the  sea,"  and  the  preservation  of 
tne  "freedom  of  the  seas." 

Copies  of  this  address  were  transmitted  to  the 
representatives  of  the  powers.  On  January  31, 
191 7,  the  German  ambassador  at  Washington,  in 
acknowledging  its  receipt,  stated  that,  while  its 
"main  tendencies"  corresponded  largely  "to  the 
desires  and  principles  professed  by  Germany,"  yet, 
as  her  enemies  had,  in  their  economic  conference  at 
Paris,  manifested  an  intention  not  to  treat  her  as  an 
equal  even  after  peace  was  restored,  and,  besides 
rejecting  her  recent  overture  for  a  discussion  of 
terms  of  peace,  had,  on  pretence  of  following  the 
principle  of  nationality,  disclosed  their  real  aim  in 
the  war  to  be  "to  dismember  and  dishonor  Germany, 
Austria-Hungary,  Turkey,  and  Bulgaria";  and  as 
Great  Britain  had  for  two  and  a  half  years  been  using 
her  naval  power  in  a  "criminal  attempt  to  force 
Germany  into  submission  by  starvation,"  there  had 
been  created  a  "new  situation"  which  forced  Ger- 
many to  "new  decisions."  These  were  embodied  in 
two  memoranda,  which  gave  notice  that,  after 
February  1,  191 7,  all  ships,  including  those  of  neu- 
trals, found  navigating  within  a  defined  zone  around 
Great  Britain,  France,  and  Italy,  and  in  the  eastern 
Mediterranean,  would  be  sunk.  A  limited  reserva- 
tion was  made  as  to  neutral  ships  in  or  on  their  way 
to  ports  in  the  "blockaded  zones"  on  the  1st  of 
February;  and  it  was  stated  that  one  American 
passenger-steamer  a  week,  in  each  direction,  might 

88 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

sail  undisturbed  to  and  from  Falmouth,  in  England, 
such  steamers  to  be  distinguished  by  certain  marks 
and  to  sail  by  a  designated  route,  the  United  States 
guaranteeing  that  they  carried  no  articles  included 
in  the  German  contraband  list. 

A  communication  of  similar  tenor  and  bearing  the 
same  date  was  handed  by  the  Imperial-Royal  For- 
eign Office  to  the  American  ambassador  at  Vienna. 

February  3,  191 7,  Mr.  Lansing,  referring  to  the 
correspondence  exchanged  in  the  case  of  the  Sussex, 
announced  to  the  German  ambassador,  by  direction 
of  the  President,  that  all  diplomatic  relations  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  the  German  Empire 
were  severed. 

On  the  same  day  the  President,  in  an  address  to 
Congress,  officially  informed  that  body  of  the  step 
thus  taken.  Notwithstanding  the  unexpected  and 
sudden  renunciation  by  the  German  authorities  of 
their  previous  assurance  regarding  the  conduct  of 
submarine  warfare,  he  refused,  he  said,  to  believe 
that  they  intended  to  do  in  fact  what  they  had  given 
warning  that  they  would  feel  at  liberty  to  do,  and 
only  "actual  overt  acts"  on  their  part  could  make 
him  believe  it.  But  he  added  that,  if  American 
ships  and  American  lives  should  in  fact  be  thus 
sacrificed,  he  should  take  the  liberty  of  coming  again 
before  Congress  for  authority  to  use  any  means  that 
might  be  necessary  "for  the  protection  of  our  sea- 
men and  our  people  in  the  prosecution  of  their  peace- 
ful and  legitimate  errands  on  the  high  seas."     He 

89 


A  M  ERIC  AN    DIPLOMACY 

could,  he  said,  do  nothing  less;  and  he  took  it  for 
granted  that  "all  neutral  governments  will  take  the 
same  course." 

On  February  nth  the  Swiss  minister  at  Washing- 
ton, to  whom  the  care  of  German  interests  had  been 
committed,  presented  a  memorandum,  stating  that 
the  German  government  was  "willing  to  negotiate, 
formally  or  informally,  with  the  United  States,  pro- 
vided that  the  commercial  blockade  against  England 
will  not  be  broken  thereby."  Mr.  Lansing,  in  the 
name  of  the  President,  replied  that  the  United 
States  would  discuss  any  questions  which  the  Ger- 
man government  might  propose,  but  only  if  the 
latter  would  first  withdraw  its  proclamation  of 
January  31st,  and  renew  the  assurances  given  on 
May  4,  1 91 6,  as  to  submarine  warfare. 

February  12  th  the  Mexican  embassy  at  Washing- 
ton presented,  by  direction  of  President  Carranza, 
a  proposal,  to  the  United  States  and  to  "all  the  other 
neutral  governments,"  that  the  warring  powers  be 
invited  to  terminate  the  conflict  either  by  direct 
negotiation  or  through  the  good  offices  or  friendly 
mediation  of  all  the  countries  which  should  jointly 
extend  the  invitation.  It  was  further  proposed  that 
if  within  a  reasonable  time  peace  should  not  by  this 
means  be  restored,  the  neutral  countries  should 
"take  the  necessary  measures  to  reduce  the  con- 
flagration to  its  narrowest  limit  by  refusing  any 
kind  of  implements  to  the  belligerents  and  suspend- 
ing commercial  relations"  with  them  until  the  con- 

90 


THE   SYSTEM   OF   NEUTRALITY 

flagration  should  have  been  "smothered."  The 
United  States,  in  subsequently  declining  this  pro- 
posal, referred  to  the  extent  to  which  one  group 
of  the  belligerents  had  carried  on  on  the  high  seas  a 
warfare  "involving  the  destruction  of  American  ships 
and  the  lives  of  American  citizens,"  and  to  the  fact 
that  the  United  States  had  "unearthed  a  plot  laid  by 
the  government  dominating  the  Central  Powers  to 
embroil  not  only  the  government  and  people  of 
Mexico,  but  also  the  government  and  people  of  Japan 
in  war  with  the  United  States."  This  statement 
referred  to  an  intercepted  dispatch  to  the  German 
minister  in  Mexico,  by  which  he  was  directed,  in 
case  the  United  States  should  cease  to  be  neutral,  to 
offer  Mexico,  as  the  price  of  her  cooperation  with 
Germany,  the  recovery  of  the  territories  which  she 
lost  to  the  United  States  in  the  fourth  decade  of  the 
nineteenth  century,  and  to  seek  an  alliance  with 
Japan. 

Meanwhile  the  general  situation  at  sea  had  not 
improved.  On  January  24,  191 7,  the  British  Foreign 
Office  had  given  notice  of  a  new  area  in  the  North 
Sea,  adjacent  to  the  Dutch  and  Danish  coasts,  which 
would  be  "rendered  dangerous  to  all  shipping  by 
operations  against  the  enemy"  and  which  "should 
therefore  be  avoided."  The  reason  assigned  for  this 
measure  was  "the  unrestricted  warfare  carried  on 
by  Germany  at  sea  by  means  of  mines  and  sub- 
marines." On  the  13  th  of  February  a  new  notice 
was  substituted,  extending  the  area;  and  further  en- 

91 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

largements   have   since   been   made   by   notices   of 
March  21st  and  April  6th. 

Moreover,  by  a  proclamation  of  February  16th, 
the  British  government,  referring  to  the  German 
memorandum  as  to  blockaded  zones,  announced 
that,  in  addition  to  the  restrictions  previously  im- 
posed on  commerce  with  the  enemy,  by  the  order  of 
March  11,  191 5,  and  other  measures,  the  rule  would 
thenceforth  be  enforced  that  any  vessel  sailing  to  or 
from  a  neutral  port  which  afforded  means  of  access 
to  the  enemy  territory,  without  calling  at  a  port  in 
British  or  allied  territory,  should,  until  the  contrary 
was  established,  be  deemed  to  be  carrying  goods  with 
an  enemy  destination  or  of  enemy  origin,  and  should 
be  brought  in  for  examination  and,  if  necessary,  for 
adjudication  before  the  prize  court.  It  was  further 
declared  that  the  infraction  of  this  rule  would  sub- 
ject the  vessel  to  capture  and  condemnation;  and 
that  goods  found  to  be  of  "enemy  origin"  or  of 
"enemy  destination"  should  be  liable  to  the  same 
penalty. 

To  the  intelligent  reader  these  measures  will  not 
fail  to  recall  the  retaliatory  orders  and  decrees  of  the 
wars  growing  out  of  the  French  Revolution  and  the 
Napoleonic  wars. 

On  February  14,  191 7,  the  American  ambassador  at 
Vienna  was  instructed  to  call  the  attention  of  the 
Imperial-Royal  government  to  the  sinking  in  the 
Mediterranean,  presumably  by  submarines  of  Aus- 
tria-Hungary, of  a  number  of  vessels  having  Amer- 

92 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

icans  aboard.  Two  British  vessels  particularly  were 
mentioned  as  having  been  torpedoed  without  warn- 
ing. The  instructions  recalled  the  assurance  given 
in  the  case  of  the  Ancona,  and,  while  remarking  that 
this  pledge  had  been  modified  "to  a  greater  or  less 
extent"  not  only  by  the  communication  of  January 
31,  191 7,  but  also  by  a  declaration  of  February  10, 

19 16,  to  the  effect  that  "all  merchant- vessels  armed 
with  cannon,  for  whatever  purpose,  by  this  very  fact 
lose  the  character  of  peaceable  vessels,"  asked  that 
the  government  definitely  state  its  attitude.  The 
answer  of  the  Imperial-Royal  government  was 
made  on  the  2d  of  March.  After  discussing  at 
length  the  questions  involved,  and  declaring  the 
opinion  that  the  arming  of  merchant-vessels,  though 
only  for  defence  against  the  exercise  of  the  right  of 
capture,  was  "not  founded  on  modern  international 
law,"  the  answer  stated  that  Austro-Hungarian  men- 
of-war  had  instructions  "even  in  case  of  encounter- 
ing armed  enemy  merchant-vessels  to  be  mindful  of 
issuing  a  warning  and  of  saving  the  persons  on  board, 
if  this  should  be  possible  under  the  existing  circum- 
stances." That  the  two  British  steamers,  men- 
tioned by  the  United  States,  were  sunk  by  Austro- 
Hungarian  submarines  was  denied.  The  answer 
further  stated  that  while  the  notice  of  January  31, 

191 7,  was  essentially  a  warning  that  no  merchant- 
ship  might  navigate  the  sea  zones  therein  defined, 
yet  the  Austro-Hungarian  men-of-war  were  "in- 
structed  to   warn   merchant-vessels   when   possible 

93 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

even  when  encountered  in  these  zones  as  well  as  to 
provide  for  the  safety  of  crews  and  passengers." 
The  Imperial-Royal  government,  said  the  answer, 
was  "unable  to  accept  a  responsibility  for  the  pos- 
sible loss  of  human  life  which,  nevertheless,  may 
result  from  the  destruction  of  armed  ships  or  ships 
encountered  in  the  closed  zones";  but  attention  was 
called  to  the  circumstance  that  Austro-Hungarian 
submarines  were  "operating  only  in  the  Adriatic  and 
in  the  Mediterranean,"  so  that  prejudice  to  American 
interests  by  their  operations  was  "hardly  to  be 
feared."  In  conclusion,  the  note  explicitly  declared 
that  the  assurance  given  in  the  case  of  the  Ancona 
and  renewed  in  that  of  the  Persia  had  "neither  been 
withdrawn  nor  restricted"  by  the  declarations  of 
February  10,  1916,  and  January  31,  191 7. 

On  February  26th,  the  term  of  the  existing  Con- 
gress being  then  about  to  expire,  the  President  again 
addressed  that  body.  He  stated  that  the  commerce 
of  other  neutral  nations  was,  in  common  with  that 
of  the  United  States,  "suffering  severely,"  but  per- 
haps not  very  much  more  severely  than  before. 
"We  have,"  said  the  President,  "asked  the  co- 
operation of  the  other  neutral  governments  to  pre- 
vent these  depredations,  but  so  far  none  of  them  has 
thought  it  wise  to  join  us  in  any  common  course  of 
action."  The  President  further  stated  that,  al- 
though two  American  vessels  had  been  sunk,  the  cir- 
cumstances did  not  clearly  indicate  an  altered  method 
in  the  German  submarine  warfare,  and  that  the  sit- 

94 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

uation  since  the  3d  of  February  had  not  substantially- 
changed,  except  for  the  tying  up  of  American  ship- 
ping in  port  because  of  the  unwillingness  of  ship- 
owners to  risk  their  vessels  at  sea  without  insurance 
or  adequate  protection,  and  the  resulting  congestion 
of  commerce  which  was  growing  rapidly  more  and 
more  serious  every  day.  This  might  in  itself,  he 
remarked,  in  effect  accomplish  what  the  new  German 
submarine  order  was  meant  to  accomplish,  but  he 
could  only  say  that  the  "overt  act"  which  he  had 
ventured  to  hope  the  German  commanders  would 
avoid  had  not  occurred.  But  there  had,  he  said, 
been  certain  additional  indications  and  expressions 
of  purpose  on  the  part  of  the  German  press  and  the 
German  authorities  which  increased  the  impression 
that  the  course  of  the  German  submarine  command- 
ers had  been  characterized  by  an  unexpected  dis- 
cretion and  restraint  rather  than  by  any  restriction 
placed  upon  them  by  their  instructions.  The  situa- 
tion, therefore,  was  fraught  with  the  gravest  possi- 
bilities and  dangers,  and  as  the  session  of  Congress 
was  about  to  expire,  he  desired  to  obtain  "full  and 
immediate  assurance"  of  the  authority  which  he 
might  at  any  moment  need  to  exercise.  The  form 
in  which  action  might  become  necessary  could  not 
be  foreseen,  but  he  asked  to  be  authorized  to  supply 
American  merchant-ships  with  defensive  arms,  should 
that  become  necessary,  and  with  the  means  of  using 
them,  and  to  employ  ' '  any  other  instrumentalities  or 
methods  that  may  be  necessary  and  adequate  to  pro- 

95 


AMERICAN    D  1  P  L  ()  M  A  C  Y 

tect  our  ships  and  our  people  in  their  legitimate  and 
peaceful  pursuits  on  the  seas."  Along  with  these 
powers,  he  asked  for  a  sufficient  credit  to  provide 
adequate  means  of  protection,  including  insurance 
against  present  war  risks. 

The  term  of  the  Congress  having  come  to  a  close 
without  legislative  action  on  this  request,  the  De- 
partment of  State  on  the  12  th  of  March  informed  the 
members  of  the  Diplomatic  Corps  in  Washington  that, 
as  the  Imperial  German  government  had  on  January 
31,  191 7,  announced  that  all  ships,  neutral  included, 
encountered  "within  certain  zones  of  the  high  seas, 
would  be  sunk  without  any  precautions  being  taken 
for  the  safety  of  the  persons  on  board,  and  without  the 
exercise  of  visit  and  search,"  the  government  of  the 
United  States  had  "determined  to  place  upon  all 
American  merchant-vessels  sailing  through  the  barred 
areas  an  armed  guard  for  the  protection  of  the  vessels 
and  the  lives  of  the  persons  on  board." 

"Overt  acts"  having  occurred,  the  President,  on 
the  2d  of  April,  again  addressed  Congress,  which  he 
had  called  in  extra  session.  Vessels  of  every  kind 
without  regard  to  flag,  character,  cargo,  destination, 
or  errand  had,  he  said,  been  ruthlessly  sent  to  the 
bottom  without  warning  and  without  thought  of 
help  or  mercy  for  those  on  board;  the  vessels  of 
friendly  neutrals  along  with  those  of  belligerents,  and 
even  hospital  ships  and  ships  carrying  relief  to 
Belgium,  though  provided  with  safe  conduct,  had 
been  sunk.     The  present  German  submarine  war- 

96 


THE    SYSTEM   OF    NEUTRALITY 

fare  against  commerce  was,  he  declared,  "a  warfare 
against  mankind,"  "a  war  against  all  nations" — 
the  "challenge"  was  "to  all  mankind."  Each  na- 
tion must  decide  for  itself  how  it  would  meet  the 
challenge.  There  was,  he  said,  but  "one  choice" 
that  could  be  made;  and  he  advised  that  the  Con- 
gress declare  the  recent  course  of  the  Imperial  Ger- 
man government  "to  be  in  fact  nothing  less  than 
war  against  the  government  and  people  of  the 
United  States,"  and  that  immediate  steps  be  taken 
"not  only  to  put  the  country  in  a  more  thorough 
state  of  defence,  but  also  to  exert  all  its  power  and 
employ  all  its  resources  to  bring  the  government  of 
the  German  Empire  to  terms  and  end  the  war." 
This  would,  he  said,  "involve  the  utmost  practicable 
co-operation  and  action  with  the  governments  now 
at  war  with  Germany,  and,  as  incident  to  that,  the 
extension ' '  to  them  ' '  of  the  most  liberal  financial 
credits,  in  order  that  our  resources"  might,  "so  far 
as  possible,  be  added  to  theirs."  It  would  "involve 
the  organization  and  mobilization  of  all  the  material 
resources  of  the  country,"  the  "immediate  full  equip- 
ment of  the  navy,"  and  the  immediate  addition  to 
the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  of  at  least 
five  hundred  thousand  men,  to  "be  chosen  upon  the 
principle  of  universal  liability  to  service."  The  ob- 
ject of  the  United  States  should  be  "  to  vindicate  the 
principles  of  peace  and  justice  in  the  life  of  the  world 
as  against  selfish  and  autocratic  power  and  to  set  up 
amongst  the  really  free  and  self-governed  peoples  of 
7  97 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  world  such  a  concert  of  purpose  and  of  action" 
as  would  ' '  henceforth  ensure  the  observance  of  those 
principles."  The  United  States  was,  President 
Wilson  further  declared,  "at  the  beginning  of  an  age" 
in  which  it  would  be  "insisted  that  the  same  stand- 
ards of  conduct  and  of  responsibility  for  wrong  done  " 
should  "be  observed  among  nations  and  their  gov- 
ernments" that  were  "observed  among  the  individ- 
ual citizens  of  civilized  states."  A  steadfast  concert 
for  peace  could  never  be  maintained  except  by  "a 
partnership  of  democratic  nations."  Events  had 
shown  that  "the  Prussian  autocracy  was  not  and 
could  never  be  our  friend  " ;  that  it  had  meant  to  stir 
up  enemies  against  the  United  States  at  its  very  doors 
was  shown  by  the  intercepted  note  to  the  German 
minister  at  the  City  of  Mexico.  The  United  States, 
the  President  affirmed,  was  about  to  accept  the  gage 
of  battle  with  this  "natural  foe  to  liberty"  and 
should,  if  necessary,  "spend  the  whole  force  of  the 
nation  to  check  and  nullify  its  pretensions  and  its 
power."  "The  world,"  said  the  President,  "must 
be  made  safe  for  democracy."  The  United  States 
had  no  "selfish  ends  to  serve,"  no  desire  for  "con- 
quest" or  for  "dominion,"  but  was  the  champion  of 
the  "rights  of  mankind." 

On  April  6,  191 7,  the  President  approved  a  joint 
resolution  of  Congress,  announcing  that  the  "state 
of  war  between  the  United  States  and  the  Imperial 
German  government"  which  had  been  "thrust  upon 
the  United  States"  was  "formally  declared." 

98 


THE    SYSTEM    OF   NEUTRALITY 

Two  days  later  (April  8th)  the  charge  d'affaires  of 
the  United  States  at  Vienna  was  notified  that,  as 
the  United  States  had  declared  the  existence  of  a 
state  of  war  with  the  Imperial  German  government, 
Austria-Hungary,  as  the  ally  of  the  German  Empire, 
had  decided  to  break  off  diplomatic  relations  with 
his  government.  At  the  same  time  passports  were 
placed  at  his  disposal  for  the  departure  of  himself 
and  the  other  members  of  the  embassy.  The  am- 
bassador of  the  United  States,  Mr.  Penfield,  had 
previously  withdrawn  from  the  Austrian  capital. 

Within  a  few  days  after  President  Wilson's  war 
message  to  Congress  the  government  of  Brazil  sev- 
ered diplomatic  relations  with  Germany  because  of 
the  torpedoing  of  the  Brazilian  steamer  Parana  off 
Cherbourg.  When,  subsequently,  the  Brazilian  ves- 
sel Tijuca  also  was  torpedoed  the  decree  of  neutrality 
not  long  previously  issued  respecting  the  war  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Germany  was  revoked, 
and  an  American  squadron,  then  on  its  way  to  South 
America,  was  thus  relieved  in  advance  from  the  ob- 
servance of  neutral  restrictions  in  Brazilian  waters. 
The  decree  of  neutrality  as  between  the  Allies  in 
Europe  and  Germany  was  not  then  withdrawn,  but 
German  merchantmen  lying  in  Brazilian  ports  were 
placed  under  the  Brazilian  flag  and  incorporated  into 
the  national  merchant  marine.  While  the  contrast  be- 
tween Brazil's  attitude  towards  the  Allies  in  Europe 
and  her  attitude  towards  the  United  States  exem- 
plified anew  the  traditional  friendship  and  sympathy 

99 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

between  the  two  American  countries,  of  which  there 
have  been  in  the  course  of  years  so  many  striking 
manifestations,1  yet  it  is  also  true  that  Brazil  had,  in 

1  In  notifying  the  United  States  of  his  government's  revocation 
of  the  decree  of  neutrality,  the  Brazilian  Ambassador  at  Washing- 
ton, June  4,  1917,  wrote  as  follows: 

"Mr  Secretary  of  State, — The  President  of  the  Republic 
has  just  instructed  me  to  inform  your  Excellency's  Government 
that  he  has  approved  the  law  which  revokes  Brazil's  neutrality  in 
the  war  between  the  United  States  of  America  and  the  German 
Empire.  The  Republic  thus  recognized  the  fact  that  one  of  the 
belligerents  is  a  constituent  portion  of  the  American  continent 
and  that  we  are  bound  to  that  belligerent  by  traditional  friendship 
and  the  same  sentiment  in  the  defense  of  the  vital  interest  of  America 
and  the  accepted  principles  of  law. 

"Brazil  ever  was  and  is  now  free  from  war-like  ambitions,  and 
while  it  always  refrained  from  showing  any  partiality  in  the  European 
conflict,  it  could  no  longer  stand  unconcerned  when  the  struggle  in- 
volved the  United  States,  actuated  by  no  interest  whatever  but 
solely  for  the  sake  of  international  judicial  order,  and  when  Germany 
included  us  and  the  other  neutral  powers  in  the  most  violent  acts  of 
war. 

"While  the  comparative  lack  of  reciprocity  on  the  part  of  the 
American  republics  divested  until  now  the  Monroe  Doctrine  of 
its  true  character,  by  permitting  of  an  interpretation  based  on  the 
prerogatives  of  their  sovereignty,  the  present  events  which  brought 
Brazil  even  now  to  the  side  of  the  United  States  at  a  critical  moment 
in  the  history  of  the  world,  are  still  imparting  to  our  foreign  policy 
a  practical  shape  of  continental  solidarity,  a  policy,  however,  that 
was  also  that  of  the  former  regime  whenever  any  of  the  other  sister 
friendly  nations  of  the  American  continent  was  concerned.  The 
Republic  strictly  observed  our  political  and  diplomatic  traditions 
and  remained  true  to  the  liberal  principles  in  which  the  nation  was 
nurtured. 

"Thus  understanding  our  duty  and  Brazil  taking  the  position 
to  which  its  antecedents  and  the  conscience  of  a  free  people  pointed, 
whatever  fate  the  morrow  may  have  in  store  for  us,  we  shall  con- 
serve the  Constitution  which  governs  us  and  which  has  not  yet  been 
surpassed  in  the  guaranties  due  to  the  rights,  lives,  and  property  of 
foreigners. 

"In  bringing  the  above-stated  resolution  to  your  Excellency's 

100 


THE    SYSTEM    OF    NEUTRALITY 

common  with  other  South  American  countries,  felt 
the  effects  of  various  restrictive  measures  of  the 
European  Allies,  such  as  the  blacklist  and  embar- 
goes. As  regards  the  latter,  it  may  be  observed  that 
the  British  list  of  prohibited  articles  contains  certain 
Brazilian  agricultural  exports,  including  the  great 
national  product — coffee.  While  this  prohibition  is 
maintained  for  the  purpose  of  assuring  the  use  of  all 
cargo  space  for  foodstuffs  of  prime  necessity,  such 
measures  are  of  necessity  more  or  less  judged  in  each 
country  by  their  local  effects.  On  June  28,  191 7» 
however,  the  President  of  Brazil  issued  a  decree 
revoking  the  prior  neutrality  decrees  as  between 
Germany,  on  the  one  hand,  and  Russia,  France, 
Belgium,  Great  Britain  Japan,  and  Portugal,  on 
the  other. 

References: 

Works  of  Hamilton,  Jefferson,  Madison,  and  Washington; 

Trescot's  Diplomatic  History  of  the  Administrations  of  Wash- 
ington and  Adams; 

Beveridge's  Life  of  John  Marshall; 

Lyman's  Diplomacy  of  the  United  States; 

Bemis's  American  Neutrality; 

Bernard's-  Historical  Account  of  the  Neutrality  of  Great  Britain 
During  the  American  Civil  War; 

Bancroft's  (Frederic)  Life  of  Seward; 

knowledge,  I  beg  you  to  be  pleased  to  convey  to  your  Government 
the  sentiments  of  unalterable  friendship  of  the  Brazilian  people  and 
Government. 

"I  avail  myself  of  the  opportunity  to  reiterate  to  your  Excellency 
the  assurances  of  my  highest  consideration. 

"DOMICIO   DA   GAMA." 

— Official  Bulletin,  Washington,  June  22,  1917. 
101 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Cushing's  Treaty  of  Washington; 

Adams's  (C.  F.)  Treaty  of  Washington. 

For  British  Orders  in  Council  and  French  Decrees,  1793-1S15, 
see  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  folio; 
Moore's  Digest  of  International  Law,  Vol.  VII;  Moore's 
History  and  Digest  of  International  Arbitrations,  Vol.  I, 
chap.  10,  and  Vol.  V,  chaps.  A  and  B;  Adams's  (Henry) 
History  of  the  United  States. 

For  a  history  of  the  Geneva  Tribunal  {Alabama  Claims), 
see  Moore's  History  and  Digest  of  International  Arbitrations, 
I,  chap.  10,  and  the  works  there  cited; 

Hackett's  Reminiscences  of  the  Geneva  Tribunal; 

Davis's  (Bancroft)  Mr.  Fish  and  the  Alabama  Claims. 

For  Senate  committee  reports,  and  presidential  messages,  see 
Compilation  of  Reports  of  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations, 
United  States  Senate  (Washington,  Government  Printing 
Office);  Richardson  (James  D.),  A  Compilation  of  the 
Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,  1789-1S97. 


Ill 

FREEDOM    OF   THE    SEAS 

In  maintaining  the  right  of  neutrals  freely  to 
navigate  the  ocean  in  pursuit  of  innocent  commerce, 
the  early  statesmen  of  America,  while  sustaining  a 
predominant  national  interest,  gave  their  support 
to  a  cause  from  the  eventual  triumph  of  which  the 
whole  world  was  to  derive  an  incalculable  benefit. 
But  it  was  not  in  time  of  war  alone  that  commerce 
was  exposed  to  attacks  at  sea.  Although  the  ex- 
orbitant pretensions  of  the  sixteenth  century,  by 
which  the  navigation  even  of  the  Atlantic  and  the 
Pacific  was  assumed  to  be  susceptible  of  engross- 
ment, had,  before  the  end  of  the  eighteenth,  fallen 
into  desuetude,  much  remained  to  be  accomplished 
before  the  exhibition  of  an  acknowledged  national 
flag  would  assure  to  the  peaceful  mariner  an  un- 
molested passage.  Ere  this  great  end  could  be  at- 
tained, it  was  necessary  that  various  exaggerated 
claims  of  dominion  over  adjacent  seas  should  be 
denied  and  overcome,  that  the  "right  of  search" 
should  be  resisted  and  abandoned,  and  that  piracy 
should  be  extirpated. 

103 


AM  E R I  CM  N    D  1  PLOMACY 

In  placing  the  danger  from  "water  thieves"  be- 
fore the  peril  of  "waters,  winds,  and  rocks,"  Shy- 
lock  described  a  condition  of  things  that  long  sur- 
vived his  own  times.  At  the  close  of  the  eighteenth 
century,  a  merchantman  built  for  long  voyages  still 
differed  little  in  armament  from  a  man-of-war. 
Whether  it  rounded  the  Horn  or  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope,  it  was  exposed  to  the  depredations  of  fero- 
cious and  well-armed  marauders,  and  if  it  passed 
through  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  it  was  forced  to  en- 
counter maritime  blackmail  in  its  most  systematic 
and  most  authoritative  form.  On  the  African  coast 
of  the  Mediterranean  lay  the  Barbary  powers — the 
empire  of  Morocco,  and  the  regencies  of  Tunis, 
Tripoli,  and  Algiers — which  had  for  generations  sub- 
sisted by  depredations  on  commerce.  In  this  way 
they  had  won  the  opprobrious  title  of  "piratical 
states,"  but  they  wore  it  with  a  pampered  and  super- 
cilious dignity.  Even  in  the  exchange  of  courtesies 
they  exhibited  a  haughty  parsimony,  exacting  from 
the  foreign  man-of-war  the  generous  requital  of  a 
barrel  of  powder  for  every  gun  with  which  they  re- 
turned its  salute.  They  had  every  reason  to  know 
that  their  power  was  understood  and  dreaded.  In 
their  navies  might  be  found  the  products  of  the 
ship-building  skill  of  England,  France,  Spain,  and 
Venice.  In  war,  civilized  powers  did  not  always 
scruple  to  make  use  of  their  aid.  Their  mode  of 
life  was  diplomatically  recognized,  and  to  some  ex- 

104 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

tent  connived  at.  It  was  regulated  by  a  simple 
formula.  While  disdaining  the  part  of  common 
pirates,  such  as  plundered  vessels  indiscriminately, 
they  professed  themselves  at  war  with  all  who  re- 
fused to  pay  them  tribute ;  and  they  took  good  care 
to  make  their  friendship  expensive.  Peace  with 
Algiers,  in  1786,  was  reported  to  have  cost  Spain 
upward  of  three  millions  of  dollars,  while  the  an- 
nual presents  of  Great  Britain  to  the  four  states 
were  valued  at  nearly  three  hundred  thousand. 

At  the  outbreak  of  the  Revolution  it  was  esti- 
mated that  one-sixth  of  the  wheat  and  flour  ex- 
ported from  the  United  States,  and  one-fourth  of 
their  dried  and  pickled  fish,  and  a  quantity  of  rice, 
found  their  best  market  in  the  ports  of  the  Mediter- 
ranean. In  this  commerce,  which  had  grown  up 
under  the  protection  of  the  British  flag,  there  were 
employed  from  eighty  to  a  hundred  ships,  manned 
by  twelve  hundred  seamen.  Early  in  the  war  it  was 
entirely  abandoned,  and  its  loss  was  severely  felt.  In 
the  plan  of  a  treaty  furnished  to  Franklin  and  his 
colleagues,  the  Continental  Congress,  accommodating 
its  demands  to  its  wishes,  proposed  that  France 
should  take  the  place  of  Great  Britain  as  the  pro- 
tector of  American  vessels ;  but  the  King  of  France 
went  no  further  than  to  agree  to  lend  his  good 
offices.  During  the  Revolution  the  Mediterranean 
commerce  therefore  remained  in  abeyance;  but  on 
May  12,  1784,  Adams,  Franklin,  and  Jefferson  were 

105 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

commissioned  to  treat  with  the  Barbary  powers; 
and  on  the  nth  of  the  ensuing  March  they  were 
authorized  to  send  agents  to  those  countries  to 
negotiate.  The  government  acted  none  too  soon. 
Before  an  agent  was  appointed  to  Morocco,  an 
American  vessel  was  captured  by  a  cruiser  of  that 
state.  The  Emperor,  however,  exhibited  much  mild- 
ness. On  the  friendly  interposition  of  Spain,  he 
restored  the  vessel  and  cargo  and  released  the  crew ; 
and  in  January,  1787,  he  concluded  a  liberal  treaty, 
at  a  cost  to  the  United  States  of  less  than  ten  thou- 
sand dollars. 

The  other  powers  proved  to  be  less  tractable,  and 
especially  troublesome  was  the  Dey  of  Algiers,  by 
whose  activities  the  revival  of  American  commerce 
with  the  Mediterranean  was  for  a  time  effectually 
prevented.  On  July  25,  1785,  the  schooner  Maria, 
of  Boston,  was  captured  off  Cape  St.  Vincent  by  an 
Algerine  cruiser,  and  five  days  later  the  ship  Dau- 
phin, of  Philadelphia,  was  taken.  The  vessels  and 
their  cargoes  were  carried  to  Algiers,  and  all  on 
board,  embracing  twenty-one  persons,  were,  accord- 
ing to  custom,  consigned  to  slavery  till  they  should 
be  ransomed.  A  new  difficulty  was  thus  created. 
When  Congress  issued  its  commission  to  Adams 
and  his  associates,  there  were  thousands  of  captives 
in  Barbary ;  but,  as  there  were  no  Americans  among 
them,  the  question  of  ransom  was  not  considered, 
and   the   whole   expense   of   the   negotiations   was 

106 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

limited  to  eighty  thousand  dollars.  For  the  libera, 
tion  of  the  twenty  -  one  Americans  subsequently 
captured,  Algiers  demanded  two  -  thirds  of  that 
sum.  For  this  emergency  no  provision  had  been 
made.  When  the  new  government  under  the  Con- 
stitution was  formed,  Jefferson,  as  Secretary  of 
State,  declared  the  determination  of  the  United 
States  "  to  prefer  war,  in  all  cases,  to  tribute  under 
any  form,"  but  a  navy  was  wanting  to  make 
this  declaration  effective.  By  December,  1793, 
the  number  of  American  vessels  captured  by  Al- 
gerine  corsairs  had  risen  to  thirteen,  and  the  num- 
ber of  captives  to  a  hundred  and  nineteen.  From 
Boston  to  Norfolk  almost  every  seaport  had  fur- 
nished its  victim.  Nor  was  the  Dey  anxious  to 
make  peace  with  America.  So  successful  had  he 
been  in  bringing  other  governments  to  terms,  that 
he  remained  at  war  only  with  the  United  States  and 
the  Hanse  Towns,  and  he  began  to  grow  apprehen- 
sive at  the  prospect  of  inactivity.  "If,"  he  ex- 
claimed, "  I  were  to  make  peace  with  everybody, 
what  should  I  do  with  my  corsairs?  What  should 
I  do  with  my  soldiers?  They  would  take  off  my 
head  for  the  want  of  other  prizes,  not  being  able  to 
live  upon  their  miserable  allowance."  Reasoning 
thus,  he  was  not  disposed  to  compromise;  but  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  urged  on  by  the 
cry  of  the  captives,  whom  it  was  then  unable  to 
rescue  by  force,  accepted  his  conditions,  and,  by 

107 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  expenditure  of  nearly  eight  hundred  thousand 
dollars,  obtained  the  release  of  its  citizens  and  pur- 
chased a  peace,  which  was  signed  on  September  5, 
1795.  A  treaty  with  Tripoli  followed  on  November 
4,  1796,  and  with  Tunis  in  August,  1797. 

The  respite  thus  secured  was  of  brief  duration. 
The  Dey  of  Algiers  received,  under  his  treaty  with 
the  United  States,  an  annual  payment  of  twelve 
thousand  sequins  (equivalent  to  nearly  twenty-two 
thousand  dollars)  in  naval  stores,  but,  besides  this 
stipulated  tribute,  there  were  customary  payments 
that  were  rigorously  counted  as  regalian  rights. 
Among  these  were  included  a  present  of  twenty 
thousand  dollars  on  the  sending  out  of  a  new  consul, 
biennial  presents  to  officers  of  government  esti- 
mated at  seventeen  thousand  dollars,  and  incidental 
and  contingent  presents  of  which  no  forecast  could 
be  made.  Tribute  was  likewise  paid  to  Tripoli  and 
to  Tunis ;  but  the  potentates  of  the  regencies,  though 
they  pursued  a  common  interest,  were  jealous  of 
one  another's  prosperity  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war, 
and  were  hard  to  content.  Early  in  1800  the  Ba- 
shaw of  Tripoli,  Jusuf  Caramanly,  a  bold  usurper  who 
seems  to  have  understood  both  the  principles  and 
the  cant  of  thrifty  politics,  complained  to  Mr.  Cath- 
cart,  the  American  consul,  that  the  presents  of  the 
United  States  to  Algiers  and  Tunis  were  more  liberal 
than  those  to  himself;  and  he  significantly  added 
that  compliments,  although  acceptable,  were  of  lit- 

108 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

tie  account,  and  that  the  heads  of  the  Barbary 
states  knew  their  friends  by  the  value  of  the  pres- 
ents they  received  from  them.  Not  long  afterwards 
he  intimated  that  he  would  like  to  have  some  Ameri- 
can captives  to  teach  him  English,  and  that,  if  the 
United  States  flag  once  came  down,  it  would  take 
a  great  deal  of  "grease"  to  raise  it  again.  Finally, 
lest  the  seriousness  of  his  grievances  might  not  be 
appreciated,  he  addressed  himself  directly  to  the 
President,  to  whom  he  pointedly  declared  that  any 
delay  in  complying  with  his  demands  would  be  prej- 
udicial to  American  interests.  No  response  came, 
and  the  Bashaw  grew  impatient.  "  In  Tripoli,  con- 
sul," said  he,  to  Cathcart,  "we  are  all  hungry,  and 
if  we  are  not  provided  for  we  soon  get  sick  and 
peevish."  Cathcart,  seeing  that  the  Bashaw  spoke 
in  metaphors,  replied  that,  when  the  chief  physician 
prescribed  the  medicine,  he  should  not  object  to 
administering  it,  but  that  meanwhile  he  could  prom- 
ise nothing.  "Take  care,"  answered  the  Bashaw, 
"that  the  medicine  does  not  come  too  late,  and,  if 
it  comes  in  time,  that  it  is  strong  enough."  On 
May  14,  1 801,  he  caused  the  American  flag-staff  to 
be  chopped  down  six  feet  from  the  ground,  in  token 
of  war.  The  answer  of  the  United  States  had  al- 
ready been  decided  upon.  Symptoms  of  unrest  had 
appeared  in  Tunis  and  Algiers  as  well  as  in  Tripoli; 
and  a  squadron  was  sent  to  the  Mediterranean  with 
orders,  if  any  of  the  Barbary  powers  should  declare 

109 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

war  or  commit  hostilities,  to  protect  American  com- 
merce and  chastise  their  insolence.  The  govern- 
ment had,  as  President  Jefferson  declared,  deter- 
mined "  to  owe  to  our  own  energies,  and  not  to 
dishonorable  condescensions,  the  protection  of  our 
right  to  navigate  the  ocean  freely."  For  two  years 
the  contest  with  Tripoli  dragged  wearily  along,  but 
its  vigorous  prosecution  with  augmented  forces, 
after  the  summer  of  1803,  brought  it  at  length  to 
a  triumphant  close.  The  midnight  destruction  by 
Decatur  of  the  frigate  Philadelphia,  under  the  fire 
of  the  Bashaw's  gunboats  and  batteries;  the  fierce 
and  incessant  bombardments  by  Preble  of  the 
Tripolitan  stronghold;  the  mysterious  fate  of  the 
heroic  Somers  and  his  fire-ship;  and  the  intrepid 
march  of  Eaton  across  the  desert  to  the  capture  of 
Derne,  were  incidents  which  taught  the  rulers  of 
the  Barbary  coast  that  a  new  spirit  must  be  reck- 
oned with.  On  June  3,  1805,  peace  was  agreed  to 
by  a  representative  of  the  Bashaw  on  board  the 
frigate  Constitution,  and  next  day  a  treaty  was  con- 
cluded on  shore. 

During  the  seven  years  that  followed  the  second 
peace  with  Tripoli,  the  relations  of  the  United  States 
with  the  Barbary  powers  were  comparatively  un- 
eventful; but  their  tranquillity  was  now  and  then 
disturbed  by  'incidents  which,  although  they  did 
not  produce  a  rupture,  bespoke  a  sullen  dissatisfac- 
tion with  existing  conditions.  This  feeling  prompt- 
no 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

ly  flamed  out  when  in  1812  the  report  was  received 
of  war  between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain. 
The  Dey  of  Algiers,  encouraged  to  believe  that  the 
maritime  power  of  America  would  be  annihilated, 
discovered  that  the  United  States  had  always  fallen 
short  in  the  payment  of  tribute,  and  expelled  the 
American  consul-general  and  all  American  citizens 
from  his  dominions.  An  American  brig  was  capt- 
ured by  an  Algerine  corsair,  and  the  crew  reduced 
to  captivity,  while  an  American  passenger  was  taken 
out  of  a  Spanish  ship  and  held  in  bondage.  Tripoli 
and  Tunis  allowed  the  prizes  of  an  American  priva- 
teer to  be  recaptured  by  the  British  in  their  ports. 
As  the  war  with  England  had  practically  shut  the 
Mediterranean  against  American  vessels,  measures 
of  defence  were  deferred;  but  on  February  23,  181 5, 
five  days  after  peace  with  Great  Britain  was  pro- 
claimed, President  Madison  recommended  a  decla- 
ration of  war  against  Algiers.  The  response  of 
Congress  was  at  once  made  in  an  act,  approved  on 
March  3d,  "for  the  protection  of  the  commerce  of 
the  United  States  against  the  Algerine  cruisers." 
Two  squadrons  were  ordered  to  the  Mediterranean, 
under  Bainbridge  and  Decatur.  Decatur,  arriving 
first  on  the  scene,  compelled  the  Dey  on  June  30th 
to  agree  to  a  treaty  by  which  it  was  declared  that 
no  tribute,  under  any  name  or  form  whatsoever, 
should  again  be  required  from  the  United  States. 
No  other  nation   had  ever  obtained  such  terms. 

in 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Tripoli  and  Tunis  were  also  duly  admonished;  and 
the  passage  of  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  was  relieved 
of  its  burdens  and  its  terrors. 

With  the  suppression  of  the  Barbary  exactions, 
tolerated  piracy  disappeared;  but  the  depredations 
of  lawless  freebooters  in  various  parts  of  the  world 
long  continued  to  furnish  occasion  for  naval  and 
to  some  extent  for  diplomatic  activity.  As  late  as 
1870  the  naval  forces  of  the  United  States  were  di- 
rected, upon  the  invitation  of  Prussia,  to  co-operate 
with  those  of  the  other  powers  for  the  suppres- 
sion of  piracy  in  Chinese  waters.  Such  incidents, 
however,  possess  no  special  significance.  No  one 
undertakes  to  defend  confessed  lawlessness.  At* 
tempts  to  abridge  the  freedom  of  the  seas  assume 
a  dangerous  form,  and  become  important  when 
they  are  made  or  sanctioned  by  governments,  on 
pleas  of  pretended  right  or  interest.  Within  this 
category  fell  the  claim  long  strenuously  asserted 
that  the  cruisers  of  one  nation  might  lawfully  visit 
and  search  the  merchant  vessels  of  another  nation 
on  the  high  seas,  in  peace  as  well  as  in  war.  To  the 
people  of  the  United  States  this  claim  was  rendered 
especially  hateful  by  the  practice  of  impressment, 
with  which  it  came  to  be  peculiarly  identified.  From 
time  immemorial  the  commanders  of  men-of-war 
had  been  in  the  habit,  when  searching  neutral  ves- 
sels for  contraband  or  enemy's  property,  of  taking 
out  and   pressing  into  service   any  seamen   whom 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

they  conceived  to  be  their  fellow-subjects.  The 
practice  was  essentially  irregular,  arbitrary,  and  op- 
pressive, but  its  most  mischievous  possibilities 
were  yet  to  be  developed  in  the  conditions  resulting 
from  American  independence.  After  Great  Britain, 
in  1793,  became  involved  in  the  wars  growing  out 
of  the  French  Revolution,  the  nature  and  extent  of 
those  possibilities  were  soon  disclosed.  Not  only 
were  the  native  sailors  of  England  and  America 
generally  indistinguishable  by  the  obvious  test  of 
language,  but  the  crews  of  American  vessels  often 
contained  a  large  proportion  of  men  of  British  birth, 
who,  even  when  naturalized  in  the  United  States, 
were,  under  the  doctrine  of  indelible  allegiance 
then  almost  universally  prevalent,  still  claimed  by 
Great  Britain  as  her  subjects.  Native  Americans, 
if  mistakenly  impressed,  ran  the  risk  of  being  killed 
in  action  before  an  order  could  be  obtained  for  their 
release;  all  others  were  firmly  held  to  service.  Nor 
was  it  a  slight  inconvenience  that  in  this  way  Ameri- 
can crews  were  sometimes  so  far  depleted  as  to  be 
unable  to  navigate  their  ships.  The  United  States, 
while  freely  admitting  the  belligerent  right  of  search, 
denied  that  it  might  be  employed  for  any  but  the 
acknowledged  purposes  of  enforcing  blockades, 
seizing  prize  goods,  and  perhaps  capturing  officers 
and  soldiers  in  the  actual  service  of  the  enemy. 
"The  simplest  rule,"  declared  Jefferson,  when  Sec- 
retary of  State,  "  will  be  that  the  vessel  being  Amer- 
8  113 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ican  shall  be  evidence  that  the  seamen  on  board 
are  such."  Efforts  were  repeatedly  made  by  the 
United  States  to  adjust  the  controversy,  but  in  vain. 
President  Madison  gave  it  the  chief  place  in  his  mes- 
sage of  June  i,  1812,  recommending  war  against 
Great  Britain ;  but  in  the  treaty  of  peace  concluded 
at  Ghent,  December  24,  1814,  it  was  not  mentioned. 
Nearly  thirty  years  later,  Webster,  when  Secretary 
of  State,  recurring  to  Jefferson's  rule,  declared:  "  In 
every  regularly  documented  American  merchant- 
vessel  the  crew  who  navigate  it  will  find  their  pro- 
tection in  the  flag  which  is  over  them."  These  words 
were  addressed  to  Lord  Ashburton  on  August  8, 
1842.  The  principle  of  protection  and  immunity 
which  they  announced  was  asserted  in  even  broader 
terms,  and  was  thus  impliedly  accepted  by  the 
British  government  in  1861.  On  November  8th  in 
that  year  the  British  mail-steamer  Trent,  while  on 
a  voyage  from  Havana  to  St.  Thomas,  was  over- 
hauled by  the  American  man-of-war  San  Jacinto, 
Captain  Wilkes,  and  was  compelled  to  surrender 
the  Confederate  commissioners  Messrs.  Mason  and 
Slidell,  and  their  secretaries,  Messrs.  McFarland  and 
Eustis,  all  of  whom  were  on  their  way  to  England. 
The  sole  reason  given  by  Earl  Russell  for  demand- 
ing their  release  was  that  "certain  individuals" 
had  "  been  forcibly  taken  from  on  board  a  British 
vessel,  the  ship  of  a  neutral  power,  while  such  ves- 
sel was  pursuing  a  lawful  and  innocent  voyage — an 

114 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

act  of  violence  which  was  an  affront  to  the  British 
flag  and  a  violation  of  international  law."  No 
wonder  that  Mr.  Seward,  in  assuring  Lord  Lyons 
that  the  demand  would  be  granted,  congratulated 
himself  on  defending  and  maintaining  "an  old. 
honored,  and  cherished  American  cause." 

The  controversy  as  to  impressment  involved  no 
question  as  to  search  on  the  high  seas  in  time  of 
peace.  Such  a  right  had  been  asserted  by  Spain 
and  other  powers  for  the  purpose  of  enforcing  their 
colonial  restrictions.  The  United  States  refused  to 
admit  it,  and  conceded  a  right  of  search  in  time  of 
peace  only  in  respect  of  pirates,  who,  as  enemies  of 
the  human  race,  were  held  to  be  outside  the  pale 
of  national  protection.  Beyond  this  the  govern- 
ment refused  to  go.  As  the  war-right  of  search 
had  been  perverted  to  the  purpose  of  impress- 
ment, so  it  was  apprehended  that  the  peace-right, 
if  any  were  admitted  to  exist,  might  be  perverted 
to  the  same  purpose  or  to  purposes  equally  odious. 

To  this  position  the  United  States  tenaciously 
adhered,  even  when  strongly  solicited  to  depart  from 
it  by  the  promptings  of  philanthropy.  The  move- 
ment so  energetically  led  by  Great  Britain  during 
the  first  half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  for  the  sup- 
pression of  the  African  slave  -  trade,  found  in  all 
civilized  lands  strong  support  in  public  opinion. 
To  its  success,  however,  the  voluntary  co-operation 
of  nations  was  discovered  to  be  indispensable.   Soon 

"5 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

after  the  close  of  the  Napoleonic  wars,  Lord  Stowell, 
the  greatest  judge  that  ever  sat  in  the  English  Court 
of  Admiralty,  declared  in  the  case  of  a  French  ves- 
sel, which  had  been  seized  by  a  British  cruiser  on  a 
charge  of  engaging  in  the  slave-trade,  that  no  nation 
could  exercise  a  right  of  visitation  and  search  upon 
the  common  and  unappropriated  part  of  the  ocean 
except  from  belligerent  claim.  The  vessel  was  dis- 
charged. As  if  to  anticipate  such  an  obstacle,  the 
British  government  had  already  entered  into  treaties 
with  Denmark,  Portugal,  and  Spain,  by  which  a 
qualified  right  of  search  was  conceded ;  and  it  sought 
to  make  the  measure  universal.  So  steadfastly  was 
the  object  pursued  that  by  1850  the  number  of  such 
treaties  in  force  between  Great  Britain  and  other 
powers  was  twenty  -  four.  Among  the  assenting 
governments,  however,  the  two  most  important 
powers  were  not  found  —  the  United  States  and 
France.  When  the  proposal  was  submitted  to  the 
United  States,  the  government  at  once  repulsed  it. 
No  man  condemned  the  slave-trade  more  strongly 
than  did  John  Quincy  Adams;  on  the  other  hand, 
no  one  more  profoundly  appreciated  the  funda- 
mental principles  of  American  policy  and  the  im- 
portance of  maintaining  them.  In  18 18,  when 
Secretary  of  State,  he  declared  that  the  admission 
of  the  right  of  search  in  time  of  peace,  under  any 
circumstances  whatever,  would  meet  with  universal 
repugnance  in  the  United  States.     He  steadily  re- 

116 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

sisted  in  Monroe's  cabinet,  even  in  opposition  to  the 
yielding  inclinations  of  Calhoun  and  other  members 
from  slave  States,  any  abatement  of  this  position. 
The  subject  was,  however,  taken  up  in  Congress, 
and  by  an  act  of  May  15,  1820,  the  slave-trade  was 
branded  as  piracy.  This  act  seemed  to  constitute 
the  first  step  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  tow- 
ards the  assimilation  of  the  traffic,  by  the  consent 
of  the  civilized  world,  to  piracy  by  law  of  nations, 
thus  bringing  it  within  the  operation  of  the  only 
acknowledged  right  of  search  in  time  of  peace ;  and 
by  a  resolution  of  the  House  of  Representatives, 
passed  on  February  28,  1823,  by  a  vote  of  131  to  9, 
the  President  was  requested  to  open  negotiations 
to  that  end.  Instructions  in  conformity  with  this 
resolution  were  given  to  the  diplomatic  representa- 
tives of  the  United  States;  and  on  March  13,  1824, 
a  convention  was  signed  at  London  which  conceded 
a  reciprocal  right  of  search  on  the  coasts  of  Africa, 
America,  and  the  West  Indies.  The  Senate  of  the 
United  States,  however,  on  May  21,  1824,  by  a  vote 
of  36  to  2,  struck  out  the  word  "America,"  and,  the 
British  government  declining  to  accept  the  amend- 
ment, the  treaty  failed.  On  December  10,  1824, 
the  Senate  rejected  a  similar  convention  with  Co- 
lombia, although  it  did  not  apply  to  the  American 
coasts.  Negotiations  on  the  subject  were  there- 
fore discontinued,  and  the  decision  not  to  concede 
even  a  qualified  right  of  search  was  adhered  to. 

117 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

The  government  of  the  United  States  was  not  in- 
sensible to  the  crying  evils  of  the  traffic  in  slaves. 
In  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  it  had  concurred  in  reprobat- 
ing the  traffic  as  "  irreconcilable  with  the  principles 
of  humanity  and  justice,"  and  had  pledged  its  best 
endeavors  to  accomplish  its  entire  abolition.  But, 
while  always  acknowledging,  as  it  did  in  the  Webster- 
Asburton  treaty,  the  duty  to  employ  its  naval  forces 
for  the  redemption  of  that  pledge,  it  insisted  that 
American  vessels  on  the  high  seas  should  be  liable 
to  search  only  by  American  cruisers;  and  it  con- 
ceded a  similar  exemption  to  the  vessels  of  other 
nations.  In  1858  this  principle  was  at  length 
formally  accepted  by  the  British  government;  and 
in  the  same  year  the  Senate  of  the  United  States 
unanimously  reaffirmed  it.  Since  that  time,  the 
United  States  has  in  three  instances  consented  to  a 
qualified  departure  from  its  observance:  in  the 
treaties  with  Great  Britain,  concluded  April  7,  1862, 
and  February  17,  1863,  during  the  civil  war,  ad- 
mitting a  reciprocal  search  for  slavers  within  two 
hundred  miles  from  the  African  coast  southward  of 
the  thirty-second  parallel  of  north  latitude,  and 
within  thirty  leagues  of  the  islands  of  Cuba,  Puerto 
Rico,  Santo  Domingo,  and  Madagascar;  in  the  gen- 
eral act  of  Brussels  of  July  2,  1890,  permitting,  for 
the  purpose  of  repressing  the  slave-trade,  a  mutual 
search  within  a  denned  zone  on  the  eastern  coast  of 
Africa  of  vessels  of  less  than  five  hundred  tons  bur- 

118 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

den;  and  in  the  agreements  for  the  protection  of 
the  fur  seals  in  Bering  Sea.  By  the  abolition  of 
slavery  in  the  Spanish  Antilles,  the  most  doubtful 
concession  made  in  the  treaties  with  Great  Britain 
soon  ceased  practically  to  cause  anxiety;  nor  was 
the  integrity  of  the  general  principle  impaired  by 
the  exceptional  and  temporary  relaxation  of  its 
observance  by  mutual  agreement.  It  may  indeed 
be  said  that  the  making  of  such  agreements  by  the 
United  States  was  rendered  possible  by  the  previous 
unqualified  acceptance  of  the  principle  of  the  free- 
dom of  the  seas  by  Great  Britain  and  other  mari- 
time powers. 

The  disposition  of  the  United  States  to  maintain 
its  general  and  time-honored  rule  was  signally  ex- 
emplified in  the  case  of  the  steamer  Virginius.  On 
October  31,  1873,  the  Virginius,  while  sailing  under 
an  American  register  and  flying  the  American  flag, 
was  chased  and  seized  on  the  high  seas  off  the 
coast  of  Cuba  by  the  Spanish  man-of-war  Tornado. 
The  captive  vessel  was  taken  to  Santiago  de  Cuba, 
where,  after  a  summary  trial  by  court  -  martial, 
ostensibly  on  a  charge  of  piracy,  fifty-three  of  her 
officers,  crew,  and  passengers,  embracing  Americans, 
British  subjects,  and  Cubans,  were  condemned  and 
shot.  The  rest  were  held  as  prisoners.  No  founda- 
tion was  shown  for  the  charge  of  piracy  beyond  the 
fact  that  the  vessel  was  employed  by  Cuban  insur- 
gents in  conveying  arms,  ammunition,  and  men  to 

119 


A  M  E  R1CAN    Dll'LO  M  A  C  V 

Cuba,  an  employment  which  obviously  did  not  con- 
stitute piracy  by  law  of  nations.  The  government 
of  the  United  States  therefore  demanded  the  restora- 
tion of  the  vessel,  the  surrender  of  the  captives,  a 
salute  to  the  American  flag,  and  the  condign  punish- 
ment of  the  Spanish  officials.  On  proof  that  the 
register  of  the  Virginias  was  fraudulent,  and  that 
she  had  no  right  to  American  colors,  the  salute  to 
the  flag  was  afterwards  dispensed  with;  but  the 
vessel  and  the  survivors  of  her  passengers  and  crew 
were  duly  delivered  up;  and  an  indemnity  was 
eventually  obtained  by  the  United  States  for  the 
relief  of  the  sufferers  and  of  the  families  of  those 
who  were  put  to  death,  with  the  exception  of  the 
British  subjects,  for  whom  compensation  was  ob- 
tained from  Spain  by  their  own  government.  It  is 
often  stated  that  the  United  States  in  this  case 
maintained  that  the  Virginius  was  exempt  from 
search  merely  because  she  bore  the  American  flag, 
even  though  her  papers  were  false  and  she  had  no 
right  to  fly  it.  This  supposition  is  contradicted 
by  the  fact  that  the  salute  to  the  flag  was  dispensed 
with.  The  demands  of  the  United  States  in  their 
last  analysis  rested  chiefly  upon  the  ground  that 
the  vessel  was  unlawfully  seized  on  a  spurious  charge 
of  piracy,  and  that  the  proceedings  at  Santiago  de 
Cuba  were  conducted  in  flagrant  disregard  of  law 
and  of  the  treaties  between  the  two  countries.  In 
March,  1895,  the  American  steamer,  Allianga,  bound 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

from  Colon  to  New  York,  was  fired  on  by  a  Spanish 
gunboat  off  the  coast  of  Cuba  outside  the  three- 
mile  limit.  The  Spanish  government  promptly  dis- 
avowed the  act  and  expressed  regret,  and,  by  way  of 
assurance  that  such  an  event  would  not  again  occur, 
relieved  the  offending  officer  of  his  command.  In- 
cidents such  as  these  serve  to  show  that  the  prin- 
ciple of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  has  lost  neither  its 
vitality  nor  its  importance.  It  may  indeed  be  said 
that  the  exemption  of  vessels  from  visitation  and 
search  on  the  high  seas  in  time  of  peace  is  a  prin- 
ciple which  rather  grows  than  diminishes  in  the  es- 
timation of  mankind ;  for  in  the  light  of  history,  its 
establishment  is  seen  to  mark  the  progress  of  com- 
merce from  a  semi-barbarous  condition,  in  which  it 
was  exposed  to  constant  violence,  to  its  present  state 
of  freedom  and  security.  Nor  is  there  any  page  in 
American  diplomacy  more  glorious  than  that  on 
which  the  successful  advocacy  of  this  great  principle 
is  recorded. 

While  maintaining  the  freedom  of  the  seas,  the 
United  States  has  also  contended  for  the  free  nav- 
igation of  the  natural  channels  by  which  they  are 
connected.  On  this  principle,  it  led  in  the  move- 
ment that  brought  about  the  abolition,  in  1857,  of 
the  dues  levied  by  Denmark  on  vessels  and  cargoes 
passing  through  the  sound  and  belts  which  form 
a  passage  from  the  North  Sea  into  the  Baltic.  These 
dues,  which  were  justified  by  the  Danish  govern- 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ment  on  the  ground  of  immemorial  usage,  sanc- 
tioned by  a  long  succession  of  treaties,  and  of  the 
benefit  conferred  on  shipping  by  the  policing  and 
lighting  of  the  waters,  bore  heavily  on  commerce, 
and  the  United  States,  after  repeatedly  remonstrat 
ing,  at  length  gave  notice  that  it  would  no  longer 
submit  to  them.  This  action  led  to  the  calling  of  a 
conference  in  Europe.  The  United  States  declined 
to  take  part  in  it,  but  afterwards  co-operated,  by 
a  treaty  with  Denmark,  in  giving  effect  to  the 
plan  under  which  the  dues  were  capitalized  and 
removed. 

An  artificial  channel  necessarily  involves  special 
consideration ;  but,  reasoning  by  analogy,  Mr.  Clay, 
as  Secretary  of  State,  declared  that  if  a  canal  to 
unite  the  Pacific  and  Atlantic  oceans  should  ever 
be  constructed,  "the  benefits  of  it  ought  not  to  be 
exclusively  appropriated  to  any  one  nation,  but 
should  be  extended  to  all  parts  of  the  globe  upon 
the  payment  of  a  just  compensation  or  reasonable 
tolls."  This  principle  was  approved  by  the  Senate 
in  1835,  and  by  the  House  of  Representatives  in 
1839,  and  was  incorporated  in  the  treaty  which  was 
concluded  at  Washington,  April  19,  1850,  by  John 
M.  Clayton,  Secretary  of  State,  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  and  by  Sir  Henry  Lytton  Bulwer, 
British  minister  at  Washington,  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain.  Although  the  ratifications  of  this 
treaty  were  promptly  exchanged  (July  4,  1850),  prob- 
ably no  other  diplomatic  document  to  which  the 

122 


FREEDOM   OF   THE    SEAS 

United  States  was  a  party  has  given  rise  to  discus- 
sions at  once  so  complicated  and  so  prolonged. 

The  immediate  object  of  the  Clayton-Bulwer 
treaty,  as  stated  in  the  preamble,  was  the  "setting 
forth  and  fixing  "  of  the  "views  and  intentions  "  of  the 
two  governments  with  reference  to  a  ship  canal 
between  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific  by  what  is 
known  as  the  Nicaragua  route.  The  construction  of 
such  a  canal  by  a  private  company,  chartered  by  the 
governments  through  whose  territories  the  route  lay, 
seemed  then  to  be  near  accomplishment.  By  the 
unauthorized  convention  concluded  by  Elijah  Hise 
with  Nicaragua  on  June  21,  1849,  Nicaragua  under- 
took to  grant  to  the  United  States  the  "exclusive 
right  and  privilege"  to  build  an  interoceanic  way 
through  Nicaraguan  territory;  and  it  was  stipulated 
(Article  III)  that  if  the  United  States  should  not  do 
the  work,  either  the  President  or  the  Congress  should 
issue  a  charter  to  some  one  for  the  purpose.  The 
treaty  was  not  submitted  to  the  United  States 
Senate;  and  in  the  debates  in  that  body,  in  March, 
1853,  on  questions  growing  out  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty,  Mr.  Clayton,  who  had  then  returned 
to  the  Senate,  found  no  one  to  controvert  his  asser- 
tion that  the  government  of  the  United  States  had  no 
constitutional  power  to  construct  a  way  in  foreign 
jurisdiction  or  to  charter  a  company  for  that  pur- 
pose. 

The  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty  was  based  upon  the 
principle  of  neutralization.     While  binding  the  con- 

123 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tracting  parties  to  protect  the  canal  from  ' '  interrup- 
tion, seizure,  or  unjust  confiscation,"  it  also  pledged 
them  to  "guarantee"  its  "neutrality,"  so  that  it 
might  "forever  be  open  and  free,"  and,  for  the  full 
attainment  of  this  object,  to  invite  other  powers  to 
enter  into  similar  stipulations  with  them,  "to  the 
end  that  all  other  states  may  share  in  the  honor 
and  advantage  of  having  contributed  to  a  work  of 
such  general  interest  and  importance."  But  the 
treaty  went  further.  It  declared  (Article  VIII)  that 
the  contracting  parties,  in  entering  into  it,  had  de- 
sired not  only  to  accomplish  a  "particular  object," 
but  also  to  "establish  a  general  principle,"  and  that 
they  therefore  agreed  "to  extend  their  protection, 
by  treaty  stipulations,  to  any  other  practicable 
communications,  whether  by  canal  or  railway," 
across  the  isthmus  connecting  North  and  South 
America,  and  especially  to  the  communications  then 
projected  by  way  of  Tehuantepec  or  Panama;  it 
being  understood,  as  a  condition  of  such  joint  pro- 
tection, that  the  "charges  or  conditions  of  traffic" 
should  be  "just  and  equitable"  to  the  citizens  of 
every  state  willing  to  participate  in  such  protection. 
In  reality,  the  railway  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama 
was  then  under  construction  by  American  capitalists, 
and  steps  had  already  been  taken  by  the  United 
States  and  New  Granada  (afterwards  Colombia) 
towards  its  neutralization,  the  treaty  of  1846  (Article 
XXXV)  having  assured  to  the  United  States  the 
"free  and  open"  transit  across  the  isthmus  by  any 

124 


FREEDOM   OF   THE    SEAS 

mode  of  communication  then  or  thereafter  existing, 
while  the  United  States,  as  "an  especial  compensa- 
tion," guaranteed  to  New  Granada,  "positively  and 
efficaciously,"  the  "perfect  neutrality  "  of  the  isthmus 
and  her  "rights  of  sovereignty  and  property"  over 
that  territory. 

After  the  Civil  War  in  the  United  States  the  tone 
of  public  utterances  changed.  A  demand  sprang  up 
for  a  canal  under  American  control.  This  demand 
gained  in  strength  after  Great  Britain's  acquisition 
of  virtual  control  of  the  Suez  Canal  and  still  more 
after  her  occupation  of  Egypt.  Eventually  the 
United  States  took  steps  to  build  the  canal  by  its 
own  means.  But  the  stipulations  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  treaty  seemed  to  stand  in  the  way,  and  par- 
ticularly, so  far  as  concerned  the  Nicaragua  route, 
the  stipulation  that  neither  contracting  party  would 
"ever  obtain  or  maintain  for  itself  any  exclusive 
control"  over  the  canal  in  that  quarter,  or  erect  or 
maintain  any  fortifications  commanding  or  near  it, 
"or  occupy,  or  fortify,  or  colonize,  or  assume,  or 
exercise  any  dominion  over  Nicaragua,  Costa  Rica, 
the  Mosquito  coast,  or  any  part  of  Central  America." 

On  February  5,  1900,  there  was  signed  at  Wash- 
ington by  Mr.  Hay,  Secretary  of  State,  and  Lord 
Pauncefote,  British  ambassador,  a  convention,  the 
object  of  which  was  declared  to  be  to  remove  any 
objection  to  the  construction  of  the  canal  under  the 
auspices  of  the  government  of  the  United  States, 
without  impairing  the  "'general  principle'  of  neu- 

125 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tralization"  established  by  Article  VIII  of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  treaty.  It  was  therefore  agreed 
that  that  treaty  should  be  considered  as  superseded, 
and  that  certain  rules,  substantially  the  same  as 
those  found  in  the  convention  of  Constantinople  of 
October  29,  1888,  relating  to  the  Suez  Canal,  should 
be  adopted  as  the  basis  of  "neutralization."  The 
Senate  amended  the  treaty  in  several  essential 
points,  including  (1)  the  elimination  of  a  clause  by 
which  the  contracting  parties  agreed  to  invite  the 
adhesion  of  other  powers,  and  (2)  the  insertion  of  a 
proviso  that  the  rules  should  not  apply  to  measures 
which  the  United  States  might  "find  it  necessary  to 
take  for  securing  by  its  own  forces  the  defence  of  the 
United  States  and  the  maintenance  of  public  order." 
In  making  these  amendments  the  Senate  no  doubt 
was  influenced  by  the  consideration  that,  as  stated 
by  Mr.  Curzon,  British  Under  Secretary  of  State  for 
Foreign  Affairs,  in  the  House  of  Commons,  July  22, 
1898,  the  convention  of  Constantinople  had  never 
"been  brought  into  practical  operation."  The 
amendments  gave  rise  to  further  negotiations,  which 
resulted  in  the  signing  at  Washington,  November 
18,  1901,  of  the  second  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty. 
This  arrangement  was  duly  ratified.  It  did  not  in- 
hibit the  fortification  of  the  canal  by  the  United 
States,  but  provided  that  "no  change  of  territorial 
sovereignty  or  of  the  international  relations  of  the 
country  or  countries  traversed"  by  the  canal  should 
affect  the  "general  principle  of  neutralization  or  the 

126 


FREEDOM   OF   THE    SEAS 

obligations  of  the  high  contracting  parties"  under 
the  "present  treaty." 

Coincidently  with  the  removal  of  obstacles  to  the 
building  and  control  of  the  canal  by  the  United 
States,  the  Nicaragua  was  abandoned  for  the  Panama 
route,  and  a  treaty  for  a  right  of  way  was  soon 
signed  with  Colombia  as  sovereign  of  the  isthmus. 
The  Colombian  Congress,  affirming  that  the  terms 
of  the  treaty  as  concluded  infringed  the  national 
sovereignty  and  were  contrary  to  the  national  con- 
stitution and  laws,  declined  to  ratify  it.  Panama 
then  declared  its  independence,  which  was  promptly 
recognized  and  supported  by  the  United  States, 
and  on  February  18,  1903,  entered  into  a  treaty 
granting  to  the  latter  in  perpetuity  a  zone  ten  miles 
wide  and  certain  adjacent  islands  for  the  purposes 
of  a  canal.  Colombia  vigorously  protested,  invok- 
ing particularly  Article  XXXV  of  the  treaty  of  1846, 
and  a  controversy  ensued  which  is  not  yet  ended.  A 
treaty  signed  at  Bogota  on  April  6,  19 14,  providing 
for  the  payment  to  Colombia  of  the  sum  of  $25,000,- 
000,  with  other  compensations,  has  not  as  yet  passed 
the  United  States  Senate,  where  objection  is  under- 
stood to  have  been  made  both  to  the  amount  of 
money  to  be  paid  and  also  to  a  clause  expressing,  in 
the  name  of  the  government  and  people  of  the 
United  States,  "sincere  regret  that  anything  should 
have  occurred  to  interrupt  or  to  mar  the  relations  of 
cordial  friendship  that  had  so  long  subsisted  between 
the  two  nations." 

127 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Meanwhile  the  canal,  begun  years  ago  by  the 
French,  has  been  completed  and  opened  to  traffic.  It 
has  also  been  fortified.  Its  "neutralization"  must 
be  admitted  to  be  only  nominal.  It  would  indeed 
be  more  nearly  accurate  to  say  that  the  term,  as 
applied  to  existing  conditions,  is  merely  a  reminiscent 
misnomer.  As  against  the  United  States,  as  sole 
owner  and  protector,  the  present  stipulations  have 
no  substantial  effect  beyond  assuring  the  commercial 
use  of  the  canal  on  terms  of  substantial  equality. 

The  Congress  of  the  United  States,  in  legislating 
(191 2)  upon  the  levy  of  tolls  in  the  canal,  authorized 
the  exemption  of  vessels  in  the  United  States  coast- 
wise trade  on  the  ground,  among  others,  that,  as  the 
coastwise  trade  was,  in  conformity  with  acknowl- 
edged right,  exclusively  reserved  to  American  vessels, 
the  question  of  equality  did  not  enter  into  it,  and  that, 
so  far  as  the  rate  of  tolls  was  concerned,  American 
vessels  not  engaged  in  the  coastwise  trade  enjoyed 
no  advantage.  The  Hay-Pauncefote  treaty  stipu- 
lates that  the  canal  shall  be  open  "on  terms  of  en- 
tire equality,"  and  that  there  shall  be  no  "discrimi- 
nation" in  the  "conditions  or  charges  of  traffic," 
which  must  be  "just  and  equitable."  The  British 
government,  while  conceding  that  the  United  States 
might  by  way  of  subsidy  remit  or  refund  the  tolls 
on  its  coastwise  vessels,  claimed  that  such  vessels 
must,  under  the  terms  of  the  treaty,  be  included  in 
the  computation  of  the  rate.  This  was  in  fact  done  in 
the  schedule  actually  adopted;    but,  as  the  words 

128 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

of  the  statute  were  broad  enough  to  authorize  their 
omission,  the  British  government,  being  apprehen- 
sive lest  they  might  not  be  included  in  a  future 
computation,  filed  its  remonstrance.  In  these  cir- 
cumstances Mr.  Knox,  as  Secretary  of  State,  while 
maintaining  that  the  claim  was  not  well  founded, 
suggested,  in  answering  it,  that  further  discussion  of 
it  might  properly  be  deferred  till  some  actual  viola- 
tion of  the  right  asserted  under  it  was  alleged  to  have 
taken  place,  and  that,  if  such  a  situation  should  arise, 
the  arbitration  of  the  question  might  then  appro- 
priately be  considered.  The  British  ambassador 
briefly  replied,  and  the  diplomatic  discussion  rested. 
President  Wilson,  however,  in  a  brief  special  address 
to  Congress  on  March  5,  1914,  asked  that  the  pro- 
vision exempting  vessels  engaged  in  the  coastwise 
trade  of  the  United  States  from  the  payment  of  tolls 
be  repealed.  No  correspondence  was  submitted 
with  the  address;  but  the  President  declared  that, 
whatever  differences  of  opinion  might  exist  in  the 
United  States,  the  meaning  of  the  treaty  was  "not 
debated  outside  the  United  States,"  that  "every- 
where else"  there  was  "but  one  interpretation,"  and 
that  this  interpretation  precluded  the  exemption  the 
repeal  of  which  he  requested.  Moreover,  in  con- 
cluding the  address,  he  said:  "I  ask  this  of  you  in 
support  of  the  foreign  policy  of  the  administration. 
I  shall  not  know  how  to  deal  with  other  matters  of 
even  greater  delicacy  and  nearer  consequence  if  you 
do  not  grant  it  to  me  in  ungrudging  measure." 
9  129 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

After  a  prolonged  debate,  in  which  the  merits  of 
the  question  were  fully  examined,  Congress,  while 
granting  the  President's  request,  coupled  the  repeal 
(June  15,  19 1 4)  with  the  declaration  that  its  action 
was  not  to  be  construed  or  held  as  a  waiver  or  re- 
linquishment of  any  right  which  the  United  States 
might  have  under  its  treaties  with  Great  Britain 
and  Panama  "to  discriminate  in  favor  of"  its  own 
vessels  by  exempting  either  them  or  its  citizens 
"from  the  payment  of  tolls,"  or  as  "in  any  way  waiv- 
ing, impairing,  or  affecting  any  right  of  the  United 
States,"  either  under  those  treaties  or  otherwise, 
"with  respect  to  the  sovereignty  over  or  the  owner- 
ship, control,  and  management  of  said  canal  and  the 
regulation  of  the  conditions  or  charges  of  traffic." 

This  reservation,  it  will  be  observed,  is  even 
broader  than  the  previously  authorized  exemption, 
since  it  embraces  American  vessels  generally,  and 
not  merely  vessels  engaged  in  the  coastwise  trade. 

In  connection  with  the  freedom  of  the  seas  we  may 
mention,  as  a  subject  somewhat  related  to  it,  the  free 
navigation,  secured  by  certain  notable  treaties, of  vari- 
ous rivers  which  are  international  in  the  sense  of  pass- 
ing in  their  navigable  course  through  the  territory  of 
more  than  one  independent  country.  While  the  ques- 
tion as  to  the  right  freely  to  navigate  such  streams 
has  formed  the  subject  of  much  theoretical  discus- 
sion, yet  its  adjustment  has  continued  to  rest  chiefly 
upon  conventional  arrangements.  It  is  not  doubted 
that  rivers  such  as  the  Hudson  and  the  Mississippi, 

130 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

which  are  navigable  only  within  the  territory  of  one 
country,  are  subject  to  that  country's  exclusive 
control.  But  with  regard  to  rivers  which  are  navi- 
gable within  two  or  more  countries,  the  principle 
of  free  navigation,  consecrated  in  the  acts  of  the 
Congress  of  Vienna,  has  been  consistently  advocated 
by  the  United  States,  and  has  been  embodied  in 
various  forms  in  several  of  its  treaties.  When  the 
British  government  sought  to  deny  to  the  inhabi- 
tants of  the  United  States  the  commercial  use  of 
the  river  St.  Lawrence,  Henry  Clay,  as  Secretary  of 
State,  appealed  to  the  regulations  of  the  Congress  of 
Vienna,  which  should,  he  declared,  "be  regarded 
only  as  the  spontaneous  homage  of  man  to  the 
superior  wisdom  of  the  paramount  Lawgiver  of  the 
Universe,  by  delivering  His  great  works  from  the 
artificial  shackles  and  selfish  contrivances  to  which 
they  have  been  arbitrarily  and  unjustly  subjected." 
The  free  navigation  of  the  St.  Lawrence  was  secured 
temporarily  by  the  reciprocity  treaty  of  1854,  and 
in  perpetuity  by  the  treaty  of  Washington  of  187 1, 
which  also  declared  the  rivers,  Yukon,  Porcupine, 
and  Stikine  to  be  "forever  free  and  open  for  pur- 
poses of  commerce  "  to  the  citizens  of  both  countries. 
For  many  years  the  government  of  the  United  States 
actively  endeavored  to  secure  the  free  navigation 
of  the  Amazon,  which  was  at  length  voluntarily  con- 
ceded by  the  Emperor  of  Brazil  to  all  nations  in 
1866,     By  a  treaty  between  the  United  States  an4 

*3* 


A  M E R I C AN    DIPLO M A  C Y 

Bolivia  of  1858,  the  Amazon  and  La  Plata,  with 
their  tributaries,  were  declared  to  be,  "in  accord- 
ance with  fixed  principles  of  international  law,  .  .  . 
channels  open  by  nature  for  the  commerce  of  all 
nations."  In  1852,  General  Urquiza,  provisional  di- 
rector of  the  Argentine  Confederation,  decreed  that 
the  navigation  of  the  rivers  Parana  and  Uruguay 
should  be  open  to  the  vessels  of  all  nations.  In  the 
next  year  the  United  States,  acting  concurrently 
with  France  and  Great  Britain,  secured  the  con- 
firmation of  this  privilege  by  treaty.  The  State  of 
Buenos  Ayres,  which  had  sought  to  control  the 
commercial  possibilities  which  the  rivers  afforded, 
protested  against  the  treaties  and  withdrew  from 
the  confederation ;  but  the  treaty  powers  decided  to 
bestow  the  moral  weight  and  influence  of  diplomatic 
relations  upon  the  government  which  had  been 
prompt  to  recognize  the  liberal  commercial  prin- 
ciples of  the  age,  and  the  policy  of  free  navigation 
prevailed. 

From  Paraguay,  which  had  sought  to  lead  the 
life  of  a  hermit  state,  a  similar  concession  was  ob- 
tained under  peculiar  circumstances.  In  1853  the 
government  of  the  United  States  sent  out  a  naval 
vessel,  called  the  Water  Witch,  under  the  command 
of  Lieutenant  Thomas  J.  Page,  to  survey  the  trib- 
utaries of  the  river  Plate  and  report  on  the  com- 
mercial condition  of  the  countries  bordering  on  their 
waters.     Permission    was   obtained   from   the   gov- 

132 


FREEDOM    OF    THE    SEAS 

ernment  of  Brazil  to  explore  all  the  waters  of  the 
Paraguay  that  were  under  Brazilian  jurisdiction, 
and  from  the  provisional  director  of  the  Argentine 
Confederation  to  explore  all  rivers  within  the  juris- 
diction of  his  government.  The  surveys  of  the 
Plate,  and  of  the  Paraguay  and  the  Parana,  had 
been  in  progress  about  a  year  and  a  half,  when,  on 
January  31,  1855,  Lieutenant  Page  started  from 
Corrientes  with  a  small  steamer  and  two  boats  to 
ascend  the  river  Salado,  leaving  Lieutenant  William 
N.  Jeffers  in  charge  of  the  Water  Witch,  with  in- 
structions to  ascend  the  Parana  as  far  as  her  draught 
would  allow.  Lieutenant  Jeffers  sailed  from  Cor- 
rientes on  the  1st  of  February,  and  had  proceeded 
only  a  few  miles  above  the  point  where  the  Parana 
forms  the  common  boundary  between  Paraguay  and 
the  Argentine  province  of  Corrientes,  when  he  ran 
aground  near  the  Paraguayan  fort  of  Itapiru.  An 
hour  later  the  Water  Witch  was  hauled  off  and 
anchored;  but  while  the  crew  were  at  dinner  it  was 
observed  that  the  Paraguayans  were  getting  their 
guns  ready.  Lieutenant  Jeffers,  though  not  expect- 
ing serious  trouble,  had  the  Water  Witch  cleared  for 
action  and  gave  directions  to  proceed  up  the  river 
at  all  hazards.  While  he  was  weighing  anchor,  a 
Paraguayan  canoe  came  alongside  and  a  man  on 
board  handed  him  a  paper  in  Spanish.  This  paper 
Jeffers  declined  to  receive,  since  he  did  not  under- 
stand the  language  in  which  it  was  printed,  and  as 

i33 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMAT  V 

soon  as  the  anchor  was  raised  he  stood  up  the  river, 
the  crew  at  quarters.  The  pilot  informed  him  that 
the  only  practicable  channel  lay  close  to  the  fort, 
on  the  Paraguayan  side  of  the  river,  and  this  he 
directed  the  pilot  to  take.  When  within  three 
hundred  yards  from  the  fort  he  was  hailed,  presum- 
ably in  Spanish,  by  a  person  who  was  said  to  be 
the  Paraguayan  admiral,  but  not  understanding  the 
import  of  the  hail  he  did  not  regard  it.  Two  blank 
cartridges  were  then  fired  by  the  fort  in  quick  suc- 
cession, and  these  were  followed  by  a  shot  which 
carried  away  the  wheel  of  the  Water  Witch,  cut  the 
ropes,  and  mortally  wounded  the  helmsman.  Lieu- 
tenant Jeffers  directed  a  general  fire  in  return,  and 
the  action  continued  for  some  minutes.  In  1858, 
the  government  of  the  United  States  sent  an  ex- 
pedition to  Paraguay  to  obtain  reparation  for  this 
and  other  incidents.  The  American  minister,  who 
accompanied  the  fleet,  obtained  "ample  apologies," 
as  well  as  an  indemnity  of  $10,000  for  the  family  of 
the  seaman  who  was  killed  at  the  wheel;  and  on 
February  4,  1859,  a  treaty  of  amity  and  commerce 
was  concluded  at  Asuncion,  by  which  Paraguay 
conceded  "to  the  merchant  flag  of  the  citizens  of 
the  United  States"  the  free  navigation  of  the  rivers 
Paraguay  and  Parana,  so  far  as  they  lay  within  her 
dominions. 


IV 

FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

As  the  cause  of  the  freedom  of  the  seas  advanced, 
inordinate  claims  of  dominion  over  adjacent  waters 
naturally  shrank  and  dwindled  away.  This  ten- 
dency towards  humaner  opinions  and  practices  may 
be  traced  in  the  history  of  fisheries  questions.  For 
more  than  three  centuries,  Denmark  claimed  the 
right,  on  grounds  of  sovereignty  and  dominion,  to 
monopolize  the  fisheries  in  all  the  seas  lying  between 
Norway  and  Iceland.  This  claim,  though  eventually 
resisted  by  other  powers,  was  acquiesced  in  by  Eng- 
land by  treaties  made  in  1400  and  1523,  under  which 
her  merchants  and  fishermen  plying  their  trade  in 
those  seas  were  required  to  take  out  licenses  from 
the  Danish  King.  At  a  later  day  the  Dutch  obtained 
licenses  from  the  British  government  for  the  purpose 
of  fishing  in  the  North  Sea.  These  examples  serve 
to  illustrate  the  practices  that  prevailed  in  times 
when  exclusive  rights  were  asserted  not  only  as  to 
fishing  in  gulfs  and  bays  and  in  vast  reaches  of  the 
open  sea,  but  also  as  to  particular  fisheries,  such  as 
those  on  the  Grand  Banks  of  Newfoundland. 

i35 


AMERICAN    D  I  P  L  O  M  A C  Y 

We  have  seen  that  among  the  subjects  discussed 
by  the  peace  commissioners  of  Great  Britain  and  the 
United  States  at  Paris  in  1782,  the  two  that  were 
the  most  strongly  contested  and  the  last  disposed  of 
were  those  of  the  fisheries  and  the  compensation  of 
the  loyalists.  The  provisional  articles  of  peace  were 
concluded  November  30,  1782.  On  the  25th  of 
that  month  the  British  commissioners  delivered  to 
the  American  commissioners  a  set  of  articles,  con- 
taining fresh  proposals  from  the  British  ministry, 
and  representing  the  results  of  many  weeks  of 
negotiation.  By  these  articles,  the  third  of  which 
related  to  the  fisheries,  the  citizens  of  the  United 
States  were  forbidden  not  only  to  dry  fish  on  the 
shores  of  Nova  Scotia,  but  also  to  take  fish  within 
three  leagues  of  the  coasts  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Law- 
rence, and  within  fifteen  leagues  of  the  coasts  of  Cape 
Breton  outside  of  that  gulf.  This  proposal  was 
unacceptable  to  the  American  commissioners;  and 
on  the  28th  of  November,  John  Adams  drew  up  a 
counter-project,  which  was  submitted  in  a  conference 
of  the  commissioners  on  the  following  day.  It  pro- 
vided that  the  subjects  of  his  Britannic  Majesty  and 
the  people  of  the  United  States  should  "  continue  to 
enjoy,  unmolested,  the  right  to  take  fish  of  every 
kind,  on  the  Grand  Bank,  and  on  all  the  other  banks 
of  Newfoundland ;  also  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence, 
and  in  all  other  places,  where  the  inhabitants  of  both 
countries  used  at  any  time  heretofore  to  fish";  and 

'.v> 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

that  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  should  "have 
liberty  to  cure  and  dry  their  fish  on  the  shores  of  Cape 
Sables,  and  any  of  the  unsettled  bays,  harbors,  or 
creeks  of  Nova  Scotia,  or  any  of  the  shores  of  the 
Magdalen  Islands,  and  of  the  Labrador  coast";  and 
that  they  should  be  "permitted,  in  time  of  peace,  to 
hire  pieces  of  land,  for  terms  of  years,  of  the  legal 
proprietors,  in  any  of  the  dominions  of  his  Majesty, 
whereon  to  erect  the  necessary  stages  and  buildings, 
and  to  cure  and  dry  their  fish."  One  of  the  British 
commissioners  objected  to  the  use  of  the  word  right, 
in  respect  of  the  taking  of  fish  on  the  Grand  Bank 
and  other  banks  of  Newfoundland,  in  the  Gulf  of 
St.  Lawrence,  "and  in  all  other  places,  where  the 
inhabitants  of  both  countries  used  at  any  time  here- 
tofore to  fish."  Another  said  that  "the  word  right 
was  an  obnoxious  expression."  Adams  vehemently 
contended  for  the  right  of  the  people  of  America  to 
fish  on  the  banks  of  Newfoundland.  "Can  there 
be  a  clearer  right?"  he  exclaimed.  "In  former 
treaties,  that  of  Utrecht,  and  that  of  Paris,  France 
and  England  claimed  the  right  and  have  used  the 
word."  Finally,  when  he  declared  that  he  would 
not  sign  any  articles  without  satisfaction  in  respect 
of  the  fishery,  the  British  commissioners  conceded 
the  point,  and  after  many  suggestions  and  amend- 
ments a  stipulation  was  agreed  on  which  formed 
the  third  article  of  the  provisional  peace.  By  this 
article,  which  was  based  on  the  proposal  submitted 

i37 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

by  Adams,  it  was  agreed  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  should  continue  to  enjoy  the  "right"  to  take 
fish  on  all  the  banks  of  Newfoundland  and  in  the 
Gulf  of  St.  Lawrence,  and  "at  all  other  places  in  the 
sea"  where  the  inhabitants  of  both  countries  had 
been  accustomed  to  fish ;  and  that  the  inhabitants  of 
the  United  States  should  have  the  "liberty"  to  take 
fish  on  the  coast  of  Newfoundland  and  on  the  coasts, 
bays,  and  creeks  of  all  other  of  his  Britannic  Majesty's 
dominions  in  America,  and  also  the  "  liberty"  to  dry 
and  cure  fish,  subject  to  an  agreement  with  the  pro- 
prietors of  the  ground,  so  soon  as  any  of  the  coasts 
should  become  settled. 

When  the  representatives  of  the  two  countries  met 
at  Ghent,  on  August  8,  1814,  to  negotiate  a  new 
treaty  of  peace,  the  British  plenipotentiaries  at  once 
took  the  ground  that  the  fishery  arrangement  of 
1782-83  had  been  terminated  by  the  war  of  181 2,  and 
declared  that,  while  they  "did  not  deny  the  right  of 
the  Americans  to  fish  generally,  or  in  the  open  seas," 
they  could  not  renew  the  privilege  of  fishing  within 
British  jurisdiction  and  of  drying  fish  on  the  Brit- 
ish shores  without  an  equivalent.  In  the  discussions 
that  ensued,  the  question  of  the  free  navigation  of 
the  Mississippi,  which  had  been  secured  to  British 
subjects  by  the  treaty  of  1782-83,  became  coupled 
with  that  of  the  fisheries.  The  American  plenipoten- 
tiaries were  unwilling  to  renew  the  stipulation  as  to 
the  Mississippi ;  the  British  plenipotentiaries  refused 

138 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

to  yield  the  fisheries  without  it ;  and  in  the  end,  on 
motion  of  the  Americans,  a  treaty  of  peace  was  con- 
cluded which  contained  no  mention  either  of  the 
fisheries  or  of  the  Mississippi.  Both  subjects  were 
left  for  future  negotiation. 

On  June  19,  181 5,  an  American  fishing- vessel,  en- 
gaged in  the  cod-fishery,  was,  when  about  forty-five 
miles  from  Cape  Sable,  warned  by  the  commander  of 
the  British  sloop  Jaseur  not  to  come  within  sixty 
miles  of  the  coast.  This  act  the  British  govern- 
ment disavowed;  but  Lord  Bathurst  is  reported  at 
the  same  time  to  have  declared  that,  while  it  was  not 
the  government's  intention  to  interrupt  American 
fishermen  "in  fishing  anywhere  in  the  open  sea,  or 
without  the  territorial  jurisdiction,  a  marine  league 
from  the  shore,"  it  "could  not  permit  the  vessels  of 
the  United  States  to  fish  within  the  creeks  and  close 
upon  the  shores  of  the  British  territories."  John 
Quincy  Adams,  who  was  then  minister  of  the  United 
States  in  London,  maintained  that  the  treaty  of 
peace  of  1783  "  was  not,  in  its  general  provisions,  one 
of  those  which,  by  the  common  understanding  and 
usage  of  civilized  nations,  is  or  can  be  considered 
as  annulled  by  a  subsequent  war  between  the  same 
parties."  This  position  Lord  Bathurst  denied.  He 
contended  that  the  treaty  of  1782-83,  like  many 
others,  contained  provisions  of  different  characters — 
some  irrevocable,  and  others  of  a  temporary  nature, 
terminable  by  war;  and  that  the  two  governments 

139 


A MERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

had,  in  respect  of  the  fisheries,  recognized  this  dis- 
tinction by  describing  as  a  "right"  the  open  sea 
fishery,  which  the  United  States  could  enjoy  merely 
by  virtue  of  its  independence,  and  as  a  "liberty," 
dependent  on  the  treaty  itself,  what  was  to  be  done 
within  British  jurisdiction.  This  position  the  British 
government  continued  to  maintain.  From  1815  to 
1 81 8  many  American  vessels  found  fishing  in  British 
waters  were  seized,  and  much  ill  feeling  was  en- 
gendered. 

Such  was  the  condition  of  things  when,  on 
October  20,  181 8,  Albert  Gallatin  and  Richard  Rush 
concluded  with  plenipotentiaries  on  the  part  of 
Great  Britain  a  convention,  the  first  article  of  which 
related  to  the  fisheries.  By  this  article  the  United 
States  "renounce  forever,  any  liberty  heretofore  en- 
joyed or  claimed  by  the  inhabitants  thereof  to  take, 
dry,  or  cure  fish  on  or  within  three  marine  miles"  of 
any  of  the  "coasts,  bays,  creeks,  or  harbours"  of  the 
British  dominions  in  America,  not  included  within 
certain  limits,  within  which  the  right  to  fish  or  to 
dry  and  cure  fish  was  expressly  reserved.  It  was 
provided,  however,  that  the  American  fishermen 
might  "enter  such  bays  or  harbours"  for  the  pur- 
poses "of  shelter  and  of  repairing  damages  there- 
in, of  purchasing  wood,  and  of  obtaining  water,  and 
for  no  other  purpose  whatever,"  subject  to  such 
restrictions  as  might  be  necessary  to  prevent  them 
from  abusing  the  privileges  thus  reserved  to  them. 

140 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

On  June  14,  1819,  an  act,  closely  following  the  lan- 
guage of  the  article,  was  passed  by  the  imperial 
parliament  to  carry  it  into  effect ;  and  from  that  time 
down  to  1836,  little  trouble  seems  to  have  occurred. 
But  in  that  year  the  legislature  of  Nova  Scotia  passed 
an  act,  by  which  the  "hovering"  of  vessels  within 
three  miles  of  the  coasts  and  harbors  was  sought  to  be 
prevented  by  various  regulations  and  penalties ;  and 
claims  were  subsequently  asserted  to  exclude  Amer- 
ican fishermen  from  all  bays  and  even  from  all  waters 
within  lines  drawn  from  headland  to  headland,  to 
forbid  them  to  navigate  the  Gut  of  Canso,  and  to 
deny  them  all  privileges  of  traffic,  including  the 
purchase  of  bait  and  supplies  in  the  British  colonial 
ports.  From  1839  down  to  1854  there  were  numer- 
ous seizures,  and  in  1852  the  home  government  sent 
over  a  force  of  war  steamers  and  sailing  vessels  to 
assist  in  patrolling  the  coast. 

With  a  view  to  adjust  the  various  questions  that 
had  arisen,  the  British  government  in  1854  sent  Lord 
Elgin  to  the  United  States  on  a  special  mission,  and 
on  June  5,  1854,  he  concluded  with  Mr.  Marcy,  who 
was  then  Secretary  of  State,  a  treaty  in  relation  to 
the  fisheries  and  to  commerce  and  navigation.  By 
this  treaty  the  United  States  fishermen  temporarily 
reacquired  the  greater  part  of  the  inshore  privileges 
renounced  by  the  convention  of  181 8.  On  the  other 
hand,  a  reciprocal  concession  was  granted  to  Brit- 
ish fishermen  on  the  eastern  coasts  of  the  United 

141 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

States  down  to  the  thirty -sixth  parallel  of  north 
latitude,  and  provision  was  made  for  reciprocal  free 
trade  between  the  United  States  and  the  British 
colonies  in  North  America  in  various  articles  of 
commerce.  This  treaty  came  into  operation  on 
March  16,  1855.  It  was  terminated  on  March  17, 
1866,  on  notice  given  by  the  United  States  in  con- 
formity with  its  provisions.  All  the  old  questions 
were  thus  revived;  but  a  new  arrangement  was  ef- 
fected by  Articles  xviii.-xxv.  of  the  comprehensive 
treaty  of  Washington  of  May  8,  1871.  The  Ameri- 
can fishermen  were  again  temporarily  readmitted 
to  the  privileges  renounced  by  the  convention 
of  181 8,  while  the  United  States  agreed  to  admit 
Canadian  fish  and  fish-oil  free  of  duty,  and  to  refer 
to  a  tribunal  of  arbitration,  which  was  to  meet  at 
Halifax,  the  question  of  the  amount  of  any  additional 
compensation  which  should  be  paid  by  the  United 
States  for  the  inshore  privileges.  On  November  23, 
1877,  an  award  was  made  in  favor  of  Great  Britain 
of  the  sum  of  five  million  five  hundred  thousand  dol- 
lars, or  nearly  half  a  million  dollars  for  each  of  the 
years  during  which  the  arrangement  was  necessarily 
to  continue  in  force.  The  United  States  protested 
against  the  award,  but  paid  it  in  due  course.  Lest, 
however,  the  same  rate  of  compensation  should 
subsequently  be  demanded,  the  United  States  in 
1883  availed  itself  of  the  right  to  give  notice  of 
termination  of  the  fishery  articles,  and  they  came  to 

14^ 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

an  end  in  1885.  A  temporary  arrangement  was 
entered  into  for  that  year,  under  which  the  Amer- 
ican fishermen  continued  to  enjoy  the  privileges 
accorded  them  by  the  terminated  articles,  in  consid- 
eration of  President  Cleveland's  undertaking  to  rec- 
ommend to  Congress,  when  it  should  again  assemble, 
the  appointment  of  a  joint  commission  to  consider 
both  the  question  of  the  fisheries  and  that  of  trade 
relations.  The  recommendation  was  submitted  to 
Congress,  but  it  was  not  adopted ;  and  on  the  opening 
of  the  fishing  season  of  1886,  seizures  of  American 
vessels  began  to  be  made.  A  sharp  controversy 
followed,  reviving  questions  not  only  as  to  the 
construction  of  the  convention  of  18 18,  but  also 
as  to  the  right  of  fishing  vessels  to  participate  in 
enlarged  privileges  of  intercourse  established  since 
that  time.  What  were  the  "bays"  intended  by  the 
convention  ?  Did  they  include  only  bodies  of  water 
not  more  than  six  marine  miles  wide  at  the  mouth, 
or  all  bodies  of  water  bearing  the  name  of  bays? 
Were  the  three  marine  miles  to  be  measured  from  a 
line  following  the  sinuosities  of  the  coast,  or  from 
a  line  drawn  from  headland  to  headland,  even  where 
there  might  be  no  body  of  water  bearing  the  name 
of  a  bay  ?  Were  American  fishing  vessels  forbidden 
to  traffic  or  to  obtain  supplies,  even  when  they  en- 
tered the  colonial  ports  for  one  of  the  four  purposes 
specified  in  the  convention?  All  these  questions 
were  raised  and  elaborately  argued.     By  an  act  of 

i43 


AMERICAN    D1PL0 M A C  Y 

March  3,  1S87,  Congress  authorized  the  President  in 
his  discretion  to  adopt  measures  of  retaliation.  A 
negotiation  was,  however,  subsequently  undertaken, 
which  resulted  in  the  Bayard-Chamberlain  treaty  of 
February  15,  1888.  Provision  was  made  for  delimit- 
ing the  waters  in  which  American  fishermen  were  to 
be  forbidden  to  fish.  To  this  end,  certain  definite 
lines  were  expressly  drawn;  and,  apart  from  these, 
the  rule,  followed  in  the  North  Sea  and  other  fishery 
arrangements,  was  adopted,  of  treating  as  territorial 
waters  all  bays  not  more  than  ten  miles  wide  at  the 
mouth,  the  theory  being  that  fishing  could  not  be 
carried  on  in  a  free  space  of  less  than  four  miles, 
without  constant  danger  of  entering  exclusive  waters. 
Fishing  vessels,  when  entering  bays  or  harbors  for 
any  of  the  four  purposes  specified  in  the  convention 
of  1818,  were  not  to  be  required  to  enter  or  clear, 
unless  remaining  more  than  twenty-four  hours  or 
communicating  with  the  shore,  or  to  pay  port  dues  or 
charges;  and  they  were  to  be  allowed  to  transship  or 
sell  their  cargoes  in  case  of  distress  or  casualty,  and 
to  obtain  on  all  occasions  "casual  or  needful  provi- 
sions and  supplies,"  as  distinguished  from  original 
outfits.  Each  vessel  was  to  be  duly  numbered  ;  but 
the  penalty  of  forfeiture  was  to  be  imposed  only  for 
fishing  in  exclusive  British  waters,  or  for  preparing  in 
such  waters  to  fish  therein ;  and  for  any  other  viola- 
tion of  the  fishery  laws  the  penalty  was  not  to  exceed 
three  dollars  for  every  ton  of  the  implicated  vessel. 

>  14 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

It  was  further  stipulated  that  all  restrictions  should 
be  removed  from  the  purchase  of  bait,  supplies,  and 
outfits,  the  transshipment  of  catch,  and  the  shipping 
of  crews,  whenever  the  United  States  should  remove 
the  duty  from  the  fishery  products  of  Canada  and 
Newfoundland.  This  treaty  enjoys  the  distinction 
of  being  the  only  one  that  was  ever,  by  formal  resolu- 
tion of  the  Senate,  discussed  in  open  session,  so  that 
the  speeches  upon  it  may  be  found  in  the  daily 
record  of  the  Congressional  debates.  Late  in  August, 
1888,  after  a  long  and  animated  debate,  it  was  re- 
jected. President  Cleveland  then  recommended  to 
Congress  a  definite  course  of  retaliation,  looking  im- 
mediately to  the  suspension  of  the  bonded -transit 
system.  This  recommendation  failed;  and  a  mo- 
dus vivcndi,  which  was  arranged  by  the  negotiators 
of  the  defeated  treaty  at  the  time  of  its  signature, 
and  under  which  a  system  of  licenses  was  established, 
continued  for  the  time  being  to  operate  by  virtue  of 
Canadian  orders  in  council.  The  fisheries  question 
was  one  of  the  subjects  considered  by  the  Quebec 
commission  of  1898,  but  no  conclusive  results  on  any 
matter  were  reached  by  that  body. 

In  recent  years  various  efforts  have  been  made  to 
create  closer  relations  between  the  United  States  and 
Canada.  In  1908  and  1909  treaties  were  concluded 
for  the  more  complete  definition  and  demarcation  of 
the  international  boundary;  for  the  adoption  of 
measures  (which  the  United  States  afterwards  failed 

i45 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

to  make  effective)  for  the  preservation  and  propaga- 
tion of  food  fishes  in  the  waters  contiguous  to  the  two 
countries;  for  the  conveyance  through  the  one 
country  of  persons  in  lawful  custody  for  trial  or  pun- 
ishment in  the  other;  for  reciprocal  rights  in  wreck- 
ing and  salvage  in  waters  contiguous  to  the  boundary ; 
and  for  the  regulation  of  the  use  of  boundary  waters 
in  such  manner  as  to  preserve  their  navigability  while 
promoting  industrial  interests. 

By  an  agreement  of  January  27,  1909,  the  north 
Atlantic  fisheries  dispute  was  referred  to  The  Hague 
Court.  Five  arbitrators  sat,  and,  September  7,  19 10, 
signed  the  award,1  holding  that  Great  Britain,  or  the 
local  colony,  might  by  laws  or  ordinances  designed 
to  preserve  the  fisheries  or  public  order  and  morals, 
but  subject  to  review  by  a  mixed  commission  of 
experts,  regulate  the  exercise  of  the  "liberties"  not 
renounced  in  1818;  that,  while  persons  not  in- 
habiting the  United  States  might  be  enrolled  on 
American  fishing-vessels,  they  gained  no  treaty  im- 
munities; that  such  vessels,  though  exempt  from 
commercial  formalities,  and  from  dues  not  imposed 
on  British  fishermen,  should,  if  proper  conveniences 
existed,  report  their  presence,  and,  even  when  coming 
in  for  shelter,  repairs,  wood,  or  water,  might  be 
required  when  staying  over  forty-eight  hours  sim- 
ilarly to  report,  personally  or  by  telegraph.     Amer- 

1  Dr.  H.  Lammasch  (Austria),  who  presided;  Jonkheer  A.  F. 
De  Savornin  Lohman  (The  Netherlands);  the  Hon.  George  Gray 
(United  States);  Sir  Charles  Fitzpatrick  (Canada);  Dr.  Luis  M. 
Drago  (Argentina),  who  dissented  on  one  point. 

146 


FISHERIES   QUESTIONS 

ican  fishing-vessels,  if  commercially  documented, 
might,  it  was  held,  exercise  commercial  privileges, 
but  not  when  on  a  fishing  voyage.  The  award, 
adopting  the  provisions  of  the  Bayard-Chamberlain 
arrangement,  delimited  certain  waters  as  exclusively 
British,  and  for  the  rest  recommended,  as  to  bays, 
the  ten-mile  rule.  The  right  of  the  Americans  to 
fish  on  the  treaty  coasts  of  Newfoundland  and  the 
Magdalen  Islands,  was  affirmed. 

On  January  6,  1911,  a  reciprocal  commercial  agree- 
ment was  submitted  to  the  legislative  bodies  of  the 
United  States  and  Canada.  Certain  incidents, 
among  which  were  the  utterances  of  American  public 
men,  turned  the  discussion  in  Canada  to  the  question 
of  preserving  "Canadian  nationality";  and  on  an 
appeal  to  the  country,  the  agreement  was  decisively 
rejected.  The  wood-pulp  and  paper  schedules  had, 
as  the  result  of  anticipatory  legislation,  at  once  taken 
effect  in  the  United  States,  and,  when  the  agreement 
failed,  other  countries  exporting  those  articles  made 
claims  for  their  admission  to  the  United  States  on 
the  same  terms  as  similar  Canadian  products.  These 
claims  the  customs  authorities  denied,  but  the  courts 
subsequently  upheld  them. 

In  its  later  phases  the  discussion  of  the  north- 
eastern fisheries  came  to  involve  only  to  a  compara- 
tively slight  extent  any  question  as  to  the  use  of  the 
open  sea.  Very  different  in  that  respect  was  the 
Bering  Sea  controversy,  which  arose  in  regard  to  the 
fur-seals  in  1886.     By  an  imperial  ukase  or  edict  of 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

July  8,  1799,  Paul  I.  of  Russia  granted  to  the  Rus- 
sian-American Company  various  important  rights 
on  the  Russian  coasts  in  America,  including  that  of 
fishing.  Twenty-two  years  later — on  September  7, 
jg2I — there  was  issued  by  the  Emperor  Alexander 
another  ukase,  the  apparent  effect  of  which  was 
much  more  far-reaching,  since  it  purported  to  ex- 
clude foreigners  from  carrying  on  commerce  and 
from  whaling  and  fishing  on  the  northwest  coast  of 
America,  from  Bering  Strait  down  to  the  fifty-first 
parallel  of  north  latitude,  and  forbade  them  even  to 
approach  within  a  hundred  Italian  miles  of  the  coast. 
Against  this  ukase  both  the  United  States  and  Great 
Britain  protested,  and  it  was  never  enforced.  On  the 
other  hand,  a  convention  was  concluded  between  the 
United  States  and  Russia  on  April  17,  1824,  by  which 
it  was  agreed  that  "  in  any  part  of  the  great  ocean, 
commonly  called  the  Pacific  Ocean,  or  South  Sea," 
the  citizens  or  subjects  of  the  high  contracting 
parties  should  be  "neither  disturbed  nor  restrained, 
either  in  navigation  or  in  fishing."  A  treaty  in 
similar  terms  was  made  by  Great  Britain  in  the 
following  year.  By  a  convention  signed  at  Washing- 
ton on  March  30,  1867,  the  Russian  Emperor,  in  con- 
sideration of  the  sum  of  seven  million  two  hundred 
thousand  dollars  in  gold,  ceded  "  all  the  territory  and 
dominion"  which  he  possessed  "on  the  continent  of 
America  and  in  the  adjacent  islands"  to  the  United 
States.     Of  this  cession,  the  eastern  limit  was  that 

148 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

defined  in  the  treaty  between  Great  Britain  and 
Russia  of  1825.  The  western  limit  was  defined  by  a 
water  line,  which  was  drawn  so  as  to  include  in  the 
territory  conveyed  numerous  islands. 

In  1886  certain  Canadian  sealers  were  seized  by 
United  States  revenue  -  cutters  in  Bering  Sea,  at  a 
distance  of  upwards  of  sixty  miles  from  the  nearest 
land.  The  United  States  Court  at  Sitka  pronounced 
a  sentence  of  condemnation,  but  the  President  sub- 
sequently ordered  the  vessels  to  be  released ;  and  on 
August  17,  1887,  Mr.  Bayard,  as  Secretary  of  State, 
instructed  the  American  ministers  at  London,  Paris, 
and  certain  other  capitals,  to  invite  the  governments 
to  which  they  were  accredited  to  co-operate  with  the 
United  States  in  measures  for  the  better  protection 
of  the  fur-seals.  It  was  represented  that,  as  the 
result  of  indiscriminate  killing,  the  seals  were  in 
danger  of  extermination,  and  that  the  nations  had  a 
common  interest  in  preventing  this  from  being  done. 
The  responses  to  this  overture  were  generally  favor- 
able, and  negotiations  'with  Great  Britain  had 
practically  reached  a  favorable  conclusion,  when,  on 
May  16,  1888,  nine  days  after  the  adverse  report  of 
the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United 
States  Senate  on  the  Bayard- Chamberlain  treaty, 
they  were  arrested  on  an  objection  from  the  Canadian 
government.  On  the  12th  of  the  following  Septem- 
ber, Mr.  E.  J.  Phelps,  then  American  minister  in  Lon- 
don, in  a  despatch  to  Mr.  Bayard,  suggested  that  the 

149 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

United  States  might  of  its  own  motion  take  measures 
to  prevent  the  destruction  of  the  fur-seals  by  captur- 
ing on  the  high  seas  the  vessels  employed  in  it.  This 
suggestion  was  not  then  adopted;  but,  after  the 
change  of  administration  in  1889,  seizures  were 
renewed.  A  warm  dispute  followed,  in  which  Mr. 
Blaine  sought  to  defend  the  seizures  on  the  ground 
that  the  killing  of  seals  in  the  open  sea  was  contra 
bonos  mores,  as  well  as  on  the  supposition  that  Russia 
had  asserted  and  exercised  exclusive  rights  in  Bering 
Sea,  and  that  the  treaties  of  1824  and  1825  did  not 
apply  to  that  body  of  water.  On  February  29,  1892, 
however,  a  treaty  was  signed,  by  which  a  tribunal 
of  arbitration,1  to  sit  at  Paris,  was  invested  with 
power  to  decide:  (1)  what  exclusive  jurisdiction,  or 
exclusive  rights  in  the  seal-fisheries,  in  Bering  Sea, 
Russia  asserted  prior  to  the  cession  of  Alaska  to  the 
United  States;  (2)  how  far  those  claims  were  rec- 
ognized by  Great  Britain;  (3)  whether  Bering  Sea 
was  included  in  the  phrase  "Pacific  Ocean,"  as  used 
in  the  treaties  of  1824  and  1825;  (4)  whether  all 
Russia's  rights  passed  to  the  United  States;  and  (5) 
whether  the  United  States  had  any  right  of  pro- 
tection or  property  in  the  fur-seals  in  Bering  Sea 
outside  the  ordinary  three-mile  limit.  If  the  arbi- 
trators found  that  the  exclusive  rights  of  the  United 
States  were  insufficient,  they  were  to  determine  what 

1  For  the  personnel  of  this  tribunal  see  infra,  p.  318. 
150 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

concurrent  regulations  the  two  governments  should 
jointly  enforce  outside  territorial  waters. 

Before  the  tribunal  of  arbitration,  the  representa- 
tives of  the  United  States  relied  much  upon  a  theory 
of  property  in  fur-seals ;  but  on  the  various  questions 
of  right  submitted,  the  decision  of  the  arbitrators 
was  adverse  to  the  United  States.  This  result  was 
due,  however,  not  to  any  lack  of  ability  or  of  effort 
on  the  part  of  the  accomplished  American  agent  and 
counsel,  who  exhausted  every  resource  of  argument, 
but  to  certain  historical  and  legal  antecedents,  among 
which  we  may  mention  the  following: 

i.  That,  when  the  first  seizures  were  reported  in 
1886,  the  Department  of  State  not  only  possessed  no 
information  concerning  them,  but  was  unable  to 
give  any  explanation  of  them,  and  that,  when  the 
circumstances  of  the  seizures  were  ascertained,  even 
though  the  full  judicial  record  had  not  then  been 
received,  the  vessels  were  ordered  to  be  released. 

2.  That  the  court  in  Alaska,  in  condemning  the 
vessels  and  punishing  their  masters  and  crews,  pro- 
ceeded on  a  doctrine  of  mare  clausum,  which  the 
United  States  had  never  legally  asserted  and  which 
the  government  afterwards  disavowed.  It  is  indeed 
generally  supposed,  and  the  supposition  apparently  is 
shared  by  the  Supreme  Court,  that  Mr.  Blaine  in  his 
correspondence  claimed  that  the  United  States  had 
derived  from  Russia  exclusive  dominion  over  Ber- 
ing Sea.     It  is,  however,  a  fact  that  in  a  note  to  Sir 

151 


AMERICAN    DI  PLOM  ACY 

Julian  Pauncefote,  December  17,  1890,  Mr.  Blaine 
said:  "The  government  has  never  claimed  it  and 
never  desired  it;  it  expressly  disavows  it."  Whether 
this  sweeping  denial  is  or  is  not  altogether  justified 
by  the  record  is  a  question  that  need  not  be  here 
considered. 

3.  That  the  treaty  ceding  Alaska  to  the  United 
States  did  not  purport  to  convey  the  waters  of 
Bering  Sea,  but  in  terms  conveyed  only  "the  ter- 
ritory and  dominion"  of  Russia  "on  the  continent 
of  America  and  in  the  adjacent  islands,"  and  drew  a 
water  boundary  so  as  to  effect  a  transfer  of  the 
islands,  many  of  them  nameless,  which  lay  in  the  in- 
tervening seas.  The  fact  was,  besides,  well  known 
that  a  declaration,  once  inadvertently  or  inconsider- 
ately adopted  by  the  House  of  Representatives, 
that  the  jurisdiction  of  the  United  States  extended 
over  those  seas,  was  rejected  by  the  Senate. 

4.  That  the  ukase  of  182 1,  which  contained  the 
only  distinctive  claim  of  mare  clausum  ever  put 
forward  by  Russia,  did  not  assume  to  treat  the  whole 
of  Bering  Sea  as  a  close  sea,  but  only  to  exclude 
foreign  vessels  from  coming  within  one  hundred 
Italian  miles  of  the  coast,  from  the  fifty-first  parallel 
of  north  latitude  to  Bering  Strait,  without  discrimi- 
nation as  to  localities. 

5.  That  against  this  ukase  both  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  protested ;  and  that  by  the  treaties 
of  1824  and  1825  Russia  agreed  not  to  interfere  with 
their  citizens  or  subjects  either  in  navigating  or  in 

152 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

fishing  in  "any  part  of  the  Pacific  Ocean,"  thus 
abandoning  the  exclusive  jurisdictional  claim  an- 
nounced in  the  ukase. 

6.  That  it  was  declared  by  Mr.  Blaine  in  the 
diplomatic  correspondence  that  if  the  phrase  ' '  Pacific 
Ocean,"  as  used  in  those  treaties,  included  Bering 
Sea,  the  United  States  had  "no  well-grounded  com- 
plaint" against  Great  Britain;  and  that  it  was  unan- 
imously found  by  the  arbitrators  that  the  phrase 
Pacific  Ocean  did  include  Bering  Sea. 

7.  That  while  the  tribunal,  by  six  voices  to  one, 
found  that  there  was  no  evidence  to  substantiate 
the  supposition  that  Russia  had  asserted  exceptional 
claims  as  to  the  fur-seals,  there  was  affirmative  evi- 
dence that  she  had  not  done  so  in  recent  years. 
In  reality,  most  of  the  specific  passages  from  ear.ly 
Russian  documents,  given  in  the  case  of  the  United 
States  to  substantiate  Russia's  supposed  exclusive 
claims,  proved  to  be  the  interpolations  of  a  dishon- 
est translator,  and  were  spontaneously  withdrawn 
by  the  agent  of  the  United  States  on  his  discovery 
of  the  circumstances,  soon  after  the  cases  were 
exchanged.  These  interpolations,  however,  did  not 
figure  in  the  diplomatic  correspondence,  but  were 
made  after  its  close. 

8.  That  it  was  admitted  that  no  municipal  law  of 
the  United  States  had  ever  treated  the  fur-seals, 
either  individually  or  collectively,  as  the  subject  of 
property  and  protection  on  the  high  seas. 

9.  That  it  was  also  admitted  by  the  representa- 

i53 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tives  of  the  United  States  that,  for  the  claim  of 
property  and  protection  on  the  high  seas,  there  was 
no  precise  precedent  in  international  law,  though  it 
was  strongly  maintained  that  the  claim  was  justified 
by  analogies. 

10.  That  the  effort  to  support  this  claim  was  em- 
barrassed by  its  relation  to  the  subject  of  visitation 
and  search  on  the  high  seas,  and  especially  by  the 
precedents  which  the  United  States  itself  had  made 
on  that  subject. 

The  question  of  regulations  stood  on  different 
grounds — that  of  international  co-operation,  pro- 
posed in  1887.  The  arbitrators,  after  deciding 
against  the  United  States  on  questions  of  right,  pro- 
ceeded to  prescribe  regulations,  which  were  after- 
wards duly  put  into  operation  by  the  two  govern- 
ments. Under  a  treaty  of  arbitration  signed  at 
Washington  on  February  8,  1896,  the  sum  of  $473,- 
151.26  was  awarded  as  compensation  to  be  paid  by 
the  United  States  for  interference  with  the  Canadian 
sealers. 

In  spite  of  the  efforts  made  for  their  protection,  the 
number  of  seals  diminished  rather  than  increased. 
Warm  discussions,  conducted  with  epithets  as  well 
as  with  figures,  took  place  as  to  the  respectively 
injurious  effects  of  pelagic  sealing  and  killing  on  land. 
Besides,  the  controversy  tended,  like  that  regarding 
the  suffrage,  to  follow  sexual  lines,  the  killing  on  land 
affecting  chiefly  the  fathers  of  the  race,  while  that 
on  the  sea  destroyed  chiefly  the  mothers.     Eventu- 

iS4 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

ally,  a  further  treaty  was  entered  into  by  the  United 
States  and  Great  Britain  on  February  7,  191 1,  but 
its  provisions  were  in  the  main  either  duplicated 
or  superseded  by  the  treaty  concluded  at  Washing- 
ton, on  the  7th  of  the  following  July,  between  the 
United  States,  Great  Britain,  Japan,  and  Russia,  for 
the  protection  of  sea-otters  as  well  as  of  fur-seals. 
By  this  treaty  the  contracting  parties  agreed  for  a 
definite  period  of  fifteen  years  to  prohibit  all  persons 
subject  to  their  laws  and  treaties,  and  also  their 
vessels,  from  engaging  in  "pelagic  sealing" — which 
was  defined,  for  the  purposes  of  the  convention,  as 
the  "killing,  capturing,  or  pursuing"  in  the  waters 
of  the  north  Pacific  above  300  latitude,  including  the 
seas  of  Bering,  Kamchatka,  Okhotsk,  and  Japan. 
The  waters  thus  designated  were  to  be  patrolled. 
Offenders  against  the  treaty  were  subject  to  arrest 
on  the  high  seas  by  the  authorities  of  any  of  the  con- 
tractants,  but  must  be  handed  over  to  their  own 
nation  for  trial;  while  skins  not  certified  as  taken 
under  the  authority  of  the  respective  powers  were 
excluded  from  importation.  Sea-otters  were  sim- 
ilarly protected. 

On  the  other  hand,  the  powers  undertook  to  solace 
one  another  for  foregoing  the  exercise  of  the  right  to 
kill  at  sea  by  furnishing  certain  compensations,  chiefly 
out  of  the  profits  of  killing  on  land.  In  case  the 
number  of  seals  visiting  the  United  States  islands  in 
any  year  fell  below  100,000,  or  the  Russian  islands 
below  18,000,  or  the  Japanese  below  6,500,  it  was  per- 

i55 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

missible  to  suspend  all  killing  without  any  allowance 
in  skins  or  in  money  till  the  specified  standard  should 
again  be  exceeded.  Subject  to  this  stipulation,  each 
of  the  powers  possessing,  within  the  designated  area, 
islands  and  shores  frequented  by  seals,  agreed  to  de- 
liver up  a  certain  gross  percentage,  in  number  and 
value,  of  the  skins  thereon  taken.  Of  the  skins 
taken  on  the  islands  and  shores  of  the  United  States 
and  of  Russia,  the  governments  of  Canada  and 
Japan  were  each  to  receive  15  per  cent.,  while  of 
those  taken  on  Japanese  islands  and  shores,  the 
United  States,  Japan,  and  Russia  were  each  to  get 
10  per  cent. ;  but  it  was  further  stipulated  that  Can- 
ada and  Japan  should  each  receive  from  the  American 
herd  not  less  than  one  thousand  skins  annually. 
In  case  any  British  islands  or  shores  should  become 
the  resort  of  seals,  the  United  States,  Japan,  and 
Russia  were  each  to  receive  10  per  cent,  of  the  skins 
thereon  taken.  These  stipulations,  however,  do  not 
limit  the  right  of  the  territorial  sovereigns  from  time 
to  time  altogether  to  suspend  the  killing  of  seals  on 
their  respective  shores  and  islands,  or  to  impose 
restrictions  and  regulations  necessary  to  protect  and 
preserve  the  herd  and  to  increase  its  number.  But, 
if  killing  is  altogether  prohibited,  for  any  reason 
other  than  that  the  number  of  visiting  seals  has  fallen 
below  the  standard,  then  the  United  States  must 
during  such  suspension  pay  Great  Britain  and  Japan 
each  an  annual  sum  of  $10,000,  for  which  it  may, 
after  killing  is  resumed,  reimburse  itself  by  retaining 

156 


FISHERIES    QUESTIONS 

skins  taken  in  excess  of  the  minimum  of  one  thousand 
agreed  to  be  turned  over.  Russia  agreed,  during  the 
last  ten  years  of  the  conventional  term  of  fifteen,  to 
kill  in  each  year  at  least  5  per  cent,  of  the  seals 
visiting  her  hauling-grounds  and  rookeries,  provided 
this  did  not  exceed  85  per  cent,  of  the  three-year-old 
male  seals  hauling  in  such  year.  Japan  made  a 
similar  engagement  in  regard  to  the  killing  of  her 
seals.  Finally,  the  United  States  agreed,  when  the 
treaty  took  effect,  to  advance  to  Great  Britain  and 
to  Japan,  each,  on  account  of  the  skins  to  which  they 
would  be  entitled,  the  sum  of  $200,000,  and  to  repay 
itself  by  retaining  an  equivalent  in  skins,  reckoned 
by  their  market  value  in  London  less  cost  of  trans- 
portation, such  reckoning,  if  disputed,  to  be  made  by 
an  "umpire,"  chosen  by  the  governments  concerned. 
In  explanation  of  the  standard  of  valuation  thus 
adopted,  the  fact  may  be  stated  that  London  had  for 
many  years  been  the  almost  exclusive  seat  of  the 
industry  of  dressing  sealskins.  The  undressed  skins, 
therefore,  for  the  most  part  found  their  way  thither; 
and  it  was  the  only  place  where  a  market  value  of  such 
skins,  resulting  from  public  sales  at  stated  seasons, 
could  then  be  said  to  exist.  These  circumstances 
also  help  to  elucidate  the  diversity,  which  prior 
negotiations  had  at  times  disclosed,  between  the 
inclinations  of  the  British  and  those  of  the  Canadian 
government,  the  latter  having  an  immediate  interest 
in  pelagic  sealing,  while  the  former  was  substantially 
interested  in  preserving  a  flourishing  industry  which 

i57 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

was  said  to  affect  the  livelihood  of  ten  thousand  per- 
sons in  England,  and  which  was  dependent  upon  a 
steady  and  permanent  supply  of  the  raw  material. 

References : 
For  a  history  of  the  North  Atlantic  Fisheries,  see  Moore's 

Digest  of  International  Law,  I,  767  ct  seq.;   Moore's  History 

and  Digest  of  International  Arbitrations,  I,  chap.   16  (The 

Halifax    Commission);    chap.     13     (Reserved    Fisheries); 

Rush's  Memoranda  of  a  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London; 

Gallatin's  Writings. 
For  the  Award  of  The  Hague  Court  (in  19 10),  see  Foreign 

Relations  of  the  United  States,  1910,  p.  544  et  seq. 
For  a  history  of  the  Bering  Sea  Dispute,  see  Moore's  History 

and  Digest  of  International   Arbitrations,  I,  chap.  17  (Fur 

Seal  Arbitration). 


V 

THE    CONTEST   WITH    COMMERCIAL   RESTRICTIONS 

When  viewed  in  their  wider  relations,  the  early 
efforts  of  the  United  States  to  establish  the  rights 
of  neutrals  and  the  freedom  of  the  seas  are  seen  to 
form  a  part  of  the  great  struggle  for  the  liberation  of 
commerce  from  the  restrictions  with  which  the  spirit 
of  national  monopoly  had  fettered  and  confined  it. 
When  the  United  States  declared  their  indepen- 
dence, exclusive  restrictions,  both  in  the  exchange  of 
commodities  and  in  their  transportation,  existed  on 
every  side.  The  system  of  colonial  monopoly  was 
but  the  emanation  of  the  general  principle,  on  which 
nations  then  consistently  acted,  of  regarding  every- 
thing "bestowed  on  others  as  so  much  withholden 
from  themselves."  Prohibitions  and  discrimina- 
tions were  universal. 

Such  was  the  prospect  on  which  the  United  States 
looked  when  they  achieved  their  independence. 
With  exceptions  comparatively  unimportant,  there 
was  not  a  single  port  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
with  which  an  American  vessel  could  lawfully  trade, 
outside   of  its   own   country.      But  the   exclusion 

i59 


A  MER1 C AN    DIPLO M A C  Y 

most  seriously  felt  was  that  from  the  British  West 
Indies.  Prior  to  the  Revolution  the  burdens  of  the 
restrictive  system  were  essentially  mitigated  by  the 
intercolonial  trade,  the  British  colonists  on  the  con- 
tinent finding  their  best  markets  in  the  British 
islands;  but  when  the  United  States,  by  establish- 
ing their  independence,  became  to  Great  Britain  a 
foreign  nation,  they  at  once  collided  with  her  colo- 
nial system.  American  statesmen  foresaw  these 
things  and  endeavored  to  guard  against  them,  but 
in  vain.  When  the  provisional  articles  of  peace 
with  Great  Britain  were  later  converted  into  a  defin- 
itive treaty,  without  the  addition  of  any  commercial 
clauses,  the  hope  of  establishing  the  relations  be- 
tween the  two  countries  at  the  outset  on  the  broad 
basis  of  mutual  freedom  of  intercourse  disappeared. 
In  the  contest  with  commercial  restrictions,  the 
government  of  the  United  States  adopted  as  the 
basis  of  its  policy  the  principle  of  reciprocity.  In 
its  later  diplomacy  the  term  "reciprocity"  is  much 
used  to  denote  agreements  designed  to  increase  the 
interchange  of  commodities  by  mutual  or  equivalent 
reductions  of  duty.  Tested  by  recent  experience, 
the  later  "reciprocity"  might  not  inaptly  be  de- 
scribed as  a  policy  recommended  by  free  -  traders 
as  an  escape  from  protection,  and  by  protectionists 
as  an  escape  from  free  trade,  but  distrusted  by  both 
and  supported  by  neither.  It  is,  however,  impos- 
sible to  doubt  that,  in  the  efforts  of  the  United  States 

160 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

to  bring  about  the  abolition  of  the  cumbersome  and 
obstructive  contrivances  of  the  old  navigation  laws, 
the  policy  of  reciprocity  proved  to  be  an  efficient 
instrument  in  furthering  the  tendency  towards 
greater  commercial  freedom.  It  was  announced  by 
the  government  at  the  very  threshold  of  its  existence. 
In  the  preamble  to  the  treaty  of  commerce  with 
France  of  1778,  it  was  declared  that  the  contracting 
parties,  wishing  to  "fix  in  an  equitable  and  perma- 
nent manner"  the  rules  that  should  govern  their 
commerce,  had  judged  that  this  end  "  could  not  be 
better  obtained  than  by  taking  for  the  basis  of  their 
agreement  the  most  perfect  equality  and  reciproc- 
ity, and  by  carefully  avoiding  all  those  burthen- 
some  preferences  which  are  usually  sources  of  de- 
bate, embarrassment,  and  discontent;  by  leaving, 
also,  each  party  at  liberty  to  make,  respecting  com- 
merce and  navigation,  those  interior  regulations 
which  it  shall  find  most  convenient  to  itself ;  and  by 
founding  the  advantage  of  commerce  solely  upon 
reciprocal  utility  and  the  just  rules  of  free  inter- 
course; reserving  withal  to  each  party  the  liberty 
of  admitting  at  its  pleasure  other  nations  to  a  par- 
ticipation of  the  same  advantages."  John  Quincy 
Adams,  in  1823,  while  avowing  the  belief  that  this 
preamble  was  "  the  first  instance  on  the  diplomatic 
record  of  nations,  upon  which  the  true  principles 
of  all  fair  commercial  negotiation  between  indepen- 
dent states  were  laid  down  and  proclaimed  to  the 
11  161 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

world,"  at  the  same  time  declared  that  it  "was,  to 
the  foundation  of  our  commercial  intercourse  with 
the  rest  of  mankind,  what  the  Declaration  of  Inde- 
pendence was  to  that  of  our  internal  government. 
The  two  instruments,"  he  added,  "were  parts  of 
one  and  the  same  system  matured  by  long  and 
anxious  deliberation  of  the  founders  of  this  Union 
in  the  ever  memorable  Congress  of  1776;  and  as  the 
Declaration  of  Independence  was  the  foundation  of 
all  our  municipal  institutions,  the  preamble  to  the 
treaty  with  France  laid  the  corner-stone  for  all  our 
subsequent  transactions  of  intercourse  with  foreign 
nations." 

The  progress  of  the  United  States,  in  the  contest 
thus  early  begun  with  commercial  restrictions,  was 
painful  and  slow.  Soon  after  the  establishment  of 
independence,  Congress  took  into  consideration  the 
entire  subject  of  commercial  relations,  and  on  May 
7,  1784,  adopted  a  series  of  resolutions  in  which  the 
principles  by  which  American  negotiators  should  be 
guided  were  set  forth.  By  the  first  of  these  reso- 
lutions it  was  declared  that,  in  any  arrangements 
that  might  be  effected,  each  party  should  have  the 
right  to  carry  its  own  produce,  manufactures,  and 
merchandise  in  its  own  vessels  to  the  ports  of  the 
other,  and  to  bring  thence  the  produce  and  mer- 
chandise of  the  other,  paying  in  each  case  only  such 
duties  as  were  paid  by  the  most -favored  nation. 
The  second   resolution,   which  related   to  colonial 

162 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

trade,  embodied  the  proposal  that  a  direct  and  simi- 
lar intercourse  should  be  permitted  between  the 
United  States  and  the  possessions  of  European  pow- 
ers in  America,  or  at  any  rate  between  the  United 
States  and  certain  free  ports  in  such  possessions; 
and  that,  if  neither  of  these  alternatives  could  be  ob- 
tained, then  each  side  should  at  least  be  permitted 
to  carry  its  own  produce  and  merchandise  in  its  own 
vessels  directly  to  the  other.  When  the  wars  grow- 
ing out  of  the  French  Revolution  began,  no  progress 
had  been  made  by  the  United  States  towards  the 
attainment  of  the  objects  of  the  second  resolution. 
American  vessels  laden  with  the  produce  of  their  own 
country,  and  in  some  cases  when  laden  with  the 
produce  of  other  countries,  were  admitted  into  most 
of  the  European  ports,  including  those  of  Great 
Britain,  on  condition  of  paying  the  customary  alien 
dues ;  but  the  ports  of  the  colonies  continued  to  be 
closed  against  them,  while  some  of  the  most  im- 
portant American  products  were  specifically  ex- 
cluded from  the  trade  which  vessels  of  the  domi- 
nant country  were  permitted  to  carry  on  between 
its  colonies  and  the  United  States.  When  author- 
izing Gouverneur  Morris,  as  an  informal  agent,  in 
1789,  to  sound  the  views  of  the  British  ministry 
concerning  relations  with  the  United  States,  Wash- 
ington said :  *';  Let  it  be  strongly  impressed  on  your 
mind  that  the  privilege  of  carrying  our  productions 
jn  our  vessels  to  their  islands,  and  bringing  in  return 

163 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMAC Y 

the  productions  of  those  islands  to  our  own  ports 
and  markets,  is  regarded  here  as  of  the  highest  im- 
portance ;  and  you  will  be  careful  not  to  countenance 
any  idea  of  our  dispensing  with  it  in  a  treaty."     In 
the  following  year  Morris  reported  that  no  arrange- 
ment on  the  subject  could  be  made.     The  question 
was,  however,  revived  in  the  instructions  given  to 
Jay,  as  special  plenipotentiary  to  England,  on  May 
6,  1794.     He  was  directed  to  secure  for  American 
vessels  the  privilege  of  carrying  between  the  United 
States  and  the  British  West  Indies  the  same  arti- 
cles as  might  be  transported  between  the  two  places 
in  British  bottoms,  and,  unless  he  could  obtain  this, 
he  was  to  do  no  more  than  refer  to  his  government 
such    concessions    as   might   be    offered.     He    sub- 
mitted to  Lord  Grenville  a  proposal  in  this  sense, 
but,  although  it  was  limited  to  American  vessels 
of  not  more  than  a  hundred  tons  burden,  it  was  re- 
jected.    So  important,  however,  did  Jay  conceive 
it  to  be  to  obtain  some  relief  from  the  colonial  re- 
strictions that,  in  spite  of  his  instructions,  he  as- 
sented to  the  incorporation  into  the  treaty,  which 
was  signed  by  him  and  Lord  Grenville  on  Novem- 
ber 19,  1794,  of  an  article  by  which  the  privilege  of 
trading  between  the  United  States  and  the  British 
West  Indies  was  for  a  term  of  years  extended  to 
American  vessels   of  a  burden   of  not   more   than 
seventy  tons,  but  only  on  condition  that,  during 
the  continuance  of  the  privilege,  the  United  States 

164 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

should  prohibit  and  restrain  the  carrying  of  any 
molasses,  sugar,  coffee,  cocoa,  or  cotton  in  American 
vessels,  either  from  the  British  islands  or  from  the 
United  States  itself,  to  any  port  not  in  the  United 
States.  It  was  argued  that  this  condition,  by  which 
American  vessels  were  to  be  forbidden  to  transport 
from  their  own  country  any  of  the  specified  com- 
modities, even  though  produced  there  or  in  a  third 
country,  was  essential  as  a  safeguard  against  abuse 
of  the  treaty  privilege.  American  vessels,  it  was 
said,  might,  after  importing  a  cargo  from  the 
British  islands,  carry  it  on  to  Europe,  under  the 
guise  of  a  feigned  American  product,  and  thus  de- 
stroy the  exclusive  advantages  which  were  to  con- 
tinue to  belong  to  British  shipping.  But  the  price 
was  deemed  by  the  United  States  to  be  too  high  for 
the  limited  privilege  that  was  gained.  The  Senate, 
in  assenting  to  the  ratification  of  the  treaty,  struck 
out  the  obnoxious  article.  The  treaty,  however, 
provided  that  the  citizens  of  the  two  countries  might 
freely  pass  and  repass  by  land,  or  by  inland  naviga- 
tion, into  the  territories  of  the  one  and  the  other  on 
the  continent  of  America  (the  country  within  the 
limits  of  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company  only  except- 
ed), and  carry  on  trade  and  commerce  with  each 
other  in  that  way.  American  vessels  were  ex- 
pressly excluded  from  any  seaports  in  such  ter- 
ritories; but,  by  another  article  of  the  treaty,  they 
were  admitted   on  certain  conditions   to   a  direct 

165 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

trade  with  the  British  dominions   in  the  East  In- 
dies. 

During  the  long  wars  that  grew  out  of  the  French 
Revolution,  colonial  restrictions  in  America  were 
from  time  to  time  suspended  under  military  neces- 
sity. The  home  governments,  when  unable  to 
carry  on  the  trade  under  their  own  flag,  were  at 
times  reluctantly  obliged  to  open  it  to  neutral  ships 
in  order  that  it  might  not  perish  altogether.  As 
early  as  March  26,  1793,  the  ports  of  the  French 
colonies  in  America  were  opened  on  certain  terms 
to  the  vessels  of  neutral  countries.  On  June  9, 
1793,  Spain  opened  the  ports  of  New  Orleans,  Pen- 
sacola,  and  St.  Augustine  to  friendly  commerce,  but 
foreign  vessels  were  required  to  touch  at  Corcubion, 
in  Galicia,  or  at  Alicant,  and  obtain  a  permit,  with- 
out which  no  entry  into  the  specified  ports  was 
allowed.  Seventeen  years  later  there  began,  in  a 
conservative  revolt  against  the  Napoleonic  domina- 
tion in  Spain,  the  movement  in  the  Spanish  colonies 
in  America  that  was  gradually  to  be  transformed 
into  a  genuine  struggle  for  independence,  a  strug- 
gle that  was  to  end  in  the  liberation  of  Spain's  vast 
continental  domain  in  the  Western  Hemisphere 
from  the  bonds  of  colonial  monopoly.  With  the 
concurrent  independence  of  Portugal's  great  colony, 
Brazil,  the  system  for  the'  most  part  disappeared 
from  the  American  continents,  below  the  northern 
boundary    of    the    United    States.     But,    emerging 

166 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

from  the  long  Napoleonic  struggle  triumphant, 
Great  Britain  retained  her  authority  over  her  colo- 
nies, and  had  even  added  to  their  number.  With 
her  the  question  of  colonial  restrictions  therefore  still 
remained.  It  had  never  ceased,  except  during  the 
war  of  1812,  to  be  a  subject  of  consideration.  Mon- 
roe and  Pinkney  had  vainly  endeavored  to  settle  it 
in  1 806.  After  the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  Ghent, 
the  discussion  was  resumed.  John  Quincy  Adams, 
with  his  accustomed  energy  and  dialectic  force; 
Richard  Rush,  with  his  wonted  tact  and  wise  judg- 
ment, and  Albert  Gallatin,  with  all  his  penetrating 
and  persuasive  reasonableness,  had  all  essayed  to 
arrange  it,  but  without  avail.  In  181 7,  Lord  Castle- 
reagh  proposed  to  extend  to  the  United  States  the 
provisions  of  the  "free  port"  acts,  the  effect  of 
which  would  have  been  to  admit  to  a  limited  trade 
American  vessels  of  one  deck ;  but  this  proposal  was 
rejected,  and  by  the  act  of  Congress  of  April  18, 
1 81 8,  the  ports  of  the  United  States  were  closed 
against  British  vessels  coming  from  any  British 
colony  which  was,  by  the  ordinary  laws  of  naviga- 
tion and  trade,  closed  against  American  vessels; 
and  British  vessels  sailing  from  the  United  States 
were  put  under  bond  to  land  their  cargoes  elsewhere 
than  in  such  a  colony.  By  an  act  of  May  15,  1820, 
these  restrictions  were  specifically  made  applicable 
to  any  British  colonial  port  in  the  West  Indies  or 
America.     In  1822  these  restrictions  were  partially 

167 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

suspended,  in  reciprocal  recognition  of  the  opening 
of  certain  colonial  ports  to  American  vessels  un- 
der certain  conditions.  By  the  act  of  Congress  of 
March  i,  1823,  this  suspension  was  continued,  but 
a  claim  was  also  put  forth,  which  had  previously 
been  advanced  by  the  United  States  in  negotiation 
but  had  always  been  resisted  by  Great  Britain,  that 
no  higher  duties  should  be  imposed  in  the  colonial 
ports  on  articles  imported  from  the  United  States 
in  American  vessels,  than  on  similar  articles  when 
imported  in  British  ships  from  any  country  whatso- 
ever, including  Great  Britain  herself  and  her  colo- 
nies. This  claim  had  been  a  favorite  one  with  Mr. 
Adams,  on  the  supposition  that  its  acceptance  was 
necessary  to  assure  to  American  vessels  their  full 
share  of  the  carrying-trade;  and  it  was  now  pro- 
posed to  enforce  it  by  means  of  discriminating  du- 
ties. Its  attempted  enforcement  immediately  led 
to  the  imposition  of  countervailing  duties  by  Great 
Britain.  Such  was  the  condition  of  things  when,  by 
the  act  of  July  5,  1825,  Parliament  opened  the  trade 
with  the  British  colonies  in  North  America  and  the 
West  Indies  to  the  vessels  of  all  nations,  on  speci- 
fied conditions.  The  government  of  the  United 
States  failed  to  accept  these  conditions,  with  the 
result  that  on  December  1,  1826,  direct  intercourse 
between  the  United  States  and  the  British-American 
colonies,  in  British  as  well  as  in  American  vessels, 
was  almost  wholly  suspended. 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

In  learning  how  an  escape  was  found  from  this 
dilemma,  we  shall  see  how  the  unmaking  of  a  min- 
ister contributed   to   the  making   of   a   President. 
When  Andrew  Jackson  was   inaugurated  as  Presi- 
dent, in  1829,  Martin  Van  Buren  became  his  Sec- 
retary of   State,  and   Louis   McLane   was  sent  as 
minister  to  the  court  of  St.  James.     In  a  speech  in 
the  Senate  in  February,  1827,  Van  Buren  had  crit- 
icised the    administration    then   in    power   for    its 
omission  to  accept  the  conditions  prescribed  in  the 
act  of  Parliament  of   1825.     The  views  which  he 
then  expressed  he  embodied  on  July  20,  1829,  in  an 
instruction  to  McLane.     In  concluding  a  long  and 
able  review  of  the  controversy  with  Great  Britain, 
Van  Buren  declared  that  there  were  three  grounds 
on  which  the  United  States  was  assailable.     The 
first  was  "in  our  too  long  and  too  tenaciously  re- 
sisting the  right  of  Great  Britain  to  impose  pro- 
tecting duties  in  her  colonies";  the  second,  "in  not 
relieving  her  vessels  from  the  restriction  of  return- 
ing direct  from  the  United  States  to  the  colonies, 
after  permission  had  been  given  by  Great  Britain 
to  our  vessels  to  clear  out  from  the  colonies  to  any 
other  than  a  British  port" ;  and  the  third,  "in  omit- 
ting to  accept  the  terms  offered  by  the  act  of  Par- 
liament of  July,    1825."     McLane   was  authorized 
to  say  that  the  United  States  would  open  its  ports 
to  British  vessels  coming  from  the  British  colonies 
laden  with  such  colonial  products  as  might  be  im- 

169 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMAC Y 

ported  in  American  vessels,  on  condition  that  Great 
Britain  would  extend  to  American  vessels  the  privi- 
leges offered  by  that  act.  In  these  instructions  Van 
Buren  only  re-echoed  the  views  which  Gallatin  had 
strongly  expressed  to  the  Department  of  State  in  his 
despatches  in  1826.  But  Van  Buren  did  not  stop 
here.  He  directed  McLane  not  to  "harass"  the 
British  cabinet  by  the  repetition  of  prior  discussions, 
but,  if  the  course  of  the  late  administration  should 
be  brought  up,  to  say  that  its  views  had  been  sub- 
mitted to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  that  the 
counsels  by  which  his  own  conduct  was  directed 
represented  the  judgment  expressed  by  the  only 
earthly  tribunal  to  which  the  late  administration 
was  amenable  for  its  acts,  and  that  to  set  up  those 
acts  as  the  cause  of  withholding  from  the  people 
of  the  United  States  privileges,  which  would  other- 
wise be  extended  to  them,  would  be  unjust  in  itself 
and  could  not  fail  to  excite  their  deepest  sensibility. 
McLane  duly  communicated  to  the  British  govern- 
ment the  entire  purport  of  his  instructions.  His 
negotiations  were  altogether  successful.  By  a  proc- 
lamation issued  by  President  Jackson  on  October 
5,  1830,  under  the  authority  of  an  act  of  Congress 
of  the  29th  of  the  preceding  May,  the  ports  of  the 
United  States  were  declared  to  be  open  to  British 
vessels  and  their  cargoes  coming  from  the  colonics, 
on  payment  of  the  same  charges  as  American  ves- 
sels coming  from  the  same  quarter.     An  order  in 

170 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

council  issued  November  5,  1830,  extended  to  Amer- 
ican vessels  reciprocal  privileges.  The  last  rem- 
nants of  the  vicious  system  that  was  thus  broken 
down  were  removed  in  1849. 

In  1 83 1  McLane  resigned  his  post  in  London,  and 
Van  Buren  was  appointed  by  the  President  to  fill 
the  vacancy.  He  arrived  in  England  in  September, 
and  entered  upon  the  discharge  of  the  duties  of  his 
office.  On  January  25,  1832,  the  Senate,  of  which 
he  had  so  recently  been  a  member,  refused  to  con- 
firm him.  In  the  memorable  debate  that  preceded 
his  rejection,  his  pointed  and  censorious  disavowal, 
in  the  instructions  to  McLane,  of  responsibility  for 
the  acts  of  the  preceding  administration,  formed  a 
principal  ground  of  objection.  It  was  eloquently 
declared  by  his  Whig  opponents  that  party  dif- 
ferences should  not  be  injected  into  international 
discussions.  The  criticism  was  essentially  sound; 
but,  in  the  popular  estimation,  the  punishment  was 
altogether  disproportionate  to  the  offence.  A  wide- 
spread impression  that  its  infliction  was  inspired  by 
resentment,  occasioned  by  party  defeat,  greatly 
enhanced  Van  Buren's  political  strength. 

While  the  contest  with  colonial  restrictions  was 
going  on,  steady  progress  was  made  towards  the 
accomplishment  of  the  design,  propounded  by  the 
Continental  Congress  in  1776,  of  placing  the  for- 
eigner, in  respect  of  commerce  and  navigation,  on 
an  equal  footing  with  the  native,  and  to  this  end 

171 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

of  abolishing  all  discriminating  charges  whatsoever. 
"This  principle,"  once  declared  John  Quincy  Adams, 
"is  altogether  congenial  to  our  institutions,  and 
the  main  obstacle  to  its  adoption  consists  in  this: 
that  the  fairness  of  its  operation  depends  upon  its 
being  admitted  universally."  Before  the  formation 
of  the  Constitution,  the  several  States  were  driven 
for  purposes  of  retaliation  to  impose  discriminating 
duties  on  foreign  vessels  and  their  cargoes.  The 
system  was  continued  by  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  for  the  same  reason.  By  an  act  of 
March  3,  181 5,  however,  Congress  offered  to  abolish 
all  discriminating  duties,  both  of  tonnage  and  of 
impost,  on  foreign  vessels  laden  with  the  produce 
or  manufactures  of  their  own  country,  on  condition 
of  the  concession  of  a  reciprocal  privilege  to  Amer- 
ican vessels.  By  "  discriminating  duties  "  are  meant 
all  duties  in  excess  of  what  would  be  charged,  in  the 
particular  country,  one  of  its  own  vessels  and  the 
cargo  imported  in  it.  This  principle  first  found  con- 
ventional expression  in  the  treaty  of  commerce  and 
navigation  with  Great  Britain  of  July  3,  181 5;  but 
its  operation  was  therein  confined,  on  the  part  of 
that  power,  to  the  British  territories  in  Europe.  By 
the  act  of  Congress  of  March  1,  1817,  the  offer  made 
in  the  act  of  181 5  was  enlarged,  by  including  vessels 
belonging  to  citizens  either  of  the  country  by  which 
the  goods  were  produced  or  manufactured,  or  of  the 
country  from  which  they  could  only  be,  or  most 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

usually  were,  first  shipped  for  transportation.  The 
final  step  was  taken  in  the  act  of  March  24,  1828, 
which  is  still  in  force,  and  by  which  a  standing  offer 
was  made  for  the  reciprocal  abolition  of  all  dis- 
criminating duties,  without  regard  to  the  origin  of 
the  cargo  or  the  port  from  which  the  vessel  came. 
The  provisions  of  this  statute  have  been  extended 
to  many  countries  by  proclamation,  and  the  prin- 
ciple on  which  they  are  founded  is  confirmed  by 
numerous  treaties. 

With  the  passing  away  of  the  old  system  of  ex- 
clusions and  discriminations  in  the  West,  the  ac- 
tivities of  American  diplomacy  were  directed  more 
and  more  to  the  East,  where  the  expansion  of  com- 
merce was  hindered  by  various  conditions,  present- 
ing every  phase  of  obstruction  from  general  insecu- 
rity to  positive  non-intercourse.  In  1830  a  treaty 
of  commerce  and  navigation  was  concluded  with 
the  Ottoman  Empire,  with  which  a  trade  had  been 
carried  on  under  the  somewhat  costly  shelter  of  the 
English  Levant  Company.  But  a  wider  field  await- 
ed the  spirit  of  enterprise  in  the  Far  East.  In  Au- 
gust, 1784,  less  than  a  year  after  the  definitive  peace 
with  Great  Britain,  a  New  York  ship,  the  Empress 
of  China,  bore  the  American  flag  into  Canton.  Be- 
fore the  close  of  the  century,  American  vessels  had 
prosecuted  their  adventures  in  trading  and  in  fish- 
ing into  all  parts  of  the  Pacific.  It  was  an  Ameri- 
can ship,  fitted  out  at  Boston  for  the  fur-trade,  that 

173 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

entered  and  explored  in  1792  the  "River  of  the 
West"  and  gave  to  it  its  name,  Columbia.  Even 
the  stern  barriers  of  Spanish  colonial  exclusion 
failed  to  withstand  the  assaults  of  American  energy 
in  the  trade  carried  on  between  the  shores  of  Amer- 
ica and  the  shores  of  Asia.  In  time,  private  in- 
itiative was  powerfully  reinforced  by  the  action  of 
government.  In  1832  Edmund  Roberts,  a  sea- 
captain  of  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  was  ap- 
pointed by  President  Jackson  as  "  agent  for  the  pur- 
pose of  examining  in  the  Indian  Ocean  the  means 
of  extending  the  commerce  of  the  United  States  by 
commercial  arrangements  with  the  powers  whose 
dominions  border  on  those  seas."  Taking  with  him 
blank  letters  of  credence,  he  embarked  in  March, 
1832,  on  the  sloop-of-war,  Peacock,  for  his  long  voy- 
age of  inquiry  and  negotiation.  If  we  were  to  judge 
by  the  provision  made  for  his  comfort  and  remu- 
neration, we  should  infer  that  little  importance  was 
attached  to  his  mission.  Rated  on  the  Peacock  as 
"captain's  clerk,"  his  pay  was  barely  sufficient  to 
defray  the  cost  of  an  insurance  on  his  life  for  the 
benefit  of  his  numerous  children;  and  for  three 
months  he  was  obliged  to  lie  on  the  sea -washed 
gun-deck  with  the  crew,  all  the  available  space  in 
the  cabin  being  occupied  by  a  charge"  d'affaires  to 
Buenos  Ayres  whose  name  is  now  forgotten.  He 
touched  at  all  the  important  countries  eastward  of 
the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  except  those  on  the  Bay 

J74 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

of  Bengal.  He  visited  Java  three  times,  on  one 
occasion  remaining  at  Batavia  nearly  two  months. 
At  Manila,  where  the  crew  were  attacked  by  cholera, 
the  Peacock  was  compelled  to  put  to  sea  with  her 
deck  converted  into  a  hospital.  In  Siam,  and  in 
the  countries  bordering  on  the  Persian  Gulf  and  the 
Red  Sea,  Roberts  endured  many  hardships  and  en- 
countered many  perils.  But  his  sacrifices  were  not 
in  vain.  On  March  30,  1833,  he  concluded  a  treaty 
of  amity  and  commerce  with  Siam,  and  on  Septem- 
ber 21st  signed  a  similar  treaty  with  the  Sultan  of 
Muscat.  He  returned  to  the  United  States,  in  1834, 
on  the  U.  S.  S.  Lexington.  His  treaties  were  prompt- 
ly approved  by  the  Senate.  He  then  returned  to 
the  East,  sailing  again  in  a  man-of-war.  His  diplo- 
matic career  ended  in  1836,  at  Macao,  where  he 
fell  a  victim  to  the  plague.  In  1839  Congress,  recog- 
nizing the  gross  inadequacy  of  the  recompense  that 
had  been  made  for  his  exceptional  services,  granted 
to  his  legal  representatives  a  belated  requital.  If 
the  successful  performance  of  important  public 
duties,  unhampered  by  any  thought  of  personal 
aggrandizement,  forms  a  just  title  to  remembrance, 
there  can  be  no  doubt  that  an  abiding  place  in  our 
history  belongs  to  this  pioneer  of  American  diplo- 
macy in  Asia. 

Roberts  was  empowered  to  negotiate  a  treaty 
with  Cochin  China,  but  in  this  task  he  made  no  prog- 
ress.    In  all  the  vast  Chinese  Empire  only  one  port 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

— that  of  Canton — was  accessible  to  foreign  mer- 
chants. The  first  permanent  breach  in  the  wall  of 
seclusion  was  made  by  the  treaty  between  Great 
Britain  and  China,  signed  at  Nanking,  August  29, 
1842,  at  the  close  of  the  opium  war.  By  this  treaty 
the  ports  of  Canton,  Amoy,  Foochow,  Ningpo,  and 
Shanghai  were  opened  to  British  subjects  and  their 
commerce,  and  the  island  of  Hongkong  was  ceded 
to  Great  Britain  as  an  entrepot.  A  supplementary 
treaty  of  commerce  and  navigation  was  concluded 
in  the  following  year.  The  United  States  soon  ap- 
peared in  the  breach.  By  the  act  of  Congress  of 
March  3,  1843,  the  sum  of  forty  thousand  dollars 
was  placed  at  the  disposal  of  the  President  to  en- 
able him  to  establish  commercial  relations  with 
China  on  terms  of  "national  equal  reciprocity." 
On  May  8th,  Caleb  Cushing,  of  Massachusetts,  was 
appointed  to  the  mission  with  the  title  of  minister 
plenipotentiary  and  commissioner.  The  choice  was 
fortunate.  No  public  character  in  America  has 
possessed  a  mind  more  versatile  or  talents  more 
varied  than  Cushing.  Lawyer,  jurist,  politician, 
soldier,  and  diplomatist,  a  student  of  literature  and 
of  science,  and  an  accomplished  linguist,  he  respond- 
ed to  the  demands  of  every  situation,  promptly 
and  without  embarrassment.  So  prodigious  and 
insatiable  was  his  acquisitiveness  that,  as  the  tradi- 
tion runs  in  the  Department  of  State,  when  deprived 
of  other  mental  pabulum    he  would   memorize  the 

176 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

groups  of  figures  in  the  cipher  code.  When  he  set 
out  for  China,  a  squadron  of  three  vessels  was  placed 
at  his  disposal.  On  February  27,  1844,  writing  from 
the  flag-ship  Brandywine,  in  Macao  Roads,  he  an- 
nounced to  the  governor-general  of  the  two  Kwang 
provinces  his  arrival  with  full  powers  to  make  a 
treaty.  He  encountered  the  usual  evasions;  but, 
after  an  exchange  of  correspondence,  he  learned 
early  in  May  that  Tsiyeng,  the  negotiator  of  the 
treaties  with  Great  Britain,  had  been  appointed  as 
imperial  commissioner  to  treat  with  him.  Tsiyeng 
arrived  outside  Macao  on  June  16th,  and  next  day 
entered  the  village  of  Wang  Hiya,  where  with  his 
suite  he  lodged  in  a  temple  that  had  been  prepared 
for  him.  On  June  21st,  after  an  exchange  of  offi- 
cial visits,  Cushing  submitted  a  project  of  a  treaty. 
In  communicating  it  he  stated  that  his  government 
desired  to  treat  on  the  basis  of  "cordial  friendship 
and  firm  peace,"  that  it  did  not  desire  any  part  of 
the  territory  of  China,  and  that,  while  it  would  be 
happy  to  treat  on  the  basis  of  opening  all  ports,  yet, 
if  China  so  desired,  it  would  be  content  with  a  free 
and  secure  commerce  with  the  five  ports  opened  by 
the  British  treaty.  The  negotiations  proceeded 
steadily,  and  on  July  3,  1844,  a  treaty  was  signed. 
The  point  of  diplomatic  representation  at  Peking 
was  yielded  with  the  express  understanding  that, 
in  case  it  should  be  conceded  to  other  Western 
powers,  the  envoy  of  the  United  States  should  likc- 
12  177 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

wise  be  received.  All  the  commercial  privileges 
obtained  by  Great  Britain  for  her  subjects  were, 
with  some  variations,  extended  to  citizens  of  the 
United  States;  and  American  citizens  were,  like 
British  subjects,  exempted  from  Chinese  jurisdiction. 
A  curious  light  is  thrown  on  American  enterprise  by 
a  correspondence  which  Cushing,  before  his  return 
to  the  United  States,  had  with  two  American  citi- 
zens who  had  established  a  ship- yard  on  the  Chinese 
coast,  opposite  Hongkong,  and  who  had  been  or- 
dered away.  Cushing  advised  them  to  acquiesce 
in  the  action  of  the  Chinese  authorities,  in  view  of 
the  stipulations  of  the  treaty  which  he  had  just 
concluded. 

A  new  treaty  was  made  in  1858;  and  ten  years 
later  a  special  Chinese  embassy,  headed  by  Anson 
Burlingame,  signed  at  Washington  the  treaty  that 
is  known  by  his  name.  In  entering  the  service  of 
China,  after  a  notable  career  of  six  years  as  Ameri- 
can minister  at  Peking,  Burlingame  declared  that 
he  was  governed  by  the  interests  of  his  country  and 
of  civilization ;  and  his  course  was  approved  by 
his  government.  The  rule  that  the  United  States 
will  not  receive  as  a  diplomatic  representative  of  a 
foreign  power  one  of  its  own  citizens  was  in  his  case 
gladly  waived.  As  American  minister  at  Peking, 
he  sought  "to  substitute  fair  diplomatic  action  in 
China  for  force,"  a  policy  which  Mr.  Seward  "ap- 
proved with  much  commendation." 

178 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

Through  the  vicissitudes  of  the  years  that  have 
since  elapsed  it  may  be  said  that  the  United  States 
has,  in  its  commercial  dealings  with  China,  uniformly 
been  guided  by  the  principle  of  the  "open  door"; 
for,  although  the  institution  of  that  policy  is  popu- 
larly associated  in  the  United  States  with  Mr. 
Hay's  circular  of  September  6,  1899,  neither  the 
phrase  nor  the  principle  denoted  by  it  in  any  sense 
originated  with  that  measure.  The  phrase  was 
used,  as  a  current  form  of  expression,  by  the  Amer- 
ican peace  commissioners  at  Paris  in  1898,  in  the 
demand,  made  under  instructions  from  their  govern- 
ment, for  the  cession  of  the  Philippines.  In  that  de- 
mand they  expressly  declared  it  to  be  the  purpose  of 
the  United  States  to  maintain  in  the  islands  "an 
open  door  to  the  world's  commerce."  The  phrase 
"open  door"  is  but  a  condensed  expression  of  the 
principle  of  "equal  and  impartial  trade"  for  all 
nations;  and  in  the  treaty  of  peace  between  the 
United  States  and  Spain  it  was  precisely  exemplified 
to  the  extent  of  the  stipulation  that  the  United 
States  would,  for  the  term  of  ten  years,  "admit 
Spanish  ships  and  merchandise  to  the  ports  of  the 
Philippine  Islands  on  the  same  terms  as  ships  and 
merchandise  of  the  United  States." 

The  United  States,  in  espousing  the  cause  of  the 
"open  door"  in  China  in  1899,  sought,  not  to  estab- 
lish a  new  principle  there,  but  to  prevent  the  aban- 
donment of  the  old  for  the  policy  of  leases  and 
spheres  of  influence  which  the  European  powers, 

179 


AMERICAN    D I P  L  O  M  A  C  Y 

whether  with  a  view  to  self-aggrandizement  or  to. 
the  avoidance  of  war  with  one  another,  seemed  ready- 
to  adopt.  The  position  of  the  United  States  was, 
however,  appreciably  weakened  by  its  prompt  re- 
linquishment of  consular  jurisdiction  within  the 
leased  territories.  As  Chinese  sovereignty  was  by 
the  terms  of  the  leases  professedly  reserved,  Japan 
logically  took  the  ground  that  consular  jurisdiction, 
which  was  exercised  under  treaties  with  China, 
remained  unimpaired;  but  the  European  govern- 
ments, each  looking  to  the  exercise  of  supreme  power 
within  its  own  leased  area,  yielded  to  one  another's 
wishes.  The  United  States  did  not  contest  their 
claim,  but,  on  the  contrary,  accepted  it  without 
protest  or  reservation. 

In  the  disorders  following  the  Boxer  Rebellion  the 
United  States  adhered  to  its  previous  declarations  of 
policy.  In  his  celebrated  circular  of  July  3,  1900, 
while  the  foreign  legations  at  Peking  were  besieged 
and  all  communication  writh  them  was  cut  off,  Mr. 
Hay  declared  that  the  policy  of  the  United  States 
would  be  "to  seek  a  solution  which  may  bring  about 
permanent  safety  and  peace  to  China,  preserve 
China's  territorial  and  administrative  entity,  pro- 
tect all  rights  guaranteed  to  friendly  powers  by 
treaty  and  international  law,  and  safeguard  for  the 
world  the  principle  of  equal  and  impartial  trade  with 
all  parts  of  the  Chinese  Empire. ' '  The  United  States 
co-operated  with  the  other  foreign  powers  in  the 
military  expedition  for  the  relief  of  the  legations; 

180 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

united  in  the  joint  demands  of  December  22,  1900, 
for  the  punishment  of  the  principal  offenders,  the 
indemnification  of  the  foreign  governments  and  their 
citizens,  and  the  adoption  of  measures  to  assure  the 
preservation  of  order  and  the  improvement  of  rela- 
tions, both  commercial  and  diplomatic;  and  signed 
the  final  protocol  of  September  7,  1901,  by  which  an 
indemnity  of  about  $330,000,000  was  assessed  upon 
China.  In  all  these  matters  the  United  States  had 
sought  to  exert  a  moderating  influence ;  and  six  years 
later  it  returned  to  China  the  unexpended  remainder, 
about  one-half,  of  the  sum  of  $24,000,000  allotted  to 
American  claims. 

Meanwhile,  a  complicated  and  elusive  negotiation 
took  place  in  regard  to  Manchuria,  whose  evacua- 
tion by  Russia  the  United  States  continued  to  urge. 
On  January  16,  1904,  however,  Japan  presented  to 
Russia  an  ultimatum,  embracing  the  preservation  of 
Chinese  sovereignty  in  Manchuria  and  the  exclusion 
of  Korea  from  the  Russian  sphere  of  interest.  In 
the  war  that  ensued  the  United  States,  while  main- 
taining its  neutrality,  expressed  to  the  belligerents 
the  wish  that  the  area  of  hostilities  might  as  far  as 
possible  be  localized.  They  assented  except  as  to 
Manchuria,  which  was  indeed  the  principal  theatre 
of  military  operations.  In  June,  1905,  they  accepted 
a  proposal  of  peace  negotiations,  which  President 
Roosevelt  is  said  to  have  made  to  Russia  at  the  in- 
stance of  Japan;  and  on  September  5,  1905,  they 
concluded  at  Portsmouth,  New  Hampshire,  a  treaty 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

by  which  Manchuria,  except  the  Liaotung  peninsula, 
was  to  be  restored  to  China,  while  Port  Arthur, 
Talienwan,  and  the  adjacent  territories  which  had 
been  leased  to  Russia  were,  with  China's  consent,  to 
be  transferred  to  Japan. 

While  the  fate  of  Manchuria  was  under  discussion 
at  Portsmouth  a  serious  agitation  against  the  United 
States  broke  out  in  China.  The  treaty  of  1 880,  while 
assenting  to  the  exclusion  from  the  United  States  of 
Chinese  "laborers,"  expressly  provided  for  the  ad- 
mission of  teachers,  students,  merchants,  and  trav- 
ellers. The  statutes  subsequently  adopted  conformed 
to  these  stipulations,  but  in  1898  their  application 
was  broadened  by  a  ruling,  contrary  to  previous 
opinion  and  practice,  that  all  persons,  such  as  sales- 
men, clerks,  buyers,  storekeepers,  and  physicians, 
who  were  not  expressly  exempted,  were  excluded  as 
"laborers."  Moreover,  the  law  was  often  enforced 
in  a  harsh  and  truculent  manner,  so  that  eventually  a 
boycott  of  American  goods  was  undertaken  in 
northern  China  under  the  auspices  of  local  guilds  and 
chambers  of  commerce.  Extensive  losses  were  sus- 
tained by  American  merchants  before  the  Chinese 
government  could  stay  the  movement. 

In  November,  1909,  coincidently  with  efforts  tc 
extend  American  industrial  and  financial  interests  in 
China,  especially  in  connection  with  the  building  of 
railways,  the  United  States,  with  a  view  to  preserve 
"the  undisputed  enjoyment  by  China  of  all  political 
rights  in  Manchuria"  as  well  as  the  "open  door," 

182 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

proposed  to  the  powers  the  "commercial  neutraliza- 
tion" of  the  Manchurian  railways  under  an  inter- 
national administration.  Russia  declined  to  accept 
the  plan,  on  the  ground  that  it  would  "seriously  in- 
jure Russian  interests,  public  and  private";  while 
her  former  antagonist,  Japan,  rejected  it  as  involving 
an  important  departure  from  the  terms  of  the  treaty 
of  Portsmouth,  under  which  the  Japanese  and  Rus- 
sian railways  in  Manchuria  were  "dedicated  exclu- 
sively to  commercial  and  industrial  uses,"  as  well  as 
the  setting  up  in  that  part  of  China  of  an  exceptional 
system  whose  operation  would  not  be  beneficial. 

In  October,  1911,  an  insurrection  against  the 
Imperial  government  broke  out  in  China.  In  Feb- 
ruary, 1 91 2,  the  Manchu  Dynasty  abdicated,  and 
Yuan  Shih  Kai,  who  had  held  many  high  govern- 
mental positions,  military  and  civil,  was  elected 
provisional  President  of  the  Republic  of  China,  by  a 
national  assembly  at  Nanking.  A  provisional  con- 
stitution was  adopted.  The  United  States  Senate 
passed  a  resolution,  which  had  come  from  the  House, 
congratulating  the  people  of  China  on  their  adoption 
of  a  republican  form  of  government.  On  February 
3d  Mr.  Knox,  as  Secretary  of  State,  replying  to  an 
inquiry  of  the  German  government,  had  reiterated 
the  desire  of  the  United  States  to  preserve  China's 
territorial  integrity  as  well  as  to  secure  the  observance 
of  the  principle  of  neutrality,  which  he  proposed  to 
extend  to  loans.  After  the  4th  of  March,  19 13,  the 
bankers  forming  the  American  group  in  the  "six- 

183 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

power"  loan  (about  $125,000,000)  then  contemplated 
under  the  auspices  of  the  United  States,  France, 
Germany,  Great  Britain,  Japan,  and  Russia,  asked 
their  government  whether  it  would  request  them  to 
participate.  On  March  19th  President  Wilson  pub- 
licly announced  that  the  administration  had  declined 
to  make  the  request,  because  it  did  not  approve 
either  the  "conditions  of  the  loan,"  which  touched 
"very  nearly  the  administrative  independence  of 
China,"  or  "the  implications  of  responsibility," 
which  "might  conceivably  go  the  length  in  some  un- 
happy contingency  of  forcible  interference  in  the 
financial,  and  even  the  political,  affairs"  of  the 
country.  In  the  following  May  the  United  States 
formally  recognized  the  republic. 

In  the  recent  controversies  between  China1  and 

1  By  chance,  as  the  result  of  the  mechanical  adjustment  of  the 
new  matter  to  the  plates  of  the  original  work,  we  are  enabled  to 
insert,  at  the  last  moment,  the  agreement  between  the  United  States 
and  Japan  concluded  at  Washington  on  November  2,  191 7,  by 
exchange  of  notes  between  Mr.  Lansing,  Secretary  of  State,  and 
Viscount  Ishii,  head  of  the  Japanese  special  mission,  on  the  subject 
of  China.  Referring  to  "recent  conversations  touching  the  ques- 
tions of  mutual  interest"  to  their  governments  relating  to  China, 
and  stating  that,  in  order  to  "silence  mischievous  reports,"  a 
"public  announcement  once  more  of  the  desires  and  intentions 
shared"  by  those  governments  on  the  subject  is  believed  to  be 
advisable,  Mr.  Lansing,  in  his  note,  declares  that  the  two  govern- 
ments "recognize  that  territorial  propinquity  creates  special  rela- 
tions between  countries,  and  consequently"  that  "the  United 
vStates  recognizes  that  Japan  has  special  interests  in  China,  par- 
ticularly in  the  part  to  which  her  possessions  are  contiguous."  He 
then  observes  that  "the  territorial  sovereignty  of  China,  neverthe- 
less, remains  unimpaired,"  and  that  the  United  States  "has  every 
confidence  in  the  repeated  assurances"  of  Japan  that,  while  "geo- 

184 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

Japan  the  United  States  does  not  appear  to  have 
become  directly  involved.  The  prestige  of  Japan 
in  that  quarter  has,  however,  been  visibly  enhanced; 
and  a  spontaneous  communication  lately  made  by 
Washington  to  Peking,  upon  the  importance  of 
maintaining  internal  political  unity,  seems  to  have 
occasioned  some  annoyance  at  Tokyo,  whose  first 
impressions  may  have  been  formed  upon  incomplete 
advices.  Possibly  the  powers  of  the  eminent  Jap- 
anese commission  now  on  its  way  (July,  191 7)  to  the 
United  States  may  be  broad  enough  to  admit  of  a 
discussion  of  the  situation  in  China. 

When  Edmund  Roberts  was  dispatched  to  the  Far 

graphical  position"  gives  her  such  "special  interests,"  she  has 
"no  desire  to  discriminate  against  the  trade  of  other  nations  or  to 
disregard  the  commercial  rights  heretofore  granted  by  China  in 
treaties  with  other  powers";  that  the  two  governments  "deny  that 
they  have  any  purpose  to  infringe  in  any  way  the  independence  or 
territorial  integrity  of  China";  that  they  "declare  furthermore  that 
they  always  adhere  to  the  principle  of  the  so-called  'open  door,' 
or  equal  opportunity  for  commerce  and  industry  in  China";  and 
that  they  "mutually  declare  that  they  are  opposed  to  the  acquisition 
by  any  other  government  of  any  special  rights  or  privileges  that 
would  affect  the  independence  or  territorial  integrity  of  China,  01 
that  would  deny  to  the  subjects  or  citizens  of  any  country  the  full 
enjoyment  of  equal  opportunity  "  in  such  "  commerce  and  industry." 
Viscount  Ishii,  repeating  the  terms  of  Mr.  Lansing's  note,  confirm?, 
under  the  authorization  of  his  government,  the  "understanding" 
thus  reached. 

The  Chinese  government,  when  promptly  furnished  by  Japan 
with  copies  of  these  notes,  lodged  at  Washington  and  at  Tokyo  a 
declaration  to  the  effect  that  China,  having  adopted  toward  friendly 
nations  the  principle  of  justice,  equality,  and  respect  for  treaty 
rights,  and  recognizing  special  relations  created  by  territorial  propin- 
quity only  so  far  as  expressed  in  treaties,  would  not  permit  herself 
to  be  bound  by  any  agreement  made  between  other  nations. 

185 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

East,  he  was  directed  to  obtain  information  respect- 
ing Japan  and  the  value  of  its  trade  with  the  Dutch 
and  the  Chinese.  Japan,  like  China,  had  been 
closed  to  intercourse  with  the  Western  powers  in 
the  seventeenth  century,  chiefly  on  account  of 
foreign  aggressions.  The  seclusion  of  Japan  was, 
however,  even  more  complete  than  that  of  China, 
since  the  only  privilege  of  trade  conceded  to  any 
Western  power  was  that  granted  to  the  Dutch,  who 
maintained  a  factory  on  the  island  of  Deshima,  at 
Nagasaki,  and  who  were  allowed  to  fit  out  two  ships 
a  year  from  Batavia  to  that  port.  In  1845  Alex- 
ander Everett,  when  he  went  as  commissioner  to 
China,  took  with  him  a  full  power  to  negotiate  a 
treaty  with  Japan.  This  power  he  afterwards  trans- 
ferred to  Commodore  James  Biddle,  who  in  1846 
paid  an  ill-fated  visit  to  the  bay  of  Yedo.  In  1849 
Commander  Glynn,  of  the  United  States  navy,  while 
stationed  in  the  western  Pacific,  made  a  voyage  in 
the  Preble  to  Nagasaki  to  inquire  as  to  the  fate  of 
certain  American  whalers,  said  to  have  been  ship- 
wrecked, who  were  reported  to  be  held  as  prisoners 
by  the  Japanese.  Commander  Glynn  found  that 
the  men  were  in  reality  deserters,  but  he  obtained 
their  release ;  and  on  his  return  to  the  United  States 
he  urged  that  another  effort  be  made  to  open  an 
intercourse  between  the  two  countries,  especially 
with  a  view  to  the  use  of  a  Japanese  port  for  the  ac- 
commodation of  a  line  of  steamers  which  was  then 

186 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

expected  to  be  established  between  California  and 
China.  On  June  10,  185 1,  Commodore  Aulick  was 
instructed  to  proceed  to  Yedo  in  his  flag-ship,  ac- 
companied by  as  many  vessels  of  his  squadron  as 
might  be  conveniently  employed.  His  health,  how- 
ever, soon  afterwards  became  impaired,  and  he  was 
relieved  of  the  mission.  His  powers  were  then 
transferred  to  Commodore  Matthew  C.  Perry,  by 
whom  elaborate  preparations  were  made  for  the 
expedition. 

On  the  afternoon  of  Friday,  July  8,  1853,  Perry, 
in  command  of  a  squadron  of  four  vessels,  anchored 
in  the  bay  of  Yedo.  His  proceedings  were  char- 
acterized by  energy  and  decision.  He  had,  as  he 
said,  determined  to  demand  as  a  right  and  not  to 
solicit  as  a  favor  those  acts  of  courtesy  which  are 
due  from  one  civilized  nation  to  another,  and  to 
allow  none  of  the  petty  annoyances  that  had  been 
unspairingly  visited  on  those  who  had  preceded 
him.  He  declined  to  deliver  his  credentials  to  any 
but  an  officer  of  the  highest  rank.  When  he  was 
asked  to  go  to  Nagasaki,  he  refused;  when  ordered 
to  leave  the  bay,  he  moved  higher  up ;  and  he  found 
that  the  nearer  he  approached  the  imperial  city 
"  the  more  polite  and  friendly  they  became."  After 
delivering  his  letters  to  two  princes  designated  by 
the  Emperor  to  receive  them,  he  went  away,  an- 
nouncing that  he  would  return  in  the  following 
spring  to  receive  a  reply  to  his  propositions.     He 

187 


A M E  R I C  A  N    DIPLOMACY 

returned  with  redoubled  forces  in  February,  1854, 
and,  passing  by  the  city  of  Uraga,  anchored  not 
far  below  Yedo.  The  Emperor  had  appointed  com- 
missioners to  treat  with  him,  four  of  whom  were 
princes  of  the  empire.  They  desired  him  to  return  to 
Uraga,  but  he  declined  to  do  so.  The  commissioners 
then  consented  to  treat  at  a  place  opposite  the  ships. 
Here  the  Japanese  erected  a  pavilion,  and  on  March 
8th  Perry  landed  in  state,  with  an  escort  of  five 
hundred  officers,  seamen,  and  marines,  embarked 
in  twenty-seven  barges.  "With  people  of  forms," 
said  Perry,  "  it  is  necessary  either  to  set  all  cere- 
mony aside,  or  to  out-Herod  Herod  in  assumed  per- 
sonal consequence  and  ostentation.  I  have  adopted 
the  two  extremes."  Perry  submitted  a  draught  of 
a  treaty;  and,  pending  the  negotiations,  he  estab- 
lished a  telegraph-line  on  shore,  and  laid  down  and 
put  in  operation  a  railway  with  a  locomotive  and 
cars,  "  carrying  around  the  circle  many  of  the  aston- 
ished natives."  A  treaty  was  signed  on  March  31, 
1854.  American  ships  were  allowed  to  obtain  pro- 
visions and  coal  and  other  necessary  supplies  at 
Simoda  and  Hakodate,  and  aid  and  protection  in 
case  of  shipwreck  were  promised.  No  provision  for 
commercial  intercourse  was  secured,  but  the  privi- 
lege was  obtained  of  appointing  a  consul  to  reside  at 
Simoda.  Such  was  the  first  opening  of  Japan,  after 
two  centuries  of  seclusion.  On  July  17,  1901,  there 
was   unveiled    at   Kurihama,  a  monument  in  com- 

.  ss 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

memoration  of  Perry's  advent.  In  Japan  his  name 
is  to-day  a  household  word,  and  is  better  known 
than  that  of  any  other  foreigner. 

On  September  8,  1855,  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  availing  itself  of  the  privilege  secured 
by  the  Perry  treaty,  appointed  Townsend  Harris  as 
consul-general  to  reside  at  Simoda.  He  was  chosen 
in  the  hope  that  by  reason  of  his  knowledge  of  East- 
ern character  and  his  general  intelligence  and  ex- 
perience in  business,  he  might  be  able  to  induce  the 
Japanese  to  enter  into  a  treaty  of  commerce.  On 
July  29,  1858,  his  efforts  were  crowned  with  success. 
A  provision  for  diplomatic  representation  at  Yedo 
was  obtained;  rights  of  residence  and  of  trade  at 
certain  ports  were  secured ;  duties  were  regulated ; 
the  privilege  of  extraterritoriality  was  granted  to 
Americans  in  Japan;  and  religious  freedom  in  that 
country  was  promised.  Harris's  triumph  was  won 
by  a  firm,  tactful,  honest  diplomacy,  and  without 
the  aid  of  a  fleet,  though  it  was  no  doubt  true  that 
he  invoked  the  then  recent  humiliation  of  China  by 
the  European  allies  as  an  argument  in  favor  of  a 
voluntary  intercourse.  Before  the  end  of  the  year, 
the  fleets  of  the  allies  appeared  in  Japanese  waters, 
and  treaties  similar  to  that  of  the  United  States  were 
obtained  by  France  and  Great  Britain.  Treaties  be- 
tween Japan  and  other  powers  followed  in  due  time. 
Harris's  treaty  provided  for  the  exchange  of  ratifica- 
tions at  Washington.    For  this  purpose  the  Japanese 

189 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

government  sent  a  special  embassy  to  the  United 
States.  Including  servants,  it  comprised  seventy- 
one  persons.  They  were  conveyed  to  America  in  a 
United  States  man-of-war,  and  Congress  provided  for 
their  expenses.  The  ratifications  of  the  treaty  were 
exchanged  at  Washington  on  May  22,  i860,  and  the 
members  of  the  embassy  were  afterwards  conducted 
to  some  of  the  principal  American  cities.  They  were 
sent  back  to  Japan  on  the  man-of-war  Niagara. 
To  the  shallow  and  sectarian  reasoner,  the  Japan 
of  to-day,  once  more  possessed  of  full  judicial  and 
economic  autonomy,  and  in  the  potent  exercise  of  all 
the  rights  of  sovereignty,  presents  an  astounding  spec- 
tacle of  sudden,  if  not  miraculous  development ;  but 
in  reality  Japan  is  an  ancient  and  polished  nation, 
the  roots  of  whose  civilization,  though  its  outward 
forms  may  have  changed,  strike  deep  into  the  past. 
During  the  Russo-Japanese  war  the  relations  of 
the  United  States  with  Japan  continued  to  be  of  the 
friendliest  character.  Popular  subscriptions  to  Jap- 
anese war  loans  were  made  with  an  enthusiasm 
which  purchasers  sometimes  refused  to  ascribe  solely 
to  the  expectation  of  profit.  The  American  public 
was  therefore  startled  when,  in  the  autumn  of  1906, 
there  arose  a  sudden  diplomatic  crisis,  occasioned  by 
the  action  of  the  San  Francisco  board  of  education 
in  passing  an  ordinance  by  which  Chinese,  Japanese, 
and  Korean  children  were  required  to  be  segregated 
together  in  an  Oriental  school.     President  Roosevelt, 

190 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

in  his  annual  message  of  December  3,  1906,  strongly 
reprobated  this  measure,  and  it  was  afterwards  es- 
sentially modified.  In  reality,  the  incident  was  one 
of  the  results  of  an  active  agitation  in  California  for 
the  exclusion  of  Japanese  laborers.  This  agitation 
the  two  governments,  acting  in  a  spirit  of  co-opera- 
tion, dealt  with  by  means  of  a  friendly  informal  un- 
derstanding. Japan,  while  permitting  her  laborers 
to  emigrate  to  Hawaii,  Canada,  and  Mexico,  had 
adopted  the  policy  of  refusing  to  provide  them  with 
passports  for  the  United  States.  This  course  she 
continued  to  follow.  Congress,  on  the  other  hand, 
by  the  Immigration  Act  of  February  20,  1907,  au- 
thorized the  President  to  exclude  from  the  continental 
territory  of  the  United  States  persons  having  pass- 
ports for  the  insular  possessions,  for  the  Canal  Zone, 
or  for  another  country.  By  an  executive  order  of 
March  14,  1907,  this  power  was  duly  exercised. 

In  1 913  relations  again  became  strained  as  the 
result  of  steps  taken  in  the  California  legislature  to 
prohibit  certain  classes  of  aliens,  including  Japanese, 
from  holding  lands  in  that  State.  President  Wilson 
deemed  the  occasion  to  be  of  sufficient  importance 
to  justify  the  sending  of  the  Secretary  of  State, 
Mr.  Bryan,  to  California  to  confer  with  the  governor 
and  the  legislature.  The  bill,  though  eventually 
passed,  was  materially  modified.  As  approved  on 
May  19,  1913,  it  permitted  aliens,  unless  they  were 
"eligible  to  citizenship"  of  the  United  States,  to  own 
and  transmit  real  property  only  so  far  as  the  right 

191 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

was  secured  by  treaty,  except  that  they  might  lease 
agricultural  lands  for  a  term  not  exceeding  three 
years.  As  Japanese  are  among  the  classes  of  aliens 
for  whose  naturalization  the  federal  laws  have  been 
held  not  to  provide,  the  statute  curtailed  the  local 
rights  as  to  land-ownership  which  they  had  previ- 
ously enjoyed.  Japan  protested  against  the  act  as 
involving  a  racial  discrimination.  The  United  States, 
while  contending  that  it  reflected  local  economic 
competition  rather  than  racial  discrimination,  main- 
tained that  it  preserved  all  rights  under  the  treaty 
of  191 1  and,  in  permitting  agricultural  leases,  even 
went  beyond  them.  The  Japanese  government, 
however,  declined  to  accept  these  explanations  as 
satisfactory,  declaring  that  it  regarded  the  act  as 
involving  an  "unjust  and  obnoxious  discrimina- 
tion," and  that  it  could  not  regard  the  question  as 
closed  "so  long  as  the  existing  state  of  things  was 
permitted  to  continue." 

The  situation  in  the  Far  East  has  beyond  a  doubt 
been  profoundly  affected  by  the  Anglo- Japanese  al- 
liance, which  has  been  twice  renewed,  with  amend- 
ments. 

By  the  first  alliance,  which  was  signed  at  London 
January  20,  1902,  the  contracting  parties,  declaring 
that  they  were  actuated  solely  by  the  desire  to  main- 
tain the  status  quo  and  general  peace  in  the  Far  East, 
but  that  they  were  also  specially  interested  in  main- 
taining  the  independence  and  territorial  integrity 
of  China  and  Korea  and  in  securing  equal  oppor- 

192 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

tunities  in  those  countries  for  the  commerce  and 
industry  of  all  nations,  agreed  that  if  either  party 
should,  in  defence  of  its  interests  in  those  countries, 
become  involved  in  war  with  another  power,  the 
other  party  would  maintain  a  strict  neutrality  and 
use  its  efforts  to  prevent  any  other  power  from  tak- 
ing part  in  hostilities  against  its  ally,  but  that  if 
these  efforts  were  not  successful  it  would  at  once 
come  to  its  ally's  assistance  and  make  war  and  peace 
in  common  with  it. 

This  agreement  was  replaced  by  the  treaty  of 
August  12,  1905,  the  objects  of  which  were  declared 
to  be  (a)  the  consolidation  and  maintenance  of  the 
general  peace  in  the  regions  of  eastern  Asia  and  of 
India;  (6)  the  preservation  of  the  common  interests 
of  all  the  powers  in  China  by  insuring  the  indepen- 
dence and  integrity  of  the  Chinese  Empire  and  the 
principle  of  equal  opportunity  for  their  commerce  and 
(c)  the  maintenance  of  the  territorial  rights  of  the 
high  contracting  parties  in  the  regions  of  eastern 
Asia  and  of  India  and  the  defence  of  their  special 
interests  in  those  regions.  To  this  end  they  agreed 
that  if  by  reason  of  unprovoked  attack  or  aggressive 
action  by  any  other  power  either  party  should  be 
involved  in  war  in  defence  of  such  territorial  rights 
or  special  interests  the  other  party  would  come  to  its 
assistance  and  conduct  the  war  and  make  peace 
in  common  with  it.  Great  Britain  then  explicitly 
recognized  the  paramount  political,  military,  and 
economic  interests  of  Japan  in  Korea,  while  Japan 
13  193 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

reciprocally  recognized  Great  Britain's  special  in- 
terests in  all  that  concerned  the  security  of  the  Indian 
frontier.  As  regarded  the  war  then  in  progress  be- 
tween Japan  and  Russia,  it  was,  however,  agreed 
that  Great  Britain  would  continue  to  maintain  a 
strict  neutrality  unless  some  other  power  should  join 
in  hostilities  against  Japan. 

The  foregoing  treaty  was  replaced  with  a  new  al- 
liance signed  at  London  July  13,  191 1.  The  same 
general  objects  are  professed  as  in  the  treaty  of 
1905,  but  it  is  stated  that  "important  changes"  have 
taken  place  since  that  time.  This  phrase  no  doubt 
embraced  the  absorption  of  Korea,  where  Japan's 
"paramount  interests,"  which  are  no  longer  men- 
tioned, had  ripened  into  territorial  rights.  And  as 
regarded  the  "territorial  rights"  or  "special  inter- 
ests" of  the  allies  in  eastern  Asia  and  in  India,  their 
obligation  to  aid  each  other  in  war  in  defence  of  such 
rights  or  interests  was  now  declared  to  become  ef- 
fective upon  "unprovoked  attack"  or  "aggressive 
action"  by  any  power  "wherever  arising."  This 
obligation  was  potentially  qualified  by  a  stipulation 
to  the  effect  that,  "should  either  .  .  .  party  conclude  a 
treaty  of  general  arbitration  with  a  third  power,"  it 
should  not  be  obliged  to  go  to  war  with  the  power 
with  which  such  treaty  was  "in  force."  This  clause 
is  understood  to  have  been  intended  to  refer  to  a 
treaty  of  general  arbitration  between  the  United 
States,  on  the  one  part,  and  Great  Britain  and 
France,  respectively,  on  the  other,  concluded  in  Au- 

194 


COMMERCIAL    RESTRICTIONS 

gust,  191 1,  which  was  in  process  of  negotiation  when 
the  alliance  was  signed;  but,  as  this  treaty  never 
came  into  force,  the  scope  of  the  alliance  did  not 
prove  to  be  affected  by  it. 

Korea,  the  Land  of  the  Morning  Calm,  continued, 
long  after  the  opening  of  China  and  Japan,  to  main- 
tain a  rigorous  seclusion.  Efforts  to  secure  access 
had  invariably  ended  in  disaster.  On  May  20,  1882, 
nowever,  Commodore  Shufeldt,  U.  S.  N.,  invested 
with  diplomatic  powers,  succeeded,  with  the  friendly 
good  offices  of  Li  Hung-Chang,  in  concluding  with 
the  Hermit  Kingdom  the  first  treaty  made  by  it 
with  a  Western  power.  The  last  great  barrier  of 
national  non-intercourse  was  broken  down. 

The  results  that  followed  were  unforeseen.  Beset 
by  the  rival  pretensions  of  China  and  Japan  to 
suzerainty,  Korea,  leading  a  feeble  and  uncertain 
existence,  formed  the  immediate  occasion  of  the  war 
between  those  countries  in  1894.  At  the  end  of  this 
war  China  relinquished  her  claims,  but  France, 
Germany,  and  Russia  intervened  to  stay  the  hand  of 
Japan.  Subsequently,  the  Korean  government  made 
to  eminent  Russians  large  timber  concessions  on  the 
Yalu  River.  It  was  chiefly  these  concessions,  which 
were  regarded  as  exposing  Korea  to  Russian  domina- 
tion, that  precipitated  the  war  between  Russia  and 
Japan  of  1904. 

Immediately  after  the  peace  of  Portsmouth  Japan 
proceeded  formally  to  absorb  Korea.  The  direction 
of  Korean  external  relations  was  taken  over  by  the 

195 


A  MERI  C  AN    DIPLOMAC  Y 

Japanese  Foreign  Office;  and  on  November  24,  1905, 
Mr.  Root,  as  Secretary  of  State,  informed  the  min- 
ister of  the  United  States  at  Seoul  that  the  diplomatic 
representation  of  matters  affecting  American  per- 
sons, property,  and  treaty  rights  was  transferred  to 
the  American  legation  at  Tokyo,  and  directed  him  to 
return  home.  Korea  as  an  independent  state  ceased 
to  exist. 

References : 

As  to  "Reciprocity"  and  the  Abolition  of  Discriminating 
Duties,  see 

Moore's  Digest  of  International  Law,  II,  69-76; 

Trescot's  Diplomacy  of  the  American  Revolution,  and  his 
Diplomacy  of  the  Administrations  of  Washington  and  Adams; 

Schuyler's  American  Diplomacy  and  the  Furtherance  of  Com- 
merce; 

The  Foreign  Policy  of  the  United  States,  Political  and  Commercial 
(American  Academy  of  Political  and  Social  Science,  1899); 

Johnson's  America's  Foreign  Relations. 

As  to  Diplomacy  with  the  Far  East,  see 

Foster's  American  Diplomacy  in  the  Orient; 

Grifiis's  Matthew  Galbraith  Perry  (Boston,  1887)  and  Townsend 
Harris,  First  American  Envoy  to  Japan  (Boston,  1893); 

Mahan's  Problem  of  Asia  and  Its  Effect  on  International 
Policies; 

Roberts  (Edmund),  Embassy  to  the  Eastern  Courts  (New  York, 

1S37); 
Williams's  Anson  Burlingame  and  the  First  Chinese  Mission 

to  Foreign  Powers. 
See,   also,   for   Diplomatic    Relations   with   China,    Moore's 

Digest  of  International  Law,  V,  416  el  seq.;    with  Japan, 

id -j  733  et  seq.;  with  Korea,  id.,  567. 


VI 

NON-INTERVENTION    AND    THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

Among  the  rules  of  conduct  prescribed  for  the 
United  States  by  the  statesmen  who  formulated  its 
foreign  policy,  none  was  conceived  to  be  more  fun- 
damental or  more  distinctively  American  than  that 
which  forbade  intervention  in  the  political  affairs 
of  other  nations.  The  right  of  the  government  to 
intervene  for  the  protection  of  its  citizens  in  foreign 
lands  and  on  the  high  seas  never  was  doubted ;  nor 
was  such  action  withheld  in  proper  cases.  But, 
warned  by  the  spectacle  of  the  great  European 
struggles  that  had  marked  the  attempts  of  nations 
to  control  one  another's  political  destiny,  the  states- 
men of  America,  believing  that  they  had  a  different 
mission  to  perform,  planted  themselves  upon  the 
principle  of  the  equality  of  nations  as  expounded 
by  Grotius  and  other  masters  of  international  law. 
This  principle  was  expressed  with  peculiar  felicity 
and  force  by  Vattel,  who  declared  that  nations  in- 
herited from  nature  "the  same  obligations  and 
rights,"  that  power  or  weakness  could  not  in  this 
respect  produce  any  difference,  and  that  a  "small 

197 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

republic"  was  "no  less  a  sovereign  state  than  the 
most  powerful  kingdom."  The  same  thought  was 
tersely  phrased  by  Chief -Justice  Marshall,  in  his 
celebrated  affirmation:  "No  principle  is  more  uni- 
versally acknowledged  than  the  perfect  equality 
of  nations.  Russia  and  Geneva  have  equal  rights." 
And  as  the  Declaration  of  Independence  pro- 
claimed life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness 
to  be  "inalienable  rights"  of  individual  men,  so 
the  founders  of  the  American  republic  ascribed  the 
same  rights  to  men  in  their  aggregate  political  ca- 
pacity as  independent  nations. 

While  the  principle  of  non-intervention  formed 
an  integral  part  of  the  political  philosophy  of  Amer- 
ican statesmen,  its  practical  importance  was  pro- 
foundly impressed  upon  them  by  the  narrowness 
of  their  escape  from  being  drawn,  by  the  alliance 
with  France,  into  the  vortex  of  the  European  con- 
flicts that  grew  out  of  the  French  Revolution.  Even 
before  American  independence  was  acknowledged 
by  Great  Britain,  American  statesmen  scented  the 
dangers  that  lurked  in  a  possible  implication  in 
European  broils.  "You  are  afraid,"  said  Richard 
Oswald  to  John  Adams,  "  of  being  made  the  tool  of 
the  powers  of  Europe."  "  Indeed,  I  am,"  said 
Adams.  "What  powers?"  inquired  Oswald.  "All 
of  them,"  replied  Adams;  "it  is  obvious  that  all  the 
powers  of  Europe  will  be  continually  manoeuvring 
with  us  to  work  us  into  their  real  or  imaginary  bal- 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

ances  of  power.  .  .  .  But  I  think  that  it  ought  to  be 
our  rule  not  to  meddle."  In  1793,  the  revolution- 
ary government  of  France,  apparently  doubting  the 
applicability  of  the  existing  alliance  with  the  United 
States  to  the  situation  in  Europe,  submitted  a  pro- 
posal for  "a  national  agreement,  in  which  two  great 
peoples  shall  suspend  their  commercial  and  political 
interests  and  establish  a  mutual  understanding  to 
defend  the  empire  of  liberty,  wherever  it  can  be 
embraced."  This  proposal  the  American  govern- 
ment declined;  and  its  response  found  practical 
embodiment  in  its  acts.  The  reasons  for  the  policy 
of  non-intervention  and  neutrality,  to  which  the 
administration  of  the  time  so  sedulously  adhered, 
were  eloquently  summed  up  by  Washington  in  that 
immortal  political  legacy,  his  Farewell  Address. 
"  The  great  rule  of  conduct  for  us,  in  regard  to  for- 
eign nations,"  said  Washington,  "is,  in  extending 
our  commercial  relations,  to  have  with  them  as  lit- 
tle political  connection  as  possible.  So  far  as  we 
have  already  formed  engagements,  let  them  be  ful- 
filled with  perfect  good  faith.  Here  let  us  stop." 
The  same  thought  was  conveyed  by  Jefferson,  in 
his  first  inaugural  address,  in  the  apothegm — 
"  Peace,  commerce,  and  honest  friendship  with  all 
nations,  entangling  alliances  with  none." 

The  policy  of  non-intervention  embraced  matters 
of  religion  as  well  as  of  politics.  By  the  first  amend- 
ment to  the  Constitution  of  the  United  States,  Con- 

199 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

gress  was  expressly  forbidden  to  make  any  law  "re 
specting  an  establishment  of  religion,  or  prohibiting 
the  free  exercise  thereof."  This  inhibition  against 
governmental  interference  with  religious  opinions 
and  practices  was  in  its  spirit  extended  to  the  inter- 
course of  the  United  States  with  foreign  nations. 
In  Article  ix.  of  the  treaty  between  the  United 
States  and  Tripoli,  which  was  concluded  on  Novem- 
ber 4,  1796,  during  the  administration  of  Washing- 
ton, we  find  this  significant  declaration:  "As  the 
Government  of  the  United  States  of  America  is  not 
in  any  sense  founded  on  the  Christian  Religion ;  as 
it  has  in  itself  no  character  of  enmity  against  the 
laws,  religion,  or  tranquillity  of  Mussulmen,  ...  it 
is  declared  by  the  parties,  that  no  pretext  arising 
from  religious  opinions  shall  ever  produce  an  inter- 
ruption of  the  harmony  existing  between  the  two 
countries."  With  the  omission  of  the  introductory 
phrase,  a  similar  declaration  was  inserted  in  the 
treaty  with  Tripoli  of  1805,  and  in  the  treaties  with 
Algiers  of  18 15  and  1816.  A  stipulation  less  broad 
in  its  tolerance  appears  in  Article  xxix.  of  the 
treaty  between  the  United  States  and  China,  signed 
at  Tientsin,  June  18,  1858.  This  article,  after  re- 
citing that  the  principles  of  the  Christian  religion 
are  "recognized  as  teaching  men  to  do  good,  and 
to  do  to  others  as  they  would  have  others  do  to 
them,"  provides  that  "any  person,  whether  citizen 
of  the  United  States  or  Chinese  convert,  who,  ac- 

200 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

cording  to  these  tenets,  peaceably  teach  and  prac- 
tice the  principles  of  Christianity,  shall  in  no  case 
be  interfered  with  or  molested."  By  Article  iv., 
however,  of  the  Burlingame  treaty  of  1868,  this 
stipulation  is  mentioned  as  an  introduction  to  the 
declaration  that  it  is  "further  agreed  that  citizens 
of  the  United  States  in  China  of  every  religious  per- 
suasion, and  Chinese  subjects  in  the  United  States, 
shall  enjoy  entire  liberty  of  conscience,  and  shall  be 
exempt  from  all  disability  or  persecution  on  ac- 
count of  their  religious  faith  or  worship  in  either 
country."  In  harmony  with  this  principle  was  the 
simple  declaration  in  the  treaty  with  Siam  of  1856, 
and  in  the  treaty  with  Japan  of  1858,  that  Americans 
in  those  countries  should  "be  allowed  the  free  ex- 
ercise of  their  religion."  They  were  to  be  protected, 
not  as  the  adherents  or  the  propagandists  of  any 
particular  faith,  but  as  American  citizens.  As  was 
well  said  by  Mr.  Cass,  it  was  the  object  of  the  United 
States  "  not  merely  to  protect  a  Catholic  in  a  Protes- 
tant country,  a  Protestant  in  a  Catholic  country,  a 
Jew  in  a  Christian  country,  but  an  American  in  all 
countries." 

The  policy  of  non-intervention,  which  guided  the 
United  States  during  the  wars  growing  out  of  the 
French  Revolution,  was  severely  tested  in  the  strug- 
gle of  the  Spanish  colonies  in  America  for  indepen- 
dence ;  but,  under  the  guardian  care  of  Monroe  and 
John  Ouincy  Adams,  it  was  scrupulously  adhered 

201 


A MERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

to.  In  view  of  this  circumstance,  it  is  strange  that 
one  of  the  gravest  perils  by  which,  after  the  days 
of  the  alliance  with  France,  the  maintenance  of  the 
policy  was  ever  apparently  threatened  should  have 
grown  out  of  a  political  contest  in  Europe.  The 
struggle  of  the  Greeks  for  independence  evoked 
much  sympathy  in  America  as  well  as  in  England; 
but  the  struggle  of  the  Hungarians,  under  the  leader- 
ship of  Kossuth,  for  emancipation  from  Austrian 
rule,  gave  rise  in  the  United  States  to  manifesta- 
tions of  feeling  that  were  unprecedented.  The  Hun- 
garian revolution  came  at  a  time  when  the  spirit 
of  democracy,  which  distinguishes  the  political  and 
social  development  of  the  nineteenth  century,  was 
especially  active;  but  the  wide-spread  interest  felt 
in  the  United  States  in  the  Hungarian  movement 
was  greatly  intensified  by  reason  of  the  popular  as- 
sumption that  the  declaration  of  Hungary's  inde- 
pendence, although  it  in  reality  left  the  question  of 
a  permanent  form  of  government  wholly  in  abey- 
ance, was  the  forerunner  of  a  republic.  It  was,  how- 
ever, only  after  the  arrival  of  Kossuth  in  the  United 
States  that  the  excitement  reached  its  greatest 
height.  In  June,  1849,  Mr.  A.  Dudley  Mann  was 
appointed  by  the  President  as  a  "special  and  con- 
fidential agent  of  the  United  States  to  Hungary"; 
but,  before  he  reached  his  destination,  Russia  had 
intervened  in  aid  of  Austria,  and  the  revolution  had 
practically  come  to  an  end.     When  the  revolution 

202 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

was  crushed,  Kossuth  and  many  of  his  associates 
sought  refuge  in  Turkey.     By  a  joint  resolution  of 
Congress  of  March  3,   1851,  the  President  was  re- 
quested, if  it  should  be  the  wish  of  these  exiles  to 
"emigrate"  to  the  United  States,  to  authorize  the 
employment  of  a  public  vessel  to  convey  them  to 
America.      In    conformity    with   this    request    the 
U.  S.  S.  Mississippi  was  sent  to  the  Dardanelles ;  but 
the  exiles  had  scarcely  embarked,  when  it  was  found 
that  Kossuth  had  other  views  than  that  of  coming 
to  America  as  an  emigrant.     At  Gibraltar  he  left 
the  Mississippi  and  proceeded  to  London,  for  the 
purpose  of  conferring  with  revolutionary  exiles  in 
that  city;  and  he  afterwards  sailed  for  America  in 
the  steamer  Humboldt,  from  Southampton.     He  ar- 
rived at  New  York  on  the  night  of  December  14, 
1 85 1,  after  a  stormy  passage.     He  soon  dissipated 
all  doubts  as  to  the  objects  of  his  mission.     In  his 
public  addresses  he  cast  off  all  reserve,  and  in  his 
"official  capacity"   as  the  representative  of  Hun- 
gary made  an  appeal  for  aid.     He  affirmed  that  the 
consideration  of  distance  should  not  deter  the  United 
States  in  the  case  of  Hungary  any  more  than  in  that 
of  Cuba  from  interfering  against  European  invasion. 
Cuba  was  six  days'  distant  from  New  York;  Hun- 
gary was  eighteen.     Was  this,  he  asked,  a  circum- 
stance to  regulate  the  conduct  and  policy  of  a  great 
people?     The   people,    wherever   he   went,    seemed 
enthusiastically   to   give    a   negative   answer.     His 

203 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

journey  to  Washington  was  in  the  nature  of  a 
triumphal  progress.  When  presented  to  the  Presi- 
dent, he  made  a  direct  appeal  for  intervention. 
President  Fillmore,  with  courtesy  and  dignity,  but 
with  equal  candor,  repelled  the  solicitation.  But, 
for  his  disappointment  at  the  White  House,  Kos- 
suth found  consolation  in  his  reception  by  Congress, 
though  it  in  the  end  proved  to  be  wholly  illusory. 
He  was  received  both  by  the  Senate  and  by  the 
House,  and  was  banqueted  by  Congress.  The  first 
effective  check  to  the  popular  excitement  was  given 
by  Henry  Clay,  who  refused  to  countenance  the  pre- 
vailing agitation.  Kossuth  more  than  once  ex- 
pressed a  desire  to  meet  him,  and  Clay,  though  in 
feeble  health,  at  length  granted  him  an  interview. 
"  For  the  sake  of  my  country,"  said  Clay,  addressing 
Kossuth,  "  you  must  allow  me  to  protest  against  the 
policy  you  propose  to  her."  "Waiving  the  grave 
and  momentous  question  of  the  right  of  one  nation 
to  assume  the  executive  power  among  nations,  for 
the  enforcement  of  international  law,"  Clay  pointed 
out  the  practical  difficulties  that  stood  in  the  way 
of  affording  to  Hungary  effective  aid  against  Austria 
and  Russia.  He  also  enlarged  upon  the  evil  ex- 
ample that  would  be  afforded  by  the  United  States 
to  other  powers  in  departing  from  its  "  ancient 
policy  of  amity  and  non-intervention";  and,  after 
declaring  that  the  United  States  had,  by  adhering 
to  that  policy,  "done  more  for  the  cause  of  liberty 

204 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

in  the  world  than  arms  could  effect,"  he  concluded: 
"  Far  better  is  it  for  ourselves,  for  Hungary,  and  for 
the  cause  of  liberty,  that,  adhering  to  our  wise 
pacific  system  and  avoiding  the  distant  wars  of 
Europe,  we  should  keep  our  lamp  burning  brightly 
on  this  Western  shore,  as  a  light  to  all  nations,  than 
to  hazard  its  utter  extinction,  amid  the  ruins  of 
fallen  or  falling  republics  in  Europe."  The  Kossuth 
danger  passed  away  even  more  suddenly  than  it 
had  arisen.  After  he  left  Washington,  he  addressed 
a  letter  to  the  presiding  officers  of  the  two  houses 
of  Congress,  in  which  he  expressed  the  hope  that  the 
United  States  would  pronounce  in  favor  of  the  law 
of  nations  and  of  international  rights  and  duties. 
A  motion  to  print  this  letter  was  carried  in  the 
Senate  by  only  one  vote,  and  the  arguments  in  sup- 
port of  the  motion  were  almost  exclusively  confined 
to  considerations  of  courtesy.  Indeed,  the  sudden 
collapse  of  Kossuth  enthusiasm  in  high  places,  after 
his  departure  from  the  capital,  would  have  been  in- 
explicable if  the  open  opponents  of  his  policy  of  in- 
tervention had  found  any  one  to  meet  them  on  that 
ground. 

It  may  be  said  that  the  most  pronounced  excep- 
tion ever  made  by  the  United  States,  apart  from 
cases  arising  under  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  to  its  pol- 
icy of  non-intervention,  is  that  which  was  made 
in  the  case  of  Cuba.  At  various  times,  since  the 
United  States  became  an  independent  nation,  con- 

205 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ditions  in  Cuba  had  been  such  as  to  invite  inter- 
ference either  for  the  purpose  of  correcting  dis- 
orders which  existed  there,  or  for  the  purpose  of 
preventing  Cuba  from  falling  a  prey  to  some  of 
Spain's  European  enemies.  During  the  Ten  Years' 
War  in  Cuba,  from  1868  till  1878,  intervention  by 
the  United  States  was  prevented  on  several  occa- 
sions only  by  the  powerful  influence  of  President 
Grant,  counselled  and  supported  by  his  Secretary 
of  State,  Hamilton  Fish.  In  its  abstention,  the 
administration  was  aided  by  the  situation  at  home, 
which  afforded  daily  admonition  of  the  difficulties 
that  might  attend  the  re  -  establishment  of  order 
in  a  large  and  populous  island  where  the  process 
of  emancipation  was  still  going  on.  In  1895  the 
situation  was  changed  in  the  United  States  as 
well  as  in  Cuba.  American  interests  in  the  island 
had  also  increased.  The  second  insurrection  was, 
besides,  more  active  than  the  first,  and  spread  over 
a  wider  area.  If  the  conflict  were  left  to  take  its 
course,  the  ruin  of  the  island  was  apparently  as- 
sured. The  United  States  tendered  its  good  offices; 
but  the  offer  was  not  productive  of  any  tangible  re- 
sult. In  his  annual  message  of  December  7,  1896, 
President  Cleveland  declared  that,  when  Spain's 
inability  to  suppress  the  insurrection  had  become 
manifest,  and  the  struggle  had  degenerated  into  a 
hopeless  strife  involving  useless  sacrifice  of  life  and 
the  destruction  of  the  very  subject-matter  of  the 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

conflict,  a  situation  would  be  presented  in  which 
the  obligation  to  recognize  the  sovereignty  of  Spain 
would  be  "superseded  by  higher  obligations." 
Conditions  continued  to  grow  worse.  The  distress 
produced  by  the  measures  of  concentration,  under 
the  rule  of  General  Weyler,  excited  strong  feeling  in 
the  United  States,  and  prompted  President  McKin- 
ley  to  request  Spain  to  put  an  end  to  existing  con- 
ditions and  restore  order.  General  Weyler  was 
afterwards  succeeded  by  General  Blanco,  and  it 
was  announced  that  an  autonomous  regime  would 
be  instituted.  But  neither  the  offer  of  autonomy 
nor  the  actual  institution  of  an  autonomous  govern- 
ment produced  peace.  The  insurgents,  embittered 
by  the  three  years'  conflict,  rejected  the  programme 
of  autonomy  with  substantial  unanimity,  while  the 
distinctively  Spanish  element  of  the  population 
viewed  it  with  disapprobation  and  withdrew  from 
politics.  In  this  delicate  situation  the  intervention 
of  the  United  States  was  precipitated  by  certain 
startling  events.  The  incident  created  by  the  sur- 
reptitious publication  of  the  letter  of  Senor  Dupuy 
de  Lome,  Spanish  minister  at  Washington,  to  Senor 
Canalejas,  in  which  President  McKinley  was  aspersed 
and  the  reciprocity  negotiations  between  the  two 
countries  were  exhibited  as  a  sham,  had  just  been 
officially  declared  to  be  closed,  when  the  U.  S.  S. 
Maine  was  blown  up  at  Havana,  and  two  hun- 
dred and  sixty-six  of  her  crew  perished.     Superficial 

207 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

reasoners  have  wished  to  treat  the  destruction  of 
the  Maine  as  the  justification  and  the  cause  of 
the  intervention  of  the  United  States.  The  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States,  however,  did  not  it- 
self take  that  ground.  It  is  true  that  the  case  of 
the  Maine  is  mentioned  in  the  preamble  to  the 
joint  resolution  of  Congress,  by  which  the  inter- 
vention of  the  United  States  was  authorized;  but 
it  is  recited  merely  as  the  culmination  of  "  abhor- 
rent conditions,"  which  had  existed  for  more  than 
three  years.  The  destruction  of  the  Maine  doubt- 
less kindled  the  intense  popular  feeling  without 
which  wars  arc  seldom  entered  upon;  but  the  gov- 
ernment of  the  United  States  never  charged — on  the 
contrary,  it  refrained  from  charging — that  the  catas- 
trophe was  to  be  attributed  to  "the  direct  act  of  a 
Spanish  official."  Its  intervention  rested  upon  the 
ground  that  there  existed  in  Cuba  conditions  so  in- 
jurious to  the  United  States,  as  a  neighboring  nation, 
that  they  could  no  longer  be  endured.  Its  action 
was  analogous  to  what  is  known  in  private  law  as 
the  abatement  of  a  nuisance.  On  this  ground  the 
intervention  was  justified  by  the  late  Alphonse 
Rivier,  one  of  the  most  eminent  publicists  in  Europe, 
and  on  this  ground  its  justification  must  continue 
to  rest. 

Any  exposition  of  the  American  doctrine  of  non- 
intervention would  be  incomplete  that  failed  spe- 
cially to  notice  the  rule  of  the  United  States  with 

208 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

regard  to  the  recognition  of  new  governments — a 
rule  which  is  indeed  a  corollary  of  that  doctrine. 
In  Europe,  governments  had  been  treated  as  legiti- 
mate or  illegitimate,  according  to  what  was  con- 
ceived to  be  the  regularity  or  the  irregularity  of  the 
succession  of  their  rulers.  The  attitude  of  the 
United  States  on  this  question  was  early  defined, 
when  the  National  Convention  in  France  proclaimed 
a  republic.  On  that  occasion  Jefferson,  as  Secre- 
tary of  State,  in  a  letter  to  Gouverneur  Morris,  of 
March  12,  1793,  which  has  become  a  classic,  said: 
"We  surely  cannot  deny  to  any  nation  that  right 
whereon  our  own  government  is  founded,  that  every- 
one may  govern  itself  according  to  whatever  form 
it  pleases,  and  change  these  forms  at  its  own  will; 
and  that  it  may  transact  its  business  with  foreign 
nations  through  whatever  organ  it  thinks  proper, 
whether  king,  convention,  assembly,  committee, 
president,  or  anything  else  it  may  choose.  The 
will  of  the  nation  is  the  only  thing  essential  to  be 
regarded."  In  a  word,  the  United  States  main- 
tained that  the  true  test  of  a  government's  title  to 
recognition  is  not  the  theoretical  legitimacy  of  its 
origin,  but  the  fact  of  its  existence  as  the  apparent 
exponent  of  the  popular  will.  And  from  this  prin- 
ciple, which  is  now  universally  accepted,  it  nec- 
essarily follows  that  recognition  can  regularly  be 
accorded  only  when  the  new  government  has  demon- 
strated its  ability  to  exist.  Recognition  extended 
*4  209 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

at  an  earlier  stage  of  the  revolution  savors  of  an  act 
of  intervention,  and  as  such  must  be  defended  on  its 
merits,  as  is  clearly  set  forth  in  President  Roosevelt's 
message  of  January  4, 1904, in  relation  to  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  Republic  of  Panama.  Conversely,  to  refuse 
recognition  of  an  actually  established  government 
merely  because  of  its  form,  or  the  non-constitutional 
or  revolutionary  character  of  its  origin  or  antece- 
dents, also  savors  of  intervention.  Thus  the  United 
States,  in  1848,  in  approving  the  act  of  its  minister 
at  Paris  in  promptly  recognizing  the  short-lived 
republican  government  then  suddenly  set  up  in 
France,  said: 

"In  its  intercourse  with  foreign  nations  the  govern- 
ment of  the  United  States  has,  from  its  origin,  always 
recognized  de  facto  governments.  We  recognize  the 
right  of  all  nations  to  create  and  re-form  their  po- 
litical institutions  according  to  their  own  will  and 
pleasure.  We  do  not  go  behind  the  existing  govern- 
ment to  involve  ourselves  in  the  question  of  legiti- 
macy. It  is  sufficient  for  us  to  know  that  a  govern- 
ment exists  capable  of  maintaining  itself;  and  then 
its  recognition  on  our  part  inevitably  follows.  This 
principle  of  action,  resulting  from  our  sacred  regard 
for  the  independence  of  nations,  has  occasioned  some 
strange  anomalies  in  our  history.  The  Pope,  the 
Emperor  of  Russia,  and  President  Jackson  were  the 
only  authorities  on  earth  which  ever  recognized 
Dom  Miguel  as  King  of  Portugal." 

In  the  case  of  the  so-called  Rivas-Walker  govern- 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

ment,  set  up  in  Nicaragua  in  1855  by  William  Walker 
in  conjunction  with  a  Nicaraguan  citizen,  Don 
Patricio  Rivas,  who  was  styled  provisory  president 
of  the  republic,  unusual  complications  were  pre- 
sented. Not  only  was  the  revolution  initiated  by 
Walker  at  the  head  of  a  filibustering  expedition  from 
the  United  States,  but  there  were  doubts  as  to  the 
character  and  stability  of  the  foundations  on  which 
the  government  claimed  to  rest.  When,  therefore,  a 
person  appeared  in  Washington  in  December,  1855, 
with  credentials  as  minister  plenipotentiary  from 
Rivas,  the  United  States  declined  to  receive  him,  and 
instructed  its  minister  in  Nicaragua  to  report  upon 
the  situation  there,  some  of  the  accounts  representing 
that  the  existing  political  "organization"  was  "satis- 
factory to  the  people,"  while  others  indicated  that 
the  people  would  "shake  off  the  power  of  Walker 
if  it  were  possible  for  them  to  do  so."  The  reports 
of  the  minister  were  favorable  to  the  "organization," 
and  in  May,  1856,  a  new  minister  from  it  was  duly 
received.  The  recognition  was,  however,  a  few 
months  later  withdrawn,  and  the  further  considera- 
tion of  its  renewal  was  soon  rendered  unnecessary 
by  the  suppression  of  the  Walker-Rivas  power  by  the 
Nicaraguans,  aided  by  Costa  Rica. 

During  and  after  the  Civil  War  the  United  States 
not  unnaturally  practised  greater  deliberation  than 
it  had  sometimes  done  before  in  recognizing  revolu- 
tionary governments  in  other  countries.  Indeed, 
Mr,  Seward,  as  Secretary  of  State,  once  went  so  far 

211 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

as  to  instruct  the  minister  of  the  United  States  in 
Bolivia  not  to  recognize  any  government  which  ' '  was 
not  adopted  through  the  free  will  and  the  constitu- 
tionally expressed  voice  of  the  people."  He  also 
informed  the  minister  of  the  United  States  in  Peru 
that  "revolutions  in  republican  states  ought  not 
to  be  accepted  until  the  people  have  adopted  them 
by  organic  law  with  the  solemnities  which  would 
seem  sufficient  to  guarantee  their  stability  and  per- 
manency." Subsequently,  however,  he  explained 
that,  far  from  denying  the  right  of  a  nation  to  change 
its  republican  constitution  by  force,  the  United 
States,  when  a  change  was  so  made,  merely  required, 
before  recognizing  the  new  administration,  that  it 
should  be  "sanctioned  by  the  formal  acquiescence 
and  acceptance  of  the  people."  In  the  case  of  Bo- 
livia, he  had  already  found  it  expedient  to  "recog- 
nize the  actual  government,"  if  it  had  become  "truly 
and  in  fact  consolidated."  In  no  instance  was  it 
assumed  that,  in  the  concession  or  withholdment  of 
recognition,  there  was  involved  the  right  to  pre- 
scribe or  control  the  course  of  political  action  in 
other  countries.  In  the  main  the  chief  object  of 
solicitude  appeared  to  be  the  probable  stability  of 
the  new  authority,  as  indicated  by  its  popular  ac- 
ceptance, of  which  the  substantial  cessation  of  armed 
opposition  was  treated  as  cogent  proof.  In  the 
case  of  the  Diaz  revolutionary  government  in  Mexico, 
in  1876,  formal  recognition  was  deferred  for  almost 
a  year  after  recognition  had  been  accorded  by  the 

212 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE 

other  American  and  the  European  governments  then 
represented  at  the  Mexican  capital.  The  reason  of 
the  delay,  as  explained  by  President  Hayes  in  his 
annual  message  of  December  3,  1877,  was,  however, 
"the  occurrences  on  the  Rio  Grande  border,"  which, 
together  with  the  non-payment  of  certain  sums  due 
under  the  claims  convention  of  1868,  created  doubts 
as  to  the  ability  and  disposition  of  the  new  govern- 
ment to  fulfil  the  "obligations  of  treaties"  and  per- 
form the  duties  of  ' '  international  friendship. ' '  It  was 
not  suggested  that  other  tests,  such  as  that  of  con- 
stitutional regularity,  might  be  applied,  although  the 
new  government,  which  was  in  fact  eventually  recog- 
nized, was  confessedly  the  result  of  an  armed  revo- 
lution. On  the  contrary,  apart  from  the  special  con- 
siderations of  an  international  character  above  noted, 
the  attitude  of  the  United  States,  then  and  there- 
after maintained,  is  well  expressed  by  the  formula 
employed,  for  instance,  in  the  case  of  the  revolu- 
tionary government  of  General  Crespo  in  Venezuela 
in  1892,  when  the  American  minister  at  Caracas  was 
instructed  to  recognize  it  if  it  was  "accepted  by  the 
people,  in  possession  of  the  power  of  the  nation,  and 
fully  established." 

In  1 9 13  the  policy  of  the  United  States  entered 
upon  a  somewhat  distinct  phase  when,  on  the  12th 
of  March,  President  Wilson  issued  a  statement  as  to 
Latin  America.  This  statement,  which  was  sent  to 
all  the  diplomatic  officers  of  the  United  States  in 
those  countries,  was  also  given  to  the  public.     "To 

213 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

cultivate  the  friendship  and  deserve  the  confidence 
of  our  sister  republics  of  Central  and  South  America, 
and  to  promote  .  .  .  the  interests  which  are  common 
to  the  people  of  the  two  continents,"  President  Wil- 
son declared  to  be  one  of  the  chief  objects  of  his 
administration.  While  he  earnestly  desired  "the 
most  cordial  understanding  and  co-operation  between 
the  peoples  and  leaders  of  America,"  co-operation 
was,  he  said,  possible  "only  when  supported  at  every 
turn  by  the  orderly  processes  of  just  government" 
based  "not  upon  arbitrary  or  irregular  force,"  but 
upon  "law,"  upon  the  "consent  of  the  governed, " 
and  upon  "the  public  conscience  and  approval." 
Having  no  sympathy  with  those  ' '  who  seek  to  s  ize 
the  power  of  government  to  advance  their  personal 
interests  or  ambition,"  we  should,  he  said,  as  friends, 
"prefer  those  who  act  in  the  interest  of  peace  and 
honor,  who  protect  private  rights  and  respect  the 
restraints  of  constitutional  provision." 

Upon  this  statement  adverse  comments  were  made 
by  various  South  American  journals,  which  professed 
to  detect  in  it  not  only  a  tone  of  admonition, 
but  also  an  assumption  that  irregular  political  con- 
ditions marked  the  countries  of  Central  and  South 
America  as  a  group.  It  is  altogether  probable,  how- 
ever, that  the  country  uppermost  in  the  President's 
thoughts  at  the  moment  was  Mexico.  Some  months 
later  the  government  of  Peru  was  suddenly  over- 
thrown and  its  chief  executive  seized  and  imprisoned. 
The  explanation  given  of  this  violent  change  was 

214 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

that  the  kidnapped  President,  Sefior  Billinghurst, 
had  been  acting  "unconstitutionally."  The  junta 
by  which  the  transformation  was  brought  about  was 
recognized  by  the  United  States  with  a  promptitude 
not  incompatible  with  a  rigorous  application  of  the 
de  facto  principle.  But,  from  the  point  of  view  of 
a  policy  designed  to  discourage  irregular  political 
action  in  foreign  countries  by  refusing  to  counte- 
nance those  who  seek  power  by  it,  the  case  must  be 
regarded  as  exceptional.  What  may  be  regarded  as 
an  application  of  the  new  policy  was  then  in  process 
of  development  in  Mexico,  where  revolutionary  con- 
ditions had  again  come  to  prevail. 

When,  on  December  i,  1910,  Porfirio  Diaz  was 
inaugurated  as  President  for  an  eighth  term  of  four 
years,  strong  discontent  was  manifested  against  the 
continuance  of  his  rule.  An  insurrectionary  pro- 
visional government  was  set  up  in  the  State  of 
Chihuahua,  under  the  presidency  of  Francisco 
Madero,  who  demanded  Diaz's  retirement,  "honest 
elections"  and  new  land  laws.  The  revolt  spread  to 
the  neighboring  States  of  Sonora,  Coahuila,  and 
Durango,  while  disturbances  occurred  in  Lower 
California  and  in  Yucatan.  Concessions  and  prom- 
ises of  further  concessions  proved  to  be  unavailing. 
Madero  continued  to  demand  Diaz's  resignation. 
On  April  23,  191 1,  under  apprehension  of  interven- 
tion by  the  United  States,  an  armistice  was  con- 
cluded; and  on  May  18th,  after  a  renewal  of  fight- 
ing, peace  was  proclaimed  on  the  basis  of  the  resig- 

215 


A  M  F.RICAN    DIPLOMACY 

nation  of  the  President  and  Vice-President,  and  the 
designation  of  Serior  Francisco  de  la  Barra  as  Presi- 
dent ad  interim,  with  a  cabinet  to  be  selected  in  con- 
sultation with  Madero.  A  "free  election"  was  to 
be  held  within  six  months.  The  election  was  held  on 
October  15th.  Francisco  Madero  was  "unanimous- 
ly" chosen  as  President  and  Pino  Suarez  as  Vice- 
President  by  a  total  popular  vote  of  somewhat  more 
than  twenty  thousand,  but  order  was  not  fully  re- 
established. Zapata  continued  active  in  the  State 
of  Morelos,  and  uprisings  occurred  in  the  north. 
In  the  city  of  Juarez,  Emilio  Vasquez  Gomez  was 
proclaimed  as  President,  and  in  the  following  year 
General  Orozco,  governor  of  Chihuahua,  "pro- 
nounced" for  him  and  took  command  of  his  forces. 
In  order  to  prevent  the  giving  of  aid  to  the  enemies 
of  the  government  at  the  City  of  Mexico  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States  adopted  a  joint  resolution  em- 
powering the  President  to  stop  the  exportation  of 
arms  and  munitions  of  war.  President  Taft  ap- 
proved this  resolution  on  March  14,  191 2,  and  on  the 
same  day  put  it  into  effect.  The  export  of  military 
supplies  for  the  Mexican  government  continued  to 
be  lawful. 

The  government  of  Madero  became  more  and  more 
insecure.  On  February  8,  19 13,  General  Victoriano 
Huerta,  commander-in-chief  of  its  forces,  went  over 
to  its  enemies.  Generals  Reyes  and  Felix  Diaz, 
whom  Madero  had  imprisoned,  were  released,  and 
a  new  revolt  was  declared.     Fighting  in   the  city 

216 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

ensued,  in  which  General  Reyes  was  killed.  Madero 
and  Pino  Suarez  were  arrested  and  forced  to  resign. 
A  few  days  later  they  were  shot  and  killed.  By 
Article  85  of  the  Mexican  Constitution  a  vacancy 
in  the  presidency  is  filled  by  the  members  of  the 
cabinet  in  a  specified  legal  succession.  When  Ma- 
dero resigned,  Pedro  Lascurain,  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  became  provisional  President,  and  appointed 
General  Huerta  Minister  of  the  Interior.  Lascurain 
then  resigned,  and,  his  resignation  being  accepted  by 
the  Congress,  Huerta,  by  virtue  of  his  cabinet  posi- 
tion, became  provisional  President.  The  American 
ambassador,  Henry  Lane  Wilson,  as  dean  of  the 
diplomatic  corps,  congratulated  him  on  his  accession, 
and  he  was  later  formally  recognized  by  the  Eu- 
ropean powers  and  by  some  of  the  American.  The 
United  States  withheld  its  recognition,  and  received 
the  concurrence  of  Argentina,  Brazil,  Chile,  and 
certain  other  governments. 

Meanwhile  a  revolt  was  begun  in  the  north  by 
Venustiano  Carranza,  governor  of  the  State  of 
Coahuila,  who,  on  March  26,  19 13,  proclaimed  the 
''Plan  of  Guadalupe,"  which  was  signed  by  sixty- 
four  officers  of  the  Coahuila  military  forces.  After 
reciting  that  Huerta,  by  arresting  Madero  and  Pino 
Suarez  and  forcing  them  to  resign,  had  been  guilty 
of  treasonable  acts  which  the  legislative  and  judicial 
powers  of  the  country,  as  well  as  various  governors 
of  States,  had  recognized  and  protected,  the  procla- 
mation  repudiated   all   those   officials   and   named 

217 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Venustiano  Carranza  as  first  chief  of  the  Constitu- 
tionalist Army  and  depositary  of  the  executive  power 
when  that  army  should  occupy  the  City  of  Mexico. 

As  the  Constitutionalists  extended  their  operations 
in  northern  Mexico  numerous  leaders  of  armed  bands 
joined  their  standard.  Among  these  was  Francisco 
Villa,  who  quickly  attained  the  leading  place  among 
their  military  chieftains.  Although  he  probably 
never  followed  Carranza  in  the  sense  of  actually 
recognizing  his  authority,  there  was  no  doubt  as  to 
his  fighting  instincts  or  as  to  his  ability  to  attract 
the  peon  class  from  which  he  recruited  his  men. 

In  July,  1 9 13,  the  Hon.  John  Lind,  formerly  gov- 
ernor of  Minnesota,  was  dispatched  to  the  City  of 
Mexico.  In  an  address  to  Congress  (August  27th), 
explanatory  of  the  mission,  President  Wilson  de- 
clared that  the  development  of  Mexico  could  be 
"sound  and  lasting  only  if  it  be  the  product  of  a 
genuine  freedom,  a  just  and  ordered  government 
founded  upon  law."  Conditions  had  not  improved, 
but  had  rather  "grown  worse,"  and  the  pacification 
of  the  country  by  the  authorities  at  the  capital  was 
"evidently  impossible  by  any  other  means  than 
force."  As  friends  it  was,  he  said,  our  duty  "at 
least  to  volunteer  our  good  offices — to  offer  to  as- 
sist" in  effecting  some  arrangement  "which  would 
bring  relief  and  peace  and  set  up  a  universally  ac- 
knowledged political  authority."  He  had  therefore 
sent  Mr.  Lind  as  his  "personal  spokesman  and 
representative,"    who,    while    paying    "the    most 

218 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

scrupulous  regard  to  the  sovereignty  and  indepen- 
dence of  Mexico,"  was  to  offer  "counsel  and  assist- 
ance." The  conditions  of  a  "satisfactory  settle- 
ment," as  specified  in  his  instructions  to  Mr.  Lind, 
were  an  immediate  armistice,  an  "early  and  free 
election"  in  which  all  would  "agree  to  take  part,"  a 
pledge  by  Huerta  not  to  be  a  candidate  for  the 
presidency,  and  "the  agreement  of  all  parties  to 
abide  by  the  results  of  the  election  and  co-operate  in 
the  most  loyal  way  in  organizing  and  supporting  the 
new  administration." 

Mr.  Lind,  said  President  Wilson,  "executed  his 
delicate  and  difficult  mission  with  singular  tact,  firm- 
ness, and  good  judgment,"  but  "the  proposals  he 
submitted  were  rejected,"  partly,  as  was  believed, 
because  the  authorities  at  Mexico  City  "had  been 
grossly  misinformed  and  misled"  as  to  the  "earnest 
friendliness  and  yet  sober  determination"  of  the 
American  people  "that  some  just  solution  be  found 
for  the  Mexican  difficulties,"  and  as  to  the  fact  that 
"the  present  administration  spoke,  through  Mr. 
Lind,  for  the  people  of  the  United  States."  The  ef- 
fect of  this  "unfortunate  misunderstanding"  on  the 
part  of  those  authorities  was,  said  President  Wilson, 
"to  leave  them  singularly  isolated  and  without 
friends"  who  could  "effectually  aid  them."  We 
could  not,  he  declared,  "thrust  our  good  offices  upon 
them";  and  having,  as  was  our  duty,  offered  our 
"active  assistance,"  it  had  become  "our  duty  to 
show  what  true  neutrality  will  do  to  enable  the  people 

219 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

of  Mexico  to  set  their  affairs  in  order  again  and  wait 
for  a  further  opportunity  to  offer  our  friendly 
counsels."  For  the  rest,  the  President  said  he 
deemed  it  his  duty  to  exercise  the  authority  con- 
ferred upon  him  by  the  act  of  March  14,  191 2,  to  the 
end  that  neither  side  to  the  struggle  should  receive 
any  assistance  from  the  United  States,  and  he 
should  "follow  the  best  practice  of  nations  in  the 
matter  of  neutrality  by  forbidding  the  exportation 
of  arms  or  munitions  of  war  of  any  kind  from  the 
United  States  to  any  part  of  the  Republic  of  Mexico." 
"We  cannot,"  he  declared,  "in  the  circumstances  be 
the  partisans  of  either  party  to  the  contest  that  now 
distracts  Mexico,  or  constitute  ourselves  the  virtual 
umpire  between  them."  In  conclusion,  he  adverted 
to  the  support  given  by  several  governments  in  se- 
curing for  Mr.  Lind  a  hearing. 

The  attitude  of  the  Mexican  authorities  was  set 
forth  in  a  note  addressed  to  Mr.  Lind  (August  16th) 
by  Senor  F.  Gamboa,  Secretary  for  Foreign  Affairs. 
In  this  note  Senor  Gamboa  affirmed  the  regularity 
of  the  provisional  government  under  Article  85 
of  the  Mexican  constitution,  and  adverted  to  the  fact 
that  diplomatic  correspondence  between  the  two 
countries  had  continued  without  interruption.  The 
provisional  government,  he  declared,  exercised  con- 
trol over  eighteen  of  the  twenty-seven  Mexican 
States,  over  the  three  territories  and  the  federal 
district,  and  over  the  custom-houses.  The  restora- 
tion of  order  was,  he  said,  impeded  by  assistance  dc- 

220 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

rived  by  rebels  from  the  United  States;  and  as  to 
the  intimation  of  a  purpose  to  respect  Mexico's 
"sovereignty  and  independence,"  he  remarked  that 
it  could  hardly  be  dealt  with  in  writing.  An  imme- 
diate armistice  could  not,  he  said,  be  proposed  with- 
out tolerating  bandits  and  recognizing  as  belliger- 
ents the  rebels  styling  themselves  Constitutionalists. 
As  to  the  request  for  the  exclusion  of  Huerta  as  a 
candidate,  he  suggested  that,  besides  being  "strange 
and  unwarranted,"  there  was  the  risk  that  it  "might 
be  interpreted  as  a  matter  of  personal  dislike."  In 
conclusion  Senor  Gamboa  declared  that,  but  for  his 
government's  feeling  of  sincere  esteem  and  friendli- 
ness, the  proposals  borne  by  Mr.  Lind  would,  "be- 
cause of  their  humiliating  and  unusual  character, 
hardly  admissible  even  in  a  treaty  of  peace  after  a 
victory,"  have  been  immediately  rejected;  and  in 
response  to  the  intimation  that  if  Mexico  could  sug- 
gest a  better  way  the  United  States  would  consider  it, 
he  proposed  the  "equally  decorous  arrangement"  of 
the  reciprocal  and  unconditional  reception  of  ambas- 
sadors, thus  restoring  relations  to  the  basis  of 
"mutual  respect,  which  is  indispensable  between  two 
sovereign  entities  wholly  equal  before  law  and 
justice." 

In  October,  1913,  Huerta  committed  a  coup  a  Hat, 
arresting  a  number  of  members  of  the  Congress  and 
assuming  dictatorial  powers.  For  some  weeks  the 
press  was  filled  with  forecasts  of  immediate  armed 
intervention  by  the  United  States  for  his  elimination, 

221 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

but  these  were  not  confirmed.     On  December  2d, 
however,  President  Wilson,  in  his  opening  address  to 
Congress,  said  that  there  could  be  "no  certain  pros- 
pect of  peace  in  America"  until  General  Huerta  had 
"surrendered   his   usurped    authority   in    Mexico"; 
until  it  was  indeed  on  all  hands  understood  "that 
such   pretended   governments   will   not   be   counte- 
nanced or  dealt  with"  by  the  United  States.     Of 
"constitutional   government  in  America,   we   are," 
President  Wilson  affirmed,  "more  than  its  friends, 
we  are  its  champions,"  since  in  no  other  way  could 
our  neighbors  "work  out  their  own  development  in 
peace  and  liberty.     Mexico,"  he  declared,  "has  no 
government."     The  "mere  military  despotism"  set 
up  in  the  City  of  Mexico  "originated,"  he  said,  "in 
the  usurpation  of  Victoriano  Huerta,  who,  after  a 
brief   attempt   to   play   the   part   of   constitutional 
President,"  had  "at  last  cast  aside  even  the  pretence 
of  legal  right  and  declared  himself  dictator."     Even 
if  he  had  succeeded  in  his  purposes,  he  would,  said 
President  Wilson,  "have  set  up  nothing  but  a  pre- 
carious and  hateful  power,  which  could  have  lasted 
but   a  little   while,    and   whose   eventual   downfall 
would  have  left  the  country  in  a  more  deplorable 
condition  than  ever."     But  he  had  not  succeeded. 
"He  has,"  declared  President  Wilson,  "forfeited  the 
respect  and  the  moral  support  even  of  those  who  were 
at  one  time  willing  to  see  him  succeed.     Little  by 
little  he  has  been  completely  isolated.     By  a  little 
every  day  his  power  and  prestige  are  crumbling,  and 

222 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

the  collapse  is  not  far  away.  We  shall  not,  I  believe, 
be  obliged  to  alter  our  policy  of  watchful  waiting. 
And  then,  when  the  end  comes,  we  shall  hope  to  see 
constitutional  order  restored  in  distressed  Mexico 
by  the  concert  and  energy  of  such  of  her  leaders  as 
prefer  the  liberty  of  their  people  to  their  own 
ambitions." 

Mr.  Lind  left  the  City  of  Mexico  on  November  12, 

1913,  and  for  some  time  afterwards  remained  with  the 
United  States  squadron  at  Vera  Cruz.     On  April  9, 

1 9 14,  a  boatload  of  sailors  from  the  U.  S.  gunboat 
Dolphin,  on  landing  at  Tampico  within  the  federal 
lines  and  zone  of  military  operations,  were  placed 
under  arrest,  but  were  soon  released.  Both  the 
Mexican  federal  commander  and  Huerta  expressed 
their  regret.  Rear-Admiral  Mayo,  however,  de- 
manded a  salute  of  twenty-one  guns,  which  Huerta 
refused  unless  the  United  States  would  in  writing 
agree  to  return  it,  maintaining  that  his  expression 
of  regret  and  the  punishment  of  the  officer  by  whom 
the  arrest  was  made  should  suffice.  The  United 
States  insisted  on  compliance  with  the  demand.  On 
April  14th  the  North  Atlantic  fleet  was  ordered  to 
Tampico,  and  on  the  following  day  Rear-Admiral 
Fletcher  proceeded,  under  orders,  to  occupy  Vera 
Cruz,  which  he  did  with  the  loss  of  twelve  killed  and 
fifty  wounded,  the  Mexican  losses  being  much 
greater.  President  Wilson,  in  an  address  to  Con- 
gress on  April  20th,  said  he  had  deemed  it  his  duty 
"to  insist  that  the  flag  of  the  United  States  should  be 

223 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

saluted  in  such  a  way  as  to  indicate  a  new  spirit 
and  attitude  on  the  part  of  the  Huertistas."  He 
stated  that,  if  the  tests  of  the  Mexican  constitution 
were  accepted,  the  country  had  "no  government," 
but  added:  "We  would  not  wish  even  to  exercise 
the  good  offices  of  friendship  without  their  (the 
Mexican  people's)  welcome  and  assent.  The  people 
of  Mexico  are  entitled  to  settle  their  own  domestic 
affairs  in  their  own  way,  and  we  sincerely  desire  to 
respect  their  right."  He  therefore  asked  Congress 
to  approve  his  use  of  the  armed  forces  of  the  United 
vStates  in  such  ways  and  to  such  an  extent  as  might 
be  necessary  "to  obtain  from  General  Huerta  and 
his  adherents  the  fullest  recognition  of  the  rights 
and  dignity  of  the  United  States."  "There  can," 
said  President  Wilson,  in  conclusion,  "in  what  we  do 
be  no  thought  of  aggression  or  of  selfish  aggrandize- 
ment. We  seek  to  maintain  the  dignity  and  author- 
ity of  the  United  States  only  because  we  wish  al- 
ways to  keep  our  great  influence  unimpaired  for 
the  uses  of  liberty,  both  in  the  United  States  and 
wherever  else  it  may  be  employed  for  the  benefit  of 
mankind." 

By  a  joint  resolution,  approved  April  22d,  Congress 
declared  that,  "in  view  of  the  facts  presented  by  the 
President  .  .  .  with  regard  to  certain  affronts  and 
indignities  committed  against  the  United  States  in 
Mexico,"  he  was  "justified  in  the  employment  of 
the  armed  forces  of  the  United  States  to  enforce  his 
demand  for  unequivocal  amends"  for  such  "affronts 

224 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

and  indignities."  The  joint  resolution  at  the  same 
time  disclaimed  "any  hostility  to  the  Mexican 
people  or  any  purpose  to  make  war  upon  Mexico." 
April  30th  General  Funston,  with  nine  thousand 
regulars,  occupied  Vera  Cruz,  the  sailors  returning 
to  their  ships.  Meanwhile,  diplomatic  relations  had 
been  severed,  and  passports  were  handed  to  the 
charge  d'affaires  of  the  United  States  at  the  City  of 
Mexico  and  to  the  Mexican  charge  d'affaires  at 
Washington.  On  April  23d  Huerta  issued  a  general 
amnesty,  and  Carranza,  in  a  note  to  Mr.  Bryan,  pro- 
tested that  the  hostile  acts  of  the  United  States 
would  "drag  us  into  an  unequal  war."  On  the  same 
day,  however,  the  ambassadors  of  Argentina,  Brazil, 
and  Chile  tendered  their  mediation.  This  offer  was 
accepted  on  both  sides,  and  the  mediators  met  at 
Niagara  on  May  20th.  On  June  14th  a  protocol  was 
signed.  It  provided  that  a  new  government,  con- 
stituted by  agreement  between  the  Mexican  fac- 
tions, should  be  recognized  by  the  United  States; 
that  the  United  States  should  demand  no  war  in- 
demnity or  other  material  satisfaction,  and  that  an 
amnesty  should  be  extended  to  foreigners  in  Mexico 
for  all  political  offences. 

July  15th  Huerta  resigned,  and  a  makeshift  ad- 
ministration was  locally  set  up  under  Francisco 
Carbajal.  At  a  convention  then  in  session  at 
Aguascalientes,  composed  of  representatives  of  Car- 
ranza, Villa,  and  Zapata,  it  was  proposed  to  entrust 
the  government  to  a  provisional  committee;  but,  as 
15  225 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Carranza  refused  to  yield  his  claims  to  the  presidency, 
the  convention  proclaimed  General  Gutierrez  as 
provisional  President.  To  this  act  Villa  and  Zapata 
announced  their  adhesion,  but  General  Obregon, 
whose  support  proved  to  be  of  great  value,  adhered 
to  Carranza.  The  City  of  Mexico  was  occupied 
first  by  one  party  and  then  by  another.  The 
Villistas  continued  to  be  active  in  the  north,  but 
their  leader's  prestige  was  broken  by  his  defeat  by 
General  Obregon  at  Celaya  on  April  2,  191 5. 

On  June  2d  President  Wilson  issued  a  public 
statement  in  regard  to  Mexico.  In  the  hour  of  their 
success  the  leaders  of  the  revolution  had,  he  said, 
disagreed  and  turned  their  arms  against  one  another, 
with  the  result  that  Mexico  was  "starving  and 
without  a  government."  In  these  circumstances  the 
United  States  must,  he  said,  presently  do  what  it 
had  not  felt  at  liberty  to  do,  "lend  its  active  moral 
support  to  some  man  or  group  of  men,  if  such  may 
be  found,  who  can  rally  the  suffering  people  of 
Mexico  to  their  support  in  an  effort  to  ignore,  if 
they  cannot  unite,  the  warring  factions  of  the  coun- 
try, return  to  the  constitution  of  the  republic  so  long 
in  abeyance,  and  set  up  a  government  at  Mexico 
City  which  the  great  powers  of  the  world  can 
recognize  and  deal  with."  He  therefore  "publicly 
and  very  solemnly"  called  upon  the  leaders  of  fac- 
tions to  act  together,  and  warned  them  that  unless 
they  did  so  within  a  very  short  time  the  United 
States  would  be  constrained  to  decide  what  means 

226 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE 

should  be  employed  "in  order  to  help  Mexico  save 
herself  and  serve  her  people." 

Villa,  who  had  suffered  yet  another  defeat,  made 
overtures  to  the  Constitutionalists  for  a  conference, 
but  denied  the  right  of  the  United  States  to  inter- 
vene. The  situation  did  not  improve,  and  several 
weeks  later  the  six  ranking  Latin-American  repre- 
sentatives— the  ambassadors  of  Argentina,  Brazil, 
and  Chile,  and  the  ministers  of  Bolivia,  Guatemala, 
and  Uruguay — were  called  into  consultation  by  the 
United  States,  with  a  view  to  find  a  solution.  After 
the  first  conference,  which  was  held  on  August  5th, 
an  appeal  was  issued  to  the  leaders  of  factions  to 
come  together  and  compose  their  differences.  The 
appeal  failed,  but,  as  Secretary  Lansing  afterwards 
explained,  it  was  found  that  the  chiefs  associated 
with  Villa  answered  independently,  while  those  asso- 
ciated with  Carranza  referred  the  appeal  to  him; 
and  from  this  it  was  inferred  that,  while  the  Villistas 
lacked  a  central  organization,  there  existed  among 
the  Carrancistas  "a  unity  and  loyalty  which  in- 
dicated the  ultimate  triumph  of  that  faction," 
especially  as  they  controlled  approximately  seventy- 
five  per  cent,  of  the  territory  of  Mexico.  In  conse- 
quence, recognition  was  on  October  19th  extended  to 
the  Carranza  government.  In  the  note  of  the 
United  States  it  was  styled  the  "de  facto  govern- 
ment of  Mexico." 

On  March  9,  1916,  an  attack  was  made  on  the  town 
of  Columbus,   New  Mexico,   by  a  force  of  about 

227 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

fifteen  hundred  men  under  the  command  of  Villa, 
and  a  number  of  Americans,  including  some  soldiers, 
were  killed,  and  various  acts  of  destruction  com- 
mitted before  the  invaders  were  driven  back  into 
Mexico.  The  next  day  President  Wilson  publicly 
announced  that  an  adequate  force  would  "be  sent 
at  once  in  pursuit  of  Villa,  with  the  single  object  of 
capturing  him  and  putting  a  stop  to  his  forays," 
and  that  this  could  and  would  be  done  "in  entirely 
friendly  aid  of  the  Constitutionalist  authorities  of 
Mexico,  and  with  scrupulous  respect  for  the  sov- 
ereignty of  that  republic."  Five  days  later,  what 
was  called  a  "punitive  expedition"  was  sent  into 
Mexico,  under  command  of  General  Pershing. 

A  question  thus  arose  as  to  the  extent  to  which  the 
basal  principle  of  the  inviolability  of  the  territory 
of  an  independent  state  may  be  held  to  yield  to  the 
right  of  self-defence.  In  the  classic  case  of  the 
steamer  Caroline,  which,  while  in  the  service  of 
Canadian  insurgents,  a  British  force  from  Canada, 
making  a  sudden  incursion  across  the  Niagara  River, 
destroyed  in  American  waters,  Mr.  Webster,  as 
Secretary  of  State,  declared  that  the  exceptions  to  the 
principle  of  inviolability,  growing  out  of  the  necessity 
of  self-defence,  should  be  confined  to  cases  in  which 
that  necessity  was  "instant,  overwhelming,  and 
leaving  no  choice  of  means;  and  no  moment  for 
deliberation."  In  the  case  at  Columbus,  complaint 
was  made  that  the  punitive  force  was  sent  into 
Mexico  without  formal  notice  to  the  government 

228 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE 

and  without  its  consent.  Discussions  had  taken 
place  at  Washington  as  to  a  possible  arrangement 
on  the  lines  of  the  agreements  entered  into  from  1882 
to  1896,  which  provided  that  under  specified 
conditions  the  regular  troops  of  the  two  govern- 
ments might,  when  in  pursuit  of  savage  Indians, 
reciprocally  cross  the  boundary,  but  stipulated  that 
they  should  not  remain  longer  than  was  necessary 
to  enable  them  to  pursue  the  band  whose  trail  they 
followed.  The  negotiations  at  Washington  having 
failed  to  result  in  a  definitive  understanding,  the  dis- 
cussions were  continued  on  the  frontier  by  Generals 
Scott  and  Funston  on  the  part  of  the  United  States, 
and  by  Gen.  Alvaro  Obregon,  Secretary  of  War  and 
Marine,  on  the  part  of  Mexico.  Various  proposals 
were  exchanged,  but  the  insistence  of  Mexico  on  the 
withdrawal  of  the  force  sent  in  pursuit  of  Villa  proved 
to  form  an  obstacle  to  an  agreement.  The  situation 
was  then  further  complicated  by  a  raid  made  by  a 
band  of  Mexican  outlaws  on  the  night  of  May  5  th 
on  Glenn  Springs,  Texas,  twenty  miles  north  of  the 
border.  American  troops  were  subsequently  sent 
in  pursuit  of  the  raiders.  They  penetrated  one  hun- 
dred and  sixty-eight  miles  into  Mexico,  without  en- 
countering any  Mexican  troops,  and  twelve  days 
later  recrossed  the  line  into  the  United  States. 

On  the  same  day — May  2 2d — the  Mexican  govern- 
ment, being  then  unaware  of  their  return,  dispatched 
to  the  United  States  an  extended  protest,  which, 
while   declaring   that   their   entrance   into   Mexico 

229 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

constituted  a  violation  of  the  national  sovereignty 
and  gravely  endangered  the  harmony  and  good  re- 
lations between  the  two  countries,  asked  for  their 
immediate  withdrawal  and  complete  abstention  from 
the  dispatch  of  similar  expeditions.  The  Mexican 
government,  said  the  note,  understood  its  obligation 
to  protect  the  frontier,  but  expected  the  United 
States  also  to  protect  its  side;  and,  if  incursions 
should  take  place,  they  should  be  regarded  as  a  sub- 
ject of  "pecuniary  reparation"  and  a  reason  for 
adopting  "a  combined  defence."  Mexico,  it  was 
asserted,  could  not  be  held  responsible  for  the  incur- 
sions of  outlaws,  while  doing  everything  possible  to 
prevent  them;  but  the  United  States,  in  sending 
regulars  into  Mexico  against  the  express  will  of  the 
government,  committed  an  act  for  which  it  was 
manifestly  responsible.  In  these  circumstances  the 
Mexican  government  not  only  would  have  to  con- 
sider the  sending  of  further  troops  into  its  territory 
as  an  act  of  invasion  against  which  it  would  be  forced 
to  defend  itself,  but  also  must  insist  upon  the  with- 
drawal of  those  remaining  in  Chihuahua  on  account 
of  the  Columbus  raid;  and  in  this  relation  the  note 
appealed  to  Article  2 1  of  the  treaty  of  Guadalupe 
Hidalgo  of  1848,  which  provides  that,  in  case  of  dis- 
agreements between  the  two  governments,  resort 
shall  not  be  had  to  "reprisals,  aggression,  or  hostility 
of  any  kind,"  until  the  government  that  deems  itself 
aggrieved  "shall  have  maturely  considered,  in  the 
spirit  of  peace  and  good  neighborship,  whether  it 

230 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

would  not  be  better  that  such  difference  should  be 
settled  by  the  arbitration  of  commissioners  ap- 
pointed on  each  side  or  by  that  of  a  friendly  nation," 
and  that,  should  this  be  proposed  by  either  party, 
it  shall  be  accepted  by  the  other,  ' '  unless  deemed  by 
it  altogether  incompatible  with  the  nature  of  the  dif- 
ference or  the  circumstances  of  the  case." 

Having  thus  dealt  with  the  legal  aspects  of  the 
subject,  the  note  proceeded  to  request  a  more  cate- 
gorical explanation  of  the  "real  intentions"  of  the 
United  States,  especially  in  view  of  the  repeated  prot- 
estations of  friendship  for  Latin-American  coun- 
tries, and  of  the  absence  of  any  intention  to  intervene 
in  their  internal  affairs,  or  to  acquire  their  territory, 
or  to  launch  into  a  conflict  with  Mexico,  protesta- 
tions with  which,  said  the  note,  the  acts  of  the 
military  authorities  were  in  conflict.  More  than 
two  months  had  elapsed  since  the  Columbus  expe- 
diticn  was  dispatched;  its  presence  and  movements 
gave  rise  to  popular  feeling,  as  was  shown  in  the 
collision  with  the  people  at  Parral ;  and  if  the  reten- 
tion of  the  troops  in  Mexico,  after  the  dispersal  of  the 
Villa  bands,  was  due  to  political  causes  or  reasons  of 
"internal  policy  of  the  United  States,"  the  dis- 
crepancy was  only  accentuated.  As  further  grounds 
of  suspicion,  the  note  specified  the  ' '  decided  support 
given  at  one  time  to  Villa  by  General  Scott  and  the 
State  Department,"  this  support  being,  so  the  note 
declared,  "the  principal  cause  of  the  prolongation 
of  the  civil  war  in  Mexico  for  many  months";    the 

231 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

refusal  to  define  by  agreement  the  number,  kind,  and 
operations  of  the  American  forces  to  be  used  in 
Mexico,  and  the  sending  of  infantry  and  artillery, 
which  indicated  regular  Mexican  forces  as  their 
object ;  and  the  detention  of  shipments  of  arms  and 
ammunition  purchased  in  the  United  States  by  the 
Mexican  government,  as  well  as  of  machinery  for  the 
manufacture  of  ammunition.  If  the  United  States 
was  thus  seeking  to  protect  itself  against  the  emer- 
gency of  a  future  conflict,  it  would,  said  the  note, 
"be  preferable  to  say  so."  Mexico  could  not  wish 
war  with  the  United  States;  war  could  occur  only 
in  consequence  of  the  "deliberate  purpose"  of  the 
latter.  The  Mexican  government  therefore  for- 
mally invited  the  United  States  "to  support  its 
declarations  and  protests  of  amity  with  real  and 
effective  action"  such  as  would  "convince  the 
Mexican  people  of  the  sincerity  of  its  purposes"; 
and  this  action,  declared  the  note,  could  not  be  other 
than  "the  immediate  withdrawal  of  the  American 
troops  which  are  now  in  Mexican  territory." 

Before  this  note  was  answered,  the  Republican 
National  Convention  was  held  at  Chicago.  The 
platform,  adopted  June  8th,  denounced  "the  in- 
defensible methods  of  interference"  employed  by 
the  administration  "in  the  internal  affairs  of  Mexico," 
and  referred  with  "shame"  to  its  permitting  existing 
conditions  to  continue,  first,  by  "failure  to  act 
promptly  and  firmly,"  and  secondly,  "through  recog- 
nition of  one  of  the  factions  responsible"  for  them. 

232 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

"We  pledge  our  aid,"  declared  the  platform,  "in 
restoring  order  and  maintaining  peace  in  Mexico. 
We  promise  to  our  citizens  on  and  near  the  border, 
and  those  in  Mexico,  wherever  they  may  be  found, 
adequate  and  absolute  protection  in  their  lives, 
liberty,  and  property."  Governor  Hughes,  in  a  tele- 
gram accepting  the  nomination,  declared  that  the 
country  had  "suffered  incalculably  from  the  weak 
and  vacillating  course  which  has  been  taken  with 
regard  to  Mexico,  a  course  lamentably  wrong  with 
regard  to  both  our  rights  and  our  duties.  We  inter- 
fered without  consistency;  and,  while  seeking  to 
dictate  when  we  were  not  concerned,  we  utterly 
failed  to  appreciate  and  discharge  our  plain  duty  to 
our  own  citizens." 

The  platform  subsequently  adopted  by  the  Demo- 
cratic National  Convention  at  St.  Louis,  on  June 
1 6th,  makes,  in  regard  to  Mexico,  the  following 
declaration : 

"The  want  of  a  stable,  responsible  government  in 
Mexico,  capable  of  repressing  and  punishing  maraud- 
ers and  bandit  bands,  who  have  not  only  taken  the 
lives  and  seized  and  destroyed  the  property  of  Amer- 
ican citizens  in  that  country,  but  have  insolently 
invaded  our  soil,  made  war  upon  and  murdered  our 
people  thereon,  has  rendered  it  necessary  temporarily 
to  occupy,  by  our  armed  forces,  a  portion  of  the 
territory  of  that  friendly  state. 

"Until,  by  the  restoration  of  law  and  order  therein, 
a  repetition  of  such  incursions  is  improbable,  the 

233 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

necessity  for  their  remaining  will  continue.  Interven- 
tion, implying  as  it  does  military  subjugation,  is 
revolting  to  the  people  of  the  United  States,  not- 
withstanding the  provocation  to  that  course  has 
been  very  great,  and  should  be  resorted  to,  if  at 
all,  only  as  a  last  resort.  The  stubborn  resistance 
of  the  President  and  his  advisers  to  every  demand  and 
suggestion  to  enter  upon  it,  is  creditable  alike  to  them 
and  to  the  people  in  whose  name  he  speaks." 

The  declaration  that  it  had  been  necessary  to 
"occupy,"  even  though  "temporarily,"  a  part  of 
the  teritory  of  Mexico,  evidently  carried  the  con- 
troversy to  a  point  beyond  that  which  was  reached  in 
the  original  pursuit  of  Villa.  This  phase  of  the 
situation  is  manifest  in  the  answer  made  by  Mr. 
Lansing,  on  June  20th,  to  the  Mexican  protest  of  the 
2 2d  of  May.  After  speaking  of  the  "discourteous 
tone  and  temper"  of  the  protest,  Mr.  Lansing 
animadverts  upon  the  chaotic  conditions  that  had 
prevailed  in  Mexico  during  the  past  three  years; 
upon  the  apparent  protection  given  by  the  govern- 
ment to  some  of  the  bandit  leaders ;  upon  the  fail- 
ure of  the  Mexican  forces  to  co-operate  or  assist  in 
the  pursuit  of  Villa ;  and  upon  the  attitude  of  the 
Mexican  representatives  in  the  discussions  regarding 
the  presence  of  American  troops  in  that  country,  an 
attitude  from  which,  he  declared,  the  conclusion 
"might  be  drawn"  that  Carranza  did  not  intend  or 
desire  that  the  outlaws  should  be  captured,  destroyed, 
or  dispersed.     Replying  to  the  statement  that  Villa 

234 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

at  one  time  had  the  support  of  American  officers  and 
of  the  State  Department,  Mr.  Lansing  remarked  that 
the  Carranza  government  had,  "from  the  moment 
of  its  recognition,"  had  the  "undivided  support" 
of  the  United  States,  as  shown  in  many  ways.  In 
discussing  the  original  crossing  of  the  expedition  in 
pursuit  of  Villa,  Mr.  Lansing  observed  that  there  was 
no  time  to  reach  an  agreement  "other  than  that  of 
March  10-13,  now  repudiated  by  General  Carranza" ; 
but,  in  the  course  of  his  answer,  he  subsequently 
' '  admitted ' '  that  the  American  troops  had  ' '  crossed 
the  international  boundary  in  hot  pursuit  of  the 
Columbus  raiders  and  without  notice  to  or  the  con- 
sent of"  the  Mexican  government,  and  added  that 
the  protestations  made  by  the  President,  the  State 
Department,  and  other  American  authorities,  "that 
the  object  of  the  expedition  was  to  capture,  destroy, 
or  completely  disperse  the  Villa  bands  of  outlaws  or 
to  turn  this  duty  over  to  the  Mexican  authorities 
when  assured  that  it  would  be  effectively  fulfilled," 
had  been  "carried  out  in  perfect  good  faith  by  the 
United  States."  The  circumstances  of  the  crossing 
were,  he  declared,  such  that  "immediate  action  alone 
could  avail."  Nor  could  the  request  made  in  the 
note  of  May  2 2d  for  the  immediate  withdrawal  of 
the  American  forces  be  entertained.  While  the  in- 
ability of  the  Mexican  government  to  check  the  out- 
rages complained  of  might,  said  Mr.  Lansing,  excuse 
its  failure  to  do  so,  it  only  made  stronger  the  duty  of 
the   United   States   to   check   them.     The   United 

235 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

States  had  not,  he  affirmed,  sought  the  duty  "of 
pursuing  bandits  who,  under  fundamental  principles 
of  municipal  and  international  law,  ought  to  be  pur- 
sued and  arrested  and  punished  by  Mexican  au- 
thorities"; the  United  States  would  be  glad  to  have 
this  obligation  fulfilled  by  Mexico;  but  if  the  "de 
facto  government"  was  pleased  to  ignore  this  obli- 
gation and  to  believe  that,  if  the  American  troops 
were  not  retired,  there  was,  as  it  had  been  intimated, 
"no  further  recourse  than  to  defend  its  territory  by 
an  appeal  to  arms,"  the  United  States  must  impress 
upon  it  the  fact  that  the  execution  of  this  threat 
would  "lead  to  the  gravest  consequences."  While 
the  United  States  "would  deeply  regret  such  a 
result,"  it  could  not,  declared  Mr.  Lansing,  recede 
from  its  "settled  determination  to  maintain  its 
national  rights  and  to  perform  its  full  duty  in  pre- 
venting further  invasions  of  the  territory  of  the 
United  States  and  in  removing  the  peril  which 
Americans  along  the  international  boundary  have 
borne  so  long  with  patience  and  forbearance." 

Meanwhile,  orders  had  been  given  to  the  Mexican 
commanders  "not  to  permit  American  forces  from 
General  Pershing's  column  to  advance  farther  south, 
nor  to  move  either  east,  south,  or  west,  from  the 
points  where  they  are  located,  and  to  oppose  new 
incursions  of  American  soldiers  into  Mexican  terri- 
tory." These  orders  were,  it  seems,  brought  by 
General  Trevino  to  the  attention  of  General  Pershing, 
who  replied  to  the  effect  that  he  received  orders  only 

236 


THE   MONROE    DOCTRINE 

from  his  own  government.  On  June  2 2d  a  detach- 
ment moving  eastward,  at  some  distance  from  its 
base,  became  engaged  with  Mexican  troops  at 
Carrizal,  and  as  a  result  of  the  encounter  several 
men  on  both  sides  were  killed  and  wounded  and 
seventeen  Americans  were  made  prisoners.  The 
incident  is  thus  explained  in  a  communication 
handed  to  Mr.  Lansing  by  Mr.  Arredondo,  the 
Mexican  diplomatic  representative  at  Washington. 
The  United  States  replied  that  it  could  regard  the 
explanation  only  as  a  formal  avowal  of  ' '  deliberately 
hostile  action"  and  demanded  "the  immediate  re- 
lease of  the  prisoners,  together  with  any  United 
States  property  taken  with  them."  It  was  added 
that  the  United  States  expected  an  early  statement 
from  the  Mexican  government  through  diplomatic 
channels,  and  not  through  subordinate  military  com- 
manders, as  to  the  course  of  action  which  it  wished 
the  United  States  to  understand  had  been  deter- 
mined upon.  The  prisoners  were  subsequently 
released.  In  this  way  a  final  crisis  was  averted, 
but  the  strain  of  the  situation  was  by  no  means 
ended. 

Subsequently  a  joint  commission,  consisting  of 
three  American  and  three  Mexican  members,  was 
organized  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  a  solution  of  the 
pending  complications.  This  commission  continued 
in  existence  through  the  remainder  of  the  year,  but 
the  formulation  on  comprehensive  lines  of  an  ac- 
ceptable plan  of  action  was  found  to  be  unattainable. 

237 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

The  American  troops  were,  however,  gradually  with- 
drawn from  Mexico,  and  early  in  191 7  an  ambassador 
was  sent  by  the  United  States  to  the  Carranza  gov- 
ernment, under  whose  auspices  a  new  national  con- 
stitution was  adopted. 

In  connection  with  the  principle  of  non-inter- 
vention, a  prominent  place  must  be  given  to  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  the  object  of  which  was  to  render 
intervention  unnecessary  by  precluding  the  oc- 
casions for  it.  On  September  26,  181 5,  the  Em- 
perors of  Austria  and  Russia,  and  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia, signed  at  Paris  a  personal  league  commonly 
called  the  Holy  Alliance,  the  design  of  which  was 
declared  to  be  the  administration  of  government, 
in  matters  both  internal  and  external,  according  to 
the  precepts  of  justice,  charity  and  peace.  To  this 
end  the  allied  monarchs,  "  looking  upon  themselves 
as  delegated  by  Providence"  to  rule  over  their  re- 
spective countries,  engaged  to  "lend  one  another, 
on  every  occasion  and  in  every  place,  assistance, 
aid,  and  support."  In  the  course  of  time,  as  revolt 
against  the  arrangements  of  the  Congress  of  Vienna 
spread  and  grew  more  pronounced,  the  alliance  came 
more  and  more  to  assume  the  form  of  a  league  for 
the  protection  of  the  principle  of  legitimacy — the 
principle  of  the  divine  right  of  kings  as  opposed  to 
the  rights  of  the  people — against  the  encroach- 
ments of  liberal  ideas.  Congresses  were  held  at 
Aix-la-Chapelle,  Troppau  and  Laybach,  for  the  pur- 

238 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

pose  of  maturing  a  programme  to  that  end.  The 
league  was  joined  by  the  King  of  France ;  but  Eng- 
land, whose  Prince  Regent  had  originally  given  it 
his  informal  adhesion,  began  to  grow  hostile.  Her 
own  government,  with  its  free  and  parliamentary 
institutions,  was  founded  on  a  revolution;  and  the 
allies,  in  the  circular  issued  at  Troppau,  had  as- 
sociated "revolt  and  crime,"  and  had  declared  that 
the  European  powers  "had  an  undoubted  right  to 
take  a  hostile  attitude  in  regard  to  those  states  in 
which  the  overthrow  of  the  government  might 
operate  as  an  example."  In  a  circular  issued  at 
Laybach  they  denounced  "as  equally  null,  and 
disallowed  by  the  public  law  of  Europe,  any  pre- 
tended reform  effected  by  revolt  and  open  force." 
In  October,  1822,  they  held  a  congress  at  Verona 
for  the  purpose  of  concerting  measures  against  the 
revolutionary  government  in  Spain;  and  in  yet 
another  circular  announced  their  determination  "to 
repel  the  maxim  of  rebellion,  in  whatever  place  and 
under  whatever  form  it  might  show  itself."  Their 
ultimate  object  was  more  explicitly  stated  in  a 
secret  treaty  in  which  they  engaged  mutually  "to 
put  an  end  to  the  system  of  representative  govern- 
ments" in  Europe,  and  to  adopt  measures  to  de- 
stroy "the  liberty  of  the  press."  Popular  move- 
ments were  forcibly  suppressed  in  Piedmont  and 
Naples;  and  in  April,  1823,  France,  acting  for  the 
allies,  invaded  Spain,  for  the  purpose  of  restoring 

239 


A  M E  R 1 C A N    D IPLO M  A C  Y 

the  absolute  monarch  Ferdinand  VII.  Before  the 
close  of  the  summer  such  progress  had  been  made 
in  this  direction  that  notice  was  given  to  the  Brit- 
ish government  of  the  intention  of  the  allies  to  call 
a  congress  with  a  view  to  the  termination  of  the 
revolutionary  governments  in  Spanish  America. 
At  this  time  Lord  Castlereagh,  who  had  always  been 
favorably  disposed  towards  the  alliance,  had  been 
succeeded  in  the  conduct  of  the  foreign  affairs  of 
England  by  George  Canning,  who  reflected  the 
popular  sentiment  as  to  the  policy  of  the  allied 
powers.  The  independence  of  the  Spanish-Amer- 
ican governments,  which  had  now  been  acknowl- 
edged by  the  United  States,  had  not  as  yet  been 
recognized  by  Great  Britain.  But  English  mer- 
chants, like  those  of  the  United  States,  had  devel- 
oped a  large  trade  with  the  Spanish  -  American 
countries,  a  trade  which  the  restoration  of  those 
regions  to  a  colonial  condition  would,  under  the 
commercial  system  then  in  vogue,  have  cut  off  and 
destroyed. 

In  view  of  this  common  interest,  Canning,  in  the 
summer  of  1823,  began  to  sound  Richard  Rush, 
the  American  minister  at  London,  as  to  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  joint  declaration  by  the  two  govern- 
ments against  the  intervention  of  the  allies  in  Span- 
ish America.  Canning  once  boasted  that  he  had 
called  into  being  the  New  World  to  redress  the 
balance   of   the   Old.     The   meaning  of   this   boast 

240 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

can  be  understood  only  in  the  light  of  his  proposals. 
In  a  "private  and  confidential"  note  to  Rush,  of 
August  23,  1823,  he  declared:  "  1.  We  conceive  the 
recovery  of  the  colonies  by  Spain  to  be  hopeless. 
2.  We  conceive  the  question  of  the  recognition  of 
them,  as  independent  states,  to  be  one  of  time  and 
circumstances.  3.  We  are,  however,  by  no  means 
disposed  to  throw  any  impediment  in  the  way  of 
an  arrangement  between  them  and  the  mother- 
country  by  amicable  negotiation.  4.  We  aim  not 
at  the  possession  of  any  portion  of  them  ourselves. 
5.  We  could  not  see  any  portion  of  them  transferred 
to  any  other  power  with  indifference/'  If  these 
opinions  and  feelings  were  shared  by  the  United 
States,  Canning  thought  that  the  two  governments 
should  declare  them  in  the  face  of  the  world,  as  the 
best  means  of  defeating  the  project,  if  any  Euro- 
pean power  should  cherish  it,  of  subjugating  the 
colonies  in  the  name  of  Spain,  or  of  acquiring  any 
part  of  them  itself  by  cession  or  by  conquest.  He 
therefore  desired  Rush  to  act  upon  his  proposals 
at  once,  if  he  possessed  the  power  to  do  so.  It  was 
said  of  Richard  Rush  by  an  eminent  Senator  that, 
in  the  course  of  an  unusually  long  and  important 
diplomatic  career,  he  "never  said  a  word  that  was 
improper,  nor  betrayed  a  thought  that  might  peril 
his  country's  fortunes."  On  the  present  occasion, 
he  acted  with  his  usual  good  judgment.  His  pow- 
ers did  not  embrace  the  making  of  such  a  declara- 
16  241 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tion  as  Canning  desired ;  but,  while  he  expressed  the 
opinion  that  Canning's  sentiments,  except  as  to  in- 
dependence, which  the  United  States  had  already 
acknowledged,  were  shared  by  his  government,  he 
lost  no  time  in  reporting  the  matter  to  the  Presi- 
dent. Monroe,  on  receiving  the  correspondence, 
hastened  to  take  counsel  upon  it.  Jefferson,  whose 
opinion  was  solicited,  replied:  "Our  first  and  fun- 
damental maxim  should  be  never  to  entangle  our- 
selves in  the  broils  of  Europe;  our  second,  never  to 
suffer  Europe  to  intermeddle  with  cis-Atlantic 
affairs."  He  was  disposed  to  look  with  favor  upon 
co  -  operation  with  England  in  the  direction  sug- 
gested. Madison  shared  his  opinion.  In  the  cabi- 
net of  Monroe,  Calhoun  inclined  to  invest  Rush 
with  power  to  join  England  in  a  declaration,  even 
if  it  should  pledge  the  United  States  not  to  take 
either  Cuba  or  Texas.  The  President  at  first  in- 
clined to  Calhoun's  idea  of  giving  Rush  discretion- 
ary powers,  but  this  was  opposed  by  John  Quincy 
Adams,  who  maintained  that  we  could  act  with 
England  only  on  the  basis  of  the  acknowledged  in- 
dependence of  the  Spanish- American  states.  The 
views  of  Adams  prevailed.  His  basal  thought  was 
the  right  of  self-government,  which  he  believed  it 
to  be  the  duty  and  the  interest  of  the  United  States 
to  cherish  and  support.  He  thought  that  the 
United  States  should  let  England  make  her  own 
declaration.     This    England    did,    without   waiting 

242 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

for  the  decision  of  the  United  States.  On  October 
9,  1823,  Canning,  in  an  interview  with  Prince  de 
Polignac,  French  ambassador,  declared  that  while 
Great  Britain  would  remain  "neutral"  in  any  war 
between  Spain  and  her  colonies,  the  "junction"  of 
any  foreign  power  with  Spain  against  the  colonies 
would  be  viewed  as  constituting  "entirely  a  new 
question,"  upon  which  Great  Britain  "must  take 
such  decision"  as  her  interests   "might  require." 

In  his  annual  message  to  Congress  of  December 
2,  1823,  President  Monroe  devoted  to  the  subject  a 
long  passage.  The  substance  of  it  is,  however,  con- 
veyed in  a  few  sentences.  After  adverting  to  the 
abstention  of  the  United  States  from  European 
wars  and  to  the  dangers  to  be  apprehended  from 
the  system  of  the  allied  powers,  he  declared:  "We 
owe  it,  therefore,  to  candor  and  to  the  amicable 
relations  existing  between  the  United  States  and 
those  powers,  to  declare  that  we  should  consider 
any  attempt  on  their  part  to  extend  their  system 
to  any  portion  of  this  hemisphere  as  dangerous  to 
our  peace  and  safety.  With  the  existing  colonies 
or  dependencies  of  any  European  power,  we  have 
not  interfered  and  shall  not  interfere.  But  with 
the  governments  who  have  declared  their  indepen- 
dence and  maintained  it,  and  whose  independence  we 
have,  on  great  consideration  and  on  just  principles, 
acknowledged,  we  could  not  view  any  interposition 
for  the  purpose  of  oppressing  them,  or  controlling 

243 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

in  any  other  manner  their  destiny,  by  any  Euro- 
pean power,  in  any  other  light  than  a  manifestation 
of  an  unfriendly  disposition  towards  the  United 
States." 

The  sentences  just  quoted  specially  relate  to  the 
aims  of  the  Holy  Alliance ;  but  there  is  another  pas- 
sage in  the  message  which  is  also  often  cited  as 
embodying  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  In  182 1  the 
Emperor  of  Russia,  as  we  have  seen,  issued  a  ukase, 
by  which  he  assumed,  as  owner  of  the  shore,  to 
exclude  foreigners  from  carrying  on  commerce  and 
from  navigating  and  fishing  within  a  hundred  Italian 
miles  of  the  northwest  coast  of  America,  from  Bering 
Straits  down  to  the  fifty-first  parallel  of  north  lati- 
tude. As  this  assertion  of  title  embraced  territory 
which  was  claimed  by  the  United  States  as  well  as 
by  Great  Britain,  both  those  governments  protested 
against  it,  as  well  as  against  the  exorbitant  juris- 
dictional pretension  with  which  it  was  associated. 
In  consequence  the  Russian  government  proposed 
to  adjust  the  matter  by  amicable  negotiation ;  and 
instructions  to  that  end  were  prepared  by  John 
Quincy  Adams  for  the  American  ministers  at  Lon- 
don and  St.  Petersburg.  At  a  meeting  of  the 
cabinet  on  June  28,  1823,  while  the  subject  was 
under  discussion,  Adams  expressed  the  opinion 
that  the  claim  of  the  Russians  could  not  be  ad- 
mitted, because  they  appeared  to  have  no  "set- 
tlement"  upon   the   territory   in   dispute;    and    on 

244 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

Tuly  17  he  informed  Baron  Tuyl,  then  Russian 
minister  at  Washington,  "that  we  [the  United 
States]  should  contest  the  right  of  Russia  to  any 
territorial  establishment  on  this  continent,  and  that 
we  should  assume  distinctly  the  principle  that  the 
American  continents  are  no  longer  subjects  for  any 
new  European  colonial  establishments."  With  ref- 
erence to  this  subject,  President  Monroe,  in  the 
message  above  quoted,  said:  "In  the  discussions  to 
which  this  interest  has  given  rise,  and  in  the  ar- 
rangements by  which  they  may  terminate,  the  oc- 
casion has  been  judged  proper  for  asserting  as  a 
principle  in  which  the  rights  and  interests  of  the 
United  States  are  involved,  that  the  American 
continents,  by  the  free  and  independent  condition 
which  they  have  assumed  and  maintain,  are  hence- 
forth not  to  be  considered  as  subjects  for  future 
colonization  by  any  European  powers." 

By  the  term  "future  colonization,"  President 
Monroe  evidently  intended  to  convey  the  same 
meaning  as  was  expressed  by  the  terms  "settle- 
ment" and  "colonial  establishments"  previously 
employed  by  Adams.  They  were  used  to  denote, 
what  they  were  then  commonly  understood  to  mean . 
the  acquisition  of  title  to  territory  by  original  occu- 
pation and  settlement.  But  in  the  course  of  time 
the  phrase  "future  colonization"  came  to  receive 
a  broader  interpretation.  President  Polk,  in  his 
annual  message  of  December  2,  1845,  declared  that, 

245 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

while  existing  rights  of  every  European  nation 
should  be  respected,  it  should  be  "  distinctly  an- 
nounced to  the  world  as  our  settled  policy,  that  no 
future  European  colony  or  dominion  shall,  with  our 
consent,  be  planted  or  established  on  any  part  of 
the  North  American  continent."  By  pronouncing 
against  the  establishment  by  a  European  power  of 
any  "dominion" — a  term  which  included  even  the 
voluntary  transfer  of  territory  already  occupied — 
President  Polk  expressed  a  conception  which  has 
come  generally  to  prevail,  and  which  is  embodied 
in  the  popular  phrase :  "  No  more  European  colonies 
on  these  continents."  The  same  meaning  is  con- 
veyed in  the  phrase — "America  for  the  Americans," 
which  signifies  that  no  European  power  shall  be 
permitted  to  acquire  new  territory  or  to  extend  its 
dominions  in  the  Western  Hemisphere. 

In  this  sense,  but  apparently  with  the  qualifica- 
tion in  the  particular  case  that  only  a  forcible  ac- 
quisition of  territory  was  forbidden,  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  was  invoked  by  President  Cleveland  in 
respect  of  the  Venezuelan  boundary  question.  This 
incident,  as  is  well  known,  grew  out  of  a  long-stand- 
ing dispute  between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela, 
which  was  the  continuation  of  a  dispute  two  cen- 
turies old  between  the  Netherlands  and  Spain  as 
to  the  limits  of  the  Dutch  and  Spanish  settlements 
in  Guiana.  In  1844  Lord  Aberdeen  proposed  to 
Venezuela   a   conventional   line,    beginning   at    the 

246 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

river  Moroco.  This  proposal  was  declined;  and, 
chiefly  in  consequence  of  civil  commotions  in  Vene- 
zuela, negotiations  remained  practically  in  abey- 
ance till  1876.  Venezuela  then  offered  to  accept 
the  Aberdeen  line;  but  Lord  Granville  suggested  a 
boundary  farther  west;  and  in  subsequent  negotia- 
tions the  British  demand  was  extended  still  farther 
in  that  direction.  Venezuela,  representing  that  this 
apparent  enlargement  of  British  dominion  consti- 
tuted a  pure  aggression  on  her  territorial  rights,  in- 
voked the  aid  of  the  United  States  on  the  ground 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine.  Venezuela  asked  for  arbi- 
tration, and  in  so  doing  included  in  her  claim  a 
large  portion  of  British  Guiana.  Great  Britain  at 
length  declined  to  arbitrate  unless  Venezuela  would 
first  yield  all  territory  within  a  line  westward  of 
that  offered  by  Lord  Aberdeen.  In  these  circum- 
stances, Mr.  Olney,  as  Secretary  of  State,  in  instruc- 
tions to  Mr.  Bayard,  American  ambassador  at  Lon- 
don, of  July  20,  1895,  categorically  inquired  whether 
the  British  government  would  submit  the  whole 
controversy  to  arbitration.  In  these  instructions 
Mr.  Olney  declared  that  the  Monroe  Doctrine  did 
not  establish  a  "protectorate"  over  other  American 
states ;  that  it  did  not  relieve  any  of  them  "  from  its 
obligations  as  fixed  by  international  law  nor  pre- 
vent any  European  power  directly  interested  from 
enforcing  such  obligations  or  from  inflicting  merited 
punishment  for  the  breach  of  them";  but  that  its 

247 


A  M  ER  I  CAN    DIPLO  M  A.C  V 

"single  purpose  ami  object"  was  that  "no  European 
power  or  combination  of  European  powers"  should 
"forcibly   deprive   an   American   stale   of  the  right 
anil   power  of  self-government  and   of  shaping  for 
itself  its  own  political  fortunes  and  destinies."     This 
principle  he  conceived  to  be  at  stake  in  the  dispute 
between  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  because,  as 
the  dispute  related   to  territory,  it  necessarily  im- 
ported "political  control   to  be  lost  by  one  party 
and  gained  by  the  other."     "To-day,"  declared  Mr. 
Olney,   "the  United  States  is  practically  sovereign 
on  this  continent,  and  its  fiat  is  law  upon  the  sub- 
jects to  which  it  confines  its  interposition."     All  the 
advantages  of  this  superiority  were,  he  affirmed,  at 
once  imperilled  if  the  principle  should  be  admitted 
that    European    powers    might    convert    American 
states  into  colonies  or  provinces  of  their  own.     Lord 
Salisbury    declined    unrestricted    arbitration;    and, 
when  his  answer  was  received,  President  Cleveland, 
on  December  17,  1895,  laid  the  correspondence  be- 
fore Congress.     "If  a  European  power,  by  an  ex- 
tension of  its  boundaries,  takes  possession  of  the 
territory  of  one  of  our  neighboring  republics  against 
its  will  and  in  derogation  of  its  rights,"  it  was,  said 
President  Cleveland,  the  precise  thing  which  Presi- 
dent Monroe  had  declared  to  be  "dangerous  to  our 
peace  and  safety";  but  he  added  that  "any  adjust- 
ment of  the  boundary  which  that  country  [Vene- 
zuela]  may  deem  for  her  advantage  and  may  enter 

24cS 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

into  of  her  own  free  will  cannot  of  course  be  ob- 
jected to  by  the  United  States."  He  then  recom- 
mended the  appointment  by  the  United  States  of 
a  commission  to  investigate  the  merits  of  the  con- 
troversy, and  declared  that,  if  the  title  to  the  dis- 
puted territory  should  be  found  to  belong  to  Vene- 
zuela, it  would  be  the  duty  of  the  United  States  "  to 
resist  by  every  means  in  its  power,  as  a  wilful  ag- 
gression upon  its  rights  and  interests,  the  appro- 
priation by  Great  Britain  of  any  lands  or  the  exer- 
cise of  governmental  jurisdiction  over  any  territory 
which,  after  investigation,  we  have  determined  of 
right  belongs  to  Venezuela."  This  declaration  pro- 
duced great  excitement,  in  the  United  States  as  well 
as  in  England.  So  far  as  it  seemed  to  imply,  as  the 
language  has  often  been  construed  to  do,  that  the 
United  States  possessed  the  right,  by  means  of  an 
ex  parte  commission,  appointed  by  itself  and  com- 
posed of  its  own  citizens,  authoritatively  to  fix  the 
boundary  between  two  other  independent  nations,  it 
went  beyond  the  immediate  necessities  of  the  case. 
If  the  commission  had  ever  reported,  it  is  probable 
that  its  conclusions,  which  conceivably  might  not 
have  been  entirely  acceptable  either  to  Great  Britain 
or  to  Venezuela,  would  have  been  treated  as  advisory 
rather  than  definitive,  and  would  have  been  made 
the  basis  of  further  correspondence  with  both  those 
governments.  The  actual  position  intended  to  be 
insisted  upon,  as  appears  by  Mr.  Olney's  instruc- 

249 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tions  to  Mr.  Bayard,  as  well  as  the  rest  of  President 
Cleveland's  message,  was  that  the  United  States 
would  resist  the  palpable  and  substantial  encroach- 
ment upon  and  appropriation  by  Great  Britain  of 
Venezuelan  territory.  This  position  was  quite  in 
harmony  with  the  spirit  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Congress  unanimously  provided  for  the  appointment 
of  a  commission  of  investigation ;  but  the  commission, 
immediately  after  its  organization,  addressed  to 
Mr.  Olney,  through  its  president,  Mr.  Justice  Brewer, 
a  letter  setting  forth  its  peaceful  and  non-partisan 
character  and  the  desirability  of  securing  the  co- 
operation of  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela  in  obtain- 
ing evidence.  At  the  close  of  his  letter,  Mr.  Justice 
Brewer  observed:  "The  purposes  of  the  pending 
investigation  are  certainly  hostile  to  none,  nor  can 
it  be  of  advantage  to  any  that  the  machinery  de- 
vised by  the  government  of  the  United  States  to 
secure  the  desired  information  should  fail  of  its 
purpose."  This  statement  was  communicated  to 
Great  Britain  as  well  as  to  Venezuela,  and  both  gov- 
ernments promptly  responded  to  the  appeal.  The 
labors  of  the  commission  were,  however,  brought 
to  a  close  by  the  conclusion  of  a  treaty  of  arbitra- 
tion, signed  by  Great  Britain  and  Venezuela,  but 
negotiated  between  Great  Britain  and  the  United 
States,  the  predominant  feature  of  which  was  the 
application  of  the  principle  of  prescription,  under 
the  definite  rule   that  fifty  years'  adverse   holding 

250 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

of  a  district,  either  by  exclusive  political  control  or 
by  actual  settlement,  should  suffice  to  constitute 
national  title.  The  adoption  of  the  principle  of 
prescription,  on  which  the  arbitrators  would  neces- 
sarily have  acted,  even  if  it  had  not  been  incorpo- 
rated into  the  treaty,  at  once  rendered  nugatory  the 
greater  part  of  the  Venezuelan  claim.  Although  the 
extreme  British  claim  was  not  allowed,  the  territorial 
results  of  the  arbitration  were  decidedly  favorable  to 
that  government.  It  must,  however,  be  conceded 
that  the  most  important  political  result  of  the 
Venezuelan  incident  was  not  the  decision  upon  the 
territorial  question,  but  the  official  adoption  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  by  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  and  its  explicit  acceptance  by  the  principal 
maritime  power  of  Europe. 

An  official  exposition  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  given  by  President  Roosevelt  in  his  annual 
message  of  December  3,  1901,  in  which  he  said: 
"The  Monroe  Doctrine  is  a  declaration  that  there 
must  be  no  territorial  aggrandizement  by  any  non- 
American  power  at  the  expense  of  any  American 
power  on  American  soil.  It  is  in  no  wise  intended 
as  hostile  to  any  nation  in  the  Old  World.  .  .  .  This 
doctrine  has  nothing  to  do  with  the  commercial 
relations  of  any  American  power,  save  that  it  in 
truth  allows  each  of  them  to  form  such  as  it  desires. 
.  .  .  We  do  not  guarantee  any  state  against  punish- 
ment if  it  misconducts  itself,  provided  that  punish- 

251 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ment  does  not  take  the  form  of  the  acquisition  of 
territory  by  any  non -American  power."  An  occa- 
sion for  the  practical  application  of  this  definition 
soon  arose.  On  December  n,  iqoi,  the  German 
ambassador  at  Washington,  in  a  promemoria  review- 
ing the  German  claims  against  Venezuela  and  the 
latter's  refusal  to  admit  diplomatic  interposition  in 
the  matter,  stated  that,  if  Venezuela  should  persist 
in  this  refusal,  the  German  government,  after  deliver- 
ing an  ultimatum,  would  have  to  consider  as  a  meas- 
ure of  coercion  the  blockade  of  the  more  important 
Venezuelan  ports  and,  if  this  did  not  suffice,  their 
"temporary  occupation"  and  the  "levying  of  du- 
ties" therein,  but  especially  declared  "that  under  no 
circumstances  do  we  consider  in  our  proceedings 
the  acquisition  or  the  permanent  occupation  of 
Venezuelan  territory."  In  acknowledging  the  re- 
ceipt of  this  memorandum,  on  December  16th,  Mr. 
Hay  adverted  to  the  fact  that  the  German  ambas- 
sador, on  his  then  recent  return  from  Berlin,  had 
conveyed  personally  to  the  President,  and  had  after- 
wards repeated  to  himself,  the  assurance  of  the 
German  Emperor  that  the  Imperial  government 
had  no  purpose  or  intention  to  make  even  the  smallest 
acquisition  of  territory  on  the  South  American  con- 
tinent or  the  adjacent  islands;  and  in  view  of  this 
circumstance,  and  of  the  further  assurance  given 
in  the  memorandum,  Mr.  Hay,  quoting  in  his  note 
President  Roosevelt's  definition  of  December  3d, 
replied  that  the  President,  "appreciating  the  courtesy 

252 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

of  the  German  government  in  making  him  ac- 
quainted" with  the  situation,  but  "not  regarding 
himself  as  called  upon  to  enter  into  the  consideration 
of  the  claims  in  question,"  believed  that  "no  meas- 
ures" would  be  taken  which  were  "not  in  accordance 
with  the  well-known  purpose"  of  the  German 
Emperor,  as  set  forth  in  the  promemoria. 

No  coercive  measures  were  taken  till  a  year  later, 
when  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and  Italy  instituted  a 
blockade  of  certain  Venezuelan  ports.  Prior  to  tak- 
ing this  step  Great  Britain,  on  November  13,  1902, 
also  gave  an  assurance  similar  to  that  of  Germany 
regarding  the  permanent  occupation  of  territory,  to 
which  Mr.  Hay  replied  that  the  government  of  the 
United  States,  although  it  "regretted  that  European 
powers  should  use  force  against  Central  and  South 
American  governments,  could  not  object  to  their 
taking  steps  to  obtain  redress  for  injuries  suffered  by 
their  subjects,  provided  that  no  acquisition  of  terri- 
tory was  contemplated." 

The  blockade,  which  was  instituted  only  in  De- 
cember, 1902,  ended  on  February  i4_I5>  JW.  after 
President  Castro  had  abandoned  his  previously  per- 
sistent refusal  to  arbitrate.  When  the  blockade  was 
begun  the  minister  of  the  United  States  at  Caracas, 
with  the  permission  of  his  government  and  the  assent 
of  Venezuela,  took  charge  of  British  and  of  German 
interests  in  that  country;  and  he  afterwards  as- 
sisted in  arranging  terms  of  arbitration.  It  was 
agreed  that  the  claims  of  all  the  foreign  governments 

253 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

against  Venezuela  should  be  referred  to  mixed  com- 
missions at  Caracas,  sitting  under  conventions 
severally  concluded  by  those  governments  with 
Venezuela;  and  that  a  demand  made  by  the  blockad- 
ing powers  for  the  preferential  payment,  in  point  of 
time,  of  awards  made  in  their  favor,  as  against 
awards  made  in  favor  of  the  non-blockading  powers, 
should  be  referred  to  the  Permanent  Court  at  The 
Hague.  The  Permanent  Court,  in  a  suit  to  which 
the  United  States  was  a  party,  sustained  this  de- 
mand; and,  in  setting  forth  the  grounds  of  its  de- 
cision, particularly  recited  the  fact  that  the  non- 
blockading  powers," including  the  United  States,  had 
never,  pending  the  employment  of  measures  of  co- 
ercion, protested  against  the  assertion  by  the  block- 
aders  of  a  right  to  special  securities.  It  also 
adverted  to  the  circumstance  that,  prior  to  the 
blockade,  the  Venezuelan  government  ' '  categorically 
refused  to  submit  its  dispute  with  Germany  and 
Great  Britain  to  arbitration,  which  was  proposed 
several  times,  and  especially  by  the  note  of  the 
German  government  of  July  16,  iqoi." 

Of  the  blockade  and  its  ending,  and  of  his  own  part 
in  the  transaction,  President  Roosevelt  gave,  in  a 
speech  at  Chicago,  April  2,  1903,  the  following 
narrative : 

The  concern  of  our  government  was  of  course  not 
to  interfere  needlessly  in  any  quarrel  so  far  as  it  did 
not  touch  our  interests  or  our  honor,  and  not  to  take 
the  attitude  of  protecting  from  coercion  any  power 

254 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

unless  we  were  willing  to  espouse  the  quarrel  of  that 
power,  but  to  keep  an  attitude  of  watchful  vigilance 
and  see  that  there  was  no  infringement  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine,  no  acquirement  of  territorial  rights  by  a 
European  power  at  the  expense  of  a  weak  sister 
republic — whether  this  acquisition  might  take  the 
shape  of  an  outright  and  avowed  seizure  of  territory 
or  of  the  exercise  of  control  which  would  in  effect  be 
equivalent  to  such  seizure.  .  .  .  Both  powers  as- 
sured us  in  explicit  terms  that  there  was  not  the 
slightest  intention  on  their  part  to  violate  the  prin- 
ciples of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  this  assurance  was 
kept  with  an  honorable  good  faith  which  merits  full 
acknowledgment  on  our  part.  At  the  same  time, 
the  existence  of  hostilities  in  a  region  so  near  our  own 
borders  was  fraught  with  such  possibilities  of  danger 
in  the  future  that  it  was  obviously  no  less  our  duty 
to  ourselves  than  our  duty  to  humanity  to  endeavor 
to  put  an  end  to  that.  Accordingly,  by  an  offer  of 
our  good  services  in  a  spirit  of  frank  friendliness  to  all 
the  parties  concerned,  a  spirit  in  which  they  quickly 
and  cordially  responded,  we  secured  a  resumption 
of  peace — the  contending  parties  agreeing  that  the 
matters  which  they  could  not  settle  among  them- 
selves should  be  referred  to  The  Hague  Tribunal 
for  settlement."  l 

In  popular  discussions  the  position  has  sometimes 
been  urged  that  it  is  a  violation  of  the  Monroe 

1  Addresses  and  Presidential  Messages  of  Tlieodore  Roosevelt,  1902- 
04,  pp.   1 17-120. 

255 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Doctrine  for  a  European  power  to  employ  force 
against  an  American  republic  for  the  purpose  of  col- 
lecting a  debt  or  satisfying  a  pecuniary  demand,  no 
matter  what  may  have  been  its  origin.  For  this  sup- 
position there  appears  to  be  no  published  official 
sanction.  It  is  true  that  a  certain  color  is  given  to 
it  by  the  citation  in  Wharton's  International  Law 
Digest,  under  the  head  of  the  "Monroe  Doctrine," 
of  two  alleged  manuscript  instructions  of  Mr.  Blaine 
to  the  American  minister  at  Paris,  of  July  23  and 
December  16,  1881,  as  authority  for  the  statement 
that  "the  government  of  the  United  States  would 
regard  with  grave  anxiety  an  attempt  on  the  part 
of  France  to  force  by  hostile  pressure  the  payment  by 
Venezuela  of  her  debt  to  French  citizens."  The 
statement,  however,  is  wholly  inadvertent.  Both 
instructions  are  published  in  the  volume  of  Foreign 
Relations  for  1881;  and  they  refer,  not  to  "hostile 
pressure,"  but  to  a  rumored  design  on  the  part  of 
France  of  "taking  forcible  possession  of  some  of  the 
harbors  and  a  portion  of  the  territory  of  Venezuela 
in  compensation  for  debts  due  to  citizens  of  the 
French  Republic."  Even  in  regard  to  this  they  no- 
where express  "grave  anxiety,"  but  merely  argue 
that  such  a  proceeding  would  be  unjust  to  other 
creditors,  including  the  United  States,  since  it  would 
deprive  them  of  a  part  of  their  security;  while  they 
avow  the  "solicitude"  of  the  government  of  the 
United  States  "for  the  higher  object  of  averting 
hostilities  between  two  republics  for  each  of  which 

256 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

it  feels  the  most  sincere  and  enduring  friendship." 
In  1 86 1  the  government  of  the  United  States  ad- 
mitted the  right  of  France,  Spain,  and  Great  Britain 
to  proceed  jointly  against  Mexico  for  the  satisfaction 
of  claims.  "France,"  said  Mr.  Seward  on  that  oc- 
casion, in  an  instruction  to  the  American  minister  at 
Paris,  of  June  26,  1862,  "has  a  right  to  make  war 
against  Mexico,  and  to  determine  for  herself  the 
cause.  We  have  the  right  and  interest  to  insist  that 
France  shall  not  improve  the  war  she  makes  to  raise 
up  an  anti-republican  or  an ti -American  government, 
or  to  maintain  such  a  government  there."  In  a 
similar  vein,  Mr.  Seward,  writing  to  the  American 
minister  in  Chile,  on  June  2,  1866,  with  reference  to 
the  hostilities  then  in  progress  between  Spain  and  the 
republics  on  the  west  coast  of  South  America,  and 
particularly  to  the  bombardment  of  Valparaiso  by 
the  Spanish  fleet,  declared  that  the  United  States  did 
not  intervene  in  wars  between  European  and  Amer- 
ican states  "if  they  are  not  pushed,  like  the  French 
war  in  Mexico,  to  the  political  point";  that  the 
United  States  had  "no  armies  for  the  purpose  of 
aggressive  war;  no  ambition  for  the  character  of  a 
regulator." 

The  supposition  is  further  discredited  by  the  course 
of  President  Roosevelt  and  Mr.  Hay  in  the  case  of 
the  Venezuelan  blockade.  In  addition  to  the  decla- 
rations and  acts  which  have  already  been  mentioned, 
it  is  important  to  recall  their  response  on  the  same 
occasion  to  the  note  of  the  Argentine  government  of 
17  257 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

December  29,  1902,  signed  by  Serior  Luis  M.  Drago, 
then  Minister  of  Foreign  Relations,  enunciating  the 
"doctrine"  that  "the  public  debt  cannot  give  rise 
to  armed  intervention  nor  even  the  actual  occupation 
of  the  territory  of  American  nations  by  a  European 
power."  Mr.  Hay,  on  February  17,  1903,  quoting 
President  Roosevelt's  definition  of  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine in  the  annual  message  of  December  3,  1901, 
and  an  analogous  passage  in  the  annual  message  of 
December  2,  1902,  declined  to  commit  the  United 
States  to  the  Drago  declaration.1 

A  tendency  is  often  exhibited  to  attach  decisive 
importance  to  particular  phrases  in  President  Mon- 
roe's message  of  1823,  or  to  the  special  circum- 
stances in  which  it  originated,  as  if  they  furnished 
a  definitive  test  of  what  should  be  done  and  what 
should  be  omitted  under  all  contingencies.  The 
verbal  literalist  would,  on  the  one  hand,  make  the 
United  States  an  involuntary  party  to  all  controver- 
sies between  European  and  American  governments, 
in  order  that  the  latter  may  not  be  "oppressed"; 
while  the  historical  literalist  would,  on  the  other 
hand,  treat  Monroe's  declarations  as  obsolete,  since 
the  conditions  to  which  they  specially  referred  no 
longer  exist.  But,  when  we  consider  the  muta- 
tions in  the  world's  affairs,  these  modes  of  reasoning 
must  be  confessed  to  be  highly  unsatisfactory.  The 
"Monroe  Doctrine"  has  in  reality  become  a  con- 
venient title  by  which  is  denoted  a  principle  that 

1  Foreign  Relations  of  the  United  Stales,  1903,  pp.  1-6. 
258 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

doubtless  would  have  been  wrought  out  if  the 
message  of  1823  had  never  been  written — the  prin- 
ciple of  the  limitation  of  European  power  and  in- 
fluence in  the  Western  Hemisphere.  We  have  seen, 
in  the  first  paper  in  this  series,  that,  as  early  as 
1778,  the  Continental  Congress,  in  the  treaty  of 
alliance  with  France,  obtained  from  its  ally  the  re- 
nunciation of  any  claim  to  the  British  possessions 
in  North  America.  When  Washington,  in  his  Fare- 
well Address,  observed  that  Europe  had  "a  set  of 
primary  interests,  which  to  us  have  none,  or  a  very 
remote  relation,"  he  lent  emphasis  tq  the  thought 
that  it  was  desirable,  so  far  as  possible,  to  dissociate 
America  from  the  vicissitudes  of  European  politics. 
Giving  to  this  thought  a  further  reach,  Jefferson, 
while  President,  in  1808,  declared:  "We  shall  be 
satisfied  to  see  Cuba  and  Mexico  remain  in  their 
present  dependence;  but  very  unwilling  to  see  them 
in  that  of  either  France  or  England,  politically  or 
commercially.  We  consider  their  interests  and 
ours  as  the  same,  and  the  object  of  both  must  be 
to  exclude  European  influence  from  this  hemi- 
sphere." On  January  15,  181 1,  twelve  years  before 
Monroe's  message  was  published,  Congress,  in  secret 
session,  "taking  into  view  the  peculiar  situation  of 
Spain  and  her  American  provinces,"  and  "the  in- 
fluence which  the  destiny  of  the  territory  adjoining 
the  southern  border  of  the  United  States  might  have 
upon  their  security,  tranquillity,  and  commerce," 
resolved  that  the  United  States  could  not,  "with- 

259 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

out  serious  inquietude,  see  any  part  of  said  terri- 
tory pass  into  the  hands  of  any  foreign  power"; 
and  the  President  was  authorized  to  occupy  all  or 
any  part  of  the  Floridas,  "in  the  event  of  an  at- 
tempt to  occupy  the  same,  or  any  part  thereof,  by 
any  foreign  government."  These  incidents  and 
avowals,  although  they  detract  nothing  from  the 
force  of  Monroe's  declarations,  with  which  they  are 
indeed  in  entire  harmony,  point  to  the  rational  con- 
clusion that  those  declarations  are  to  be  considered 
rather  as  an  important  expression  than  as  the  ex- 
clusive and  final  test  of  American  policy.  In  the 
long  struggle,  which  was  eventually  crowned  with 
success,  to  exclude  European  domination  from  the 
interoceanic  canal  routes,  and  to  secure  the  con- 
struction of  a  neutralized  canal  under  American 
auspices,  American  statesmen  no  doubt  were  aided 
by  the  authority  of  Monroe's  declarations,  but  were 
by  no  means  dependent  upon  them.  It  is  a  remark- 
able fact  that  Seward,  neither  in  the  formal  demand 
upon  France  in  1865  to  desist  from  armed  inter- 
vention in  Mexico  for  the  purpose  of  overthrowing 
the  domestic  republican  government  under  Juarez 
and  establishing  on  its  ruins  the  foreign  imperial 
government  under  Maximilian,  nor  in  any  of  the 
official  correspondence  relating  to  the  subject, 
mentioned  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  although  his 
action  came  within  the  letter  as  well  as  the  spirit 
of  the  message  of  1823.  President  Polk,  on  the 
other  hand,  in  pronouncing  against  the  acquisition 

260 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

of  new  dominion  in  North  America  by  a  Euro- 
pean power,  although  he  was  well  within  the  limits 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  as  it  is  now  understood, 
invoked  a  passage  that  fell  far  short  of  sustaining 
his  position.  It  would  be  easy  to  cite  many  similar 
examples. 

The  Monroe  Doctrine,  as  a  limitation  upon  the 
extension  of  European  power  and  influence  on  the 
American  continents,  is  now  generally  recognized 
as  a  principle  of  American  policy.  To  its  explicit 
acceptance  by  Great  Britain  and  Germany  there 
may  be  added  the  declaration  which  was  spread  by 
unanimous  consent  upon  the  minutes  of  The  Hague 
Conference,  and  which  was  permitted  to  be  annexed 
to  the  signature  of  the  American  delegates  to  the 
convention  for  the  peaceful  adjustment  of  inter- 
national disputes,  that  nothing  therein  contained 
should  be  so  construed  as  to  require  the  United 
States  "to  depart  from  its  traditional  policy  of  not 
entering  upon,  interfering  with,  or  entangling  itself 
in  the  political  questions  or  internal  administration 
of  any  foreign  state,"  or  to  relinquish  "its  traditional 
attitude  towards  purely  American  questions." 

An  important  development  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
was  made  by  President  Roosevelt  in  the  case  of 
Santo  Domingo.  In  a  letter  read  in  New  York, 
in  May,  1904,  at  a  dinner  held  to  celebrate  the 
anniversary  of  Cuban  independence,  he  said:  "Any 
country  whose  people  conduct  themselves  well  can 
count  upon  our  hearty  friendliness.     If  a  nation 

261 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY^ 

shows  that  it  knows  how  to  act  with  decency  in  in- 
dustrial and  political  matters;  if  it  keeps  order  and 
pays  its  obligations — then  it  need  fear  no  interference 
from  the  United  States.  Brutal  wrong-doing,  or 
impotence  which  results  in  the  general  loosening  of 
the  ties  of  civilized  society,  may  finally  require  in- 
tervention by  some  civilized  nation,  and  in  the 
Western  Hemisphere  the  United  States  cannot 
ignore  its  duty."  These  declarations  President 
Roosevelt  repeated,  with  only  slight  changes  in 
phraseology,  in  his  annual  message  to  Congress  in 
the  following  December.  On  February  15,  1905,  he 
transmitted  to  the  Senate,  for  its  advice  and  con- 
sent, a  treaty  concluded  at  Santo  Domingo  City 
on  the  7th  of  the  same  month,  under  which  the 
United  States  agreed  to  undertake  the  adjustment 
of  all  Dominican  debts,  foreign  and  domestic,  and 
to  that  end  to  take  charge  of  and  administer  the 
custom-houses.  In  the  message  accompanying  the 
treaty,  President  Roosevelt  stated  that  conditions 
in  Santo  Domingo  had  for  many  years  been  growing 
steadily  worse,  that  there  had  been  many  disturb- 
ances and  revolutions,  and  that  debts  had  been 
contracted  beyond  the  power  of  the  republic  to  pay. 
Those  who  profited  by  the  Monroe  Doctrine  must,  he 
affirmed,  accept  certain  responsibilities  along  with  the 
rights  which  it  conferred;  and  the  justification  for 
assuming  the  responsibility  proposed  in  the  present 
instance  was  to  be  found  in  the  fact  that  it  was  in- 
compatible with  international  equity  for  the  United 

262 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

States  to  refuse  to  allow  other  powers  to  take  the 
only  means  at  their  disposal  of  satisfying  the  claims 
of  their  citizens  and  yet  to  refuse  itself  to  take  any 
such  steps.  Under  the  Monroe  Doctrine  the  United 
States  could  not,  said  President  Roosevelt,  see  any 
European  power  "seize  and  permanently  occupy" 
the  territory  of  an  American  republic,  and  yet  such 
seizure  might  eventually  offer  the  only  way  in  which 
such  a  power  could  collect  any  debts,  unless  the 
United  States  should  interfere.  Under  such  cir- 
cumstances the  United  States  should  take  charge  of 
the  custom-houses.  In  the  course  of  his  message  he 
further  said:  "Either  we  must  abandon  our  duty 
under  our  traditional  policy  towards  the  Dominican 
people,  who  aspire  to  a  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment while  they  are  actually  drifting  into  a  condition 
of  permanent  anarchy,  in  which  case  we  must  permit 
some  other  government  to  adopt  its  own  measures  in 
order  to  safeguard  its  own  interests,  or  else  we  must 
ourselves  take  seasonable  and  appropriate  action." 
And  in  conclusion  he  avowed  the  belief  that  the  pro- 
posed treaty  afforded  a  "practical  test  of  the  ef- 
ficiency of  the  United  States  government  in  main- 
taining the  Monroe  Doctrine."  The  Senate  ad- 
journed without  taking  a  vote  on  the  treaty,  final 
action  on  which  was  thus  deferred.  Meanwhile, 
under  a  modus  vivendi  concluded  by  President  Roose- 
velt, an  American  citizen  designated  by  him  was 
placed  by  the  Dominican  government  in  charge 
of  the  collection  of  the  revenues,  a  certain  proportion 

263 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

of  which  was  to  be  deposited  in  a  bank  in  New  York, 
on  account  of  the  claims  of  creditors,  till  the  question 
of  ratification  of  the  treaty  should  be  definitely 
determined. 

Subsequently,  negotiations  were  taken  up  on  dif- 
ferent lines,  to  the  extent  of  endeavoring  to  bring 
about  a  prior  settlement  of  debts  between  Santo 
Domingo  and  her  creditors,  instead  of  leaving  them 
to  future  adjustment  by  the  United  States.  By  a 
protocol  between  the  United  States  and  the  Do- 
minican Republic  of  January  31,  1903,  the  latter  had 
already  agreed  to  pay  the  sum  of  $4,500,000,  on 
terms  to  be  fixed  by  arbitrators,  in  full  settlement 
of  the  claims  of  the  San  Domingo  Improvement 
Company  and  certain  other  American  companies 
allied  with  it,  including  indemnity  for  their  relin- 
quishment to  the  government  of  their  properties  and 
interests,  including  a  railway.  The  arbitrators,  on 
July  14,  1904,  with  the  concurrence  of  their  Domin- 
ican colleague,  unanimously  awarded  that  the  stipu- 
lated sum  should  be  paid  in  certain  monthly  instal- 
ments, and  assigned  as  security  the  revenues  of  the 
custom-houses  within  a  definite  district.  They  also 
authorized  the  appointment  of  a  financial  agent  by 
the  United  States  to  supervise  the  collection  of  such 
revenues,  the  San  Domingo  Improvement  Company 
having  previously  exercised  a  general  supervision 
over  the  customs  under  its  contracts  with  the 
Dominican  government. 

It   was  estimated   that   the   total   debts  of   the 

264 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

Dominican  Republic  amounted  nominally  to  more 
than  $30,000,000.  An  adjustment  was  in  the  end 
conditionally  effected  by  the  Dominican  government 
of  substantially  all  its  debts,  internal  as  well  as  for- 
eign; and  on  this  basis  there  was  concluded  on 
February  8,  1907,  a  new  treaty  by  which  the  govern- 
ment was  to  issue  new  bonds  to  the  amount  of 
$20,000,000,  payable  in  fifty  years,  if  not  sooner  re- 
deemed, and  bearing  interest  at  the  rate  of  five  per 
cent.  On  the  other  hand,  it  was  agreed  that  the 
President  of  the  United  States  should  appoint  a 
general  receiver  of  Dominican  customs  to  collect, 
with  the  aid  of  assistants  similarly  appointed,  all  the 
customs  duties  of  the  republic  till  all  the  bonds 
should  be  paid  or  retired,  the  United  States  engaging 
to  give  to  the  general  receiver  and  his  assistants  ' '  such 
protection"  as  it  might  "find  to  be  requisite  for  the 
performance  of  their  duties."  No  intervention  be- 
yond this  in  Dominican  affairs  was  provided  for. 

This  treaty  was  ratified  by  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States  and  by  the  Dominican  Congress,  and  the 
ratifications  were  exchanged  on  July  8,1907.  It  was 
duly  carried  into  effect. 

December  1,  1909,  Mr.  Knox,  as  Secretary  of 
State,  notified  Sefior  Rodriguez,  Nicaraguan  charge 
d'affaires  at  Washington,  that  the  United  States  had 
decided  no  longer  to  recognize  the  government  of 
President  Zelaya  in  Nicaragua,  and  that  Sefior 
Rodriguez's  functions  as  the  diplomatic  representa- 
tive of  that  government  were  at  an  end.     Passports 

265 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

were  enclosed  to  him,  in  case  he  should  wish  to  leave 
the  United  States ;  but  he  was  informed  that,  in  case 
he  should  remain  in  Washington,  he  would  be  re- 
ceived on  the  same  footing  as  the  representatives 
of  the  revolutionary  factions  in  control  of  the  eastern 
and  western  parts  of  the  country;  that  is  to  say,  as 
an  "unofficial  channel"  of  communication  with 
"de  facto  authorities,"  who,  pending  the  establish- 
ment in  Nicaragua  of  a  government  with  which  the 
United  States  could  maintain  diplomatic  relations, 
would  be  held  severally  accountable  for  the  protec- 
tion of  American  interests  in  the  districts  which  they 
respectively  occupied.  The  reasons  given  for  this 
step  were  (i)  that  President  Zelaya  had  repeatedly 
violated  the  Washington  conventions  of  1907,  which 
were  designed  to  preserve  the  neutrality  of  Honduras 
and  maintain  peace  in  Central  America,  and  had 
kept  Central  America  in  continuous  turmoil;  (2)  that 
he  had  practically  destroyed  republican  institutions 
and   free    and    orderly   government   in    Nicaragua; 

(3)  that  he  had  caused  two  American  citizens,  con- 
cerned in  a  revolutionary  movement,  to  be  executed 
with  "barbarous  cruelties,"  had  menaced  the  Amer- 
ican consulate  at  Managua,  and  had  by  "petty 
annoyances  and  indignities"  made  it  impossible 
for   the  American   minister  longer  to  reside  there; 

(4)  that  his  rule  had  produced  a  condition  of  an- 
archy in  which,  responsible  government  having 
ceased  to  exist,  the  United  States  was  obliged  to 
look  to   factions    in    dc  facto   control  of  particular 

266 


THE    MONROE    DOCTRINE 

districts  for  the  protection  of  American  life  and 
property. 

January  10,  191 1,  Mr.  Knox  signed  a  loan  conven- 
tion with  Honduras,  for  the  purpose  of  rehabilitating 
the  national  finances.  The  Senate  of  the  United 
States  failed  to  ratify  it.  A  similar  fate  awaited  a 
treaty  concluded  with  Nicaragua,  June  6,  191 1,  which 
contemplated  a  loan  by  American  bankers  and  fol- 
lowed the  lines  of  the  Dominican  receivership. 
These  efforts  were  popularly  assailed  as  "dollar  di- 
plomacy." The  aid  of  American  bankers  was  indeed 
to  a  certain  extent  actually  obtained.  In  August, 
1 91 2,  in  the  midst  of  disorders,  the  United  States,  on 
the  request  of  the  Nicaraguan  President,  landed 
marines,  explaining  that  it  did  so  for  the  defence  of  its 
legation  and  the  protection  of  American  life  and 
property,  but  declaring  that  the  conditions  that  had 
prevailed  under  President  Zelaya  could  not  be 
restored.  The  marines  had  several  encounters  with 
revolutionists,  and  a  detachment  remained  at  the 
capital. 

Subsequently  Mr.  Knox  made  a  tour  of  the  coun- 
tries of  Central  America,  as  well  as  of  Panama, 
Venezuela,  Haiti,  Santo  Domingo,  and  Cuba.  He 
sought  to  dispel  apprehensions  concerning  the  atti- 
tude of  the  United  States,  and  particularly  concern- 
ing the  application  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  which, 
in  a  speech  at  Panama,  he  said,  would  "reach  the 
acme  of  its  beneficence  when  it  is  regarded  by  the 
people  of  the  United  States  as  a  reason  why  we  should 

267 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

constantly  respond  to  the  needs  of  those  of  our 
Latin-American  neighbors  who  may  find  necessity  for 
our  assistance  in  their  progress  towards  better  gov- 
ernment or  who  may  seek  our  aid  to  meet  their  just 
obligations  and  thereby  to  maintain  honorable  rela- 
tions to  the  family  of  nations." 

In  his  opening  address  to  the  Second  Pan-American 
Scientific  Congress  on  December  27,  191 5,  Mr. 
Lansing,  as  Secretary  of  State,  observing  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  was  ' '  founded  on  the  principle  that 
the  safety  of  this  Republic  would  be  imperiled  by 
the  extension  of  sovereign  rights  by  a  European 
power  over  territory  in  this  hemisphere,"  said  that 
the  United  States  had  "within  recent  years  .  .  . 
found  no  occasion,  with  the  exception  of  the  Venezu- 
elan boundary  incident,  to  remind  Europe  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  continues  unaltered  a  national 
policy  of  this  Republic."  Meanwhile,  the  American 
republics  had  "attained  maturity";  and  from  the 
feeling  that  they  constituted  "a  group,  separate  and 
apart  from  the  other  nations  of  the  world"  and 
''united  by  common  ideals  and  common  aspirations," 
there  had  resulted  the  "international  policy  of  Pan- 
Americanism." 

Addressing  the  same  body  on  January  6,  191 6, 
President  Wilson,  while  declaring  that  the  United 
States  had  proclaimed  the  Monroe  Doctrine  "on  her 
own  authority,"  and  always  had  maintained  and 
always  would  maintain  it  "upon  her  own  respon- 
sibility,"  stated   that   it    "demanded   merely   that 

268 


THE  MONROE  DOCTRINE 

European  governments  should  not  attempt  to  extend 
their  political  system  to  this  side  of  the  Atlantic." 
But,  as  it  did  not  "disclose  the  use  which  the  United 
States  intended  to  make  of  her  power,"  there  had 
come  to  exist  among  the  States  of  America  an  un- 
certainty which  must  be  removed  by  establishing 
"the  foundations  of  amity  so  that  no  one  will  here- 
after doubt  them." 

References : 

As  to  the  Policy  of  Non-intervention,  see 

Trescot's  Diplomacy  of  the  Administrations  of  Washington  and 
Adams; 

Schuyler's  American  Diplomacy; 

Wharton's  Digest  of  International  Law,  I,  172  et  seq.; 

Moore's  Digest  of  International  Law,  VI,  11  et  seq.; 

Hodges,  The  Doctrine  of  Intervention. 
As  to  the  question  of  Recognition,  see 

Wharton's  and  Moore's  Digests,  supra,  and  Goebel's  Recog- 
nition Policy  of  the  United  Slates  (New  York,  1916). 
As  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  see 

Adams's  (John  Quincy)  Memoirs  (Diary); 

Moore's  Digest  of  International  Law,  VI,  369  el  seq-; 

Hart's  (Albert  Bushnell)  Monroe  Doctrine,  an  Interpretation; 

Johnson's  America's  Foreign  Relations; 

Reddaway's  Monroe  Doctrine; 

Rush's  Memoranda  of  a  Residence  at  the  Court  of  London, 
Second  Series  (1819-1825); 

Kraus's  (Herbert),  Die  Monroedoktrin  (Berlin,  1913); 

Petin's  Les  Etats-Unis  et  la  Doctrine  de  Monroe; 

Schouler's  History  of  the  United  States; 

Tucker's  Monroe  Doctrine; 

Woolsey's  America's  Foreign  Policy. 


VII 

THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

The  Declaration  of  Independence  enumerates  as 
among  the  "inalienable  rights"  with  which  "all 
men"  are  "endowed  by  their  Creator,"  "life,  liberty, 
and  the  pursuit  of  happiness."  It  has  often  been 
remarked  that  this  dogma,  like  the  associated  af- 
firmation that  "all  men  are  created  equal,"  was 
evidently  considered  as  an  abstraction,  since  its 
announcement  was  not  conceived  to  render  inad- 
missible the  continued  holding  in  bondage  of  a  large 
servile  population.  This  criticism,  however,  cannot, 
certainly  in  its  more  sinister  sense,  be  accepted  as 
just.  All  general  declarations  of  human  rights  to  a 
large  extent  represent  aspirations,  for  the  perfect  ful- 
filment of  which  conditions  altogether  ideal  would 
be  requisite.  So  long  as  human  conditions  are  im- 
perfect, the  realization  of  the  highest  human  aspi- 
rations will  be  imperfect.  Even  admitting,  there- 
fore, that  the  enumerated  rights  belonged  to  "all 
men"  and  were  "inalienable,"  there  yet  remained 
the  task  of  determining  what  they  actually  included 
m.l    what    were    their    practical    limitations.     No 

2/0 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

argument,  beyond  the  common  experience  of  daily 
life,  was  needed  to  demonstrate  that  the  unregu- 
lated pursuit  by  each  individual  of  his  own  will 
was  incompatible  with  the  existence  of  social  order ; 
and  it  was  therefore  freely  conceded,  even  by  the 
most  extreme  proponents  of  the  theory  of  natural 
rights,  that  men,  when  living  in  society,  must  be 
considered  as  having  yielded  up  a  part  of  those 
rights  for  the  sake  of  the  common  welfare.  But 
the  question  still  remained,  to  what  extent  had  this 
been  done  ? 

We  are  now  concerned  with  the  answer  to  this 
question  in  only  one  particular.  Does  the  right  to 
"liberty"  and  the  "pursuit  of  happiness,"  in  the 
sense  in  which  they  may  be  called  "inalienable," 
embrace,  incidentally,  a  right  on  the  part  of  the  in- 
dividual to  expatriate  himself  at  will?  This  was  a 
question  that  was  destined,  in  the  growth  and  de- 
velopment of  American  policy,  to  give  rise  to  im- 
portant international  controversies,  some  of  which 
yet  remain  unadjusted.  In  order  to  grasp  the 
meaning  of  these  controversies,  it  is  necessary  at 
the  outset  clearly  to  understand  just  what  was 
the  point  at  issue.  The  word  expatriation  is  often 
employed  to  denote  merely  the  giving  up  of  one's 
country,  and  more  particularly  one's  native  coun- 
try, by  a  permanent  change  of  abode;  but,  as 
used  in  diplomatic  discussions,  it  signifies  the 
change    both    of    home    and    of    allegiance,    and 

271 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

more  especially  of  allegiance.  By  the  laws  of  all 
civilized  countries,  provision  is  made  for  the  ad- 
mission of  aliens  to  citizenship.  The  process  by 
which  this  is  done  is  called  naturalization.  What 
is  the  effect  of  this  process?  Docs  it  confer  upon 
the  individual  a  new  political  character,  without 
divesting  him  of  that  which  he  previously  had, 
thus  exposing  him,  unless  his  original  sovereign  con- 
sent to  the  change,  to  the  conflicting  claims  of  a 
dual  allegiance  ?  or  does  it  of  its  own  force  not  only 
invest  him  with  a  new  allegiance,  but  also  free  him 
from  the  obligations  of  the  old?  By  the  laws  of 
the  United  States  the  alien  was  required,  at  the 
time  of  his  admission  to  citizenship,  to  forswear  all 
allegiance  to  his  former  sovereign  ;  and  no  inquiry 
was  made  as  to  whether  that  sovereign  had,  either 
by  general  or  by  specific  permission,  consented  to 
the  act.  It  might  therefore  be  inferred  that  they 
were  framed  upon  the  theory  that  the  individual 
possessed  an  absolute  and  unrestricted  right  to 
change  his  allegiance,  without  regard  to  the  claims 
which  his  country  of  origin  might  assert,  even  within 
its  own  jurisdiction.  This  would,  however,  be  a 
hasty  inference,  so  far,  at  any  rate,  as  the  omission 
to  inquire  concerning  the  claims  of  prior  allegiance 
is  concerned.  Other  countries  had  naturalization 
statutes,  by  which  no  such  inquiry  was  authorized; 
and  yet  those  countries  conceded  to  their  own  sub- 
jects the  right  of  expatriation  only  with  substantial 

272 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

qualifications  or  not  at  all.  While  they  granted 
naturalization,  they  did  not  claim  that  it  dissolved 
the  ties  of  prior  allegiance  and  made  its  recipient 
an  alien  to  his  native  country,  without  regard  to 
the  latter's  laws  on  the  subject.  And  we  shall  see 
that  a  long  time  elapsed  before  the  United  States 
advanced  to  the  full  assertion  of  this  position  in  its 
diplomatic  correspondence,  and  a  still  longer  time 
before  it  embodied  the  claim  in  its  legislation. 

Nor  is  this  surprising.  The  courts,  and  the  most 
authoritative  jurists,  repeatedly  expressed  the  opin- 
ion that  the  United  States  had  inherited,  as  part  of 
the  common  law,  the  English  doctrine  with  regard 
to  the  change  of  allegiance.  Chancellor  Kent,  re- 
viewing in  his  Commentaries  the  decisions  of  the 
American  courts,  said  that  "  the  better  opinion  would 
seem  to  be,  that  a  citizen  cannot  renounce  his  al- 
legiance to  the  United  States  without  the  permission 
of  government,  to  be  declared  by  law,"  and  that, 
as  there  was  "no  existing  legislative  regulation"  on 
the  subject,  "the  rule  of  the  English  common  law" 
remained  "unaltered."  Mr.  Justice  Story,  deliver- 
ing in  a  certain  case  the  judgment  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  laid  down  the  general  rule  that  individuals 
could  not,  "  by  any  act  of  their  own,  without  the 
consent  of  the  government,  put  off  their  allegiance 
and  become  aliens";  while,  in  his  work  on  the  Con- 
flict of  Laws,  he  declared  that  every  nation  had  "  an 
exclusive    right    to    regulate    persons    and    things 

18  273 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

within  its  own  territory,  according  to  its  own  sov- 
ereign will  and  public  policy."  To  this  general  cur- 
rent of  legal  authority  there  was  just  one  exception, 
and  that  was  a  decision  rendered  by  the  court  of 
appeals  of  Kentucky,  in  1839,  a  decision  in  which 
there  seemed  to  breathe  the  free  and  untrammelled 
spirit  of  the  West.  In  this  case  it  was  declared 
that  expatriation  might  be  "considered  a  practical 
and  fundamental  doctrine  of  America";  but  the 
qualification  was  immediately  added  that  "the  po- 
litical obligations  of  the  citizen,  and  the  interests 
of  the  Republic,"  might  "forbid  a  renunciation  of 
allegiance  by  his  mere  volition  or  declaration  at 
any  time,  and  under  all  circumstances,"  and  that 
for  this  reason  "the  government,  for  the  purpose 
of  preventing  abuse  and  securing  public  welfare," 
might  "regulate  the  mode  of  expatriation."  Even 
as  thus  qualified,  Chancellor  Kent  expressed  disap- 
proval of  the  decision,  and  maintained  not  only 
that  "the  weight  of  American  authority"  was  "in 
favor  of  the  opposite  doctrine,"  but  also  that  the 
opposite  doctrine  was  "  founded  .  .  .  upon  the  most 
safe  and  reliable  principles." 

In  the  earlier  diplomatic  correspondence  of  the 
United  States,  we  find  no  radical  dissent  from  the 
views  generally  expressed  by  the  courts.  It  is  true 
that  Jefferson,  as  Secretary  of  State,  in  a  letter  to 
Gouverneur  Morris,  minister  to  France,  of  August 
t6,    1793,   said  that  citizens  of  the   United   States 

«94 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

were  "certainly  free  to  divest  themselves  of  that 
character  by  emigration  and  other  acts  manifesting 
their  intention,"  and  might  "then  become  the  sub- 
jects of  another  power"  and  be  "free  to  do  what- 
ever the  subject  of  that  power  may  do";  but  this 
was  far  from  saying  that  other  countries  were 
obliged  to  act  upon  the  same  doctrine.  John  Mar- 
shall, as  Secretary  of  State,  a  few  years  later,  in  com- 
menting upon  the  effects  of  naturalization,  observed 
that  no  nation  had  a  right  to  question  its  validity, 
"unless  it  be  one  which  may  have  a  conflicting  title 
to  the  person  adopted." 

It  is  constantly  stated  that  the  United  States 
maintained  the  right  of  expatriation  in  its  con- 
troversies with  Great  Britain  concerning  the  im- 
pressment of  seamen.  This  is  true,  but  only  in  a 
very  limited  sense.  Taking  the  dispute  over  im- 
pressment as  a  whole,  it  did  not  involve  the  crucial 
point  of  the  later  controversies  as  to  expatriation. 
The  burden  of  the  complaint  in  regard  to  impress- 
ment, as  defined  in  Madison's  war  message  of  June 
i,  1812,  was  that  Great  Britain  sought,  under  cover 
of  belligerent  right,  to  execute  her  municipal  law  of 
allegiance  on  board  the  ships  of  other  countries  on 
the  high  seas,  where  no  laws  could  operate  "but  the 
law  of  nations,  and  the  laws  of  the  country  to  which 
the  vessels  belong."  Precisely  the  same  position 
was  maintained  by  Webster  in  his  correspondence 
with  Lord  Ashburton  in  1842.     Ships  on  the  high 

275 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

seas  are  treated,  for  purposes  of  jurisdiction,  as  if 
they  were  part  of  the  territory  of  the  nation  to 
which  they  belong.  The  complaint  that  the  Brit- 
ish government  enforced  the  English  law  of  alle- 
giance on  board  American  vessels  on  the  high  seas 
was  manifestly  a  different  thing  from  objecting  to 
her  enforcement  of  the  same  law  within  British 
jurisdiction. 

A  comprehensive  examination  of  our  unpublished 
diplomatic  records  enables  me  to  say  that  the  first 
Secretary  of  State  to  announce  the  doctrine  of  ex- 
patriation in  its  fullest  extent — the  doctrine  that 
naturalization  in  the  United  States  not  only  clothes 
the  individual  with  a  new  allegiance  but  also  ab- 
solves him  from  the  obligations  of  the  old — was 
James  Buchanan.  In  an  instruction  to  George 
Bancroft,  then  American  minister  in  London,  of 
December  18,  1848,  Buchanan,  referring  to  the  duty 
of  protecting  American  citizens,  naturalized  as  well 
as  native,  said :  "  We  can  recognize  no  difference  be- 
tween the  one  and  the  other,  nor  can  we  permit  this 
to  be  done  by  any  foreign  government,  without  pro- 
testing and  remonstrating  against  it  in  the  strongest 
terms.  The  subjects  of  other  countries  who  from 
choice  have  abandoned  their  native  land,  and,  ac- 
cepting the  invitation  which  our  laws  present,  have 
emigrated  to  the  United  States  and  become  Ameri- 
can citizens,  are  entitled  to  the  very  same  rights  and 
privileges  as  if  they  had  been  born  in  the  country. 

276 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

To  treat  them  in  a  different  manner  would  be  a 
violation  of  our  plighted  faith  as  well  as  our  solemn 
duty."  The  same  doctrine  was  asserted  by  Buchan- 
an, in  terms  equally  unequivocal,  on  prior  occasions. 
As  early  as  November  25,  1845,  he  informed  an  in- 
quirer that  the  fact  of  his  having  become  a  citizen 
of  the  United  States  by  naturalization  entitled  him 
"  to  the  same  protection  from  this  government  that 
a  native  citizen  would  receive." 

Buchanan's  innovation  was  not,  however,  ac- 
cepted by  any  of  his  successors  as  Secretary  of  State 
till  he  himself  became  President.  Webster,  as  Sec- 
retary of  State  under  Fillmore,  fully  adopted  the 
view  expressed  by  the  eminent  American  publicist, 
Wheaton,  when  minister  to  Prussia,  that  naturaliza- 
tion would  entitle  its  recipient  to  protection  every- 
where but  in  his  native  country.  Edward  Everett, 
Webster's  successor  under  Fillmore,  held  to  the 
same  opinion.  Nor  did  any  reversal  of  it  take  place 
when  Pierce  succeeded  Fillmore,  and  that  Democrat 
of  Democrats,  William  L.  Marcy,  became  Secretary 
of  State.  In  an  instruction  to  the  American  minis- 
ter to  Sardinia,  of  November  10,  1855,  Marcy,  while 
declaring  that  a  naturalized  citizen  of  the  United 
States  had  all  the  rights  of  a  native,  went  on  to  ob- 
serve that  the  vindication  of  those  rights  could  not 
require  or  authorize  "an  interference  in  his  behalf 
with  the  fair  application  to  him  of  the  municipal 
laws  of  his  native  country  when  he  voluntarily  sub- 

277 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

jects  himself  to  their  control  in  the  same  manner 
and  to  the  same  extent  as  they  would  apply  if  he 
had  never  left  that  country.  A  different  view  of 
the  duties  of  this  government  would,"  added  Marcy, 
"be  an  invasion  of  the  independence  of  nations, 
and  could  not  fail  to  be  productive  of  discord;  it 
might,  moreover,  prove  detrimental  to  the  interests 
of  the  States  of  this  Union." 

Views  similar  to  these  were  expressed  by  Caleb 
Cushing,  Attorney-General  under  Pierce,  in  1856,  in 
an  opinion  which  he  gave  upon  a  question  pro- 
pounded by  the  Bavarian  minister  at  Berlin  as  to 
the  law  in  the  United  States.  The  results  of  an  ex- 
amination of  judicial  decisions,  both  Federal  and 
State,  Cushing  summarized  thus:  "Expatriation  a 
general  right,  subject  to  regulation  of  time  and  cir- 
cumstances according  to  public  interests;  and  the 
requisite  consent  of  the  state  presumed  where  not 
negatived  by  standing  prohibitions."  Subject  to 
"the  conditions  thus  indicated,"  and  to  "such  oth- 
ers as  the  public  interest  might  seem  to  Congress  to 
require  to  be  imposed,"  he  thought  that  the  right 
of  expatriation  existed  and  might  be  freely  exer- 
cised by  citizens  of  the  United  States.  He  took 
occasion,  however,  to  observe  that  opinion  on  the 
subject  in  the  United  States  had  always  been  "a 
little  colored  ...  by  necessary  opposition  to  the 
assumption  of  Great  Britain  to  uphold  the  doctrine 
of  indefeasible  allegiance,  and  in  tenns  to  prohibit 

278 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

expatriation.  Hence,"  he  continued,  "we  have 
been  prone  to  regard  it  hastily  as  a  question  between 
kings  and  their  subjects.  It  is  not  so.  The  true 
question  is  of  the  relation  between  the  political  so- 
ciety and  its  members,  upon  whatever  hypothesis  of 
right  and  in  whatever  form  of  organization  that 
society  may  be  constituted.  The  assumption  of  a 
natural  right  of  emigration,  without  possible  re^ 
striction  in  law,  can  be  defended  only  by  maintain- 
ing that  each  individual  has  all  possible  rights 
against  the  society  and  the  society  none  with  re- 
spect to  the  individual;  that  there  is  no  social  or- 
ganization, but  a  mere  anarchy  of  elements,  each 
wholly  independent  of  the  other,  and  not  otherwise 
consociated  save  than  by  their  casual  coexistence  in 
the  same  territory." 

A  pronounced  change  in  the  tone  and  language 
of  the  government  was  now  impending,  and  for 
reasons  altogether  intelligible.  In  March,  1857, 
Buchanan  became  President,  and  conditions  were 
ripe  for  the  further  development  of  the  position 
which  he  had  taken  as  Secretary  of  State  ten  years 
before.  For  several  decades  after  the  formation  of 
the  government  of  the  United  States,  the  immigrant 
element  of  the  population  was  comparatively  un- 
important. It  is  estimated  that  the  whole  num- 
ber of  immigrants  from  1790  to  1820  was  only  about 
250,000.  During  the  twenties  it  continued  to  be 
small;  but  in  the  next  decade  it  grew  rapidly.     In 

279 


AMERICAN    DI  P  L  O  M  A  C  Y 

the  year  1842  the  number  reached  100,000.  In 
1846  there  began  the  movement  due  to  the  Irish 
famine;  and  this  movement,  combined  with  bad 
times  in  Germany,  produced  in  1854  the  enormous 
maximum  of  427,833,  which  was  not  again  reached 
till  after  the  Civil  War.  In  i860  the  foreign -born 
population  of  the  United  States  was  4,138,697.  In 
1870  it  was  5,567,229.  Immigrants  and  the  chil- 
dren of  immigrants  had  come  to  form  a  large  per- 
centage of  the  country's  citizenship.  Such  a  con- 
dition of  things  inevitably  produced  an  effect  on 
the  policy  of  the  United  States,  just  as  it  must 
have  done  on  the  policy  of  any  other  government 
founded  on  popular  suffrage.  The  foreign  -  born 
citizen  who  desired  to  revisit  the  country  of  his 
origin,  represented  an  interest  so  wide-spread  and 
so  powerful  that  its  wishes  could  not  be  disregarded, 
no  matter  what  the  courts  and  publicists,  or  even 
what  Secretaries  of  State,  had  said. 

As  the  largest  immigration  prior  to  1857  was  from 
Ireland  and  the  German  states,  controversies  as  to 
allegiance  most  frequently  arose  in  those  quarters. 
By  the  law  of  England,  a  British  subject  could  not 
put  off  his  natural  allegiance  except  by  act  of  Par- 
liament, and  of  such  an  act  there  was  no  record. 
The  law  in  Germany  was  more  liberal.  A  Prussian 
subject,  for  example,  might  lose  his  allegiance  in 
various  ways,  one  of  which  was  by  living  ten  years 
in  a  foreign  land.     But  this  did  not  suffice  to  pre- 

280 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

vent  a  collision,  since  the  laws  of  the  United  States 
required  for  naturalization  only  a  five  years'  resi- 
dence, and  sometimes  less;  and  since,  above  all,  in 
Prussia  as  well  as  in  other  European  states,  the  dis- 
charge from  allegiance  was  always  subject  to  the 
performance  of  military  duties,  whether  the  in- 
dividual had  at  the  time  of  his  emigration  reached 
the  age  of  actual  service  or  not. 

In  1859  the  issue  was  broadly  made.  In  Feb- 
ruary of  that  year  a  native  of  Hanover,  named 
Christian  Ernst,  who  had  emigrated  to  the  United 
States  eight  years  before,  at  the  age  of  nineteen,  was 
admitted  to  citizenship ;  and  in  the  following  month 
he  procured  a  passport  and  returned  to  Hanover 
on  a  visit.  On  arriving  in  his  native  village  he  was 
arrested  and  forced  into  the  army.  President  Bu- 
chanan gave  to  the  case  his  immediate  personal 
attention,  and  submitted  it  to  Judge  Jeremiah  S. 
Black,  his  Attorney-General,  for  an  opinion.  Judge 
Black's  opinion  bore  the  significant  date  of  the  4th  of 
July.  He  advised  that  it  was  the  "natural  right  of 
every  free  person,  who  owes  no  debts  and  is  not  guilty 
of  crime,  to  leave  the  country  of  his  birth  in  good 
faith  and  for  an  honest  purpose,"  and  to  throw  off 
his  natural  allegiance  and  substitute  another  for  it ; 
that,  although  the  common  law  of  England  denied 
this  right,  and  "  some  of  our  own  courts,  misled  by 
British  authority,  have  expressed,  though  not  very 
decisively,  the  same  opinion,"  this  was  not  to  be 

281 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

taken  as  settling  the  question  ;  that  "  natural  reason 
and  justice,  writers  of  known  wisdom,"  and  "the 
practice  of  civilized  nations"  were  "all  opposed  to 
the  doctrine  of  perpetual  allegiance,"  and  that  the 
United  States  was  pledged  to  the  right  of  expatria- 
tion and  could  not  without  perfidy  repudiate  it; 
that  expatriation  "includes  not  only  emigration  out 
of  one's  native  country,  but  naturalization  in  the 
country  adopted  as  a  future  residence";  that  "nat- 
uralization does  ipso  facto  place  the  native  and  the 
adopted  citizen  in  precisely  the  same  relations  with 
the  government  under  which  they  live,  except  in  so 
far  as  the  express  and  positive  law  of  the  country  has 
made  a  distinction  in  favor  of  one  or  the  other  "  ;  that 
there  was  no  law  in  the  United  States  that  made  any 
difference  between  native  and  naturalized  citizens 
with  regard  to  protection  abroad;  that  the  opinion 
held  by  "persons  of  very  high  reputation,"  that  a 
naturalized  citizen  ought  to  be  protected  every- 
where except  in  the  country  of  his  birth,  had  "no 
foundation  to  rest  upon  .  .  .  except  the  dogma  which 
denies  altogether  the  right  of  expatriation  without 
the  consent  of  his  native  country";  that,  even  as- 
suming that  Hanover  had  a  municipal  regulation 
by  which  the  right  of  expatriation  was  denied  to 
those  of  her  subjects  who  failed  to  comply  with  cer- 
tain conditions,  and  that  this  regulation  was  violated 
by  Ernst  when  he  came  away,  the  unlawfulness  of 
his  emigration  would  not  make  his  naturalization 

282 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

void  as  against  the  King  of  Hanover;  that,  if  the 
laws  of  the  two  countries  were  in  conflict,  the  law  of 
nations  must  decide  the  question  upon  principles 
and  rules  of  its  own;  and  that,  "by  the  public  law 
of  the  world  we  have  the  undoubted  right  to  natural- 
ize a  foreigner,  whether  his  natural  sovereign  con- 
sented to  his  emigration  or  not";  and,  finally,  that 
the  government  of  Hanover  could  justify  Ernst's 
arrest  only  by  proving  that  the  original  right  of 
expatriation  depended  upon  the  consent  of  the 
natural  sovereign — a  proposition  which,  said  Judge 
Black,  "I  am  sure  no  man  can  establish." 

On  July  8,  1859,  the  views  of  the  President  in 
relation  to  the  case  of  Christian  Ernst  and  analogous 
cases  were  communicated  to  Mr.  Wright,  American 
minister  at  Berlin,  in  a  paper  that  at  once  acquired 
great  celebrity.  In  this  paper  the  views  announced 
by  Judge  Black,  which  in  reality  were  but  a  reitera- 
tion of  those  held  by  Buchanan  as  Secretary  of  State, 
were  fully  adopted.  What  right,  it  was  asked,  did 
the  laws  of  the  United  States  confer  upon  a  foreigner 
by  granting  him  naturalization?  The  answer  was, 
all  the  rights,  privileges,  and  immunities  which  be- 
longed to  a  native  citizen,  except  that  of  eligibility 
to  the  office  of  President.  "With  this  exception," 
it  was  affirmed,  "the  naturalized  citizen,  from  and 
after  the  date  of  his  naturalization,  both  at  home 
and  abroad,  is  placed  upon  the  very  same  footing 
with  the  native  citizen.     He  is  neither  in  a  better 

283 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

nor  a  worse  condition  .  .  .  The  moment  a  foreigner 
becomes  naturalized,  his  allegiance  to  his  native 
country  is  severed  forever.  He  experiences  a  new 
political  birth.  A  broad  and  impassable  line  sep- 
arates him  from  his  native  country.  He  is  no  more 
responsible  for  anything  he  may  say  or  do,  or  omit 
to  say  or  do,  after  assuming  his  new  character  than 
if  he  had  been  born  in  the  United  States.  Should 
he  return  to  his  native  country,  he  returns  as  an 
American  citizen,  and  in  no  other  character.  In 
order  to  entitle  his  original  government  to  punish 
him  for  an  offence,  this  must  have  been  committed 
while  he  was  a  subject  and  owed  allegiance  to  that 
government."  This  instruction  was  signed  by  Mr. 
Cass,  but  in  its  citations  of  the  law  of  Pennsylvania, 
as  well  as  in  its  sentiments  and  style,  it  bears  Presi- 
dential ear-marks.  On  August  20,  1859,  the  Han- 
overian government  stated  that  a  "  full  pardon"  had 
been  granted  to  Ernst,  and  that  he  had  been  "dis- 
missed" from  the  military  service,  but  added  that 
similar  conflicts  could  be  prevented  in  the  future 
only  by  the  United  States  "  renouncing  its  own  viewa 
on  the  subject,  which  did  not  agree  with  inter- 
national relations,"  or  by  concluding  a  special  ar- 
rangement. President  Buchanan,  however,  in  his 
annual  message  of  December  3,  i860,  declared: 
"  Our  government  is  bound  to  protect  the  rights  of 
our  naturalized  citizens  everywhere  to  the  same  ex- 
tent as  though  they  had  drawn  their  first  breath  in 

284 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

this  country.  We  recognize  no  distinction  between 
our  native  and  naturalized  citizens." 

The  instruction  to  Mr.  Wright  was  printed  and 
issued  by  the  Department  of  State  in  circular  form, 
for  the  purpose  of  denning  the  position  which  the 
United  States  would  in  future  maintain.  It  was 
so  used  by  Seward,  as  Secretary  of  State,  after  Lin- 
coln had  succeeded  Buchanan  as  President.  But, 
as  the  Civil  War  grew  more  serious  and  the  United 
States  was  forced  to  adopt  a  policy  of  conscription, 
Seward  permitted  the  controversy  to  rest.  Writing 
to  Motley,  who  was  then  minister  to  Austria,  on 
April  21,  1863,  he  adverted  to  the  perplexities  in 
which  the  United  States  had  become  involved  by 
refusing,  on  the  one  hand,  to  exempt  from  its  mili- 
tary service  persons  whom  foreign  powers  claimed 
the  right  to  protect,  while  demanding,  on  the  other, 
the  exemption  of  a  like  class  from  military  service 
in  the  country  of  their  origin  on  the  ground  of  their 
having  become  citizens  of  the  United  States.  The 
President  had,  he  said,  decided  that  it  was  not  ex- 
pedient in  the  crisis  then  existing  to  urge  questions 
of  the  latter  sort  beyond  the  limits  of  an  appeal  to 
the  good -will  and  friendly  disposition  of  foreign 
powers.  It  was,  besides,  deemed  necessary  to  dis- 
courage rather  than  encourage  the  return  of  natural- 
ized foreigners  to  their  native  country,  as  well  as 
the  emigration  of  American  citizens  to  Europe. 

But,  soon  after  the  close  of  the  war,  Seward  was 
285 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

somewhat  violently  torn  away  from  this  position 
by  the  outbreak,  in  1866,  of  the  Fenian  agitation, 
and  the  arrest  in  British  jurisdiction  of  naturalized 
American  citizens,  natives  of  Ireland,  for  acts  done 
in  furtherance  of  that  movement.  Among  the 
numerous  cases  of  this  kind,  the  most  notable  one, 
historically,  was  that  of  Warren  and  Costello,  who 
were  members  of  the  discordant  and  ill-starred  ex- 
pedition on  the  brigantine  Jacmel  to  the  coast  of 
Ireland,  and  who  were  afterwards  tried  and  con- 
victed  at  Dublin  on  a  charge  of  treason-felony.  At 
that  time  an  alien  charged  with  crime  in  British 
jurisdiction  was  by  law  entitled  to  be  tried  by  what 
was  technically  called  a  jury  de  medietate  Ungues— 
a  jury  composed  half  of  British  subjects  and  half  of 
foreigners.  Warren  and  Costello  applied  for  such 
a  jury,  on  the  ground  that  they  were  American  citi- 
zens. Had  they  been  native  citizens  of  the  United 
States,  their  request  would  have  been  granted,  but, 
as  they  were  British  subjects  by  birth,  it  was  re- 
fused, the  court  citing  Blackstone,  Kent,  and  Story 
to  show  that  their  original  allegiance  still  survived. 
The  trial  and  conviction  of  Warren  and  Costello, 
as  well  as  of  other  prisoners,  under  these  circum- 
stances produced  an  excitement  that,  to  borrow 
Seward's  picturesque  phrase,  extended  "through- 
out the  whole  country,  from  Portland  to  San  Fran- 
cisco and  from  St.  Paul  to  Pensacola."  Public 
meetings  attended  by  immense  crowds  were  held  in 

286 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

many  cities,  and  resolutions  were  adopted  calling 
upon  the  government  for  vigorous  measures.  In  this 
agitation  the  leading  spirit  was  William  E.  Robin- 
son, then  a  member  of  Congress  from  Brooklyn, 
popularly  known  as  "Richelieu"  Robinson,  "Riche- 
lieu" being  the  name  under  which  he  practised 
journalism.  Robinson  was  a  native  of  Ireland  and 
an  advocate  of  her  independence,  or,  as  he  once 
declared  in  Congress,  of  her  purchase  and  annexa- 
tion by  the  United  States.  When  in  the  latter  part 
of  1867  Congress  assembled,  he  at  once  brought  up 
the  subject  of  the  Irish-American  prisoners.  He 
offered  resolutions  of  inquiry  looking  to  the  im- 
peachment of  the  American  minister  at  London, 
and  of  the  American  consul  at  Dublin,  for  neglect 
of  duty;  and  declared  that  unless  every  American 
citizen  then  confined  in  a  British  jail,  against  whom 
a  charge  of  crime  had  not  already  been  filed,  should 
not  on  demand  be  instantly  released,  the  American 
minister  should  "  come  home  and  breathe  his  native 
air,  and  be  prepared  to  stand  up  like  a  man,  and  not 
be  trembling  all  over  like  a  jelly."  As  the  minister 
thus  described  was  no  other  than  Charles  Francis 
Adams,  who,  in  the  dark  hours  of  the  great  Ameri- 
can conflict,  could  quietly  say  to  Earl  Russell,  with 
reference  to  the  apprehended  escape  of  "Lairds' 
Ironclads,"  "It  would  be  superfluous  in  me  to 
point  out  to  your  lordship  that  this  is  war,"  it  is 
obvious  that  Mr.  Robinson  was  a  man  of  fancy, 

287 


A  M  E  R  I  C A  N    DIPLOMACY 

though  tastes  will  necessarily  differ  as  to  the  quality 
of  his  wit.  On  a  subsequent  occasion  he  proposed 
a  resolution,  which  was  at  once  voted  by  the  House 
of  Representatives,  requesting  the  President  to  ob- 
tain the  release  of  Warren  and  Costello  and  "  their 
return  to  our  flag,  with  such  ceremonies  as  are  ap- 
propriate to  the  occasion."  Warren  and  Costello 
were  eventually  released,  but  without  special  cere- 
monial incidents. 

Meanwhile,  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs, 
spurred  on  by  ninety-six  resolutions  and  memorials 
that  had  been  adopted  at  public  meetings  in  differ- 
ent sections  of  the  country,  all  demanding  that 
action  be  taken  to  secure  to  citizens  of  the  United 
States  protection  abroad,  had  been  wrestling  with 
various  proposals  designed  to  accomplish  that  end; 
and  on  January  27,  1868,  the  chairman,  General 
Banks,  brought  in  a  bill,  accompanied  by  an  elabo- 
rate report.  The  report  was  both  able  and  tem- 
perate. It  pertinently  declared  that  the  claim  of 
"indefeasible  allegiance  and  perpetual  service"  was 
the  symbol  of  "feudalism  and  force,"  but  it  also 
affirmed  that  "the  law  of  allegiance  and  of  service" 
was  "as  essential  to  a  republic  at  it  is  to  a  mon- 
archy," and  that  the  "extinction  of  the  mutual  ob- 
ligations between  a  government  and  its  subject" 
should  depend  upon  "the  express  or  implied  con- 
sent of  both  parties,"  under  proper  regulations. 
The  bill  was  less  carefully  reasoned,  and,  alter  some 

288 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

discussion,  was  recommitted.  It  was  reported 
again,  in  a  form  much  altered,  on  March  ioth.  In 
its  new  form  it  declared  that  the  "right  of  ex- 
patriation" was  "a  natural  and  inherent  right  of 
all  people,  indispensable  to  the  enjoyment  of  the 
rights  of  life,  liberty,  and  the  pursuit  of  happiness," 
and  that  "any  declaration,  instruction,  opinion, 
order,  or  decision,"  of  any  officer  of  the  govern- 
ment, which  denied,  restricted,  impaired,  or  ques- 
tioned that  right,  was  "  inconsistent  with  the  funda- 
mental principles"  of  the  government.  It  further 
provided  that  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United 
States  should  while  abroad  receive  the  same  pro- 
tection as  native  citizens  in  like  circumstances ;  and 
empowered  the  President,  whenever  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States  should  be  arrested  and  detained  by 
a  foreign  government  upon  the  allegation  that 
naturalization  in  the  United  States  did  not  operate 
to  dissolve  his  original  allegiance,  to  retaliate  by 
arresting  and  detaining  any  subject  of  that  govern- 
ment found  within  the  national  jurisdiction. 

The  bill,  after  discussion  and  amendment,  passed 
the  House  on  April  20,  1868,  by  a  vote  of  104  to  4, 
81  members  not  voting.  In  the  Senate  it  was  re- 
ferred to  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations,  from 
which  it  was  reported  by  the  chairman,  Mr.  Sumner, 
on  June  23d,  with  two  amendments,  one  of  which 
struck  out  the  provision  for  reprisals  and  made  it 
the  duty  of  the  President,  in  cases  of  improper  ar- 
*9  289 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

rest  and  detention,  merely  to  report  the  facts  to 
Congress.  In  the  debate  that  ensued,  Mr.  Williams, 
of  Oregon,  moved  to  substitute  for  this  amendment 
a  clause  making  it  the  duty  of  the  President,  before 
reporting  the  facts  to  Congress,  to  use  all  means, 
not  amounting  to  acts  of  war,  to  obtain  the  pris- 
oner's release.  This  amendmen:  was  eventually 
adopted.  The  bill,  as  amended,  passed  the  Senate 
On  July  25,  1868,  by  a  vote  of  39  to  5,  20  Senators 
not  voting.  On  the  same  day  the  amendments  of 
the  Senate  were  concurred  in  by  the  House,  and  on 
July  27th  the  bill,  with  the  approval  of  the  Presi- 
dent, became  a  law. 

An  examination  of  the  debates  shows  that  the 
passage  of  the  bill  was  greatly  facilitated  by  two 
circumstances,  which  were  repeatedly  mentioned. 
One  was  that,  while  the  bill  was  pending,  both  the 
great  political  parties  held  their  national  conven- 
tions and  adopted  declarations  in  favor  of  the  equal 
protection  of  all  citizens,  both  native  and  natural- 
ized, at  all  times  and  in  all  places.  The  other  was 
that  George  Bancroft  had,  with  the  kindly  and 
powerful  co  -  operation  of  Bismarck,  concluded  on 
February  22,  1868,  with  the  North  German  Union 
his  epoch-making  naturalization  treaty,  which  was 
soon  followed  by  similar  treaties  with  Baden  and 
Bavaria,  and  by  the  promise  or  well-founded  ex- 
pectation of  treaties  with  yet  other  powers,  includ- 
ing   Great    Britain.     Indeed,    the    principles    of    a 

290 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

naturalization  treaty  with  Great  Britain  were  set- 
tled in  a  protocol  signed  in  London  as  early  as 
October  9,  1868,  though  they  were  not  embodied 
in  a  formal  convention  till  May  13,  1870,  when  Par- 
liament had  by  an  act  of  the  preceding  day  adopted 
the  necessary  legislation.  Before  the  close  of  1872, 
naturalization  treaties  were  made  with  Hesse  (1868), 
Belgium  (1868),  Sweden  and  Norway  (1869),  Aus- 
tria-Hungary (1870),  Ecuador  (1872),  and  Den- 
mark (1872).  Of  all  these  treaties,  however,  that 
with  Great  Britain  is  the  most  liberal,  since  it  recog- 
nizes the  fullest  possible  effects  of  naturalization, 
whether  American  or  British,  whenever  acquired, 
while  all  the  rest  make  a  five  years'  residence  in  the 
country  of  adoption  a  necessary  condition  of  ex- 
patriation, even  though  naturalization  should,  as 
in  some  cases  it  may,  be  sooner  obtained.  The 
treaty  with  Great  Britain  is  therefore  the  only  one 
that  meets  the  full  exactions  of  the  act  of  July  27, 
1868;  but  they  were  all  promptly  ratified. 

Since  1872  the  government  of  the  United  States 
has  earnestly  and  constantly  striven  to  secure 
naturalization  treaties  with  other  powers,  but  its 
efforts  have  been  rewarded  only  in  the  single  and 
unimportant  case  of  Hayti.  For  this  failure  there 
are  several  reasons,  first  among  which  we  may  men- 
tion the  controversies  that  have  arisen  under  the 
existing  treaties,  in  consequence  of  the  return  to 
their  native  country,  immediately  after  their  nat- 

291 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

uralization  in  the  United  States,  of  young  men  who 
emigrated  just  before  arriving  at  the  age  when  they 
were  subject  to  military  duty.     While  the  number 
of  such  persons  from  year  to  year  has  been  com- 
paratively small,  yet  it  has,  as  the  volumes  of  dip- 
lomatic   correspondence   amply   testify,  been   large 
enough  to  produce  incalculable  mischief.     This  un- 
fortunate complication,  which  has  in  some  instances 
put  in  jeopardy  subsisting  arrangements,  has  nat- 
urally served  as  an  obstacle  to  the  formation  of  new 
ones.     Besides,  the  increasing  pressure  of  the  mili- 
tary system   in   Europe  has  made  the  non-treaty 
powers  more  and  more  reluctant  to  recognize  the 
expatriation  of  any  citizen  or  subject  who  has  not 
performed  the  entire  military  service  which  the  law 
prescribes.     This   tendency   is   clearly   seen   in   the 
case  of  France,  who,  abandoning  a  less  stringent  rule 
formerly  applied,   now  enforces   her  military   laws 
upon  Frenchmen  naturalized  abroad  who  were  at 
the  time  of  their  naturalization  subject  to  military 
service  in  the  active  army  or  in  the  reserve  of  that 
army.     By  the  Italian  cjvil  code  of  1866,  citizenship 
of  that  country  is  lost  by  naturalization  abroad,  but 
it  is  expressly  declared  by  the  same  code  that  this 
does  not  carry  with  it  exemption  from  the  obligation 
of  military  service  or  from  the  penalties  inflicted  on 
those  who  bear  arms  against  their  native  country. 
Other  countries,   including  Switzerland,   have  laws 
of  similar  purport;  but  the  Swiss  laws  contain  a 

292 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

provision  under  which  a  native  of  that  country  may, 
if  he  sees  fit  to  do  so,  renounce  his  natural  allegiance. 
The  most  difficult  case,  however,  to  deal  with  is  that 
of  Russia,  by  whose  laws  any  native  of  that  country 
who  enters  a  foreign  service  without  the  permission 
of  his  government,  or  takes  the  oath  of  allegiance 
to  a  foreign  power,  is  exposed  to  the  loss  of  all  civil 
rights  and  perpetual  banishment  from  the  empire, 
or,  in  case  of  his  unauthorized  return  to  Russia,  to 
deportation  to  Siberia.  In  addition  to  this,  he  is 
required  to  perform  his  term  of  military  service. 
Turkey,  prior  to  1869,  recognized  the  right  of  ex- 
patriation, but  has  since  refused  to  do  so.  Referring 
to  the  situation  thus  created,  President  McKinley, 
in  his  annual  message  of  December  5,  1899,  said: 
"  Our  statutes  do  not  allow  this  government  to  admit 
any  distinction  between  the  treatment  of  native  and 
naturalized  Americans  abroad,  so  that  ceaseless  con- 
troversy arises  in  cases  where  persons,  owing  in  the 
eye  of  international  law  a  dual  allegiance,  are  pre- 
vented from  entering  Turkey  or  are  expelled  after 
entrance.  Our  law  in  this  regard  contrasts  with 
that  of  the  European  states.  The  British  act,  for 
instance,  does  not  claim  effect  for  the  naturalization 
of  an  alien  in  the  event  of  his  return  to  his  native 
country,  unless  the  change  be  recognized  by  the  law 
of  that  country  or  stipulated  by  treaty  between  it 
and  the  naturalizing  state."  It  may  be  doubted 
whether  this  statement,  so  far  as  it  relates  to  a 

293 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

"dual  allegiance,"  was  made  with  full  appreciation 
of  its  significance ;  for  if  it  be  admitted  that  an  alien 
naturalized  in  the  United  States,  as  a  result  owes, 
under  international  law,  a  dual  allegiance,  it  neces- 
sarily follows  that  the  doctrine  of  voluntary  ex- 
patriation has  no  foundation  in  international  law. 
No  one  has  ever  contended  that  the  naturalization 
of  an  alien  is  ineffective  in  the  country  in  which  it  is 
granted.  The  only  question  that  has  existed  is  as  to 
its  effect  in  other  countries,  and  especially  in  the 
country  of  origin.  The  doctrine  embodied  in  the 
act  of  1868  is  that  naturalization  invests  the  in- 
dividual with  a  new  and  single  allegiance,  and  by 
consequence  absolves  him  from  the  obligations  of  the 
old.  The  position  of  governments  and  of  publicists 
who  deny  the  American  contention  is  that  naturaliza- 
tion merely  adds  a  new  allegiance  to  the  old,  so  that 
the  individual  becomes  subject  to  a  dual  allegiance, 
and  may  be  held  to  all  the  obligations  of  his  original 
citizenship  if  he  returns  to  his  native  country.  The 
doctrine  of  dual  allegiance  is,  in  a  word,  the  precise 
test  the  acceptance  of  which  distinguishes  those  who 
reject  the  doctrine  of  voluntary  expatriation  from 
those  who  support  it. 

But,  quite  apart  from  conditions  existing  in  other 
countries,  it  would  be  uncandid  not  to  admit  that  the 
failure  of  the  United  States  since  1872  to  extend 
the  operation  of  the  doctrine  of  expatriation  may 
in  a  measure  be  ascribed  to  certain  acts  that  have 

29-1 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

seemed  to  discredit  the  declarations  made  in  the  act 
of  1868.  By  the  naturalization  laws  of  the  United 
States  prior  to  1870,  admission  to  citizenship 
was  restricted  to  "free  white"  persons.  By  the 
act  of  July  14,  1870,  Congress,  after  the  adoption  of 
the  Thirteenth  and  Fourteenth  Amendments  to  the 
Constitution,  changed  the  laws  so  as  to  embrace 
persons  of  "African"  nativity  or  descent.  While 
this  act  was  under  discussion  in  Congress,  Senator 
Sumner  made  repeated  efforts  to  strike  from  the 
laws  the  word  "white,"  but  in  this  he  was  unsuc- 
cessful. In  the  preparation  of  the  Revised  Statutes 
of  the  United  States,  the  word  "  white  "  was  omitted, 
but  by  the  act  of  February  18,  1875,  Congress  cor- 
rected this  omission  by  expressly  restricting  the 
right  of  naturalization  to  "white"  persons  and  to 
persons  of  "African"  nativity  or  descent.  This 
legislation,  under  which  Chinese,  Japanese,  and  per- 
sons of  various  other  races,  being  neither  "white" 
nor  "African,"  have  been  held  to  be  incapable  of 
naturalization  in  the  United  States,  necessarily  im- 
paired the  moral  if  not  the  legal  authority  of  the 
act  of  1868.  The  act  of  1868  declared  expatriation 
to  be  "a  natural  and  inherent  right  of  all  people," 
and  the  right  of  expatriation,  as  correctly  held  by 
Judge  Black,  includes  both  emigration  and  natural- 
ization. It  is  obvious  therefore  that  the  right  of 
expatriation  is  only  imperfectly  recognized  where 
people,  not  individually  because  of  misconduct,  but 

29s 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

in  the  mass  because  of  their  race,  are  excluded  from 
naturalization.  Some  of  the  very  words  of  the  act 
of  July  27,  1868,  declaratory  of  the  right  of  expatria- 
tion, were  embodied  on  the  following  day  in  the 
treaty  with  China,  commonly  called  the  Burlingame 
treaty. 

By  the  act  of  Congress  of  June  29,  1906,  which  has 
been  only  slightly  amended  by  subsequent  legisla- 
tion, important  changes  were  made  in  the  laws  relat- 
ing to  naturalization  in  the  United  States.  The 
process  was  made  far  more  stringent  than  it  had 
been.  As  the  result  of  the  provision  that,  while 
the  petition  for  admission  to  citizenship  must  be  ac- 
companied with  proof  that  the  applicant  has  resided 
in  the  United  States  at  least  five  years,  final  action 
on  it  cannot  be  taken  till  at  least  ninety  days  after 
it  is  filed  and  publicly  posted,  the  normal  period  of 
residence  was  in  effect  extended  from  five  years  to 
five  years  and  three  months.  Nor  may  a  certificate 
of  naturalization  be  issued  within  thirty  days  pre- 
ceding the  holding  of  a  general  election.  The  candi- 
date must  file  his  petition  not  more  than  seven  years 
after  making  his  declaration  of  intention,  which 
otherwise  ceases  to  be  effective.  The  petition  must 
also  be  signed  by  him  in  his  own  handwriting,  and  the 
hearing  upon  it  must  be  held  in  open  court  before  the 
judge  or  judges.  The  applicant,  except  in  certain 
specified  cases,  must  be  able  to  speak  the  English 
language.  Polygamists  or  believers  in  the  practice 
of  polygamy  are  excluded  from  admission  to  citizen- 

296 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  EXPATRIATION 

ship.  So  also  are  persons  disbelieving  in  or  opposed 
to  organized  government,  or  belonging  to  or  af- 
filiated with  organizations  entertaining  and  teaching 
such  disbelief  or  opposition,  as  well  as  persons  who 
advocate  or  teach  "the  duty,  necessity,  or  propriety 
of  the  unlawful  assaulting  or  killing"  of  an  officer 
or  officers,  either  specifically  or  generally,  "of  the 
government  of  the  United  States,  or  of  any  other 
organized  government,  because  of  his  or  their  of- 
ficial character."  Power  is  expressly  given  for  the 
cancellation  of  certificates  improperly  obtained.  A 
bureau  of  naturalization  is  established  at  Washing- 
ton, where  certified  copies  or  duplicates  of  naturaliza- 
tion records  are  kept.  It  is  further  provided  that 
where  a  person  shall,  within  five  years  after  his 
naturalization,  return  to  his  native  country,  or  go 
to  any  other  foreign  country,  and  take  up  there  a 
"permanent  residence,"  this  shall  be  considered  pre- 
sumptive evidence  that  he  did  not,  when  he  filed  his 
application,  intend  to  become  "a  permanent  citizen 
of  the  United  States,"  and  shall,  in  the  absence  of 
countervailing  evidence,  authorize  the  cancellation 
of  his  certificate  as  fraudulent.  The  diplomatic  and 
consular  officers  of  the  United  States  are  required 
to  co-operate  in  the  enforcement  of  this  provision 
by  reporting  the  names  of  any  such  persons  within 
their  respective  jurisdictions. 

Important  changes  were  also  made  by  the  act  of 
March  2,  1907,  in  the  law  relating  to  the  expatriation 
of  citizens  of  the  United  States  and  their  protection 

297 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

abroad.  Such  expatriation  is  declared  to  be  effected 
either  by  naturalization  abroad  or  by  the  taking  of  an 
"oath  of  allegiance"  to  any  foreign  state.  In  the 
case  of  a  "naturalized  citizen,"  however,  residence 
of  two  years  in  the  state  from  which  he  came,  or  of 
five  years  in  any  other  foreign  state,  creates  a  pre- 
sumption that  he  "has  ceased  to  be  an  American 
citizen."  This  presumption  may  be  overcome  by 
proof.  It  is  explicitly  provided  that  "no  American 
citizen  shall  be  allowed  to  expatriate  himself  when 
this  country  is  at  war."  The  act  further  expressly 
provides  that  an  American  woman  marrying  a 
foreigner  takes  the  nationality  of  her  husband;  but 
that,  when  the  marital  relation  ends,  she  may 
"resume"  her  American  citizenship,  if  she  is  abroad, 
either  by  registering  within  a  year  as  an  American 
citizen  at  an  American  consulate  or  by  returning  to 
the  United  States  to  reside,  or,  if  she  is  already  in  the 
United  States,  by  continuing  to  reside  there.  Con- 
versely, if  a  foreign  woman  married  to  an  American 
continues,  after  the  marital  relation  ends,  to  reside 
in  the  United  States,  she  is  assumed  to  retain  her 
adoptive  citizenship,  unless  she  renounces  it  before 
a  competent  court;  but,  if  she  is  residing  abroad,  she 
is  permitted  to  retain  it  by  registering  within  a  year 
at  an  American  consulate. 

The  act  of  1907,  contrary  to  previous  well-con- 
sidered legislation,  contains  a  novel  provision  for  the 
issuance  of  passports,  under  certain  conditions  and 
limitations,  to  persons  who  are  not  citizens  of  the 

298 


THE  DOCTRINE  OF  EXPATRIATION 

United  States,  but  who  have  only  declared  their  in- 
tention to  become  so.  The  conditions  and  limita- 
tions are  (i)  that  the  declarant  must  have  resided 
in  the  United  States  for  three  years,  (2)  that  the  pass- 
port is  good  for  only  six  months,  (3)  that  it  cannot 
be  renewed,  and  (4)  that  it  does  not  entitle  the 
holder  to  the  protection  of  the  United  States  in  the 
country  of  which  he  was  a  citizen  when  he  made  his 
declaration  of  intention.  It  is  superfluous  to  point 
out  that  this  clause  recognizes  the  fact  that  the 
holder  is  not  entitled  to  the  rights  of  a  citizen  of  the 
United  States.  It  is  equally  obvious  that  even  the 
third  country  in  which  he  happened  to  be  might  de- 
cline to  recognize  any  protective  claim  of  the  United 
States,  especially  as  against  a  claim  of  the  country 
whose  citizenship  he  has  not  yet  renounced,  and  that 
in  taking  such  a  position,  such  third  country  might 
at  least  argumentatively  invoke  the  stipulation, 
usually  found  in  the  naturalization  treaties  of  the 
United  States,  that  "the  declaration  of  an  intention 
to  become  a  citizen  of  the  one  or  the  other  country 
has  not  for  either  party  the  effect  of  naturalization." 
In  truth,  much  confusion  in  the  discussion  of  this 
subject  has  resulted  from  the  supposition  that,  in 
making  the  declaration  of  intention  to  become  a 
citizen,  the  declarant  is  required  to  forswear,  and 
in  fact  does  forswear,  his  allegiance  to  the  govern- 
ment of  the  country  from  which  he  came.  Not  only 
is  this  a  popular  supposition;  it  has  even  found  ex- 
pression now  and  then  in  official  documents.     But  it 

299 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

is  quite  destitute  of  foundation.  In  this  respect  it 
may  be  classed  with  the  impression  which  has  widely 
prevailed,  and  of  which  traces  also  may  now  and 
then  be  found  in  official  documents,  that  the  United 
States  has  on  some  occasions  contended  that  a 
declaration  of  intention  to  become  a  citizen  clothed 
the  individual  with  American  nationality  and  gave 
him  the  same  right  to  protection  abroad  as  if  he  had 
been  naturalized.  This  impression  is  altogether  er- 
roneous, and  is  directly  opposed  to  the  positive  decla- 
rations of  a  long  line  of  Secretaries  of  State,  including 
Buchanan,  Marcy,  Cass,  Fish,  Evarts,  Freling- 
huysen,  Bayard,  Blaine,  Olney,  Hay.  The  Depart- 
ment of  State,  in  issuing  passports,  exacted  proof  of 
citizenship.  In  1856  this  rule  was  enacted  into  law; 
and,  save  a  guarded  relaxation  from  1863  to  1866  for 
declarants  subject  to  military  duty,  it  remained  till 
1907  unmodified,  except  that  those  whom  Congress 
after  1898  declared  to  be  "citizens"  of  certain  insular 
possessions  and  so  entitled  to  protection,  received 
passports  in  that  character.  But  their  national  al- 
legiance to  the  United  States  was  undivided.  The 
erroneous  impression  with  regard  to  the  effect  of  a 
declaration  of  intention  seems  to  have  grown  out  of  a 
popular  misconception  of  the  case  of  Martin  Koszta, 
in  which  Marcy  is  supposed  to  have  maintained  that 
by  such  a  declaration  an  alien  acquired  American 
nationality.  Marcy,  however,  took  no  such  ground. 
The  only  purpose  for  which  he  referred  to  Koszta's 
declaration  of  intention  was  that  of  showing  that 

300 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

Koszta  was  domiciled  in  the  United  States.  He  did 
maintain  that  a  person's  domicil,  by  which  is  meant 
his  permanent  home,  may  in  certain  relations  invest 
him  with  a  nationality.  But  even  in  this  regard  the 
position  of  Marcy  has  been  much  misapprehended. 
A  brief  explanation  of  the  case  will  conduce  to  a 
clearer  understanding  of  it. 

Martin  Koszta,  a  Hungarian  by  birth  and  an  Aus- 
trian subject,  was  an  active  participant  in  the  Hun- 
garian revolution  of  1848-49.  At  its  close  he,  with 
many  others,  took  refuge  in  Turkey.  Their  extra- 
dition was  demanded  by  Austria  but  was  resisted  by 
Turkey,  backed  up  by  England  and  France ;  and  they 
were  at  length  released  on  the  understanding  that 
they  would  go  into  foreign  parts.  Many  of  them 
emigrated  to  the  United  States.  Among  these  was 
Koszta,  who,  on  July  31,  1852,  declared  his  intention 
to  become  a  citizen.  Nearly  two  years  later  he  tem- 
porarily returned,  on  private  business,  to  Turkey, 
and  placed  himself  under  the  protection  of  the 
American  consul  at  Smyrna,  by  whom  he  was  fur- 
nished with  a  tezkereh,  a  kind  of  passport  or  safe- 
conduct  given  by  foreign  consuls  in  Turkey  to  per- 
sons whom  they  assume  to  protect.  While  waiting 
for  an  opportunity  to  return  to  the  United  States, 
Koszta  was  seized  and  thrown  into  the  sea,  where 
he  was  picked  up  by  a  boat's  crew,  lying  in  wait 
for  him,  and  taken  on  board  the  Austrian  man-of- 
war  Huszar,  where  he  was  confined  in  irons.     It 

301 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

afterwards  transpired  that  his  seizure  was  insti- 
gated by  the  Austrian  consul-general  at  Smyrna, 
and  that  the  Turkish  officials  had  refused  to  grant 
any  authority  for  the  purpose.  The  American  con- 
sul at  Smyrna  and  the  American  charge  d'affaires 
at  Constantinople  sought  to  effect  his  liberation, 
but  in  vain.  Just  then,  however,  the  American 
sloop-of-war  St.  Louis  arrived  at  Smyrna,  and  her 
commander,  Captain  Ingraham,  after  inquiring  into 
the  circumstances  of  the  case,  demanded  Koszta's 
release,  and  intimated  that  he  would  resort  to  force 
if  the  demand  was  not  complied  with  by  a  certain 
hour.  An  arrangement  was  then  made  by  which 
Koszta  was  delivered  into  the  custody  of  the  French 
consul-general,  until  the  United  States  and  Austria 
should  agree  as  to  the  manner  of  disposing  of  him. 

When  a  report  of  the  transaction  was  received  at 
Washington,  Marcy  justified  Captain  Ingraham 's 
conduct,  chiefly  on  the  ground  that  Koszta,  while 
at  Smyrna,  had,  according  to  the  local  custom, 
which  was  recognized  by  international  law,  the  right, 
as  a  Frank  or  sojourner,  to  place  himself  under  any 
foreign  protection  that  he  might  select;  that  he  did 
in  fact  place  himself  under  the  protection  of  the 
American  consul  at  Smyrna;  and  that,  having  thus 
been  clothed  with  the  nationality  of  the  protecting 
power,  he  became  entitled  to  be  regarded  while  in 
that  situation  as  a  citizen  of  the  United  States. 
These  views  Marcy  afterwards  elaborated  in  his  an- 

T,Q2 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

swer  to  the  protest  lodged  by  Austria  against  Cap- 
tain Ingraham's  action.  The  links  in  Marcy's  chain 
of  reasoning,  in  this  celebrated  paper,  were  that,  as 
the  seizure  and  rescue  of  Koszta  took  place  within 
the  jurisdiction  of  a  third  power,  the  respective 
rights  of  the  United  States  and  of  Austria,  as  par- 
ties to  the  controversy  that  had  arisen  concerning 
that  transaction,  could  not  be  determined  by  the 
municipal  law  of  either  country,  but  must  be  de- 
termined by  international  law;  that,  as  the  previous 
political  connection  between  Koszta  and  the  Aus- 
trian government  had,  by  reason  of  the  circum- 
stances of  his  emigration  and  banishment,  been, 
even  under  the  laws  of  Austria,  dissolved,  he  could 
not  at  the  time  of  his  seizure  be  claimed  as  an  Aus- 
trian subject,  nor  could  his  seizure  as  such  be  justi- 
fied by  Austria,  either  under  international  law  or 
her  treaties  with  Turkey;  that  the  seizure  in  its 
method  and  circumstances  constituted  an  outrage 
so  palpable  that  any  by-stander  would  have  been 
justified,  on  elementary  principles  of  justice  and 
humanity,  in  interposing  to  prevent  its  consumma- 
tion; that  there  were,  however,  special  grounds  on 
which  the  United  States  might,  under  international 
law — that  being  under  the  circumstances  the  only 
criterion  —  assert  a  right  to  protect  Koszta;  that, 
although  he  had  ceased  to  be  a  subject  of  Austria, 
and  had  not  become  a  citizen  of  the  United  States, 
and  therefore  could  not  claim  the  rights  of  a  citizen 

303 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

under  the  municipal  laws  of  either  country,  he  might 
under  international  law  derive  a  national  character 
from  domieil ;  that  even  if  Koszta  was  not  by  rea- 
son of  his  domieil  invested  with  the  nationality  of 
the  United  States,  he  undoubtedly  possessed,  under 
the  usage  prevailing  in  Turkey,  which  was  recog- 
nized and  sanctioned  by  international  law,  the 
nationality  of  the  United  States  from  the  moment 
when  he  was  placed  under  the  protection  of  the 
American  diplomatic  and  consular  agents  and  re- 
ceived from  them  his  tezkereh;  that,  as  he  was 
clothed  with  the  nationality  of  the  United  States, 
and  as  the  first  aggressive  act  was  committed  by 
the  procurement  of  the  Austrian  functionaries,  Aus 
tria,  if  she  upheld  what  was  done,  became  in  fact 
the  first  aggressor,  and  was  not  entitled  to  an  apol- 
ogy for  the  measures  adopted  by  Captain  Ingraham 
to  secure  his  release ;  that  Captain  Ingraham 's  action 
was  further  justified  by  the  information  which  he 
received  of  a  plot  to  remove  Koszta  clandestinely, 
in  violation  of  the  amicable  arrangement  under 
which  he  was  to  be  retained  at  Smyrna  while  the 
question  of  his  nationality  was  pending;  and  finally, 
that,  as  the  seizure  of  Koszta  was  illegal  and  un- 
justifiable, the  President  could  not  consent  to  his 
delivery  to  the  Austrian  consul-general  at  Smyrna, 
but  expected  that  measures  would  be  taken  to  cause 
him  to  be  restored  to  the  condition  he  was  in  be- 
fore he  was  seized. 

3°4 


THE    DOCTRINE    OF    EXPATRIATION 

On  October  14,  1853,  the  American  consul  and 
the  Austrian  consul-general  at  Smyrna,  acting  un- 
der instructions  from  the  American  and  Austrian 
ministers  at  Constantinople,  requested  the  French 
consul-general  to  deliver  Koszta  over  into  the  cus- 
tody of  the  United  States;  and  on  the  same  day 
Koszta  took  passage  on  the  bark  Sultana  for  Boston. 

References : 

For  documents  and  discussions  relating  to  the  historical  and 
legal  development  of  the  Doctrine  of  Expatriation,  sec 
Moore's  Digest  of  International  Law,  III,  552,  ct  scq. 

As  to  the  doctrine  of  double  nationality,  or  double  allegiance, 
see  id.,  518  ct  seq. 

20 


VIII 

INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

Although  the  independence  of  the  United  States 
was  won  by  the  sword,  the  founders  of  the  American 
Republic  were  accustomed  to  look  upon  war  as  a 
measure  that  could  be  justified  only  as  a  choice  of 
evils.  Standing  armies  and  elaborate  preparations 
for  war  they  deprecated  as  a  menace  to  liberty. 
Having  proclaimed  as  the  basis  of  their  political 
system  the  consent  of  the  governed,  they  cherished 
as  their  ideal  a  peaceful  nation,  always  guided  by 
reason  and  justice.  In  order  that  this  ideal  might 
be  attained,  they  perceived  the  necessity  of  estab- 
lishing international  relations  on  definite  and  sure 
foundations.  To  that  end  they  became  ardent  ex- 
pounders of  the  law  of  nations ;  and  their  predilec- 
tion for  legal  methods  naturally  found  expression  in 
the  employment  of  arbitration  for  the  settlement  of 
international  differences. 

By  arbitration  we  mean  the  determination  of 
controversies  by  international  tribunals  judicial  in 
their  constitution  and  powers.  Arbitration  is  not 
to  be  confounded  with  mediation.     Mediation  is  an 

306 


INTERNATIONAL    ARBITRATION 

advisory,  arbitration  a  judicial,  process.  Mediation 
recommends,  arbitration  decides.  And  while  it  may 
be  true  that  nations  have  for  this  reason  sometimes 
accepted  mediation  when  they  were  unwilling  or 
reluctant  to  arbitrate,  yet  it  is  also  true  that  they 
have  settled  by  arbitration  questions  which  media- 
tion could  not  have  adjusted.  It  is,  for  instance, 
hardly  conceivable  that  the  question  of  the  Ala- 
bama claims  could  have  been  settled  by  mediation. 
The  same  thing  may  be  said  of  many  boundary  dis- 
putes. The  importance  of  mediation,  as  one  of  the 
forms  of  amicable  negotiation,  should  not,  indeed,  be 
minimized.  A  plan  of  mediation  even  may,  as  in 
the  case  of  The  Hague  convention  for  the  peaceful 
settlement  of  international  disputes,  form  a  useful 
auxiliary  to  a  system  of  arbitration;  but  the  fact 
should  nevertheless  be  understood  that  the  two 
processes  are  fundamentally  different,  and  that, 
while  mediation  is  only  a  form  of  diplomacy,  arbi- 
tration consists  in  the  application  of  law  and  of 
judicial  methods  to  the  determination  of  inter- 
national disputes. 

The  government  of  the  United  States  had  been  in 
existence  only  five  years,  when  it  found  occasion  to 
employ  arbitration  for  the  settlement  of  serious  dif- 
ferences with  the  mother-country.  Important  pro- 
visions of  the  treaty  of  peace  remained  unexecuted. 
Various  posts  along  the  northern  frontier  were  still 
held  by  the  British  forces,  and  the  British  govern- 

307 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ment  refused  to  evacuate  them  because  of  the  fail- 
ure of  the  United  States  to  render  effectual  the  en- 
gagement that  British  creditors  should  meet  with 
no  lawful  impediment  to  the  recovery  of  their  con- 
fiscated debts.  Moreover,  almost  immediately  after 
the  ratification  of  the  treaty  of  peace,  a  question 
arose  as  to  what  was  the  "River  St.  Croix,"  which 
was  to  form  the  eastern  boundary  of  the  United 
States  in  its  course  northward  from  the  Bay  of 
Fundy.  Such  a  river  appeared  on  the  map  used  by 
the  negotiators  of  the  treaty,  but  no  stream  answer- 
ing to  the  name  was  afterwards  found.  The  un- 
certainty as  to  the  boundary  was  embarrassing, 
while  the  controversy  as  to  the  surrender  of  the 
posts  and  the  recovery  of  debts  formed  a  prolific 
source  of  irritation.  But  a  still  more  acute  cause 
of  quarrel  arose  when,  in  1793,  the  governments  of 
France  and  Great  Britain  began  to  fulminate  and 
enforce  measures  invasive  of  the  rights  of  neutral 
trade.  The  situation  then  became  so  tense  that, 
apparently  as  the  only  alternative  to  measures  of 
force,  Washington  decided  to  send  a  special  mission 
to  England.  John  Jay,  who  was  chosen  for  that 
delicate  task,  submitted  his  first  formal  representa- 
tions to  Lord  Grenville  on  July  30,  1794-  In  the 
treaty  concluded  on  the  19th  of  the  following  No- 
vember, provision  was  made  for  three  arbitrations. 
The  first  of  these  related  to  the  boundary  question ; 
the  second,  to  the  claims  on  account  of  confiscated 

308 


INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

debts ;  the  third,  to  the  subject  of  neutral  rights  and 
duties. 

The  boundary  question  was  referred  to  a  mixed 
commission  of  three  persons,  which  met  at  Halifax, 
Nova  Scotia,  on  August  30,  1796,  and  rendered  its 
award  at  Providence,  Rhode  Island,  on  October  25, 
1798,  holding  that  the  Schoodiac,  or  Schoodic,  was 
the  river  intended  under  the  name  of  the  St.  Croix. 

The  claims  of  British  subjects,  on  account  of  the 
impediments  which  they  had  encountered  in  their 
efforts  to  collect  in  the  State  courts  their  confiscated 
debts,  were  referred  to  a  mixed  commission  of  five 
persons,  which  met  at  Philadelphia  in  May,  1797. 
The  proceedings  of  this  body  were  inharmonious, 
and  its  sittings  were  suspended  on  July  31,  1798, 
by  the  withdrawal  of  the  two  American  members. 
Differences  of  opinion  on  questions  of  law  were  to 
be  expected,  but  the  discussions  at  the  board  also 
developed  personal  feeling.  This  appears  to  have 
been  largely  due  to  the  action  of  Mr.  Macdonald, 
one  of  the  British  commissioners,  a  gentleman  who 
no  doubt  deserved  all  the  commendations  bestowed 
upon  him  at  the  time  of  his  appointment  for  recti- 
tude and  good -will,  but  who  seems  unfortunately 
to  have  possessed  a  sense  of  duty  unmitigated  by  a 
sense  of  proportion.  Wishing  to  be  entirely  candid 
with  his  associates,  he  made  it  a  rule  freely  to  ac- 
quaint them  with  all  his  opinions;  and  he  adopted 
the  practice  of  presenting  to  the  board,  when  it  was 

309 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

not  otherwise  occupied,  memoranda  expressive  of 
his  views.  The  final  rupture  was  caused  by  his  sub- 
mitting a  resolution  which  declared  that  from  the 
beginning  of  the  Revolution  down  to  the  treaty  of 
peace  the  United  States,  whatever  may  have  been 
their  relation  to  other  powers,  stood  to  Great  Brit- 
ain in  an  attitude  of  rebellion.  As  it  has  always 
been  the  doctrine  of  the  United  States  that  the 
treaty  of  peace  did  not  grant  their  independence, 
but  merely  recognized  it  as  a  condition  existing 
from  July  4,  1776,  the  date  of  its  declaration,  the 
American  commissioners  regarded  the  resolution  as 
gratuitously  offensive  and  withdrew.  The  claims 
which  the  commission  failed  to  adjust  were  settled 
by  a  treaty  concluded  January  8,  1802,  under  which 
the  British  government  accepted  the  sum  of  £600,- 
000  in  satisfaction  of  its  demands. 

But  the  most  important,  as  well  as  the  most  in- 
teresting, of  the  arbitral  tribunals  under  the  Jay 
treaty,  was  that  which  sat  at  London  for  the  pur- 
pose of  disposing  of  American  claims  against  Great 
Britain  on  account  of  captures  made  under  the 
orders  in  council,  and  of  British  claims  against  the 
United  States  on  account  of  the  latter's  failure  com- 
pletely to  enforce  its  neutrality.  The  membership 
of  this  board  was  worthy  of  the  great  questions  sub- 
mitted to  its  determination.  The  American  com- 
missioners were  Christopher  Gore,  who,  although 
popularly  known  as  the  legal  preceptor  of  Daniel 

310 


INTERNATIONAL    ARBITRATION 

Webster,  achieved  an  eminence  of  his  own;  and 
William  Pinkney,  of  Maryland,  who,  besides  win- 
ning distinction  in  diplomacy  and  statesmanship, 
was  the  acknowledged  leader  of  the  American  bar 
of  his  time.  The  British  commissioners  were  Sir 
John  Nicholl,  an  eminent  civilian,  who  was  after- 
wards succeeded  by  Maurice  Swabey;  and  John 
Anstey.  The  fifth  commissioner  was  Colonel  John 
Trumbull,  of  Connecticut,  who  had  accompanied 
Jay  to  England  when  he  negotiated  the  treaty.  The 
mode  by  which  Trumbull  was  chosen  is  worthy  of 
mention.  The  treaty  provided  that  in  case  the 
four  commissioners,  two  of  whom  were  to  be  ap- 
pointed by  each  government,  could  not  agree  upon 
the  fifth,  he  should  be  chosen  by  lot.  In  execution 
of  this  stipulation,  the  commissioners  on  each  side 
presented  to  the  others  a  list  of  four  persons;  but, 
as  neither  side  would  yield,  it  became  necessary  to 
resort  to  the  casting  of  lots.  The  next  step,  accord- 
ing to  common  practice,  would  have  been  for  each 
side  to  place  in  the  urn  a  name  of  its  own  indepen- 
dent selection,  with  the  chances  in  favor  of  his  being 
a  partisan.  But  at  London  each  side  selected  its 
name  from  the  list  of  four  made  out  by  the  other 
with  a  view  to  a  mutual  agreement,  and  the  result 
was  that  a  well-disposed  man  became  the  fifth 
commissioner. 

The  board  had  not  been  long  in  session  when  a 
serious  controversy  arose  as  to  its  power  to  deter- 

311 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

mine  its  own  jurisdiction  in  respect  of  the  several 
claims  presented  for  its  decision.  The  division  of 
opinion  was  so  pronounced  that  for  a  time  the  Brit- 
ish commissioners  absented  themselves  from  the 
meetings,  but  the  difficulty  was  eventually  sub- 
mitted to  Lord  Chancellor  Loughborough,  who 
ended  it  by  declaring  "that  the  doubt  respecting 
the  authority  of  the  commissioners  to  settle  their 
own  jurisdiction  was  absurd,  and  that  they  must 
necessarily  decide  upon  cases  being  within  or  with- 
out their  competency." 

Important  questions  of  law  came  before  the  com- 
missioners in  relation  to  contraband,  the  rights  of 
neutrals,  and  the  finality  of  the  decisions  of  prize 
courts.  These  were  all  discussed  with  marked 
ability,  especially  by  Pinkney.  His  opinions  as  a 
member  of  the  board  Wheaton  justly  pronounced 
to  be  "  finished  models  of  judicial  eloquence,  uniting 
powerful  and  comprehensive  argument  with  a  copi- 
ous, pure,  and  energetic  diction";  and  they  are  al- 
most all  we  possess  in  a  complete  and  authentic 
form  of  the  legal  reasoning  of  the  great  master  by 
whom  they  were  delivered.  The  sessions  of  the 
board  were  brought  to  a  close  on  February  24,  1804, 
all  the  business  before  it  having  been  finished. 
There  was,  however,  an  interruption  in  its  proceed- 
ings from  July  30,  1799,  to  February  15,  1802,  pend- 
ing the  diplomatic  adjustment  of  the  difficulty  caused 
by  the  breaking  up  of  the  commission  at  Philadelphia. 

312 


INTERNATIONAL    ARBITRATION 

By  reason  of  the  fact  that  the  proceedings  of  the 
London  commission  for  a  century  remained  unpub- 
lished, its  labors  have  not  received  from  writers  the 
attention  which  they  deserve.  It  was  estimated  that, 
through  the  operation  of  the  stipulations  under  which 
the  commissioners  sat,  American  claimants  recov- 
ered from  the  British  government  the  enormous  sum 
of  $11,650,000.  "The  whole  of  this  sum,"  says 
Trumbull,  "was  promptly  and  punctually  paid  to 
each  claimant,  or  his  assignee;  for,  after  a  careful 
and  accurate  examination  of  the  merits  of  every 
case  of  complaint,  the  awards  of  the  board  were 
made  in  favor  of  each  individual,  in  the  form  of  an 
order  to  pay,  and  payable  at  the  treasury  of  Great 
Britain;  nor  do  I  recollect  even  to  have  heard  a 
single  complaint,  of  the  delay  of  an  hour,  in  any 
instance  of  an  award  presented  for  payment."  The 
aggregate  of  the  awards  against  the  United  States 
appears  to  have  been  $143,428.14;  but  although  this 
amount  was  relatively  small,  its  payment  estab- 
lished the  principle  that  a  government  is  liable  in 
damages  for  neglect  to  perform  its  neutral  duties, 
and  thus  laid  the  foundation  of  the  award  made  in 
1872  at  Geneva. 

Since  the  close  of  the  arbitral  proceedings  under 
the  Jay  treaty,  arbitration  has,  except  in  the  case 
of  the  extraordinary  train  of  events  that  led  up  to 
the  war  of  181 2,  been  almost  habitually  employed 
by  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  for  the  set- 

313 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tlement  of  controversies  that  could  not  be  adjusted 
by  negotiation.  Like  the  Jay  treaty,  the  treaty 
of  Ghent,  of  December  24,  1814,  which  restored 
peace  between  the  two  countries,  provided  for  three 
arbitrations.  The  first  related  to  the  ownership  of 
certain  islands  in  Passamaquoddy  Bay  and  the  Bay 
of  Fundy ;  the  second,  to  the  ascertainment  of  the 
boundary  of  the  United  States  from  the  source  of 
the  river  St.  Croix  to  the  river  St.  Lawrence;  the 
third,  to  the  determination  of  the  boundary  along 
the  middle  of  the  Great  Lakes  and  of  their  water 
communications  to  the  most  northwestern  point  of 
the  Lake  of  the  Woods.  In  1818,  a  difference  as  to 
the  performance  by  Great  Britain  of  her  obligation 
under  the  treaty  of  Ghent,  not  to  carry  away  from 
United  States  territory  then  in  her  possession  "  any 
slaves  or  other  private  property,"  was  referred  to 
the  Emperor  of  Russia.  He  rendered  a  decision  in 
favor  of  the  United  States,  and  in  1822  a  mixed 
commission  was  erected  in  order  to  fix  the  amount 
to  be  paid.  In  1827  a  dispute  as  to  the  northeast- 
ern boundary  was  referred  to  the  King  of  the  Nether- 
lands ;  but  as  his  award  was  recommendatory  rather 
than  decisive,  both  governments  agreed  to  waive  it, 
and  the  question  was  settled  by  the  Webster-Ash- 
burton  treaty.  In  1853  a  convention  was  entered 
into  for  the  settlement  by  means  of  a  mixed  com- 
mission of  all  outstanding  claims.  The  commission 
sat  in   London,   and  disposed  of  many  important 

3i4 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 

controversies,  including  the  celebrated  case  of  the 
Creole,  which  so  nearly  caused  a  rupture  of  relations 
in  1842.  For  the  peculiarly  satisfactory  results  of 
the  board's  labors,  credit  was  perhaps  chiefly  due 
to  the  umpire,  Joshua  Bates,  an  American  by  birth, 
but  then  the  head  of  the  house  of  the  Barings,  who 
exhibited  in  his  decisions  the  same  broad  intelli- 
gence and  sound  judgment  as  had  characterized  his 
exceptionally  successful  career  in  business.  By  the 
reciprocity  treaty  of  1854,  by  which  the  troubles  as 
to  the  northeastern  fisheries  were  temporarily  al- 
layed, arbitration  was  employed  for  the  purpose  of 
determining  what  fisheries  were  exclusively  reserved 
to  the  inhabitants  of  the  two  countries  under  the 
agreement.  In  1863  another  arbitral  board  was 
erected  for  the  purpose  of  deciding  upon  the  claims 
of  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company  and  the  Puget's 
Sound  Agricultural  Company  against  the  United 
States  for  damages  to  their  property  and  rights  in 
connection  with  the  treaty  of  1846,  by  which  the 
limits  between  the  United  States  and  the  British 
possessions  west  of  the  Rocky  Mountains  were  es- 
tablished. 

This  board  was  still  in  session  when  the  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  were 
seriously  disturbed  by  the  controversies  growing  out 
of  the  civil  war,  the  northeastern  fisheries,  and  the 
disputed  San  Juan  water  boundary.  These  differ-' 
ences  were  all  composed  by  the  great  treaty  signed 

315 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

at  Washington  on  May  8,  187 1,  on  the  part  of  the 
United  States  by  Hamilton  Fish,  Robert  C.  Schenck, 
Samuel  Nelson,  Ebenezer  Rockwood  Hoar,  and 
George  H.  Williams;  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain, 
by  the  Earl  de  Grey  and  Ripon,  Sir  Stafford  H. 
Northcote,  Sir  Edward  Thornton,  Sir  John  A.  Mac- 
donald,  and  Mountague  Bernard.  This  treaty  pro- 
vided for  four  distinct  arbitrations,  the  largest  num- 
ber ever  established  under  a  single  convention,  and, 
by  reason  of  this  fact  as  well  as  of  the  magnitude  of 
the  questions  submitted,  was  undoubtedly  the  great- 
est treaty  of  arbitration  that  the  world  had  ever 
seen. 

Of  the  four  arbitrations  for  which  it  provided,  the 
first  in  order  and  in  importance  was  that  at  Geneva. 
On  the  part  of  the  United  States,  the  arbitrator 
was  Charles  Francis  Adams;  on  the  part  of  Great 
Britain,  Sir  Alexander  Cockburn.  There  were  three 
other  arbitrators,  Count  Frederic  Sclopis,  a  dis- 
tinguished jurist;  Jacques  Staempfli,  afterwards 
President  of  Switzerland;  and  the  Viscount  D'lta- 
juba,  an  eminent  diplomatist,  respectively  desig- 
nated by  the  King  of  Italy,  the  President  of  the 
Swiss  Confederation,  and  the  Emperor  of  Brazil. 
The  American  agent  was  J.  C.  Bancroft  Davis; 
the  British  agent,  Lord  Tenderden.  Caleb  Cushing, 
William  M.  Evarts,  and  Morrison  R.  Waite  appeared 
as  counsel  for  the  United  States.  Sir  Roundell 
Palmer,    afterwards    Lord   Selborne,    appeared   for 

316 


INTERNATIONAL    ARBITRATION 

Great  Britain,  assisted  by  Mountague  Bernard  and 
Mr.  Cohen. 

The  demands  presented  by  the  United  States  to 
the  tribunal,  arising  out  of  the  acts  of  Confederate 
cruisers  of  British  origin,  and  genetically  known  as 
the  Alabama  claims,  embraced  (i)  direct  losses 
growing  out  of  the  destructions  of  vessels  and  their 
cargoes  by  such  cruisers,  (2)  the  national  expendi- 
tures in  pursuit  of  the  cruisers,  (3)  the  loss  for  the 
transfer  of  the  American  commercial  marine  to  the 
British  flag,  (4)  the  enhanced  payments  of  insur- 
ance, and  (5)  the  prolongation  of  the  war  and  the 
addition  of  a  large  sum  to  its  cost.  As  to  classes  3, 
4,  and  5,  Great  Britain  denied  the  jurisdiction  of 
the  tribunal;  but  without  deciding  this  question, 
the  tribunal  disposed  of  these  three  classes  by  ex- 
pressing an  opinion  that  they  did  not,  upon  the 
principles  of  international  law,  constitute  a  good 
foundation  for  an  award  of  compensation,  and  that 
they  should  be  excluded  from  consideration,  even 
if  there  were  no  difference  between  the  two  govern- 
ments as  to  the  board's  competency.  In  regard  to 
the  second  class  of  claims,  the  tribunal  held  that 
they  were  not  properly  distinguishable  from  the 
general  expenses  of  the  war  carried  on  by  the  United 
States;  and  further,  by  a  majority  of  three  to  two, 
that  no  compensation  should  be  awarded  to  the 
United  States  on  that  head.  On  claims  of  the  first 
class,  the  tribunal  awarded  the  sum  of  $15,500,000. 

317 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Its  first  session  was  held  December  15,  187 1 ;  its  last, 
September  14,  1872. 

The  dispute  as  to  the  San  Juan  water  boundary 
was  submitted  to  the  German  Emperor,  who  ren- 
dered, on  October  21,  1872,  an  award  in  favor 
of  the  United  States.  Claims  of  British  subjects 
against  the  United  States,  and  of  citizens  of  the 
United  States  against  Great  Britain  (other  than  the 
Alabama  claims),  arising  out  of  injuries  to  persons 
or  property  during  the  civil  war  in  the  United 
States,  from  April  17,  1861,  to  April  9,  1865,  were 
referred  to  a  mixed  commission,  which  sat  in  the 
United  States.  The  fourth  arbitration  under  the 
treaty  of  Washington,  to  determine  the  compensa- 
tion, if  any,  due  to  Great  Britain  for  privileges  ac- 
corded by  the  treaty  to  the  United  States  in  the 
northeastern  fisheries,  was  conducted  by  a  com- 
mission of  three  persons — a  citizen  of  the  United 
States,  a  British  subject,  and  a  Belgian — which  met 
at  Halifax,  June  15,  1877,  and  on  the  23d  of  the 
following  November  awarded  to  Great  Britain  (the 
American  commissioner  dissenting)  the  sum  of  $5,- 
500,000. 

Questions  of  great  moment,  as  affecting  the  free 
use  of  the  seas,  were  involved  in  the  fur-seal  arbi- 
tration, which  was  held  in  Paris  under  the  treaty  of 
February  29,  1892;  and  eminent  men  were  chosen 
to  discuss  and  decide  them.  On  the  part  of  the 
United  States,  the  arbitrators  were  John  M.  Harlan, 

318 


INTERNATIONAL    ARBITRATION 

of  the  Supreme  Court,  and  John  T.  Morgan,  of  the 
Senate;  on  the  part  of  Great  Britain,  Lord  Hannen, 
of  the  High  Court  of  Appeal,  and  Sir  John  Thomp- 
son, Minister  of  Justice  and  Attorney  -  General  of 
Canada.  The  neutral  arbitrators  were  the  Baron 
Alphonse  de  Courcel,  a  senator  and  ambassador  of 
France;  the  Marquis  Emilio  Visconti  Venosta,  a 
senator  of  Italy,  who  had  held  the  post  of  Minister 
of  Foreign  Affairs;  and  Gregers  Gram,  a  Minister  of 
State  of  Sweden.  The  American  agent  was  John 
W.  Foster;  the  British  agent,  Sir  Charles  H.  Tupper. 
As  counsel  for  the  United  States,  there  appeared 
Edward  J.  Phelps,  James  C.  Carter,  Henry  W. 
Blodgett,  and  Frederic  R.  Coudert;  for  Great  Brit- 
ain, Sir  Charles  Russell,  Sir  Richard  Webster,  and 
Christopher  Robinson.  The  award  which,  so  far  as 
questions  of  jurisdiction  were  concerned,  was  un- 
favorable to  the  United  States,  is  conceded  to  have 
been  based  upon  existing  rules  of  international  law, 
the  tribunal  deeming  its  duties  to  be  judicial  rather 
than  legislative.  The  commission,  however,  under 
powers  expressly  conferred  upon  it,  prescribed  regu- 
lations for  the  protection  of  the  fur-seals  by  joint 
action.  The  claims  of  British  subjects  for  the  pre- 
vious seizure  of  their  vessels  by  American  cruisers 
in  Bering  Sea  were  afterwards  adjusted  by  a  mixed 
commission. 

The  proceeding  of  1903,  by  which  the  Alaskan 
boundary  dispute  was  settled,  can  scarcely  be  classed 

319 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

as  an  arbitration,  since  the  tribunal,  which  contained 
an  equal  number  of  the  citizens  or  subjects  of  each 
contracting  party,  was  unable  to  render  a  decision 
unless  an  appointee  of  one  government  should  give 
his  decision  in  favor  of  the  other.  This  proved  in 
the  particular  instance  to  be  possible,  Lord  Alver- 
stone  (formerly  Sir  Richard  Webster),  Chief -Justice 
of  England,  one  of  the  British  members,  having 
given  the  highest  proof  of  the  independence  and 
impartiality  of  the  British  bench  by  joining  in  a 
decision  favorable  to  the  United  States.  I  do  not 
hesitate  to  say  this,  although  it  has  been  insinuated 
both  in  Canada  and  in  the  United  States  that  Lord 
Alverstone  accepted  a  place  on  the  commission  with 
at  least  the  tacit  understanding  that  he  was  to  decide 
in  favor  of  the  United  States,  thus  ending  a  trouble- 
some controversy.  Lord  Alverstone  did  not  shrink 
from  denouncing  this  insinuation  when  it  first  ap- 
peared; and  this  denunciation  he  repeated  in  his 
autobiography,  in  which  he  affirms  that  he  acted 
"purely  in  a  judicial  capacity"  and  was  influenced 
solely  by  a  sense  of  duty  to  his  position.  In  reality, 
the  Canadian  contentions  in  regard  to  the  Alaskan 
boundary  fundamentally  lacked  merit,  and,  like 
those  of  the  United  States  in  the  fur-seal  arbitration, 
derived  color  chiefly  from  the  fact  that  a  government 
was  willing  to  take  the  chance  of  presenting  them. 

We  have  elsewhere  mentioned  the  termination  of 
the  age-long  dispute  between  the  United  States  and 
Great  Britain  as  to  the  north  Atlantic  fisheries  by  the 

320 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 

award  of  the  Permanent  Court  at  The  Hague  in 
1910. 

Down  to  1898,  when  the  controversy  as  to  Cuba 
was  at  length  settled  by  the  sword,  all  differences  be- 
tween the  United  States  and  Spain,  which  could  not 
be  adjusted  by  diplomacy,  were,  beginning  with  the 
mixed  commission  under  the  Pinckney-Godoy  treaty 
of  1795,  settled  by  arbitration.  The  most  important 
of  the  arbitral  tribunals  between  the  two  countries 
was  that  which  was  established  under  the  diplo- 
matic agreement  of  February  11-12,  1871,  touch- 
ing claims  growing  out  of  the  insurrection  in  Cuba. 
There  were  two  other  arbitrations  between  the  two 
countries,  held  respectively  in  1870  and  1880. 

As  between  the  United  States  and  France,  many 
important  questions,  including  large  pecuniary 
claims,  have  been  settled  by  direct  negotiation. 
But  from  November,  1880,  to  March,  1884,  a  mixed 
commission,  sitting  in  Washington,  disposed  of  the 
claims  of  citizens  of  France  against  the  United  States 
for  injuries  to  their  persons  and  property  during  the 
American  Civil  War,  and  of  the  claims  of  citizens  of 
the  United  States  against  France  for  injuries  during 
the  war  between  that  country  and  Germany. 

On  various  occasions,  as  under  the  treaties  of 
1839  and  1868,  arbitrations  have  been  held  between 
the  United  States  and  Mexico.  The  claims  sub- 
mitted under  the  treaty  of  1868  were  remarkable 
both  in  number  and  in  amount,  those  presented  by 
the  United  States  aggregating  one  thousand  and 
-'l  321 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

seventeen,  and  those  by  Mexico  nine  hundred  and 
ninety-eight,  while  the  total  amount  claimed  on 
one  side  and  the  other  exceeded  half  a  billion  dol- 
lars. The  total  amount  allowed  was,  however, 
about  $4,250,000.  Two  of  the  awards  against  Mex- 
ico, which  embraced  nearly  or  quite  a  third  of  the 
total  amount  awarded  against  her,  were  alleged  to 
have  been  procured  by  fraudulent  testimony.  The 
government  of  the  United  States  investigated  this 
allegation,  and  eventually  returned  to  Mexico  all  the 
money  that  had  been  paid  by  her  on  the  awards  in 
question,  even  paying  out  of  its  own  treasury  such 
part  as  had  already  been  distributed  among  the 
claimants. 

Arbitrations  have  also  been  held  by  the  United 
States  with  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Denmark,  Ecua- 
dor, Haiti,  Nicaragua,  Paraguay,  Peru,  Portugal,  Sal- 
vador, Santo  Domingo,  Siam,  and  Venezuela.  The 
total  number  of  the  arbitrations  of  the  United  States 
down  to  1 9 14  was  sixty-eight,  twenty-two  of  which 
were  with  Great  Britain,  while  the  President  of  the 
United  States  had  acted  as  arbitrator  between  other 
nations  in  five  cases,  and  ministers  of  the  United 
vStates,  or  persons  designated  by  the  United  States, 
had  acted  as  arbitrator  or  umpire  in  nine  cases. 
The  number  of  the  arbitrations  of  the  United  States 
during  that  period  was  equalled  only  by  those  of 
Great  Britain,  the  total  of  which  appears  to  have 
been  about  the  same. 

In  adopting  arbitration  as  a  means  of  settling  its 

322 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 

disputes  the  government  of  the  United  States  has 
no  doubt  been  influenced  by  the  manifestation  in 
various  forms  of  public  sentiment  in  favor  of  that 
method.  As  early  as  February,  1832,  the  senate 
of  Massachusetts,  by  a  vote  of  19  to  5,  resolved  that 
"some  mode  should  be  established  for  the  amicable 
and  final  adjustment  of  all  international  disputes 
instead  of  resort  to  war";  and  in  1837  a  like  resolu- 
tion was  passed  by  the  house  of  representatives 
unanimously.  Similar  declarations  were  adopted  by 
the  legislatures  of  other  States.  In  1874  a  resolution 
in  favor  of  general  arbitration  was  passed  by  the 
House  of  Representatives  of  the  United  States. 

On  November  29,  1881,  Mr.  Blaine,  as  Secretary 
of  State,  extended,  in  the  name  of  the  President,  an 
invitation  to  all  the  independent  countries  of  North 
and  South  America  to  participate  in  a  general  con- 
gress to  be  held  in  Washington  on  November  24, 
1882,  "for  the  purpose  of  considering  and  discussing 
methods  of  preventing  war  between  the  nations  of 
America."  Action  upon  this  proposal  was  post- 
poned chiefly  because  of  the  continuance  of  the  Chile- 
Peruvian  war,  but  the  project  was  never  entirely  re- 
linquished, and  on  May  28,  1888,  the  President  gave 
his  approval  to  the  act  under  which  was  convoked 
the  International  American  Conference  of  1889- 
1890.  Of  this  conference  one  of  the  results  was  the 
celebrated  plan  of  arbitration  adopted  April  18, 
1890.  By  this  plan  it  was  declared  that  arbitration, 
as  a  means  of  settling  disputes  between  American 

323 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

republics,  was  adopted  "as  a  principle  of  American 
international  law";  that  arbitration  should  be 
obligatory  in  all  controversies  concerning  diplo- 
matic and  consular  privileges,  boundaries,  terri- 
tories, indemnities,  the  right  of  navigation,  and  the 
validity,  construction,  and  enforcement  of  treaties; 
and  that  it  should  be  equally  obligatory  in  all  other 
cases,  whatever  might  be  their  origin,  nature,  or  ob- 
ject, with  the  sole  exception  of  those  which,  in  the 
judgment  of  one  of  the  nations  involved  in  the  con- 
troversy, might  imperil  its  independence;  but  that 
even  in  this  case,  while  arbitration  for  that  nation 
should  be  optional,  it  should  be  "obligatory  upon 
the  adversary  power."  As  yet  this  plan  represents 
but  an  aspiration,  since  it  failed  to  receive  the  ap- 
proval of  the  governments  whose  representatives 
adopted  it. 

On  February  14,  1890,  the  Senate  of  the  United 
States,  and  on  the  3d  of  the  following  April  the  House 
of  Representatives,  adopted  a  concurrent  resolu- 
tion by  which  the  President  was  requested  to  in- 
vite, from  time  to  time  as  fit  occasions  might  arise, 
negotiations  with  any  government  with  which  the 
United  States  maintained  diplomatic  relations,  "to 
the  end  that  any  differences  or  disputes  arising  be- 
tween the  two  governments  which  cannot  be  ad- 
justed by  diplomatic  agency  may  be  referred  to  ar- 
bitration, and  be  peaceably  adjusted  by  such  means." 
On  July  16,  1893,  the  British  House  of  Commons 
formally  declared  its  cordial  sympathy  with  the  pur- 

324 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 

pose  of  this  resolution,  and  expressed  the  hope  that 
her  Majesty's  government  would  "lend  their  ready 
co-operation  to  the  government  of  the  United 
States"  upon  the  basis  indicated. 

Nothing  tangible  had  been  accomplished  in  that 
direction  when  the  controversy  over  the  Venezuelan 
boundary  disclosed  the  importance  of  arbitration 
as  a  possible  means  of  avoiding  a  conflict  between 
the  two  countries.  Under  these  circumstances, 
Mr.  Olney,  as  Secretary  of  State,  negotiated  with 
Sir  Julian  Pauncefote,  then  British  ambassador  at 
Washington,  concurrently  with  the  negotiation  of  a 
special  treaty  of  arbitration  for  the  settlement  of 
the  Venezuelan  question,  a  general  arbitration  treaty. 
By  this  treaty,  provision  was  made  for  three  classes 
of  tribunals,  two  of  which  were  to  be  boards  of  three 
or  five  members,  as  the  case  might  be,  while  the 
third  was  to  be,  not  in  strictness  a  tribunal  of  arbi- 
tration, but  a  joint  commission,  in  the  form  lately 
employed  in  the  Alaskan  boundary  dispute,  specifi- 
cally to  deal  with  territorial  claims.  This  treaty 
failed  to  receive  the  approval  of  the  necessary  two- 
thirds  of  the  Senate,  but  only  by  a  few  votes. 

In  the  peace  conference  that  met  at  The  Hague, 
in  1899,  on  the  invitation  of  the  Czar  of  Russia,  the 
United  States  was  one  of  the  participants.  Of  this 
conference,  the  most  notable  achievement  was  the 
convention  for  the  peaceful  adjustment  of  interna- 
tional differences.  This  convention  embraces  stip- 
ulations,  first,   as  to  mediation,   and  secondly,   as 

325 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

to  arbitration.  In  the  part  relating  to  mediation, 
the  signatory  powers  agree  that,  in  case  of  "grave 
difference  of  opinion  or  conflict,"  they  will,  before 
appealing  to  arms,  have  recourse,  "as  far  as  circum- 
stances permit,"  to  the  good  offices  of  one  or  more 
friendly  powers,  and  that  such  powers  even  may  of 
their  own  motion  offer  mediation,  without  incur- 
ring the  odium  of  performing  an  unfriendly  act. 
The  functions  of  the  mediator  are,  however,  de- 
clared to  be  purely  conciliatory,  and  his  recommen- 
dations "advisory"  and  not  "obligatory."  As  an 
adjunct  to  the  system  of  mediation  the  convention 
recommends  in  certain  cases  the  appointment  of  an 
international  commission  of  inquiry,  the  mode  of 
whose  appointment,  as  well  as  its  jurisdiction  and 
procedure,  is  to  be  regulated  by  a  special  -convention 
between  the  disputing  states. 

By  the  arbitral  stipulations,  the  object  of  inter- 
national arbitration  is  declared  to  be  "the  settle- 
ment of  disputes  between  nations  by  judges  of  their 
own  choice  and  in  accordance  with  their  reciprocal 
rights";  and  arbitration  is  recognized  as  specially 
applicable  to  questions  of  law,  and  of  the  interpre- 
tation and  execution  of  treaties,  which  cannot  be 
settled  by  diplomacy.  The  resort  to  arbitration  is 
voluntary,  but  the  convention  furnishes  a  plan  by 
which  it  is  intended  to  be  systematized  and  made 
easy.  Of  this  plan  the  basal  feature  is  what  is 
called  the  permanent  court  of  arbitration,  which  is 
constituted  by  the  designation  by  each  of  the  sig- 

326 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 

natory  powers  of  not  more  than  four  persons  "rec- 
ognized as  competent  to  deal  with  questions  of  in- 
ternational law,  and  of  the  highest  personal  integ- 
rity." The  persons  so  designated,  who  are  known 
as  "members  of  the  court,"  constitute  a  list  from 
which  any  of  the  signatory  powers,  in  the  event  of 
a  controversy,  may,  if  they  see  fit  to  do  so,  choose 
a  tribunal  for  the  decision  of  the  particular  case. 

To  the  existence  of  this  convention  there  is,  no 
doubt,  to  be  ascribed  the  remarkable  agreement  be- 
tween Great  Britain  and  Russia  for  the  settlement, 
by  means  of  a  mixed  court  of  inquiry,  of  the  Dogger 
Bank  incident. 

The  subject  of  general  arbitration  between  Ameri- 
can nations,  which  remained  in  abeyance  after  the 
Washington  conference  of  1890,  was  again  taken  up 
by  the  Second  International  Conference  of  Ameri- 
can States,  which  met  at  the  city  of  Mexico  on 
October  22,  1901.  There  appeared  to  be,  as  the 
American  members  of  the  conference  reported,  a 
unanimous  sentiment  in  favor  of  "arbitration  as  a 
principle,"  but  a  great  contrariety  of  opinion  as  to 
the  extent  to  which  the  principle  should  be  carried. 
A  plan  was  finally  adopted  in  the  nature  of  a  com- 
promise. A  protocol  looking  to  adhesion  to  The 
Hague  convention  was  signed  by  all  the  delegations 
except  those  of  Chile  and  Ecuador,  who  are  said, 
however,  afterwards  to  have  accepted  it  in  open 
conference.  A  project  of  a  treaty  of  compulsory 
arbitration  was  also  signed  by  the  delegations  of 

327 


AMERICAN    DIl'LOMAC  Y 

certain  countries,  not  including  the  United  States, 
and  a  treaty  was  also  adopted  covering  the  arbitra- 
tion of  pecuniary  claims. 

By  the  treaty  last  mentioned,  which  was  signed 
January  19,  1902,  the  contracting  parties  agreed  to 
submit  to  the  permanent  court  at  The  Hague,  unless 
they  should  prefer  to  create  a  special  jurisdiction, 
"all  claims  for  pecuniary  loss  or  damage  which 
may  be  presented  by  their  respective  citizens,  and 
which  cannot  be  amicably  adjusted  through  diplo- 
matic channels,  when  said  claims  are  of  sufficient 
importance  to  warrant  the  expenses  of  arbitration." 
The  existence  of  the  treaty  being  limited  to  five 
years,  the  question  of  its  renewal  came  before  the 
Third  International  American  Conference,  at  Rio 
de  Janeiro,  in  1906.  The  treaty  had  then  been 
ratified  by  eight  of  the  signatory  states — namely,  the 
United  States,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Guatemala,  Sal- 
vador, Honduras,  Peru,  and  Bolivia.  A  new  treaty, 
incorporating  the  text  of  the  old  with  some  amend- 
ments, was  concluded  on  August  13,  1906.  When 
the  Fourth  International  American  Conference  met 
at  Buenos  Aires  in  July,  1910,  the  treaty  of  1906  had 
been  ratified  by  twelve  governments.  These,  in  the 
order  of  their  ratification,  were  the  United  States, 
Chile,  Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Cuba,  Ecuador, 
Guatemala,  Honduras,  Mexico,  Nicaragua,  Panama, 
and  Salvador.  On  August  11,  1910,  the  treaty  was 
renewed,  with  certain  amendments,  one  of  which 
provided  that  it  should  continue  in  force  indefinitely, 

32S 


INTERNATIONAL    ARBITRATION 

subject  to  the  right  of  a  ratifying  power  to  withdraw 
after  two  years'  notice.  The  attitude  of  the  govern- 
ments which  had  failed  to  ratify  the  treaty,  after  their 
representatives  in  the  previous  conferences  had 
signed  it,  was  undoubtedly  affected  by  the  question, 
the  discussion  of  which  had  not  failed  to  attend 
its  consideration  on  any  and  all  occasions,  as  to  the 
proper  limits  of  diplomatic  intervention  and  as  to 
what  might  be  said  to  constitute  a  "denial  of  jus- 
tice," rendering  such  intervention  permissible.  This 
question  becomes  peculiarly  difficult  and  delicate 
where  the  claim  is  founded  on  an  alleged  miscarriage 
of  justice  in  the  courts.  In  the  report  of  the  com- 
mittee at  Buenos  Aires,  which  had  the  treaty  in 
charge,  it  is  admitted  to  be  hardly  practicable  "to 
lay  down  in  advance  precise  and  unyielding  formulas 
by  which  the  question  of  a  denial  of  justice  may  in 
every  instance  be  determined,"  and  it  is  left  to  be 
disposed  of  by  the  amicable  methods  of  diplomacy 
and  arbitration. 

The  assumptions  often  made  as  to  the  recent 
progress  of  international  arbitration  and  as  to  the 
part  lately  taken  by  the  United  States  in  its  develop- 
ment render  appropriate  a  simple  statement  of  the 
facts.  The  Convention  for  the  Pacific  Settlement 
of  International  Disputes,  concluded  at  the  Peace 
Conference  at  The  Hague  in  1899,  was  renewed  at 
the  Second  Peace  Conference  in  1907.  This  con- 
vention was  justly  hailed  as  a  memorable  achieve- 
ment;  and  although  it  does  not  in  terms  make  ar- 

329 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

1  titration  obligatory  in  any  case,  it  does  not,  on  the 
other  hand,  by  general  exceptions,  exclude  or  dis- 
credit in  advance  the  submission  of  any  question  or 
class  of  questions  or  facilitate  the  entire  evasion  of 
the  process  by  rhetorical  formulas.  Nevertheless, 
in  order,  as  was  said,  to  make  arbitration  "obliga- 
tory "  a  form  of  treaty  was  afterwards  widely  adopted 
which,  while  ostensibly  requiring  the  submission, 
preferably  to  the  Permanent  Court  at  The  Hague,  of 
differences  "of  a  legal  nature  or  relating  to  the  in- 
terpretation of  treaties,"  excepts  even  from  this  re- 
stricted obligation  questions  affecting  "the  vital  in- 
terests," "the  independence,"  or  the  "honor"  of 
the  parties,  or  the  "interests  of  third  powers" — in 
effect,  every  question  concerning  which  there  could 
be  a  serious  difference.  So  far  as  the  United  States 
and  Great  Britain  are  concerned  this  clause  ran  far 
behind  their  actual  practice,  since  they  had  on 
numerous  occasions,  and  notably  in  the  case  of  the 
Alabama  claims,  submitted  to  arbitration  questions 
which  had  been  declared  to  affect  the  "honor"  of 
the  parties.  Moreover,  the  Senate,  in  acting  upon 
the  treaties,  amended  them,  by  providing  that  the 
"special  agreement"  defining  the  question  sub- 
mitted, the  arbitrators'  powers,  and  the  procedure, 
should  always  be  subject  to  its  advice  and  consent, 
thus  in  effect  requiring  a  new  treaty  to  be  made  in 
each  case.  Because  of  this  amendment  the  Presi- 
dent, in  1904,  withdrew  the  treaties  from  the 
Senate,  and  they  were  for  the  moment  abandoned; 

330 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 

but  in  1908  they  were  again  taken  up  and  the 
amendment  was  accepted. 

The  result  is  that,  so  far  as  the  United  States  is  con- 
cerned, it  is  in  practice  now  more  difficult  to  secure 
international  arbitration  than  it  was  in  the  early  days 
of  our  independence.  Prior  to  1908  the  United 
States  constantly  arbitrated  pecuniary  claims  against 
foreign  governments  without  concluding  a  formal 
treaty.  As  examples  we  may  take  the  agreement 
between  the  United  States  and  Spain,  effected  by 
an  exchange  of  notes  on  February  11-12,  187 1,  under 
which  all  claims  of  citizens  of  the  United  States 
against  Spain,  for  wrongs  and  injuries  committed 
against  their  persons  and  property  by  the  Spanish 
authorities  in  Cuba  since  the  beginning  of  the  in- 
surrection in  1868,  were  submitted  to  a  mixed  com- 
mission composed  of  two  arbitrators  and  an  umpire. 
These  claims  involved  questions  of  great  interna- 
tional importance,  including  the  validity  of  decrees 
of  the  Spanish  government  and  of  legal  proceedings 
against  both  persons  and  property  in  Cuba.  Indeed, 
questions  analogous  to  those  involved  in  the  cele- 
brated case  of  the  Virginius  eventually  came  before 
the  commission,  as  well  as  many  delicate  questions 
of  nationality  or  citizenship.  The  commission  re- 
mained in  existence  more  than  ten  years,  and  the 
claims  presented  to  it  amounted  to  more  than 
$30,000,000,  exclusive  of  interest.  The  awards 
amounted  to  nearly  $1,300,000. 

The  first  case  submitted  to  the  Permanent  Court 
33i 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

at  The  Hague  under  the  convention  of  1899 — the 
well-known  case  of  the  Pious  Fund  of  the  Californias 
— was  submitted  under  a  simple  executive  agreement. 
Other  examples  might  readily  be  given;  but  it  suf- 
fices to  say  that,  where  the  settlement  embraced 
claims  against  the  foreign  government  alone  and  not 
against  the  United  States,  twenty-seven  of  our  in- 
ternational arbitrations  up  to  1908  were  held  under 
executive  agreements  as  against  nineteen  under 
treaties.  The  former  method  is  now  forbidden  by 
the  treaties  of  1908  so  far  as  they  apply. 

Again,  it  was  formerly  the  practice  of  the  United 
States  to  make  general  claims  treaties  or  conven- 
tions for  the  submission  of  all  claims  of  the  one 
government  against  the  other  arising  during  a  cer- 
tain number  of  years — perhaps  as  many  as  thirty 
or  forty  years — to  a  mixed  commission,  without  dis- 
crimination and  without  specification  of  particular 
claims.  Reference  has  already  been  made  to  the 
great  arbitration  under  Article  VII.  of  the  Jay  treaty 
of  1794.  This  article  provided  for  the  reference  to  a 
mixed  commission  of  all  complaints  made  by  citizens 
of  the  United  States  for  loss  and  damage  by  reason 
of  irregular  or  illegal  captures  or  condemnations  of 
vessels  or  other  property  under  color  of  authority  of 
his  Britannic  Majesty,  and  of  all  complaints  of 
British  subjects  on  account  of  loss  and  damage  suf- 
fered by  reason  of  the  failure  of  the  United  States 
to  enforce  neutrality  within  its  jurisdiction.  Here 
there  was  no  specification   or  limitation,   the  two 

332 


INTERNATIONAL    ARBITRATION 

governments  being  evidently  anxious  to  remove  every 
cause  of  controversy  by  a  sweeping  arbitral  settle- 
ment. By  the  convention  of  1853  it  was  agreed  that 
"all  claims"  on  the  part  of  citizens  of  the  United 
States  against  the  British  government,  and  "all 
claims"  on  the  part  of  British  subjects  against  the 
United  States,  which  had  arisen  since  the  signature 
of  the  treaty  of  peace  of  December  24,  18 14,  should 
be  referred  to  a  mixed  commission.  This  convention, 
as  has  been  seen,  was  duly  carried  into  effect  with 
great  satisfaction  to  both  governments.  But  when, 
in  1 9 10,  a  treaty  for  the  arbitration  of  claims  was 
made  with  Great  Britain,  it  was  found  to  be  neces- 
sary to  agree  to  obtain  the  Senate's  prior  consent  to 
the  submission  of  each  particular  claim,  with  the 
result  that  when,  on  the  outbreak  of  the  war  in  Eu- 
rope in  1 9 14,  the  sittings  of  the  tribunal  were  sus- 
pended, there  was  every  prospect  that,  after  its 
labors  were  ended,  many  important  claims  would 
remain  unsettled. 

It  has  been  stated,  and  probably  is  a  fact,  that 
there  was  opposition  to  a  general  claims  convention 
with  Great  Britain  because  bond  claims  perhaps 
might  be  presented  to  the  commission.  But  it  may 
be  observed  that  claims  were  presented  to  the  com- 
mission under  the  convention  of  1853  growing  out  of 
the  non-payment  of  the  bonds  of  Florida  and  of 
Texas,  and  were  disposed  of  by  the  decision  of  the 
umpire,  who  disallowed  the  claims.  The  same  thing 
took  place  in  respect  of  claims  on  account  of  the 

333 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Confederate  debt  which  were  presented  to  the  com- 
mission under  the  treaty  of*  187 1. 

With  a  view  to  remove  existing  limitations  and 
set  an  example  of  confidence  in  amicable  processes 
there  were  signed  at  Washington  on  August  3,  191 1, 
two  remarkable  agreements,  commonly  called  the 
Taft-Knox  treaties,  between  the  United  States,  on  the 
one  part,  and  France  and  Great  Britain,  respectively, 
on  the  other,  by  which  (Article  1)  all  future  unad- 
justed differences,  involving  a  "claim  of  right"  and 
"justiciable  in  their  nature  by  reason  of  being  sus- 
ceptible of  decision  by  the  application  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  law  or  equity,"  were  to  be  submitted  to 
arbitration.  In  each  case  the  United  States  was  to 
submit  a  "special  agreement"  to  the  Senate,  while, 
if  the  subject  affected  the  interests  of  a  self-govern- 
ing dominion,  the  British  government  reserved  the 
right  to  obtain  its  concurrence.  It  was  further 
agreed  (Article  2)  to  institute,  on  occasion,  a  Joint 
High  Commission  of  Inquiry,  to  which  controversies 
might  be  referred  for  investigation,  including  any  as 
to  whether  a  difference  was  "justiciable  " ;  and  it  was 
stipulated  (Article  3)  that  if  all  or  all  but  one  of  the 
members  of  the  commission  should  report  that  the 
difference  was  of  that  character,  it  should  be  re- 
ferred to  arbitration.  The  Senate  amended  these 
treaties  (1)  by  making  it  certain  that  a  "special 
agreement,"  requiring  its  approval,  must  be  effected 
in  each  case  of  arbitration;  (2)  by  denying  to  the 
Joint  High  Commission  of  Inquiry  any  power  finally 

334 


INTERNATIONAL  ARBITRATION 

to  decide  that  a  difference  was  arbitrable;  and  (3)  by- 
excluding  from  the  arbitral  obligation  any  question 
affecting  the  admission  of  aliens  into  the  United 
States  or  to  State  educational  institutions,  the  terri- 
torial integrity  of  any  State  or  of  the  United  States, 
the  alleged  indebtedness  or  monied  obligation  of  any- 
State,  or  any  question  involving  the  maintenance  of 
the  Monroe  Doctrine,  "or  other  purely  governmental 
policy."     The  treaties  were  then  abandoned. 

In  the  spring  of  1913  a  paper,  later  published  under 
the  title  of  "President  Wilson's  Peace  Proposal," 
was  handed  by  Mr.  Bryan  to  members  of  the  Diplo- 
matic Corps  in  Washington.  It  proposed  that  all 
disputes  which  diplomacy  should  fail  to  adjust 
should  be  submitted  to  an  international  commission, 
pending  whose  investigation  and  report  war  should 
not  be  declared  nor  hostilities  begun.  In  a  memo- 
randum accompanying  the  proposal  Mr.  Bryan  sug- 
gested that  the  international  commission,  which  was 
to  have  the  power  to  act  on  its  own  initiative,  should 
be  composed  of  five  members,  each  government 
choosing  two,  only  one  of  whom  should  be  its  own 
citizen,  while  the  fifth  should  be  agreed  on  by  the 
contracting  parties.  A  year  was  to  be  allowed  for 
the' investigation  and  report.  It  was  further  stated 
that  the  United  States  was  prepared  to  consider 
the  question  of  maintaining  the  status  quo  as  to 
military  and  naval  preparations  during  the  period  of 
investigation;  and  it  was  tentatively  suggested  that, 
pending  such  period,  there  should  be  no  change  in 

335 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  military  and  naval  program  of  either  party  unless 
danger  from  a  third  power  should  compel  a  change, 
in  which  case  a  confidential  written  statement  of 
the  fact  by  the  party  menaced  was  to  release  both 
parties  from  the  obligation. 

Salvador  was  the  first  power  to  sign  the  plan  in 
treaty  form.  She  accepted  it  in  its  entirety,  includ- 
ing the  clause  as  to  military  and  naval  programs,  as 
did  Guatemala,  Panama,  Honduras,  and  Nicaragua. 
Treaties,  without  this  clause,  were  concluded  with 
various  powers.  Up  to  July,  1017,  the  ratifications 
of  treaties  embracing  the  essentials  of  the  plan  have 
been  exchanged  with  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile,  China, 
Costa  Rica,  Denmark,  Ecuador,  France,  Great 
Britain,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Italy,  Norway, 
Paraguay,  Peru,  Portugal,  Russia,  Spain,  Sweden, 
and  Uruguay.  They  do  not,  as  sometimes  is  ap- 
parently supposed,  bind  the  parties  to  arbitration, 
but  expressly  reserve  to  them  entire  freedom  of  ac- 
tion after  the  report  of  the  commission  shall  have  been 
made.  The  underlying  thought  of  the  plan  is  three- 
fold: (1)  That  it  furnishes  an  honorable  means  of 
suspending  controversy;  (2)  that  the  suspension  of 
controversy  will  tranquillize  the  minds  of  the  dis- 
putants; and  (3)  that  the  report  of  the  commission  of 
investigation  probably  will  point  the  way  to  a  fair 
and  equitable  adjustment.  The  plan,  it  may  be 
observed,  makes  no  distinction  between  different 
kinds  of  rights.  It  embraces  "all  disputes"  as  to 
"questions  of  an  international  character,"  no  matter 

336 


INTERNATIONAL   ARBITRATION 

what  may  be  the  nature  of  the  right  asserted  or 
denied.  A  point  which  it  apparently  does  not  cover, 
a  point  which  it  is  indeed  very  difficult  to  meet  in 
advance  by  any  specific  provision,  is  that  of  what 
may  be  called  a  continuing  injury,  consisting  of  a 
wilful  and  persistent  aggression  upon  substantial 
rights  either  as  to  persons,  or  as  to  property,  or  as 
to  jurisdiction,  or  as  to  commerce,  rights  in  whose 
deliberate  and  prolonged  invasion  other  governments 
cannot  lawfully  or  properly  be  asked  to  acquiesce. 

When  we  consider  the  future  of  international 
arbitration,  whether  in  America  or  elsewhere,  we 
are  at  once  confronted  with  the  question  as  to  its 
limitations.  Is  it  possible  to  fix  any  precise  bounds, 
beyond  which  this  mode  of  settling  international 
disputes  may  be  said  to  be  impracticable?  If  we 
consult  the  history  of  arbitrations  during  the  past 
hundred  years,  we  are  obliged  to  answer  that  no 
such  lines  can  be  definitely  drawn;  but  this  is  far 
from  affirming  that  the  use  of  force  in  the  conduct 
of  international  affairs  will  soon  be  abolished.  It 
signifies  merely  that  phrases  such  as  "national 
honor"  and  "national  self-defence,"  which  have 
been  employed  in  describing  supposed  exceptions 
to  the  principle  of  arbitration,  convey  no  definitive 
meaning.  Questions  of  honor  and  of  self-defence 
are,  in  international  as  in  private  relations,  matters 
partly  of  circumstance  and  partly  of  opinion.  When 
the  United  States,  in  1863,  first  proposed  that  the 
differences  that  had  arisen  with  Great  Britain,  as 

22  337 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

to  the  fitting  out  of  the  Alabama  and  other  Con- 
federate cruisers,  should  be  submitted  to  arbitra- 
tion, Earl  Russell  rejected  the  overture  on  the 
ground  that  the  questions  in  controversy  involved 
the  "honor"  of  her  Majesty's  government,  of  which 
that  government  was  declared  to  be  "the  sole 
guardian."  Eight  years  later  there  was  concluded 
at  Washington  the  treaty  under  which  the  differ- 
ences between  the  two  governments  were  submitted 
to  the  judgment  of  the  tribunal  that  met  at  Geneva. 
This  remarkable  example  serves  to  illustrate  the 
fact  that  the  scope  and  progress  of  arbitration  will 
depend,  not  so  much  upon  special  devices,  or  upon 
general  declarations  or  descriptive  exceptions,  as 
upon  the  dispositions  of  nations,  dispositions  which, 
although  they  are  subject  to  the  modifying  in- 
fluence of  public  opinion,  spring  primarily  from  the 
national  feelings,  the  national  interests,  and  the 
national  ambitions. 


References: 

See  Moore's  History  and  Digest  of  International  Arbitrations, 
Washington,   1898.     6  vols. 

As  to  The  Hague  Conferences,  see  the  works  of  Holls  and 
James  Brown  Scott  (the  latter  covering  both  conferences, 
1899,  1907);    also  The  Memoirs  of  Andrew  D.  White. 

See  also  the  Reports  of  the  International  American  Con- 
ferences. 


IX 

THE  TERRITORIAL  EXPANSION  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

As  conventionalized  in  the  annual  messages  of 
Presidents  to  Congress,  the  American  people  are  dis- 
tinguished chiefly  by  their  peaceful  disposition  and 
their  freedom  from  territorial  ambitions.  Neverthe- 
less, in  spite  of  these  quiet  propensities,  it  has  fallen  to 
their  lot,  since  they  forcibly  achieved  their  indepen- 
dence, to  have  had,  prior  to  that  whose  existence  was 
declared  April  6,  191 7,  four  foreign  wars,  three 
general  and  one  limited,  and  the  greatest  civil  war 
in  history,  and  to  have  acquired  a  territorial  do- 
main almost  five  times  as  great  as  the  respectable 
endowment  with  which  they  began  their  national 
career.  In  reality,  to  the  founders  of  the  American 
Republic  the  question  of  territorial  expansion  did 
not  present  itself  as  a  matter  of  speculation,  or  even 
of  choice.  There  was  not  a  single  European  power 
having  possessions  in  America  that  did  not  lay  claim 
to  more  territory  than  it  had  effectively  occupied, 
nor  was  there  a  single  one  whose  claims  were  not 
contested  by  some  other  power;  and  these  contests 
were  interwoven  with  the  monopolistic  struggle 
then  in  progress  for  colonial  commerce  and  naviga* 

339 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tion.     The  Spaniards  and  the  Portuguese,  the  Eng- 
lish and  the  French,  the  Swedes  and  the  Dutch,  con- 
tended with  one  another  in  Europe  as  well  as  in 
America   for  empire  on  the  American  continents. 
Their  colonists  knew  no  rule  of  life  but  that  of  con- 
flict;   and    they    regarded    the    extension    of    their 
boundaries  as  a  measure  of  self-defence  rather  than 
of  aggression.     We  have  seen  that,  by  the  treaty  of 
alliance  with  France  of  1778,  the  remaining  British 
possession   in   North   America,    if   they   should   be 
wrested  from  the  mother-country,  were  to  be  "con- 
federated  with   or   dependent   upon"    the    United 
States;  and  in  harmony  with  this  stipulation,  pro- 
vision was  made  in  the  Articles  of  Confederation 
(Article  xi.)  for  the  full  admission  of  Canada  into 
the  Union.     No  other  colony  was  to  be  so  admitted 
without  the  consent  of  nine  States ;  and  unless  they 
consented,  the  colony,  if  seized,  was  to  remain  in  a 
"dependent"  position.     With  the  independence  of 
the  United  States,  a  new  force  entered  into  the  ter- 
ritorial contests   in  America,   but  it  did  not  stay 
their  course.     On  the  north  of  the  new  republic  lay 
the  possessions  of  Great  Britain;  on  the  west,  the 
possessions  of  France ;  on  the  south,  the  possessions 
of  Spain.     With  all  these  powers  there  were  ques- 
tions of  boundary,  while  the  colonial  restrictions  in 
commerce  and  in  navigation  were  as  so  many  withes 
by  which  the  limbs  of  the  young  giant  were  fettered. 
It  was  in  order  to  obtain  relief  from  such  condi- 

340 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

tions  that  the  United  States  acquired  Louisiana. 
To  the  inhabitants  of  the  West,  the  Mississippi 
River  was,  as  Madison  once  declared,  the  Hudson, 
the  Delaware,  the  Potomac,  and  all  the  navigable 
rivers  of  the  Atlantic  States  formed  into  one  stream. 
During  the  dark  hours  of  the  American  Revolution, 
the  Continental  Congress  seemed  to  be  ready  to 
yield  to  Spain,  in  return  for  her  alliance,  the  ex- 
clusive right  to  navigate  the  Mississippi;  but  for- 
tunately this  was  not  done.  After  the  re-estab- 
lishment of  peace,  Spain  continued  to  maintain  her 
exclusive  claims.  But  the  opposition  to  them  in 
the  United  States  steadily  grew  stronger  and  louder ; 
and  at  length,  on  October  27,  1795,  encompassed 
by  many  perils  in  her  foreign  relations,  Spain  con- 
ceded to  the  United  States  the  free  navigation  of  the 
Mississippi,  together  with  the  privilege  of  depositing 
merchandise  at  New  Orleans  and  thence  exporting 
it  without  payment  of  duty.  The  incalculable  ad- 
vantage of  this  arrangement  was  daily  growing  more 
manifest  when,  early  in  1801,  rumors  began  to  pre- 
vail that  Spain  had  ceded  both  Louisiana  and  the 
Floridas  to  France.  As  a  neighbor,  Spain,  because 
of  the  internal  weakness  of  her  government  and  the 
consequent  unaggressiveness  of  her  foreign  policy, 
was  not  feared;  but  an  apprehension  had  from  the 
5rst  been  exhibited  by  the  United  States  as  to  the 
possibility  of  being  hemmed  in  by  colonies  of  Eng- 
land and  France.     If  the  rumored  cession  should 

34i 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

prove  to  be  true,  the  arrangement  with  Spain  with 
regard  to  the  Mississippi  was  threatened  with  ex- 
tinction. Jefferson  was  therefore  hardly  extrava- 
gant when  he  declared  that  the  cession  of  Louisiana 
and  the  Floridas  by  Spain  to  France  would  com- 
pletely reverse  all  the  political  relations  of  the 
United  States,  and  would  render  France,  as  the  pos- 
sessor of  New  Orleans,  "our  natural  and  habitual 
enemy." 

The  treaty  of  cession  was  in  fact  signed  at  San 
Ildefonso,  on  October  i,  1800;  but  it  was  not  pub- 
lished and  even  its  existence  was  officially  denied. 
It  did  not  embrace  the  Floridas,  but  included  the 
whole  of  the  vast  domain  then  known  as  Louisiana. 
The  administration  at  Washington,  though  in  the 
dark  as  to  what  had  actually  been  done,  felt  the 
necessity  of  action.  It  desired  if  possible  to  prevent 
the  transfer  of  the  territory ;  or,  if  this  could  not  be 
accomplished,  to  obtain  from  France  the  Floridas, 
if  they  were  included  in  the  cession,  or  at  least  West 
Florida,  so  as  to  give  the  United  States  a  continu- 
ous stretch  of  territory  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the 
Mississippi.  With  these  objects  in  view,  Jefferson 
appointed  Robert  R.  Livingston  as  minister  to 
France.  Livingston  set  out  on  his  mission  early  in 
October,  1801.  On  his  arrival  in  Paris  he  soon 
became  convinced  that  the  cession  of  Louisiana,  if 
not  of  the  Floridas,   had  been  concluded;  and  he 

hinted  to  Talleyrand,   who  was  then  Minister  of 

342 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

Foreign  Affairs,  that  Louisiana  might  be  transferred 
to  the  United  States  in  payment  of  debts  due  by 
France  to  American  citizens.  Talleyrand  replied, 
"None  but  spendthrifts  satisfy  their  debts  by  sell- 
ing their  lands,"  and  then,  after  a  pause,  blandly 
added,  "But  it  is  not  ours  to  give."  Livingston 
was  not  deceived  by  this  evasion ;  on  the  contrary, 
he  endeavored  to  obtain,  by  appeal  to  the  First  Con- 
sul himself,  Napoleon,  the  cession,  not  of  the  whole 
but  of  a  part  of  Louisiana,  or  at  any  rate  an  assur- 
ance that  the  transfer  of  the  territory  by  Spain  to 
France  would  not  be  permitted  to  disturb  the  arrange- 
ment as  to  the  use  of  the  Mississippi.  On  February 
ii,  1802,  Talleyrand  informed  Livingston  that  he  had 
been  instructed  by  the  First  Consul  to  give  the  most 
positive  assurance  on  this  subject ;  but  it  had  barely 
been  given,  when  a  report  reached  Washington  that 
the  Spanish  intendant  at  New  Orleans  had  sus- 
pended the  right  of  deposit.  It  was  soon  learned 
that  the  suspension  was  not  authorized  by  the  Span- 
ish government,  but  the  act  of  the  intendant  gave 
rise  to  energetic  discussions  in  Congress.  A  reso- 
lution was  adopted  by  the  House  declaring  that  the 
stipulated  rights  of  the  United  States  in  the  Missis- 
sippi would  be  inviolably  maintained,  while  a  reso- 
lution was  offered  in  the  Senate  to  authorize  the 
President  to  take  forcible  possession  of  such  places 
as  might  be  necessary  to  secure  their  full  enjoyment. 
The   state   of  public   feeling   was   such  that   every 

34.3 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

branch  of  the  government  felt  obliged  to  take 
measures  not  only  to  preserve  existing  rights,  but 
also,  if  possible,  to  enlarge  and  safeguard  them.  With 
this  end  in  view,  James  Monroe  was  joined  with 
Livingston  in  an  extraordinary  commission  to  treat 
with  France,  and  with  Charles  Pinckney  in  a  like 
commission  to  treat,  if  necessary,  with  Spain.  The 
specific  objects  of  the  mission,  as  defined  in  the  in- 
structions given  by  Madison,  as  Secretary  of  State, 
on  March  2,  1803,  were  the  cession  to  the  United 
States  of  the  island  of  New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas. 
Meanwhile,  Livingston  had,  if  possible,  redoubled 
his  exertions.  His  favorite  plan  was  to  obtain  from 
France  the  cession  of  the  island  of  New  Orleans  and 
all  that  part  of  Louisiana  lying  northward  of  the 
Arkansas  River;  and  he  also  urged  the  cession  of 
West  Florida,  if  France  had  obtained  it  from  Spain. 
On  Monday,  April  nth,  he  held  with  Talleyrand  a 
memorable  and  startling  interview.  Livingston  was 
expatiating  upon  the  subject  of  New  Orleans,  when 
Talleyrand  quietly  inquired  whether  the  United 
States  desired  the  "whole  of  Louisiana."  Living- 
ston answered  that  their  wishes  extended  only  to 
New  Orleans  and  the  Floridas,  though  policy  dic- 
tated that  France  should  also  cede  the  country  above 
the  river  Arkansas;  but  Talleyrand  observed  that, 
if  they  gave  New  Orleans,  the  rest  would  be  of  little 
value,  and  asked  what  the  United  States  would 
"give   for   the   whole."     Livingston   suggested   the 

344 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

sum  of  20,000,000  francs,  provided  the  claims  of 
American  citizens  were  paid.  Talleyrand  declared 
the  offer  too  low,  but  disclaimed  having  spoken  of 
the  matter  by  authority.  In  reality  Napoleon  had, 
on  the  preceding  day,  announced  to  two  of  his 
ministers  his  final  resolution.  The  expedition  to 
Santo  Domingo  had  miserably  failed;  colonial  en- 
terprises appeared  to  be  no  longer  practicable;  war 
with  England  was  at  hand;  and  it  seemed  wiser  to 
sell  colonies  than  go  down  with  them  in  disaster. 
In  this  predicament  Napoleon  decided  to  sell  to 
the  United  States  not  only  New  Orleans  but  the 
whole  of  Louisiana,  and  only  a  few  hours  before  the 
interview  between  Talleyrand  and  Livingston  was 
held,  had  instructed  Barbe  Marbois,  his  Minister  of 
Finance,  to  negotiate  the  sale. 

Monroe  arrived  in  Paris  on  April  12th.  On  the 
next  day  Marbois  informed  Livingston  that  Na- 
poleon had  authorized  him  to  say  that,  if  the  Amer- 
icans would  give  100,000,000  francs  and  pay  their 
own  claims,  they  might  "take  the  whole  country." 
Noting  Livingston's  surprise  at  the  price,  Marbois 
eventually  suggested  that  the  United  States  should 
pay  to  France  the  sum  of  60,000,000  francs  and  as- 
sume the  claims  of  its  own  citizens  to  the  amount 
of  20,000,000  more.  Livingston  declared  that  it 
was  in  vain  to  ask  a  thing  so  greatly  beyond  their 
means,  but  promised  to  consult  with  Monroe.  The 
American    plenipotentiaries    were    thus    confronted 

345 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

with  a  momentous  question  concerning  which  in  its 
full  extent  their  instructions  did  not  authorize  them 
to  treat;  but  properly  interpreting  the  purposes  of 
their  government  and  the  spirit  of  their  country- 
men, they  promptly  and  boldly  assumed  the  re- 
sponsibility. They  accepted  Marbois's  terms,  ex- 
cessive as  they  at  first  seemed,  and  took  the  whole 
province.  Speaking  in  a  prophetic  strain,  Living- 
ston, when  he  had  affixed  his  name  to  the  treaty  of 
cession,  exclaimed :  "  We  have  lived  long,  but  this 
is  the  noblest  work  of  our  lives.  .  .  .  To-day  the 
United  States  take  their  place  among  the  powers 
of  the  first  rank.  .  .  .  The  instrument  we  have  signed 
will  cause  no  tears  to  flow.  It  will  prepare  centu- 
ries of  happiness  for  innumerable  generations  of  the 
human  race."  Time  has  verified  Livingston's  pre- 
vision. The  purchase  of  Louisiana  has  contributed 
more  than  any  other  territorial  acquisition  to  make 
the  United  States  what  it  is  to-day. 

Though  the  whole  of  Louisiana  was  ceded,  its 
limits  were  undefined.  The  province  was  retro- 
ceded  by  Spain  to  France  in  1800  "with  the  same 
extent  that  it  now  has  in  the  hands  of  Spain,  and 
that  it  had  when  France  possessed  it,"  and  by  the 
treaty  of  April  30,  1803,  the  territory  was  ceded  to 
the  United  States  "in  the  same  manner,"  but  the 
boundaries  had  never  been  precisely  determined. 
Livingston  and  Monroe  assured  their  government 
that  the  cession  extended  to  the  river  Perdido,  and 

346 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

therefore  embraced  West  Florida.  This  claim  was 
not  sanctioned  by  France,  but  Congress,  acting 
upon  Livingston  and  Monroe's  assurance,  author- 
ized the  President  in  his  discretion  to  erect  "the 
bay  and  river  Mobile"  and  the  adjacent  terri- 
tory into  a  customs  district.  Spain  strongly  pro- 
tested, and  the  execution  of  the  measure  was  held 
in  suspense.  In  the  summer  of  1810,  however, 
a  revolution  took  place  in  West  Florida.  Baton 
Rouge  was  seized ;  the  independence  of  the  province 
was  declared;  and  an  application  was  made  for  its 
admission  into  the  Union.  The  President  repulsed 
this  application,  but  occupied  the  territory,  as  far  as 
the  river  Pearl,  as  part  of  the  Louisiana  purchase. 
The  country  lying  between  that  stream  and  the 
Perdido  was  permitted  still  to  remain  in  the  pos- 
session of  Spain. 

On  January  3,  181 1,  President  Madison,  incited  by 
the  political  situation  in  America  as  well  as  in  Europe, 
sent  to  Congress  a  secret  message,  in  which  he  recom- 
mended that  the  Executive  be  authorized  to  take 
temporary  possession  of  any  part  of  the  Floridas,  in 
certain  contingencies.  As  to  West  Florida,  Congress 
had  already  clothed  the  Executive  with  ample  pow- 
ers; but  as  East  Florida  unquestionably  still  be- 
longed to  Spain,  Congress  authorized  the  President 
to  occupy  all  or  any  part  of  the  country,  either  un- 
der arrangements  with  the  local  authorities  or  in 
case  a  foreign  government  should  attempt  to  seize 

347 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

it.  Under  this  act,  East  Florida  was  taken  pos' 
session  of  all  the  way  from  Fernandina  to  St.  Au- 
gustine; but  the  manner  in  which  it  was  done  was 
disapproved  by  the  government  at  Washington,  and 
in  May,  1813,  the  country  was  finally  evacuated  by 
the  American  forces.  During  the  war  of  181 2,  West 
Florida  was  the  scene  of  hostilities  between  the 
British  and  the  American  forces,  and  in  181 7  and 
1818  it  was  the  theatre  of  the  famous  Seminole  war. 
Meanwhile  the  government  of  the  United  States  was 
endeavoring  to  obtain  from  Spain  the  relinquish- 
ment of  her  provinces.  The  negotiations,  which 
were  conducted  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  by 
John  Quincy  Adams,  were  brought  to  a  close  by  the 
treaty  of  February  22,  18 19,  by  which  Spain  ceded 
to  the  United  States  not  only  the  Floridas,  but  also 
all  the  Spanish  titles  north  of  the  forty -second  par- 
allel of  north  latitude  from  the  source  of  the  Ar- 
kansas River  to  the  Pacific  Ocean.  In  return,  the 
United  States  agreed  to  pay  the  claims  of  its  citizens 
against  Spain  to  an  amount  not  exceeding  $5,000,- 
000,  and  to  indemnify  the  Spanish  inhabitants  of 
the  Floridas  for  injuries  suffered  at  the  hands  of 
American  forces,  besides  granting  to  Spanish  com- 
merce in  the  ceded  territories,  for  the  term  of  twelve 
years,  exceptional  privileges. 

While  the  United  States  retained  under  the  treaty 
of  1 8 19  all  the  territory  to  the  eastward  that  it 
claimed  as  part  of  Louisiana,  it  relinquished  by  the 

348 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

same  treaty  its  claim  to  the  imperial  domain  called 
Texas,  a  province  long  in  dispute  between  France 
and  Spain,  and  after  1803  between  Spain  and  the 
United  States.  Only  a  brief  time,  however,  elapsed 
when  efforts  began  to  be  made  to  recover  Texas, 
either  in  whole  or  in  part.  Two  such  attempts  were 
made  during  the  Presidency  of  John  Quincy  Adams, 
in  1825  and  1827.  The  effort  was  renewed  by  Presi- 
dent Jackson  in  1829,  and  again  in  1833.  In  August, 
1835,  the  American  minister  in  Mexico  was  directed 
to  persevere  in  the  task,  and  also  to  offer  half  a 
million  dollars  for  the  bay  of  San  Francisco  and  cer- 
tain adjacent  territory  as  a  resort  for  American 
vessels  in  the  Pacific.  On  March  2,  1836,  the  peo- 
ple of  Texas,  through  a  convention  of  delegates,  de- 
clared their  independence.  In  the  following  year 
President  Van  Buren  repelled  an  overture  for  an- 
nexation. The  independence  of  Texas  was,  how- 
ever, acknowledged  not  only  by  the  United  States, 
but  also  by  France  and  Great  Britain;  and  treaties 
were  made  with  Texas  by  all  those  powers.  On 
April  12,  1844,  a  treaty  of  annexation  was  concluded 
at  Washington.  This  treaty  having  failed  in  the 
Senate,  Congress,  by  a  joint  resolution  approved 
March  1,  1845,  took  action  looking  to  the  admission 
of  Texas  into  the  Union  as  a  State.  The  terms  of- 
fered in  the  resolution  were  accepted  by  Texas,  and 
by  a  joint  resolution  of  Congress,  approved  Decem- 
ber 29,   1845,  the  admission  was  formally  accom- 

349 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

plished.  No  acquisition  of  territory  by  the  United 
States  has  been  the  subject  of  so  much  honest  but 
partisan  misconception  as  that  of  the  annexation  of 
Texas.  By  a  school  of  writers  whose  views  have 
had  great  currency,  the  annexation  has  been  de- 
nounced as  the  result  of  a  plot  of  the  slave-power 
to  extend  its  dominions.  But,  calmly  surveying  the 
course  of  American  expansion,  we  are  forced  to  con- 
clude that  no  illusion  could  be  more  complete.  It 
would  be  more  nearly  correct  to  say  that,  but  for 
the  controversy  concerning  slavery,  there  would 
have  been  no  appreciable  opposition  in  the  United 
States  to  the  acquisition  of  Texas.  Such  local  an- 
tagonism as  might  have  existed  to  the  disturbance 
of  the  balance  of  power  in  the  Union  would  have 
been  overwhelmed  by  the  general  demand  for  an 
extension  of  boundaries  so  natural  and,  except  for 
the  slavery  question,  in  every  respect  so  expedient. 
Six  months  after  the  annexation  of  Texas,  the 
long  dispute  as  to  the  Oregon  territory  was  brought 
to  a  close.  This  territory  was  bounded,  according 
to  the  claim  of  the  United  States,  by  the  426.  par- 
allel of  north  latitude  on  the  south,  by  the  line  of 
540  40'  on  the  north,  and  by  the  Rocky  or  Stony 
Mountains  on  the  east.  It  embraced,  roughly  speak- 
ing, an  area  of  600,000  square  miles.  The  claim  of 
the  United  States  was  founded  upon  the  discovery 
by  Captain  Robert  Gray,  of  the  American  ship 
Columbia,  in  1792,  of  the  River  of  the  West,  which 

.350 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

he  named  from  his  ship  the  Columbia  River ;  the  ex- 
ploration of  the  main  branch  of  that  river  by  Lewis 
and  Clark;  the  establishment  of  the  fur-trading 
settlement  of  Astoria,  by  John  Jacob  Astor,  in  1811, 
and  its  restoration  to  the  United  States  under  the 
treaty  of  Ghent;  and  finally,  the  acquisition  in  1819 
of  all  the  territorial  rights  of  Spain  on  the  Pacific 
above  forty-second  degree  of  north  latitude.  By  the 
Democratic  national  platform  of  1844  the  title  of  the 
United  States  to  the  whole  of  Oregon  was  declared 
to  be  "clear  and  unquestionable."  This  declaration 
was  popularly  interpreted  to  mean  "  fifty-four  forty 
or  fight";  but  on  June  15,  1846,  under  the  shadow 
of  the  Mexican  war,  the  dispute  was  terminated  by 
a  nearly  equal  division  of*  the  territory  along  the 
forty-ninth  parallel  of  north  latitude. 

This  title  had  barely  been  assured,  when,  as  the 
result  of  the  war  with  Mexico,  the  United  States, 
by  the  treaty  signed  on  its  behalf  by  Nicholas  P. 
Trist,  in  defiance  of  instructions,  at  Guadalupe- 
Hidalgo,  on  February  2,  1848,  came  into  possession 
of  California  and  New  Mexico.  In  consideration 
of  these  cessions,  the  United  States  paid  to  Mexico 
$15,000,000,  and  assumed  the  payment  of  claims 
of  American  citizens  against  Mexico  to  an  amount 
not  exceeding  $3,250,000.  The  acquisitions  thus 
made  were  enlarged  by  the  convention  of  December 
30,  1853,  by  which  Mexico,  for  the  sum  of  $10,000,- 
000,   released  the  United  States  from  liability  on 

3Si 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

account  of  certain  stipulations  of  the  treaty  of  1848 
and  ceded  the  Mesilla  Valley.  This  cession,  which 
is  often  called  the  Gadsden  purchase,  was  strongly 
desired  by  the  United  States,  not  only  for  the  pur- 
pose of  establishing  a  safe  frontier  against  the  Ind- 
ians, but  also  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  a  feasi- 
ble route  for  a  railway  near  the  Gila  River. 

By  the  treaty  signed  at  Washington  on  March 
30,  1867,  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  in  consideration 
of  the  sum  of  $7,200,000,  conveyed  to  the  United 
States  all  his  "territory  and  dominion"  in  America. 
Many  strange  conjectures  have  been  made  as  to  the 
motives  of  this  transaction.  It  has  been  suggested 
that  it  was  merely  a  cover  for  the  reimbursement  to 
Russia  of  the  expenses  of  her  "  friendly  naval  dem- 
onstration" during  the  American  civil  war.  This 
explanation  may  be  placed  in  the  category  of  the 
grotesque.  Robert  J.  Walker  has  been  given  as 
authority  for  the  statement  that  the  Emperor 
Nicholas  was  ready  to  give  Alaska  to  the  United 
States  during  the  Crimean  war,  if  the  United  States 
would,  in  spite  of  the  treaty  of  1846,  reassert  its 
claim  to  the  whole  of  Oregon.  In  reality,  the  ter- 
ritory was  of  comparatively  small  value  to  Russia, 
who  had  for  years  leased  an  important  part  of  the 
coast  to  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company.  In  the  hands 
of  the  United  States  its  potential  value  was  obvious- 
ly greater.  Its  acquisition  was,  besides,  gratifying 
to  the  spirit  of  continental  dominion,  which  has  al- 

352 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

ways  been  so  strongly  manifested  by  the  people  of 
the  United  States. 

The  acquisition  of  the  Hawaiian  Islands,  under 
the  joint  resolution  of  Congress  of  July  7,  1898, 
marked  the  natural  consummation  of  the  special  re- 
lations that  had  long  subsisted  between  the  United 
States  and  that  island  group.  As  early  as  1853 
the  United  States,  while  William  L.  Marcy  was  Sec- 
retary of  State,  sought  to  annex  the  islands.  A 
treaty  of  annexation  was  negotiated,  but,  as  its 
form  was  unacceptable  to  the  United  States,  it  was 
put  aside  for  a  treaty  of  reciprocity.  This  treaty 
failed  to  receive  the  approval  of  the  Senate,  but  the 
agitation  for  annexation  or  reciprocity  continued; 
and  at  length,  on  January  30,  1875,  a  reciprocity 
treaty  was  concluded  by  which  the  islands  were 
virtually  placed  under  an  American  protectorate. 
This  treaty  was  renewed  in  1887,  the  United  States 
then  acquiring  the  right  to  establish  a  naval  station 
in  the  harbor  of  Pearl  River.  On  February  14, 
1893,  a  treaty  of  annexation  was  signed  at  Wash- 
ington, but  on  the  change  of  administration  it  was 
withdrawn  from  the  Senate.  Another  treaty  of 
annexation,  signed  on  June  16,  1897,  was  still  be- 
fore the  Senate  when  the  joint  resolution  was  passed 
by  which  the  acquisition  was  definitively  accom- 
plished. 

Alaska  and  Hawaii  were  far  distant  from  the 
United  States,  but  the  greater  part  of  Alaska  was  on 

23  353 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  continent  of  North  America,  and  the  Hawaiian 
Islands  had  so  long  been  the  subject  of  special  pro- 
tection as  to  have  come  to  be  considered  within 
the  sphere  of  American  influence.  The  war  with 
Spain  opened  a  new  vista.  Even  the  remotest  of 
the  Spanish  possessions  in  the  West  Indies  fell 
within  the  conception  of  America,  but  the  Spanish 
possessions  in  the  Far  East  lay  beyond  the  accus- 
tomed range  of  American  political  thought.  For 
some  weeks  after  the  destruction  of  the  Spanish 
fleet  at  Manila,  the  views  of  the  United  States  seem- 
ed scarcely  to  extend  beyond  the  possible  acquisi- 
tion of  a  naval  station  in  the  Philippines  for  strategic 
purposes.  The  desire  for  a  naval  station,  however, 
soon  grew  into  the  desire  for  an  island — perhaps  the 
island  of  Luzon.  When  news  came  of  the  capture 
of  .Manila  by  the  American  forces,  with  some  Ameri- 
can casualties,  the  desire  for  the  whole  group  re- 
ceived a  marked  impulse.  In  his  instructions  to 
the  American  peace  commissioners  at  Paris,  Presi- 
dent McKinley  said  that  the  United  States  would 
not  be  content  with  "  less  than  "  the  island  of  Luzon. 
More  than  two  months  elapsed  before  instructions 
were  given  to  take  the  whole  group;  and  even  then, 
as  the  records  show,  the  American  commissioners 
were  divided  on  the  question.  For  my  own  part, 
I  venture  to  express  the  opinion  that  the  problem 
was  simplified  by  taking  all  the  islands.  Though 
the  group  is  vast  in  extent,  it  is    physically   con- 

354 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

tinuous,  and,  if  a  considerable  part  of  it  had  been  re- 
tained by  Spain,  the  dangers  attendant  upon  native 
revolt  and  discontent  would  have  been  incalculably 
increased.  The  acquisition  of  Puerto  Rico  and 
other  Spanish  islands  in  the  West  Indies  provoked 
no  division  of  opinion. 

There  is  no  incident  in  the  history  of  the  United 
States  that  better  prepares  us  to  understand  the 
acquisition  of  the  Philippines  than  the  course  of  the 
government  towards  the  Samoan  Islands.  As  early 
as  1853,  if  not  earlier,  the  United  States  was  repre- 
sented at  Apia  by  a  commercial  agent;  but  the 
islands  and  their  affairs  attracted  little  attention 
till  1872,  when  the  great  chief  of  the  bay  of  Pago- 
Pago  (pronounced  Pango-Pango),  in  the  island  of 
Tutuila,  desirous  of  obtaining  the  protection  of  the 
United  States,  granted  to  the  government  the  ex- 
clusive privilege  of  establishing  a  naval  station  in 
that  harbor.  A  special  agent,  named  Steinberger, 
was  then  despatched  to  Samoa,  and,  after  making  a 
report,  he  was  sent  back  to  convey  to  the  chiefs  a 
letter  from  President  Grant  and  some  presents. 
Subsequently  he  set  up,  on  his  own  responsibility, 
a  government  in  the  islands  and  administered  it. 
But  as  ruler  of  Samoa  he  fell  into  difficulties,  and, 
with  the  concurrence  of  the  American  consul,  was 
deported  on  a  British  man-of-war.  On  January  16, 
1878,  a  treaty  between  the  United  States  and  Samoa 
was  concluded  at  Washington,  by  which  the  privi- 

355 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

leges  of  the  United  States  in  the  harbor  of  Pago- 
Pago  were  confirmed,  and  by  which  it  was  provided 
that,  if  differences  shall  arise  between  the  Samoan 
government  and  any  other  government  in  amity  with 
the  United  States,   the  latter  would   "employ  its 
good  offices  for  the  purpose  of  adjusting  those  dif- 
ferences upon  a  satisfactory  and  solid  foundation." 
It  was  under  this  clause  that  the  conference,  which 
was  held  in  Washington  in  June  and  July,    1887, 
between  Mr.  Bayard,  as  Secretary  of  State,  and  the 
British  and  German  ministers,  on  Samoan  affairs, 
was  brought  about.     The  conference  failed  to  pro- 
duce  an   agreement.     Germany   intervened  in   the 
islands,  and  became  involved  in  hostilities  with  a 
part  of  the  natives.     Steps  were  taken  to  protect 
American  interests,  and  the  relations  between  the 
United  States  and  Germany  had  become  decidedly 
strained  when,  on  the  invitation  of  Prince  Bismarck, 
the  sessions  of  the  conference  were  resumed  at  Ber- 
lin.    They  resulted  in  the  treaty  of  June  14,  1889, 
by  which  the  islands  were  placed  under  the  joint 
protection  and  administration  of  the  three  powers. 
One  of  the  first  acts  of  the  United  States  after  the  war 
with  Spain  was  the  termination  of  this  cumbersome 
system  of  tripartite  government,  which,  apart  from 
an  adjustment  of  claims  to  land,  had    yielded  no 
beneficial   result.     Disorders   had   increased    rather 
than  diminished,  while  local  complications  at  times 
threatened  to  disturb   the   good   understanding   of 

356 


TERRITORIAL   EXPANSION 

the  intervening  powers.  At  length  there  was  sug- 
gested, to  take  the  place  of  the  treaty  of  1889,  a 
"condominium"  under  which  the  functions  of  sov- 
ereignty were  to  be  exercised  by  unanimous  consent 
of  the  three  powers.  Fortunately,  this  device  was 
not  tried.  A  radical  solution  was  wisely  adopted. 
By  a  convention  between  the  three  powers,  signed 
at  Washington,  December  2,  1899,  the  group  was 
divided,  the  United  States  securing  all  the  islands 
east  of  the  meridian  of  1710  west  of  Greenwich, 
while  Germany  obtained  all  west  of  that  line.  Great 
Britain  retired  for  compensation  from  Germany  in 
other  directions.  The  principal  islands,  Savaii  and 
Upolu,  fell  to  Germany,  her  preponderant  commercial 
and  landed  interests  being  thus  recognized,  as  those 
of  the  United  States  in  Hawaii  had  been  by  Germany 
in  the  days  of  Prince  Bismarck.  The  island  of 
Tutuila,  with  the  much-coveted  harbor  of  Pago 
Pago,  was  among  the  islands  that  passed  exclusively 
to  the  United  States.  The  significance  of  the 
Samoan  incident  lies,  however,  not  in  the  mere 
division  of  territory,  but  in  the  disposition  shown  by 
the  United  States,  long  before  the  acquisition  of  the 
Philippines,  to  have  a  voice  in  determining  the  fate 
of  a  remote  island  group  in  which  American  com- 
mercial interests  were  so  slight  as  to  be  scarcely 
appreciable. 

By  the  convention  with  the  Republic  of  Panama, 
November  18,  1903,  the  United  States  acquired  in 
perpetuity   the  use,   occupation,   and  control  of  a 

357 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

zone  ten  miles  wide  on  the  Isthmus  of  Panama,  and 
certain  adjacent  islands,  for  the  purposes  of  an  in- 
teroceanic  canal.  Within  these  lands  and  the  ad- 
jacent waters  the  United  States  possesses  "all  the 
rights,  power,  and  authority"  which  it  would  have 
if  it  were  the  sovereign  of  the  territory  within  which 
the  lands  and  waters  lie.  It  may  be  observed  that 
an  unsuccessful  effort  was  made  in  1856  to  obtain 
from  New  Granada  the  cession  of  five  islands  in  the 
bay  of  Panama,  with  a  view  to  protect  the  isthmian 
route. 

In  1903  Cuba  leased  to  the  United  States  coaling 
and  naval  stations  at  Guantanamo  and  Bahia  Honda. 
While  the  United  States  agreed  to  recognize  the  con- 
tinuance of  the  "ultimate  sovereignty"  of  Cuba 
over  the  areas  of  land  and  water  thus  leased,  Cuba 
agreed  that  the  United  States  should  exercise  "com- 
plete jurisdiction  and  control"  over  them. 

By  the  treaty  of  August  5,  19 14,  Nicaragua  leased 
to  the  United  States,  for  the  term  of  ninety-nine 
years,  the  Corn  Islands  and  also  a  naval  base,  to  be 
selected  by  the  United  States,  in  the  territory  of 
Nicaragua  bordering  on  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca.  The 
treaty  also  gives  the  United  States  the  option  of 
renewing  the  leases,  and  declares  that  the  leased 
places  "shall  be  subject  exclusively  to  the  laws  and 
sovereign  authority  of  the  United  States  during  the 
terms  of  such  lease  and  grant  and  of  any  renewal 
or  renewals  thereof." 

As  early  as  January,  1865,  Mr.  Seward  began  to 

358 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

sound  the  Danish  government  as  to  the  cession  of 
its  islands  in  the  West  Indies.  His  advances  were 
discouraged,  but  they  were  renewed  officially  in 
July,  1866.  A  convention  for  the  cession  of  St. 
Thomas  and  St.  John  for  $7,500,000,  leaving  Santa 
Cruz  to  Denmark,  was  signed  at  Copenhagen  on 
October  24,  1867.  As  stipulated  in  the  treaty,  a 
vote  was  taken  in  the  islands;  it  was  almost  unani- 
mously in  favor  of  annexation  to  the  United  States. 
This  circumstance  greatly  increased  the  embarrass- 
ment of  the  Danish  government  when  the  United 
States  Senate  failed  to  approve  the  treaty.  On 
January  24,  1902,  a  convention  was  signed  at  Wash- 
ington for  the  cession  to  the  United  States  of  the 
islands  of  St.  Thomas,  St.  John,  and  Santa  Cruz, 
with  the  adjacent  islands  and  rocks,  all  for  the  sum 
of  $5,000,000.  It  was  approved  by  the  Senate  on 
February  17,  1902.  It  was  approved  by  the  lower 
house  of  the  Danish  Rigsdag;  but  on  October  21, 
1902,  it  failed  in  the  upper  house,  by  an  even  di- 
vision. The  cession  was,  however,  eventually  ef- 
fected by  a  treaty,  concluded  August  4,  1916,  by 
which  the  United  States  agreed  to  pay  $25,000,000. 
The  transaction  was  completed.  The  United  States 
has  named  the  group  the  Virgin  Islands. 

Besides  the  annexations  above  detailed  the  United 
States  has  acquired  or  assumed  jurisdiction  over 
many  islands  in  various  parts  of  the  world.  In  1850 
the  cession  was  obtained  from  Great  Britain  of 
Horse-Shoe  Reef,  in  Lake  Erie,  for  the  purposes  of  a 

359 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

lighthouse.  In  1867,  Brooks  or  Midway  Islands, 
lying  eleven  hundred  miles  west  of  Honolulu,  were 
formally  occupied  by  the  commander  of  the  U.  S.  S. 
Lackawanna.  In  like  manner  the  atoll  called  Wake 
Island,  lying  in  latitude  190  17'  50"  north  and 
longitude  1660  31'  east,  was  taken  possession  of  in 
1899  by  the  commander  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Bennington. 
But  the  greatest  extension  of  jurisdiction  over  de- 
tached islands  or  groups  of  islands  has  taken  place 
under  the  Guano  Islands  Act  of  August  18,  1856. 
By  this  act,  where  an  American  citizen  discovers  a 
deposit  of  guano  on  an  island,  rock,  or  key,  not 
within  the  jurisdiction  of  any  other  government, 
and  takes  peaceable  possession  and  gives  a  certain 
bond,  the  President  may,  at  his  discretion,  treat  the 
territory  as  "appertaining  to  the  United  States"; 
but  the  government  is  not  obliged  to  retain  pos- 
session after  the  guano  shall  have  been  removed. 
Under  this  statute  more  than  eighty  islands,  lying 
in  various  parts  of  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific,  have 
been  brought  within  American  jurisdiction. 

The  actual  acquisitions  of  territory  by  the  United 
States  by  no  means  indicate  the  scope  of  its  diplo- 
matic activities  in  that  direction.  Efforts  have 
been  made  to  annex  territory  which  has  not  event- 
ually been  obtained.  As  late  as  1870  the  annexation 
of  Canada,  to  which  the  Articles  of  Confederation 
looked,  was  the  subject  of  informal  discussions  be- 
tween British  and  American  diplomatists.  In  De- 
cember,  1822,  the  government  of  Salvador,  acting 

360 


TERRITORIAL    EXPANSION 

under  a  decree  of  its  Congress,  dispatched  three 
commissioners  to  Washington  to  offer  the  sover- 
eignty of  the  country  to  the  United  wStates,  but  be- 
fore their  arrival  the  situation  had  changed  and  the 
proposal  was  abandoned.  Ever  since  the  founda- 
tion of  the  American  Republic,  the  annexation  of 
Cuba  has  formed  a  topic  of  discussion  and  of  diplo- 
matic activity.  John  Quincy  Adams  in  1823  de- 
clared that  Cuba,  if  forcibly  disjoined  from  Spain, 
and  incapable  of  self-support,  could  gravitate  only 
towards  the  North  American  Union;  and  Jefferson 
confessed  that  he  had  "ever  looked  on  Cuba  as  the 
most  interesting  addition  which  could  ever  be  made 
to  our  system  of  states."  In  1848  an  offer  was 
made  to  Spain  to  purchase  the  island  for  $100,000,- 
000,  but  it  was  summarily  repulsed.  During  the 
Civil  War  in  the  United  States,  the  discussion  of 
the  Cuban  question,  which  had  actively  continued 
during  the  administrations  of  Pierce  and  Buchanan, 
was  suspended;  but  it  was  revived  by  the  breaking 
out  of  the  Ten  Years'  War  in  Cuba,  in  1868.  In  the 
next  year  a  vigorous  effort  was  made  to  secure  the 
separation  of  Cuba  from  Spain  either  by  annexation 
to  the  United  States  or  by  the  grant  of  independence 
under  the  guarantee  of  the  United  States.  This 
was  the  last  definite  proposal  made  to  Spain  for 
annexation,  and,  when  the  United  States  eventually 
intervened,  it  was  for  the  purpose  of  establishing 
Cuban  independence.  In  the  peace  negotiations 
at  Paris,   the  Spanish  commissioners  proposed  to 

361 


r 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

cede  the  island  to  the  United  States.  The  pro- 
posal was  declined;  and  the  manner  in  which  the 
resolution  of  intervention  was  kept,  by  the  estab- 
lishment of  an  independent  government  under  safe- 
guards which  cannot  hamper  the  exercise  of  the 
island's  sovereignty  for  any  legitimate  purpose, 
forms  one  of  the  most  honorable  chapters  in  diplo- 
matic history. 

In  1848  an  offer  of  the  sovereignty  of  Yucatan 
was  made  to  the  United  States,  but  the  occasion 
for  its  consideration  soon  passed  away. 

In  negotiations  with  the  Dominican  Republic,  in 
1854,  for  a  commercial  treaty,  an  effort  was  made 
to  obtain  for  the  United  States  a  coaling  station  in 
Samana  Bay.  An  examination  of  the  bay  had 
been  made  by  Captain  George  B.  McClellan,  whose 
report  may  be  found  among  the  Congressional  docu- 
ments. The  effort  to  obtain  the  desired  privilege 
was  renewed  in  1855,  but  without  success.  In  1866, 
Air.  F.  W.  Seward,  Assistant  Secretary  of  State, 
was  sent  to  Santo  Domingo  for  the  purpose  of  se- 
curing a  cession  or  lease  of  the  peninsula  of  Samana 
as  a  naval  station.  His  mission  was  not  successful, 
but  its  object  was  not  abandoned,  and  his  powers 
were  transferred  to  the  commercial  agent  at  Santo 
Domingo  City.  In  1868  the  President  of  the  Do- 
minican Republic  requested  the  United  States  im- 
mediately to  take  the  country  under  its  protection 
and  occupy  Samana  Bay  and  other  strategic  points 
as  a  preliminary  to  annexation.     In  his  annual  mes- 

362 


TERRITORIAL   EXPANSION 

sage  of  December  9,  1868,  President  Johnson,  Mr. 
Seward  still  being  Secretary  of  State,  advocated  the 
acquisition  of  "the  several  adjacent  continental  and 
insular  communities  as  speedily  as  it  may  be  done 
peacefully,  lawfully,  and  without  any  violation  of 
national  justice,  faith,  or  honor,"  and  declared  that, 
while  foreign  possession  or  control  of  them  had 
"hindered  the  growth  and  impaired  the  influence  of 
the  United  States,"  "chronic  revolution  and  anarchy 
would  be  equally  injurious."  A  joint  resolution 
was  introduced  in  the  House  of  Representatives  for 
the  annexation  of  the  Dominican  Republic.  An 
agent  from  Santo  Domingo  was  then  in  Washington 
awaiting  action.  The  project  was  warmly  espoused 
by  President  Grant,  and  on  November  29,  i86g) 
two  treaties  were  concluded,  one  for  the  annexation 
of  the  Dominican  Republic  and  the  other  for  the 
lease  of  Samana  Bay.  Both  instruments  were  com- 
municated to  the  Senate  on  January  10,  1870. 
They  failed  to  receive  that  body's  approval.  In  his 
last  annual  message  to  Congress,  in  1876,  President 
Grant  recurred  to  the  subject,  reaffirming  his  belief 
in  the  wisdom  of  the  policy  that  he  had  proposed. 

In  1867  George  Bancroft  was  instructed,  while 
proceeding  as  minister  to  Berlin,  to  call  at  Madrid 
and  sound  the  Spanish  government  as  to  the  cession 
of  the  islands  of  Culebra  and  Culebrita,  in  the  Span- 
ish West  Indies,  to  the  United  States  as  a  naval  sta- 
tion. The  results  of  his  inquiries  were  so  discourag- 
ing that  the  subject  was  peremptorily  dropped ;   but 

363 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  islands  came  into  the  possession  of  the  United 
States  under  the  treaty  of  peace  with  Spain  of  1898. 
The  Mole  St.  Nicolas,  in  Hayti,  was  leased  by  the 
United  States  during  the  Civil  War  as  a  naval  sta- 
tion. In  1 89 1,  however,  the  Haytian  government 
declined  to  let  the  harbor  again  for  a  similar  purpose. 

References: 

For  a  review  of  the  Territorial  Expansion  of  the  United 

States,  see 
Moore's  Digest  of  International  Law,  I,  429  ct  seq.; 
Bancroft's  (Frederic)  Life  of  Seward; 
Barbe  Marbois's  History  of  Louisiana; 
Roosevelt's  Winning  of  the  West. 


X 

PAN    AMERICANISM 

The  American  republics  number  just  twenty-one. 
The  youngest,  Panama,  which  suddenly  came  into 
being  late  in  1903,  was  very  shortly  preceded  in 
existence  by  Cuba.  With  the  exception  of  the 
United  States  they  are  all,  politically  speaking,  of 
"Latin"  origin,  and  constitute  what  is  for  that 
reason  called  Latin  America,  occupying  the  vast 
region  formerly  ruled  by  Spain  and  by  Portugal. 
The  Portuguese  dominions,  though  greater  in  extent 
than  the  connected  continental  area  of  the  United 
States,  are  comprised  in  what  was  for  sixty-seven 
years  the  empire,  but  is  now  the  republic,  of  Brazil. 
The  remaining  nineteen  countries  were  once  colonies 
or  provinces  of  Spain.  When  we  speak  of  Pan 
Americanism  we  associate  the  countries  of  Spanish 
and  of  Portuguese  derivation  with  the  United  States, 
and  thus  link  together  in  our  thoughts  all  the  in- 
dependent governments  of  America. 

The  chief  significance  to  Spain  of  the  American 
Revolution  lay  in  the  fact  that  it  marked  the  be- 
ginning of  the  end  of  the  old  system  of  colonial 

365 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

monopoly.  In  the  Orient,  as  well  as  in  America, 
colonies  had  been  held  by  European  nations  purely 
for  purposes  of  national  exploitation.  The  move- 
ment for  independence  in  America  indicated  the  fact 
that  the  time  would  come  when,  with  the  develop- 
ment of  colonial  resources,  dependence  would  be 
succeeded  by  independence. 

For  a  number  of  years  after  the  American  Revolu- 
tion the  Spanish  colonies  in  America  continued  to  be 
comparatively  quiet  and  contented.  Grave  mis- 
fortunes, however,  awaited  the  mother  country. 
In  1808  Spain  was  invaded.  Her  King,  Charles  IV., 
was  forced  to  abdicate  and  to  transfer  to  Napoleon 
all  right  and  titles  to  the  Spanish  Crown  and  to  its 
colonial  possessions.  On  June  15,  1808,  Napoleon's 
brother,  Joseph  Bonaparte,  was  crowned  King  of 
Spain  at  Bayonne.  The  people  of  Spain  refused  to 
bow  to  alien  rule.  Juntas  were  formed  in  various 
parts  of  the  country  for  the  purpose  of  resisting 
in  the  name  of  Ferdinand  VII.,  son  of  the  dethroned 
monarch,  the  new  government.  Not  long  after- 
wards similar  movements  took  place  in  South 
America.  Loyalist  juntas  were  formed,  modelled  on 
those  that  were  organized  in  Spain.  But  owing  to 
various  causes,  among  which  was  the  refusal  of  the 
Regency  at  Cadiz  to  recognize  the  American  juntas, 
the  loyalist  movement  in  the  colonies,  although 
originally  levelled  against  the  Napoleonic  government 
in  Spain,  was  gradually  transformed  into  a  genuine 
movement   for  independence.     As  a  result   Spain, 

366 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

after  her  legitimate  government  was  restored,  found 
herself  at  war  with  her  American  colonies. 

In  1815  Simon  Bolivar,  then  living  in  poverty  and 
exile  at  Kingston,  Jamaica,  wrote  the  famous 
"prophetic"  letter  in  which  he  declared  that  the 
destiny  of  America  to  be  independent  was  "ir- 
revocably fixed."  On  July  9,  1816,  a  congress  at 
Tucuman  declared  the  United  Provinces  of  the 
Rio  de  la  Plata,  of  which  Buenos  Aires  was  the  head, 
to  be  a  free  and  independent  nation.  In  February 
of  the  following  year  the  Chilean  revolutionists  gained 
at  Chacabuco  a  decisive  victory  which  presaged  a 
similar  declaration.  On  December  6,  181 7,  Henry 
Clay  announced  in  the  House  of  Representatives 
that  he  intended  to  move  the  recognition  of  Buenos 
Aires  and  probably  of  Chile. 

In  the  struggle  between  Spain  and  her  colonies 
the  United  States  maintained  a  neutral  position, 
although  the  sympathies  of  the  people  naturally  ran 
strongly  in  favor  of  the  revolutionists.  In  181 7  a 
commission  consisting  of  Cassar  A.  Rodney,  John 
Graham,  and  Theodoric  Bland,  with  Henry  M. 
Brackinridge  as  secretary,  was  sent  out  to  examine 
into  the  conditions  existing  in  South  America,  and 
particularly  in  Buenos  Aires  and  Chile.  The  views 
of  the  commissioners,  which  in  many  respects  dif- 
fered, were  embodied  in  separate  reports.  These 
reports  were  duly  submitted  to  Congress,  as  was 
also  a  special  report  from  Joel  R.  Poinsett,  who  had 
acted  as  an  agent  of  the  United  States  at  Buenos 

367 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Aires.  The  general  tenor  of  the  reports  was  un- 
favorable to  the  recognition  of  independence  at  that 
time ;  but  this  did  not  deter  Mr.  Clay  from  moving 
in  the  House  of  Representatives  in  March,  1818, 
an  appropriation  for  the  salary  of  a  minister  to  the 
government  which  had  its  scat  at  Buenos  Aires. 
This  motion  was  lost  by  one  hundred  and  fifteen 
noes  to  forty-five  ayes.  On  May  10,  1820,  Clay 
submitted  in  the  House  a  resolution  declaring  it  to 
be  expedient  to  provide  by  law  for  the  sending  of 
ministers  to  any  of  the  governments  of  South  Amer- 
ica that  had  established  their  independence.  This 
resolution  was  carried  by  a  vote  of  eighty  to  seventy- 
five,  but  it  did  not  provide  an  appropriation.  On 
February  9,  182 1,  a  motion  for  an  appropriation  was 
lost  by  only  seven  votes.  A  year  later,  the  Presi- 
dent having  expressed  to  Congress  the  opinion  that 
recognition  should  no  longer  be  withheld,  an  ap- 
propriation was  duly  made;  and  the  recognition  of 
the  independence  of  the  new  American  nations  was 
begun.  Against  such  recognition  the  Spanish  minis- 
ter at  Washington,  in  the  name  of  his  government, 
solemnly  protested,  but  the  action  of  the  United 
States  was  vindicated,  with  his  accustomed  ability, 
by  John  Quincy  Adams,  then  Secretary  of  State,  on 
grounds  both  of  right  and  of  fact. 

On  December  2,  1823,  there  came,  as  has  elsewhere 
been  seen,  the  celebrated  pronouncement  of  Presi- 
dent Monroe.  When  that  pronouncement  was  made 
the  danger  of  interference  by  the  Allied  Powers  of 

368 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

Europe  in  the  affairs  of  Spanish  America  had  in 
reality  passed  away.  But  a  great  question  still  re- 
mained. Recognition  had  been  accorded;  but  the 
character  of  the  relations  of  the  United  States 
with  the  other  independent  countries  of  the  hemi- 
sphere remained  to  be  determined  and  defined. 

In  a  letter  written  at  Lima  on  December  7,  1824, 
Bolivar,  then  at  the  head  of  the  Republic  of  Peru, 
suggested  the  holding  of  a  conference  of  representa- 
tives of  the  independent  governments  of  America 
at  Panama.  The  object  of  the  conference  was  de- 
clared to  be  "the  establishment  of  certain  fixed 
principles  for  securing  the  preservation  of  peace  be- 
tween the  nations  of  America,  and  the  concurrence  of 
all  those  nations  in  defence  of  their  own  rights." 
Bolivar's  invitation  embraced  Colombia,  Mexico, 
Central  America,  Buenos  Aires,  Chile,  and  Brazil. 
It  did  not  include  the  United  States.  For  this 
omission  a  sufficient  reason  may  be  found  in  the  cir- 
cumstance that  the  United  States  was  not  a  party 
to  the  conflict  then  still  in  progress  between  Spain 
and  her  former  colonies,  but  it  has  also  been  con- 
jectured that  the  existence  of  African  sal  very  in  the 
United  States  was  regarded  by  Bolivar  as  an  ob- 
stacle to  the  free  discussion  of  some  of  the  matters 
of  which  the  congress  might  be  obliged  to  treat. 
The  first  intimation  that  the  presence  of  the  United 
States  was  desired  was  made  by  the  representatives 
of  Colombia  and  Mexico  in  conversations  with  Clay, 
who  had  become  Secretary  of  State.     The  President, 

24  369 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

John  Quincy  Adams,  although  he  had  warmly  es- 
poused the  cause  of  the  American  nations  as  against 
any  hostile  projects  of  the  Holy  Alliance,  felt  obliged 
to  proceed  with  caution,  since  the  United  States  was 
maintaining  in  the  Spanish-American  conflict  a  neu- 
tral position;  but  Clay  warmly  urged  that  the  invi- 
tation be  accepted.  The  idea  of  a  common  interest 
arising  from  a  similarity  of  political  principles  had 
taken  a  profound  hold  upon  him.  He  was  in  reality 
the  great  champion  of  this  conception.  The  invita- 
tion to  the  congress  was  accepted. 

The  subjects  to  be  discussed  were  divided  into  two 
classes:  First,  those  peculiarly  and  exclusively  con- 
cerning the  countries  which  were  still  at  war  with 
Spain ;  and  secondly,  those  between  belligerents  and 
neutrals.  In  the  discussion  of  the  former,  it  was  not 
expected  that  the  United  States  would  take  part, 
but  the  occasion  was  thought  to  be  opportune  for  the 
establishment  of  fixed  principles  of  international  law 
in  matters  in  respect  of  which  the  previous  uncer- 
tainty had  been  the  cause  of  many  evils. 

The  President  appointed  as  plenipotentiaries  of  the 
United  States  two  eminent  men,  Richard  C.  Ander- 
son of  Kentucky  and  John  Sergeant  of  Pennsylvania. 
Their  instructions,  dated  May  8,  1826,  were  drawn 
by  Clay  and  were  signed  by  him  as  Secretary  of 
State.  Covering  a  wide  range,  they  disclosed  the 
broad  and  far-reaching  views  to  which,  in  co-opera- 
tion with  the  President,  now  a  sturdy  advocate  of 
Pan  Americanism,  he  sought  to  give  effect.     At  the 

37o 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

very  threshold  they  declared  that  the  President 
could  not  have  declined  the  invitation  to  the  con- 
gress "without  subjecting  the  United  States  to  the 
reproach  of  insensibility  to  the  deepest  concerns  of 
the  American  hemisphere,"  and  perhaps  of  a  want  of 
sincerity  in  regard  to  Monroe's  solemn  declarations. 
Moreover,  the  assembling  of  a  congress  would,  so 
the  instructions  declared,  "form  a  new  epoch  in 
human  affairs."  Not  only  would  the  fact  itself  chal- 
lenge the  attention  of  the  civilized  world,  but  it  was 
confidently  hoped  that  the  congress  would  "entitle 
itself  to  the  affection  and  lasting  gratitude  of  all 
America,  by  the  wisdom  and  liberality  of  its  prin- 
ciples ' '  and  by  the  establishment  of  a  new  guarantee 
for  the  great  interests  which  would  engage  its  de- 
liberations. At  the  same  time  the  fact  was  empha- 
sized that  the  congress  was  to  be  regarded  as  a  dip- 
lomatic body,  without  powers  of  ordinary  legislation. 
It  was  not  to  be  "an  amphictyonic  council,  invested 
with  power  finally  to  decide  controversies  between  the 
American  states  or  to  regulate  in  any  respect  their 
conduct,"  but  was  expected  to  afford  opportunities 
for  free  and  friendly  conference  and  to  facilitate  the 
conclusion  of  treaties. 

After  these  preliminary  explanations,  the  instruc- 
tions proceeded  to  point  out  that  it  was  not  the  in- 
tention of  the  United  States  to  challenge  its  "pacific 
and  neutral  policy."  While,  therefore,  the  con- 
gress probably  would  consider  the  future  prosecution 
of  the  war  with  Spain  by  the  existing  belligerents, 

37i 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  delegates  of  the  United  States  were  not  to  enter 
into  the  discussion  of  that  subject,  but  were  to  con- 
fine themselves  strictly  to  subjects  in  which  all  the 
American  nations,  whether  belligerent  or  neutral, 
might  have  an  interest.  One  of  these  was  the 
maintenance  of  peace,  which  was  declared  to  be  "the 
greatest  want  of  America."  In  regard  to  European 
wars,  confidence  was  expressed  that  the  policy  of  all 
America  would  be  the  same,  that  of  "peace  and 
neutrality,"  which  the  United  States  had  consist- 
ently labored  to  preserve.  On  this  supposition  the 
greatest  importance  was,  said  the  instructions,  at- 
tached to  questions  of  maritime  neutrality.  The 
delegates  were  to  bring  forward  "the  proposition  to 
abolish  war  against  private  property  and  non- 
combatants  upon  the  ocean,"  as  formerly  proposed 
by  Dr.  Franklin;  but,  as  this  might  not  be  readily 
adopted,  they  were  authorized  to  propose  that  free 
ships  should  make  free  goods  and  that  enemy  ships 
should  make  enemy  goods,  both  rules  being  con- 
sidered to  operate  in  favor  of  neutrality.  The  dele- 
gates were  also  to  seek  a  definition  of  blockade,  and 
were,  besides,  to  deal  with  the  subject  of  contraband, 
whose  vital  relation  to  the  preservation  of  neutral 
trade  is,  it  may  be  remarked,  not  always  fully 
appreciated. 

In  regard  to  commercial  intercourse,  the  instruc- 
tions incorporated  the  most  liberal  views.  The  dele- 
gates of  the  United  States  were  not  to  seek  exclusive 
privileges,   even  as  against  the  European  powers. 

372 


PAN   AMERICANISM 

They  were  to  observe  the  most-favored-nation  prin- 
ciple, so  that  any  favors  in  commerce  or  in  navigation 
granted  by  an  American  nation  to  any  foreign  power 
should  extend  to  every  other  American  nation;  and 
were  to  oppose  the  imposition  of  discriminating 
duties  on  importations  or  exportations  on  account 
of  the  flag.  As  for  the  Monroe  declarations,  the 
delegates  of  the  United  States,  without  committing 
the  parties  to  the  support  of  any  particular  boun- 
daries or  to  a  joint  resistance  in  any  future  case,  were 
desired  to  propose  a  joint  declaration  that  each 
American  state,  acting  for  and  binding  only  itself, 
would  not  allow  a  new  European  colony  to  be  estab- 
lished within  its  territories.  Another  subject,  closely 
related  to  commerce  as  well  as  to  politics,  was  that 
of  a  canal  to  connect  the  Atlantic  and  the  Pacific. 
Treating  of  this  subject  in  a  spirit  of  liberality,  the 
instructions  said:  "What  is  to  redound  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  all  America  should  be  effected  by  com- 
mon means  and  united  exertions,  and  should  not  be 
left  to  the  separate  efforts  of  any  one  power.  .  .  . 
If  the  work  should  ever  be  executed  so  as  to  admit 
of  the  passage  of  sea  vessels  from  ocean  to  ocean,  the 
benefits  of  it  ought  not  to  be  exclusively  appropriated 
to  any  one  nation,  but  should  be  extended  to  all 
parts  of  the  globe  upon  the  payment  of  a  just  com- 
pensation or  reasonable  tolls." 

In  only  one  passage  of  this  remarkable  state  paper 
did  its  author  seem  to  labor.  This  was  where  he  was 
obliged  to  discuss  the  troublesome  question  that  so 

373 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

persistently  marred  the  prospect  in  which  his  fancy 
loved  to  range.  The  congress  might  perhaps  consider 
the  question  of  Cuba  and  of  Haiti.  With  regard  to 
the  latter,  he  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  subject 
was  not  one  that  required  concert  of  action  between 
all  American  powers.  The  case  of  Cuba  was  more 
complex.  The  United  States,  it  was  said,  would 
prefer  the  unaided  establishment  of  Cuban  inde- 
pendence, but  was  convinced  that  the  island  was 
incompetent  to  sustain  self-government  without  as- 
sistance. An  independence  guaranteed  by  other 
powers,  European  or  American,  or  both,  would  on  the 
other  hand  involve  difficulties  almost  insuperable. 
Likewise  fraught  with  danger  was  the  design  which 
rumor  ascribed  to  Colombia  and  to  Mexico  to  con- 
quer and  annex  the  island.  Such  an  attempt  would, 
declared  the  instructions,  change  the  whole  character 
of  the  war  and  involve  continual  fears  as  to  the  future 
stability  of  conditions.  The  delegates  of  the  United 
States  were  therefore  authorized  to  state  without 
reserve  that  their  government,  having  too  much  at 
stake  to  see  with  indifference  a  war  against  Cuba 
prosecuted  in  a  desolating  manner,  or  one  race  em- 
ployed against  another  probably  with  the  most 
shocking  excesses,  would  be  constrained  to  employ  all 
means  necessary  to  defend  itself  against  the  "con- 
tagion" of  such  near  and  dangerous  examples. 

Having  thus  dealt  with  a  vexed  question,  the  in- 
structions passed  to  other  topics.  It  was  suggested 
that  a  joint  declaration  be  made  in  favor  of  the  free 

374 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

toleration  of  religious  worship.  If  questions  of 
boundary  and  other  controverted  matters  among  the 
new  American  powers  should  be  presented,  the  dele- 
gates of  the  United  States  were  to  manifest  a  willing- 
ness to  give  their  best  counsel  and  advice,  and,  if  it 
were  desired,  to  serve  as  arbitrator.  Finally,  as  to 
forms  of  government  and  the  cause  of  free  institu- 
tions, it  was  declared  that  the  United  States  were 
not  and  never  had  been  "animated  by  any  spirit 
of  propagandism."  They  preferred  "to  all  other 
forms  of  government  .  .  .  their  own  confederacy"; 
but,  allowing,  as  they  did,  "no  foreign  interference" 
either  in  the  formation  or  in  the  conduct  of  their 
own  government,  they  were  "equally  scrupulous  in 
refraining  from  all  interference  in  the  original  struct- 
ure or  subsequent  interior  movement  of  the  govern- 
ments of  other  independent  nations." 

The  views  of  Clay  were  strongly  reenforced  by  the 
utterances  of  the  President.  "Having  been  the 
first,"  said  Adams,  "to  recognize  their  independence 
and  to  sympathize  with  them,  so  far  as  was  compati- 
ble with  our  neutral  duties,  in  all  their  struggles  and 
sufferings  to  acquire  it,  we  have  laid  the  foundation 
of  our  future  intercourse  on  the  broadest  principles 
of  reciprocity  and  the  most  cordial  feelings  of  fra- 
ternal friendship.  To  extend  those  principles  to  all 
our  commercial  relations  with  them,  and  to  hand 
down  that  friendship  to  future  ages,  is  congenial  to 
the  highest  policy  of  the  Union,  as  it  will  be  to  that 
of  all  those  nations  and  their  posterity."     Entering 

375 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

into  the  matter  more  particularly,  he  placed  the 
interest  of  the  United  States  in  the  congress  on  fom 
grounds:  First,  that  of  promoting  "the  principles 
of  a  liberal  commercial  intercourse";  second,  the 
adoption  of  liberal  principles  of  maritime  law,  in- 
cluding the  rule  that  free  ships  make  free  goods,  and 
the  proper  restriction  of  blockades;  third,  an  agree- 
ment between  all  the  parties  that  each  would  ' '  guard 
by  its  own  means  against  the  establishment  of  any 
future  European  colony  within  its  border,"  as  had 
already  been  announced  in  the  message  of  Monroe; 
and  fourth,  the  promotion  of  religious  liberty. 

Nevertheless,  the  plans  of  the  administration  in 
regard  to  the  assembly  at  Panama  encountered  in  the 
Congress  of  the  United  States  a  determined  and  able 
opposition.  It  was  argued  that  the  proposed  mis- 
sion involved  a  departure  from  the  wise  policy  of 
non-intervention  established  by  Washington.  An- 
other ground  of  opposition  was  that  one  of  the  ques- 
tions proposed  for  discussion  in  the  congress  was 
"the  consideration  of  the  means  to  be  adopted  for 
the  entire  abolition  of  the  African  slave  trade." 
An  apprehension  was  also  felt  that  the  congress 
would  be  called  upon  to  consider  plans  of  inter- 
national consolidation  which  would  commit  the 
United  States  to  a  more  hazardous  connection  with 
the  fortunes  of  other  countries  than  was  desirable. 

In  the  end,  the  nominations  of  the  President  were 
confirmed;  but  when  the  representatives  of  the 
United  States  reached  the  Isthmus  of  Panama  the 

376 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

congress  had  adjourned.  Four  governments  were 
represented  in  it — namely,  Colombia,  Central  Amer- 
ica, Mexico,  and  Peru.  The  assembly  held  ten 
meetings,  the  last  of  which  took  place  on  July  15, 
1826.  Representatives  of  Great  Britain  and  of  the 
Netherlands  were  present  on  the  Isthmus  and,  al- 
though not  admitted  to  the  congress,  no  doubt  freely 
advised  with  its  members. 

Four  agreements  were  signed  at  Panama:  (1)  A 
treaty  of  perpetual  union,  league,  and  confederation; 
(2)  an  engagement  for  the  assembling  of  the  congress 
every  two  years,  and,  while  the  war  with  Spain 
lasted,  every  year;  (3)  a  convention  specifying  the 
contributions  in  men,  in  ships,  and  in  money,  which 
the  parties  should  make  for  the  prosecution  of  the 
war  against  Spain ;  and  (4)  a  plan  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  their  common  force.  To  a  great  extent  these 
agreements  related  to  the  interests  which  the  parties 
had  as  belligerents,  but  there  were  some  of  the 
stipulations  which  had  a  far  wider  scope.  An  at- 
tempt was  made  to  establish  a  council  for  the  in- 
terpretation of  treaties  and  for  the  employment  of 
conciliation  and  mediation  in  the  settlement  of 
international  disputes.  It  was  provided  that  all  dif- 
ferences between  the  contracting  parties  should  be 
amicably  compromised,  and  that  if  this  were  not 
done,  such  differences  should  be  submitted  to  the 
General  Assembly,  as  it  was  called,  for  the  formula- 
tion of  an  amicable  recommendation.  In  case  of 
complaints  or  injuries  the  parties  were  not  to  declare 

377 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

war  or  to  resort  to  reprisals  without  first  submitting 
their  grievances  to  the  decision  of  the  General  As- 
sembly. Nor  was  any  of  the  parties  to  go  to  war 
against  an  outsider  without  soliciting  the  good  of- 
fices, interposition,  and  mediation  of  the  allies. 
Any  contracting  party  violating  these  stipulations, 
either  by  going  to  war  with  another  or  by  facing 
to  comply  with  the  decision  of  the  General  Assembly, 
was  to  be  excluded  from  the  confederation  and  was 
to  be  incapable  of  restoration  except  by  a  unanimous 
vote.  The  contracting  parties  also  pledged  them- 
selves to  co-operate  to  prevent  colonial  settlements 
within  their  borders,  and  as  soon  as  their  boundaries 
were  determined  mutually  to  guarantee  the  integrity 
of  their  respective  territories. 

These  benevolent  proposals,  which  strongly  remind 
us  of  some  that  are  put  forth  to-day,  were  not 
destined  to  be  carried  into  effect.  The  agreements 
were  ratified  by  one  only  of  the  contracting  parties — 
Colombia — -and  by  Colombia  only  in  part.  In 
reality  the  conditions  at  the  time  were  such  that 
effective  co-operation  was  scarcely  possible. 

The  practical  failure  of  the  United  States  to  be 
represented  at  the  Congress  of  Panama  was  an  un- 
fortunate omen.  Indicative  in  itself  of  an  attitude 
somewhat  unsympathetic,  this  impression  was  deep- 
ened by  the  arguments  by  which  the  opposition  to  the 
mission  was  sustained.  But,  in  addition  to  this,  the 
continuance  of  the  war  with  Spain  and  the  prevalence 
of  revolutionary  conditions  in  the  new  states  gave 

378 


PAN   AMERICANISM 

rise  to  frequent  complaints  and  controversies.  In 
the  southern  part  of  the  hemisphere  an  unfavorable 
sentiment  was  no  doubt  created  by  the  breaking  up 
by  the  United  States  of  the  establishment  which  the 
government  at  Buenos  Aires  had  made  on  the 
Falkland,  or,  as  the  Argentines  call  them,  the 
Malvinas  Islands,  the  title  to  which  was  generally 
believed  to  belong  to  Great  Britain,  by  whom  they 
were  afterwards  effectively  occupied.  But  the  great- 
est source  of  disturbance  was  that  which  existed 
at  the  north,  where  Mexico  labored  in  the  constant 
throes  of  revolution.  This  cause  of  divergence  was 
greatly  accentuated  by  the  revolt  in  Texas  and  the 
cry  which  sprang  up  in  the  United  States  for  the  "re- 
annexation"  of  that  imperial  domain,  which  was 
alleged  to  have  been  a  part  of  the  Louisiana  territory. 
As  I  have  elsewhere  remarked,1  no  acquisition  of 
territory  ever  made  by  the  United  States  was  more 
natural  or  more  completely  in  conformity  with  the 
aspirations  and  habits  of  thought  of  the  American 
people.  But,  no  matter  how  natural  it  may  have 
been,  it  created  a  sense  of  apprehension,  which  was 
deepened  and  greatly  intensified  by  the  war  with 
Mexico,  which,  resulting  as  it  did  in  the  conquest 
and  annexation  by  the  United  States  of  a  vast  extent 
of  Mexican  territory,  produced  upon  the  attitude  of 
the  countries  of  Central  and  South  America  towards 
the  United  States  a  more  pronounced  and  more  un- 
favorable effect  than  any  other  event  that  has  ever 

1  Four  Phases  of  American  Development,  p.  174. 
379 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

occurred.  Of  this  fact,  practically  nothing  is  said 
in  our  histories,  nor  has  it  been  clearly  understood 
in  the  United  States;  but  its  influence  may  easily  be 
traced  in  the  acts  and  utterances  of  the  Central  and 
South  American  governments. 

For  some  years  after  the  Congress  of  Panama 
steps  were  from  time  to  time  taken  to  bring  about 
another  meeting.  In  this  movement  Mexico  was  the 
chief  factor,  no  doubt  because  of  her  apprehension 
as  to  the  continued  retention  of  her  northern  terri- 
tory. The  object  which  she  proposed  was  a  union 
and  close  alliance  ' '  for  the  purposes  of  defence  against 
foreign  invasion,  the  acceptance  of  friendly  mediation 
in  the  settlement  of  all  disputes  .  .  .  between  the 
sister  republics,  and  the  framing  and  promulgation 
of  a  code  of  public  law  regulating  their  mutual 
relations."  Sixteen  years  later,  in  1847,  a  congress 
composed  of  representatives  of  Bolivia,  Chile, 
Ecuador,  New  Granada  (now  Colombia),  and  Peru 
assembled  at  Lima  for  the  purpose  of  adopting 
measures  to  insure  "the  independence,  sovereignty, 
dignity,  and  territorial  integrity"  of  the  republics 
concerned.  Other  American  republics  were  to  be 
admitted  to  the  deliberations  of  the  congress  or  to 
adhere  to  the  agreements  which  it  might  conclude. 
The  congress  even  decided  to  extend  an  invitation  to 
the  United  States,  but  a  favorable  response  could 
hardly  have  been  expected,  the  United  States  being 
then  at  war  with  Mexico  and  in  occupation  of  Cali- 
fornia and   New  Mexico,   besides  having  annexed 

380 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

Texas.  The  invitation  probably  was  intended  to 
convey  to  the  United  States  a  pointed  intimation 
of  the  views  and  objects  of  the  congress. 

On  September  15,  1856,  there  was  signed  at  San- 
tiago, in  Chile,  the  so-called  "Continental  Treaty," 
between  Chile,  Ecuador,  and  Peru,  for  the  purpose, 
as  the  text  declared,  of  "cementing  upon  substantial 
foundations  the  union  which  exists  between  them, 
as  members  of  the  great  American  family  .  .  .  and 
promoting  moral  and  material  progress,  as  well  as 
giving  further  guarantees  of  their  independence  and 
territorial  integrity."  The  government  of  Peru  was 
authorized  to  communicate  the  treaty  to  other 
American  governments  and  to  request  their  ad- 
hesion. Brazil,  although  then  a  monarchy,  was 
invited  to  join  the  union.  The  United  States  was 
not  approached. 

In  reality  the  chief  cause  of  the  attempted  alliance 
was  the  feeling  of  continued  apprehension  towards 
the  United  States  caused  by  the  expeditions  of 
William  Walker  and  other  filibusters  to  Central 
America  and  Mexico  in  the  years  following  the 
Mexican  War. 

The  alarm  created  by  these  expeditions,  and  par- 
ticularly by  those  of  Walker  to  Central  America, 
was  profound,  nor  can  it  be  said  to  have  been 
destitute  of  foundation.  Costa  Rica,  apprehensive 
as  to  her  own  future,  undertook  the  necessary  sacri- 
fices of  men  and  of  money  for  the  expulsion  of  the 
so-called  Walker-Rivas  government  from  Nicaragua. 

381 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

In  their  extremity  the  countries  of  Central  America 
then  looked  for  help  to  Europe  rather  than  to  the 
United  States,  and  they  felt  that,  so  far  as  thanks 
were  due  to  any  foreign  power  for  aid  in  the  sup- 
pression of  filibustering,  they  were  due  chiefly  to 
France  and  Great  Britain,  who  eventually  took 
concerted   action  in  that  direction. 

Moreover,  ten  years  after  the  close  of  the  war  with 
Mexico  a  serious  condition  of  affairs  again  arose 
between  the  United  States  and  that  country.  By 
the  so-called  Gadsden  treaty  of  1853  the  United 
States  acquired  by  purchase  the  Mesilla  Valley  from 
Mexico.  Five  years  later,  in  1858,  President  Bu- 
chanan, referring  in  his  second  annual  message  to 
Congress  to  the  unhappy  condition  of  affairs  exist- 
ing along  the  southwestern  frontier  of  the  United 
States,  earnestly  advised  Congress  "to  assume  a 
temporary  protectorate  over  the  northern  parts  of 
Chihuahua  and  Sonora,  and  to  establish  military 
posts  within  the  same."  "This  protection  might," 
he  said,  "be  withdrawn  as  soon  as  local  governments 
should  be  established  in  those  states  capable  of  per- 
forming their  duties  to  the  United  States,  of  re- 
straining lawlessness  and  of  preserving  peace  along 
the  borders."  The  disorders  continuing  to  increase, 
he  recurred  to  the  subject  in  his  third  annual  mes- 
sage and  recommended  that  he  be  authorized  to 
"employ  a  sufficient  military  force  to  enter  Mexico 
for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  indemnity  for  the  past 
and  security  for  the  future."     In  making  this  recom- 

382 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

mendation  he  referred  to  Mexico  as  "a  wreck  upon 
the  ocean,  drifting  about  as  she  is  impelled  by  dif- 
ferent factions."  In  these  circumstances  he  inti- 
mated that  if  the  United  States  should  not  take 
appropriate  action  it  would  not  be  surprising  if  some 
other  nation  should  undertake  the  task. 

Having  discovered  that  his  recommendations 
would  not  be  sustained  by  Congress,  he  sought  to 
accomplish  the  same  object  by  means  of  treaties,  but 
the  United  States  was  then  on  the  verge  of  the 
great  convulsion  which  was  to  shake  the  structure  of 
its  own  government  to  the  very  foundations,  and 
attention  was  drawn  from  affairs  in  Mexico  and  other 
American  countries  to  the  approaching  crisis  in 
affairs  at  home. 

But  for  the  occurrence  of  the  Civil  War  in  the 
United  States  there  is  every  reason  to  believe  that 
the  relations  between  this  country  and  the  other 
independent  nations  of  the  hemisphere  would  have 
been  radically  different  from  those  that  came  to  pre- 
vail. The  opposition  to  the  extension  of  slavery 
having  always  operated  as  a  force  antagonistic  to 
expansion  towards  the  south,  the  outbreak  of  the 
Civil  War  put  a  sudden  end  to  the  tendencies  in  that 
direction,  besides  serving  to  create  a  readier  sym- 
pathy with  countries  afflicted  with  domestic  dissen- 
sions. The  attitude  of  the  United  States  underwent 
an  instantaneous  and  profound  change.  The  govern- 
ment of  Costa  Rica,  when  discussing  with  the  govern- 
ment of  Colombia  in  1862  a  proposal  for  a  "Con- 

383 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tinental  League,"  observed  that  there  were  not  al- 
ways at  the  head  of  the  great  Republic  of  the  North 
"moderate,  just,  and  upright  men  such  as  those  who 
now  form  the  administration  of  President  Lincoln." 
This  utterance  is  highly  significant,  not  only  of  the 
impression  that  had  so  long  prevailed,  but  also  of  the 
change  which  was  taking  place.  The  feeling  of 
sympathy  was  also  quickened  by  the  sense  of  com- 
mon danger  which  followed  the  French  invasion  of 
Mexico.  And  later,  when  Spain  went  to  war  with 
the  republics  on  the  west  coast  of  South  America,  the 
good  offices  of  the  United  States  were  employed  for 
the  purpose  of  bringing  about  a  termination  of  the 
conflict. 

This  was  done  by  means  of  a  conference,  which  was 
opened  at  the  Department  of  State  at  Washington, 
on  October  28,  1870,  under  the  presidency  of  Hamil- 
ton Fish,  who  was  then  Secretary  of  State.  Repre- 
sentatives of  Spain,  Peru,  Chile,  and  Ecuador  at- 
tended. And  on  April  11,  187 1,  the  contending 
parties  agreed  upon  an  armistice  which  was  to  con- 
tinue indefinitely,  and  which  could  not  be  broken  by 
any  of  the  belligerents  except  after  three  years' 
notice  given  through  the  government  of  the  United 
States  of  its  intention  to  renew  hostilities.  During 
the  continuance  of  this  armistice  all  restrictions  on 
neutral  commerce  which  were  incident  to  a  state  of 
war  were  to  cease.  Mr.  Fish  signed  these  articles 
"in  the  character  of  mediator." 

This  important  act  affords  a  notable  illustration 

3&A 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

of  the  change  which  had  supervened  in  the  relations 
between  the  United  States  and  the  other  independent 
nations  of  this  hemisphere.  But  it  was  only  an 
augury  of  what  was  to  take  place  in  the  future. 

Towards  the  close  of  the  decade  in  which  the  per- 
petual armistice  was  signed  there  broke  out  what  is 
commonly  known  as  the  War  of  the  Pacific  between 
Chile  on  the  one  side  and  Peru  and  Bolivia  on  the 
other.  This  unfortunate  conflict  naturally  revived 
the  thoughts  which  had  so  often  been  cherished  of 
the  formulation  of  a  plan  for  the  preservation  of 
peace  among  the  American  nations.  A  step  in  this 
direction  was  taken  when,  on  September  3,  1880, 
the  representatives  of  Chile  and  Colombia,  on  the 
initiative  of  the  latter,  signed  at  Bogota  a  treaty  by 
which  they  bound  themselves  "in  perpetuity  to  sub- 
mit to  arbitration  ...  all  controversies  and  dif- 
ferences" of  every  nature  whatsoever  which  could 
not  be  settled  by  diplomacy.  And  it  was  further 
agreed  that  if  they  should  be  unable  to  concur  in  the 
choice  of  an  arbitrator  the  arbitral  function  should 
be  discharged  by  the  President  of  the  United  States — ■ 
a  provision  which  bore  eloquent  testimony  to  the 
growth  of  friendly  sentiments.  The  two  govern- 
ments further  engaged  at  the  earliest  opportunity 
to  conclude  similar  conventions  with  the  other 
American  nations  to  the  end,  as  they  said,  ' '  that  the 
settlement  by  arbitration  of  each  and  every  inter- 
national controversy  shall  become  a  principle  of 
American  public  law."     On  the  strength  of  the  sign- 

25  385 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ing  of  this  treaty  the  Colombian  government,  on 
October  n,  1880,  issued  an  invitation  for  a  con- 
ference to  be  held  at  Panama;  but,  as  Chile  and 
Peru  continued  at  war,  action  upon  the  invitation 
was  deferred. 

The  project,  however,  was  not  abandoned.  On 
November  29,  1881,  James  G.  Blaine,  as  Secretary  of 
State,  extended,  in  the  name  of  the  President  of  the 
United  States,  "to  all  the  independent  countries  of 
North  and  South  America  an  earnest  invitation  to 
participate  in  a  General  Congress  to  be  held  in  the 
City  of  Washington  on  the  twenty-fourth  day  of 
November,  1882,  for  the  purpose  of  considering  and 
discussing  the  methods  of  preventing  war  between 
the  nations  of  America. "  "  To  this  one  great  object, 
Blaine  declared  it  to  be  the  desire  of  the  President 
that  ' '  the  attention  of  the  congress  should  be  strictly 
confined."  The  continuance  of  the  war  between 
Chile  and  Peru  led  to  the  subsequent  withdrawal 
of  this  invitation.  But,  in  reality,  the  accomplish- 
ment of  its  great  design  was  only  postponed,  for, 
after  the  submission  and  consideration  from  time  to 
time  of  many  proposals,  the  Congress  of  the  United 
States,  at  length,  by  an  act  of  May  25,  1888,  au- 
thorized the  President  to  invite  the  republics  of 
Mexico,  Central  and  South  America,  Haiti,  Santo 
Domingo,  and  the  empire  of  Brazil,  to  join  the 
United  States  in  a  conference  to  meet  at  Washington 
on  October  2,  1889.  The  subjects  proposed  for  the 
consideration  of  the  conference  were:    (1)  Measures 

386 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

tending  to  preserve  the  peace  and  promote  the  pros- 
perity of  the  American  nations;  (2)  measures  tow- 
wards  the  formation  of  a  customs  union ;  (3)  the  estab- 
lishment of  frequent  communications  between  the 
various  countries;    (4)  uniform  customs  regulations; 

(5)  a   uniform   system   of   weights   and   measures; 

(6)  laws  for  the  protection  of  patents,  copyrights, 
and  trade-marks;  (7)  extradition;  (8)  the  adoption 
of  a  common  silver  coin;  (9)  the  formulation  of  "a 
definite  plan  of  arbitration  of  all  questions,  disputes, 
and  differences  that  may  now  or  hereafter  exist" 
between  the  American  nations,  "to  the  end  that  all 
difficulties  and  disputes  between  such  nations  may 
be  peaceably  settled  and  wars  prevented." 

When  the  conference  assembled  Mr.  Blaine  again 
occupied  the  post  of  Secretary  of  State.  His  address 
of  welcome  to  the  delegates  was  worthy  of  the  occa- 
sion, and  he  was  chosen  to  preside  over  the  delibera- 
tions of  the  assembly.  This  was  the  first  of  what 
have  come  to  be  distinctively  known  as  the  Inter- 
national American  Conferences,  of  which  four  have 
already  been  held.  The  fifth  would  have  met  in 
Santiago,  Chile,  in  1914,  but  for  the  breaking  out 
of  the  unfortunate  conflict  in  Europe. 

The  first  conference  continued  to  sit  until  the 
19th  of  April,  1890.  Various  important  interna- 
tional agreements  were  formulated.  Among  these, 
one  of  the  most  notable  was  the  plan  for  international 
arbitration,  which  was  adopted  on  April  18,  1890. 
By  this  plan  it  was  declared  that  arbitration  as  a 

387 


AMERICAN    D  I  P  L  O  M  A  C  Y 

means  of  settling  disputes  between  the  American 
nations  was  adopted  "as  a  principle  of  American 
international  law";  that  arbitration  should  be  ob- 
ligatory in  all  controversies  concerning  diplomatic 
and  consular  privileges,  boundaries,  territories,  in- 
demnities, the  right  of  navigation,  and  the  validity 
and  enforcement  and  construction  of  treaties;  and 
that  it  should  be  equally  obligatory  in  all  other  cases, 
whatever  might  be  their  origin,  nature,  or  object, 
with  the  sole  exception  of  those  which,  in  the  judg- 
ment of  one  of  the  nations  involved  in  the  con- 
troversy, might  imperil  its  independence.  But  it 
was  provided  that  even  in  this  case,  while  arbitra- 
tion for  that  nation  should  be  optional,  it  "should 
be  obligatory  upon  the  adversary  power."  As  yet 
this  plan  represents  but  an  aspiration,  since  it  failed 
to  receive  the  approval  of  the  governments  whose 
representatives  adopted  it.  In  connection  with  it 
there  was  also  adopted  a  declaration  against  the 
acquisition  of  title  by  conquest,  which  was  designed 
to  form,  in  effect,  an  integral  part  of  the  arbitral  plan. 

An  agreement  destined  to  produce  practical  results 
was  that  by  which  was  constituted  the  Bureau  of 
the  American  Republics,  now  known  as  the  Pan- 
American  Union.  This  organization,  after  twenty 
years  of  active  usefulness,  had  the  good  fortune  to 
be  installed  at  Washington  in  a  building  which  is  one 
of  the  finest  examples  of  architecture  in  the  country. 

Another  measure  that  has  yielded  definite  results 
was  the  agreement  for  the  prosecution  of  surveys  for 

*88 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

what  is  popularly  known  as  the  Inter-Continental 
Railway.  Although  it  is  not  probable  that  such  a 
railway  will  in  the  near  future  furnish  an  actual 
means  of  transportation  between,  for  instance,  New 
York  and  Buenos  Aires,  yet  the  various  links  in  the 
chain  of  railways  to  which  the  name  of  Inter- 
Continental  is  applicable  have  been  steadily  pro- 
gressing and  many  of  them  are  in  actual  use  for  pur- 
poses of  transportation. 

A  notable  event  of  the  first  International  American 
Conference  was  the  transformation  of  the  empire  of 
Brazil  into  the  republic  of  Brazil.  This  transition 
from  a  monarchical  to  a  republican  form  of  govern- 
ment was  brought  about  by  a  revolution  which  was 
substantially  bloodless.  The  wise  and  patriotic 
ruler,  Dom  Pedro  II. ,  scarcely  more  eminent  as  a 
statesman  than  as  a  student  of  science  and  of 
philosophy,  retired  without  a  contest  before  the 
demonstration  on  the  part  of  his  people  of  a  desire 
for  a  change  in  the  form  of  their  government.  There 
was  thus  fulfilled  the  aspiration,  manifested  in 
Brazil  just  a  hundred  years  before,  when,  in  1789, 
a  movement  for  independence  was  started  in  the 
state  of  Minas  Geraes  by  a  group  of  Brazilian  stu- 
dents, one  of  whom  had  met  and  talked  with  Thomas 
Jefferson  in  France  in  1786.  And  in  this  relation  it 
is  interesting  to  note  that,  by  the  constitution  of 
Brazil,  the  republic  is  forbidden  to  undertake,  di- 
rectly or  indirectly,  a  war  of  conquest  either  by  itself 
or  in  alliance  with  another  government. 

389 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Between  the  first  and  the  second  International  Con- 
ference of  American  States  an  interval  of  more  than 
eleven  years  elapsed.  The  second  conference  sat  in 
the  City  of  Mexico  from  October  22,  1901,  to  Janu- 
ary 31,  1902.  One  of  its  notable  results  is  the  fact 
that,  by  means  of  it,  the  American  nations  became 
parties  to  The  Hague  Convention  of  1899  for  the 
pacific  settlement  of  international  disputes.  More- 
over, a  project  of  a  treaty  was  adopted  for  the  ar- 
bitration, as  between  American  nations,  of  pecuniary 
claims.  This  treaty  was  signed  by  the  delegations 
of  all  the  countries  represented  in  the  conference. 
It  obligated  the  contracting  parties  for  a  period  of 
five  years  to  submit  to  the  Permanent  Court  at  The 
Hague  all  claims  for  pecuniary  losses  or  damage  which 
might  be  presented  by  their  respective  citizens,  when 
such  claims  were  of  sufficient  importance  to  justify 
the  expense  of  arbitration ;  but  it  also  permitted  the 
contracting  parties  to  organize  a  special  jurisdiction 
in  case  they  should  so  desire. 

The  Third  International  American  Conference  was 
held  in  Rio  de  Janeiro  in  1906,  and  resulted  in  the 
conclusion  of  certain  treaties  or  conventions,  two 
of  which  may  be  specially  mentioned.  One  was  the 
convention  for  the  renewal  of  the  treaty  concluded 
at  Mexico  for  the  arbitration  of  pecuniary  claims. 
The  other  is  the  convention  providing  for  the  crea- 
tion of  what  is  known  as  the  International  Com- 
mission of  Jurists,  to  formulate  codes  of  international 
law  for  the  American  nations.     This  commission  held 

390 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

its  first  meeting  at  Rio  de  Janeiro  in  the  summer  of 
1 91 2,  and  was  to  have  held  a  second  meeting  at  the 
same  place  in  the  summer  of  191 5.  Because  of  the 
outbreak  of  the  war  in  Europe  in  1914,  this  meeting 
was  postponed.  At  the  first  meeting  the  commis- 
sion was  divided  into  committees,  to  each  of  which 
is  entrusted  the  preparation  of  drafts  of  statutes  on 
certain  designated  subjects.  The  work  of  the  com- 
mission is  to  be  submitted  for  final  approval  to  the 
governments  concerned  or  to  the  International 
American  Conference,  and,  so  far  as  its  provisions 
may  be  of  general  application,  it  is  not  improbable 
that  they  may  be  brought  before  the  Peace  Con- 
ference at  The  Hague  when  conditions  are  such  as  to 
admit  of  the  revival  of  that  assembly. 

A  notable  incident  of  the  third  conference  was 
the  visit  of  Mr.  Root,  then  Secretary  of  State  of  the 
United  States,  while  on  a  tour  of  South  America. 
From  his  address  to  the  conference  the  following 
words  have  often  been  quoted: 

"We  wish  for  no  victories  but  those  of  peace; 
for  no  territory  except  our  own;  for  no  sovereignty 
except  the  sovereignty  over  ourselves.  We  deem 
the  independence  and  equal  rights  of  the  smallest 
and  weakest  member  of  the  family  of  nations  en- 
titled to  as  much  respect  as  those  of  the  greatest 
empire,  and  we  deem  the  observance  of  that  re- 
spect the  chief  guaranty  of  the  weak  against  the 
oppression  of  the  strong.  We  neither  claim 
nor    desire    any    rights,    or    privileges,    or    powers 

39i 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

that  we  do  not  freely  concede  to  every  American 
republic." 

The  Fourth  International  American  Conference 
was  held  at  Buenos  Aires  in  1 910.  It  was  notable 
for  having  finally  dealt  with  all  the  subjects  on  its 
program,  including  treaties  relating  to  patents,  trade- 
marks, and  copyrights.  A  treaty  was  also  made  for 
the  indefinite  extension  of  the  agreement  for  the 
arbitration  of  pecuniary  claims.  In  the  report  of 
the  delegates  to  the  fourth  conference  special  refer- 
ence is  made  to  the  harmony  which  characterized  its 
deliberations.  There  can  be  no  doubt  that,  quite 
apart  from  the  actual  work  accomplished,  the  free 
interchange  of  views  in  friendly  conference  between 
representative  men  from  all  parts  of  America  cannot 
fail  to  create  a  better  understanding  and  to  draw 
closer  the  relations  between  the  countries  con- 
cerned. This  is  indeed  one  of  the  chief  benefits  of 
the  International  American  Conferences.  The  proc- 
ess of  assimilating  or  harmonizing  legal  rules  and 
remedies  in  countries  whose  systems  of  jurisprudence 
are  derived  from  different  sources  is  necessarily  slow 
and  uncertain.  But  this  by  no  means  implies  the 
existence  of  a  serious  obstacle  to  the  promotion  of  a 
free  and  beneficial  intercourse. 

By  the  diplomatic  and  consular  appropriation  act, 
approved  March  4,  1915,  the  President  of  the  United 
States  was  authorized  to  invite  the  governments 
of  Central  and  South  America  to  be  represented  by 
their  Ministers  of  Finance  and  some  of  their  leading 

302 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

bankers  at  a  conference  with  the  Secretary  of  the 
Treasury,  at  Washington,  with  a  view  to  establish 
"closer  and  more  satisfactory  financial  relations" 
between  their  countries  and  the  United  States. 
The  invitation  was  accepted  by  eighteen  govern- 
ments— namely,  Argentina,  Bolivia,  Brazil,  Chile, 
Colombia,  Costa  Rica,  Cuba,  Dominican  Republic, 
Ecuador,  Guatemala,  Honduras,  Nicaragua,  Panama, 
Paraguay,  Peru,  Salvador,  Uruguay,  and  Venezuela. 
The  conference  met  in  Washington  on  Monday, 
May  24,  191 5,  and  adjourned  on  the  following  Sat- 
urday. It  was  called  the  Pan-American  Financial 
Conference,  and  was  attended  not  only  by  the  for- 
eign official  delegates,  but  also  by  the  members  of 
the  diplomatic  corps  from  Central  and  South  Amer- 
ica, by  the  Secretary  of  State  of  the  United  States 
and  other  members  of  the  cabinet,  by  the  chairmen 
of  the  foreign  affairs  committees  of  the  Senate  and 
House,  by  the  assistant  secretaries  of  the  Treasury, 
by  the  members  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Board  and 
officers  of  the  Federal  Reserve  Banks,  by  members 
of  the  Federal  Trade  Commission,  and  by  repre- 
sentative bankers  and  business  men  from  all  parts 
of  the  United  States.  It  was  presided  over  by  the 
Hon.  W.  G.  McAdoo,  Secretary  of  the  Treasury. 

The  immediate  occasion  of  the  assembly  was  the 
derangement  of  commerce  and  finance  by  the  great 
European  war,  the  effects  of  which  were  acutely  felt 
not  only  in  the  dislocation  of  exchanges  between 
Europe  and  America,  but  also  in  the  relations  be- 

303 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tween  the  American  countries  themselves,  which, 
although  their  interdependence  had  been  greatly 
increased,  found  it  necessary  to  make  numerous  re- 
adjustments. The  original  program  embraced  the 
monetary  and  banking  situation,  the  financing  of 
public  improvements  and  private  enterprises,  the 
extension  of  inter-American  markets,  and  the  im- 
provement of  transportation  facilities,  including 
postal  exchanges,  money-orders,  and  the  parcels 
post.  For  the  purpose  of  considering  these  questions 
the  members  of  the  conference  were  assigned  to  group 
committees,  such  a  committee  being  created  for  each 
country.  The  reports  of  these  committees,  which 
show  that,  next  to  transportation,  the  subjects  that 
attracted  most  attention  were  improved  banking 
facilities  and  the  extension  of  credits,  were  referred 
to  a  general  committee  on  uniformity  of  laws  relating 
to  trade  and  commerce,  which  was  charged  with  the 
duty  of  reporting  upon  the  subjects  with  which  the 
conference  should  deal  and  the  organization  neces- 
sary to  carry  the  resolutions  of  the  conference  into 
effect.  The  report  of  this  committee,  which  was 
unanimously  adopted  by  the  conference,  included, 
in  the  order  here  given,  seven  subjects:  (i)  the  es- 
tablishment of  a  gold  standard  of  value;  (2)  bills  of 
exchange,  commercial  paper,  and  bills  of  lading; 
(3)  uniform  (a)  classification  of  merchandise,  (b)  cus- 
toms regulations,  (c)  consular  certificates  and  in- 
voices, (d)  port  charges;  (4)  uniform  regulations  for 
commercial   travellers;    (5)   further  legislation  con- 

394 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

cerning  trade-marks,  patents,  and  copyrights;  (6)  the 
establishment  of  a  uniform  low  rate  of  postage  and 
of  charges  for  money-orders  and  parcels  post,  and 
(7)  the  extension  of  the  process  of  arbitration,  by 
chambers  of  commerce  and  other  agencies,  of  private 
commercial  disputes.  Because  of  variances  of  view 
as  to  methods  and  measures  and  the  complications 
of  local  legislation  the  subject  of  marine  transpor- 
tation, in  spite  of  the  deep  and  general  interest 
which  it  excited,  was  not  for  the  moment  placed 
upon  the  program. 

For  the  purpose  of  carrying  its  resolutions  into 
effect  the  conference  recommended  the  establishment 
of  an  International  High  Commission,  to  be  com- 
posed of  not  more  than  nine  members  resident  in 
each  country,  to  be  appointed  by  the  Minister  of 
Finance  of  such  country,  these  local  bodies,  com- 
posed of  jurists,  financiers,  and  technical  adminis- 
trators, constituting  the  national  sections  of  the 
International  High  Commission.  This  recommen- 
dation was  promptly  carried  into  effect  in  the 
countries  concerned;  and  by  the  act  of  Congress  of 
February  7,  1916,  the  United  States  section  was 
endowed  with  a  specific  legislative  status. 

The  International  High  Commission,  which,  be- 
sides carrying  on  its  work  locally  through  various 
national  sections,  had  conducted  its  work  inter- 
nationally by  exchange  of  correspondence,  held  its 
first  general  meeting  at  Buenos  Aires  from  April  3 
to  April  12,  191 6.     The  program  included,  in  addi- 

395 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

tion  to  those  acted  upon  by  the  Washington  con- 
ference, six  different  subjects:  (a)  international 
agreements  on  uniform  labor  legislation;  (6)  uni- 
formity of  regulations  concerning  the  classification 
and  analysis  of  petroleum  and  other  mineral  fuels 
with  reference  to  national  policy  on  the  development 
of  natural  resources;  (c)  the  betterment  of  transpor- 
tation facilities  between  the  American  countries; 
(d)  banking  facilities,  extension  of  credit,  financing 
public  and  private  enterprises,  and  the  stabilization 
of  international  exchange;  (e)  telegraph  facilities 
and  rates,  and  the  use  of  wireless  telegraphy  for 
commercial  purposes;  (/)  uniform  legislation  as  to 
conditional  sales  and  chattel  mortgages.  All  these 
topics  were  discussed  and  were  the  subject  of  reports 
by  appropriate  committees. 

The  International  High  Commission,  at  its  meet- 
ing in  Buenos  Aires,  besides  dealing  with  questions 
of  finance  and  administration,  constituted  a  Central 
Executive  Council  for  the  purpose  of  systematizing 
and  co-ordinating  its  work,  carrying  out  its  recom- 
mendations, and  preparing  the  programs  of  future 
meetings.  This  council  consists  of  three  members — 
a  president,  vice-president,  and  a  secretary- general. 
These  three  places  are  occupied  by  the  chairman, 
vice-chairman,  and  secretary  of  the  national  section 
of  the  country  chosen  for  the  time  being  as  head- 
quarters of  the  International  High  Commission. 
On  motion  of  a  member  from  Argentina,  Washington 
was  unanimously  designated  as  the  headquarters  of 

396 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

the  commission  till  the  next  meeting,  and  the  chair- 
man, vice-chairman,  and  secretary  of  the  United 
States  section  thus  became  the  constituent  members 
of  the  Central  Executive  Council. 

The  Central  Executive  Council,  on  entering  upon 
its  labors,  decided  that  the  best  plan  of  procedure 
would  be,  while  pressing  the  work  of  the  conference 
as  a  whole,  to  select  certain  subjects  for  more  im- 
mediate, definite  treatment.  With  this  view,  it  se- 
lected five  subjects:  (i)  The  establishment  of  an  in- 
ternational gold  clearance  fund;  (2)  an  international 
agreement  to  facilitate  the  work  of  commercial 
travellers;  (3)  legislation  concerning  negotiable  in- 
struments (including  The  Hague  rules  on  bills  of 
exchange),  checks  and  bills  of  lading  and  ware- 
house receipts;  (4)  the  arbitration  of  commercial 
disputes;  (5)  the  ratification  of  the  conventions 
adopted  by  the  Fourth  International  American  Con- 
ference at  Buenos  Aires  in  1910  on  trade-marks, 
copyrights,  and  patents. 

In  pursuance  of  this  plan  the  Central  Executive 
Council  has  formulated  drafts  of  treaties  concern- 
ing commercial  travellers  and  the  establishment 
of  an  international  gold  clearance  fund,  and  these 
drafts  have  been  submitted  through  the  Depart- 
ment of  State  of  the  United  States  to  the  gov- 
ernments concerned,  together  with  explanatory 
memoranda. 

In  December  and  January,  191 5-16,  there  was 
held    at    Washington    the    Second    Pan-American 

397 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Scientific  Congress,  the  first  having  been  held  in 
Santiago,  Chile,  in  December  and  January,  1907-08. 

The  Washington  Congress,  which  was  presided 
over  by  His  Excellency  Eduardo  Suarez  Mujica, 
ambassador  of  Chile  and  chairman  of  the  Chilean 
delegation,  embraced  in  its  program  anthropology 
and  allied  subjects;  astronomy,  meteorology,  and 
seismology;  conservation  of  natural  resources,  agri- 
culture, irrigation,  and  forestry;  education;  en- 
gineering; international  law,  public  law,  and  juris- 
prudence; mining  and  metallurgy,  economic  geology, 
and  applied  chemistry;  public  health  and  medical 
science;  transportation,  commerce,  finance,  and 
taxation.  In  order  to  discuss  these  subjects  the 
Congress,  whose  sessions  opened  on  the  27th  of 
December  and  closed  on  the  8th  of  January,  was 
divided  into  nine  sections  and  forty-five  subsections. 

In  an  address  before  the  Southern  Commercial 
Congress  at  Mobile,  Alabama,  October  27,  1013, 
President  Wilson,  recurring  to  the  subject  of  Pan 
Americanism,  said  that  the  future  was  "going  to  be 
very  different  for  this  hemisphere  from  the  past"; 
that  the  states  lying  to  the  south  would  be  "drawn 
closer  to  us  by  innumerable  ties,"  and,  he  hoped, 
chief  of  all,  by  the  tie  of  a  common  understanding, 
into  a  spiritual  union,  so  that  the  opening  of  the 
Panama  Canal  would  open  the  world  to  "a  com- 
merce that  she  has  not  known  before,  a  commerce  of 
intelligence,  of  thought  and  sympathy  between 
North  and  South."     The  states  of  Lntin   Amcrici 

j98 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

were,  he  said,  also  going  to  see  an  emancipation  from 
subordination  to  foreign  enterprise,  such  as  had  re- 
sulted from  the  granting  of  "concessions"  to  foreign 
capitalists.  The  United  States  "ought  to  be  the 
first  to  take  part  in  assisting  in  that  emancipation." 
"Human  rights,  national  integrity,  and  opportunity 
as  against  material  interests" — this  was  the  issue  to 
be  faced.  The  United  States,  he  declared,  would 
"never  again  seek  one  additional  foot  of  territory 
by  conquest."  Making  "honorable  and  fruitful 
use"  of  what  she  already  had,  she  "must  regard  it 
as  one  of  the  duties  of  friendship  to  see  that  from  no 
quarter  are  material  interests  made  superior  to 
human  liberty  and  national  opportunity,"  the  true 
relationship  of  the  Americas  being  that  "of  a  family 
of  mankind  devoted  to  the  development  of  true 
constitutional  liberty." 

Speaking  in  a  similar  strain,  Secretary  Lansing,  in 
addressing  the  Second  Pan  American  Scientific  Con- 
gress, finely  observed  that  the  "essential  qualities" 
of  Pan  Americanism  were  "those  of  the  family — 
sympathy,  helpfulness,  and  a  sincere  desire  to  see 
another  grow  in  prosperity,  absence  of  covetousness 
of  another's  possessions,  absence  of  jealousy  of  an- 
other's prominence,  and  above  all  absence  of  that 
spirit  of  intrigue  which  menaces  the  domestic  peace 
of  a  neighbor";  that,  while  the  Monroe  Doctrine 
is  the  "national  policy  of  the  United  States,"  Pan 
Americanism  is  the  "international  policy  of  the 
Americas" ;  that  Pan  Americanism  "extends  beyond 

399 


A  M  ERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  sphere  of  politics  and  finds  its  application  in  the 
varied  fields  of  human  enterprise";  that  it  is  "an 
expression  of  the  idea  of  internationalism"  and  the 
"most  advanced"  and  "most  practical  form  of  that 
idea,"  and  has  been  "made  possible"  by  our  "geo- 
graphical isolation,"  "similar  political  institutions," 
and  "common  conception  of  human  rights." 

Nevertheless,  when  one  surveys  the  actual  rela- 
tions between  the  countries  of  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere he  cannot  be  blind  to  the  fact  that,  as  else- 
where in  the  world,  the  power  and  influence  which 
nations  wield  tend  to  be  proportionate  to  their  popu- 
lation and  resources,  their  political  stability,  and 
their  financial  strength;  and  that,  although  the  term 
Pan  Americanism  is  often  said  to  denote  a  union  of 
independent  and  co-equal  American  commonwealths, 
some  of  the  members  occupy  a  special  position.  This 
is  clearly  the  case  with  Cuba  and  with  Panama  under 
the  treaties,  coeval  with  their  origin,  by  which  the 
United  States  guarantees  their  independence,  subject 
to  specified  conditions.  Special  situations,  partly 
conventional,  but  also  partly  de  facto,  have  since 
come  to  exist  in  Nicaragua,  Haiti,  and  Santo  Do- 
mingo; and  a  progressive  tendency  has  been  mani- 
fested towards  the  growth  of  such  situations. 

We  have  seen  elsewhere  that  American  marines 
were  landed  in  Nicaragua  in  August,  191 2,  and  that 
a  detachment  remained  at  the  capital  for  the  pur- 
pose of  lending  support  to  the  government  in  the 
maintenance  of  order.     In  February,  1913,  towards 

400 


PAN   AMERICANISM 

the  close  of  President  Taft's  administration,  a  treaty 
was  signed  with  Nicaragua,  granting  to  the  United 
States  the  exclusive  right  to  build  a  canal  by  what 
is  called  the  Nicaragua  route,  as  well  as  the  lease  of 
the  Corn  Islands  as  a  naval  station,  the  United  States 
agreeing  to  pay  $3,000,000.  This  measure  met  the 
approval  of  the  administration  of  President  Wilson; 
and,  after  an  ineffectual  attempt  to  incorporate  in 
the  treaty  the  terms  of  the  Piatt  Amendment,  a  new 
treaty  was  signed  August  5,  191 4,  by  which  the 
United  States  acquires,  together  with  the  other  con- 
cessions mentioned,  a  naval  base  on  the  Gulf  of 
Fonseca.  This  treaty  has  been  ratified.  Protests 
have  been  made  against  it  by  Costa  Rica,  Honduras, 
and  Salvador,  because,  as  they  affirm,  it  forms  an 
obstacle  to  Central  American  union;  by  Honduras 
and  Salvador,  because  it  infringes  their  jurisdictional 
rights  in  the  Gulf  of  Fonseca;  by  Costa  Rica  alone, 
because  Nicaragua,  in  granting  the  canal  concession 
without  her  concurrence,  disregarded  the  terms  of 
President  Cleveland's  award  of  May  22,  1888,  as  to 
their  common  boundary. 

On  the  grounds  thus  jointly  or  severally  main- 
tained by  them,  Costa  Rica  and  Salvador,  in  order 
judicially  to  test  the  legality  of  the  treaty,  each 
brought  a  suit  against  Nicaragua  in  the  Central 
American  Court  of  Justice,  the  international  tribunal 
organized  by  the  Central  American  states  under  the 
treaty  of  December  20,  1907.  This  treaty,  which  was 
concluded  at  the  Central  American  Peace  Con- 
26  401 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

ference  held  at  Washington  in  that  year  through  the 
mediation  of  the  United  States  and  Mexico,  provided 
for  the  creation,  as  between  the  Central  American 
states,  of  an  International  Court  of  Justice.  The 
court  was  duly  established,  and  the  published  reports 
of  its  proceedings  now  occupy  five  volumes.  In  the 
suits  above  mentioned  it  rendered  judgment  against 
Nicaragua,  holding  that  the  treaty  violated  existing 
international  engagements  and  undertook  to  grant 
to  the  United  States  rights  which  Nicaragua  was  not 
competent  alone  to  convey.  Nicaragua  declined  to 
accept  the  decision.  The  Corn  Islands,  it  may  be 
remarked,  are  claimed  by  Colombia.  In  the  award 
of  President  Loubet,  on  the  boundary  between 
Colombia  and  Costa  Rica,  they  are  enumerated  as 
belonging  to  Colombia.  Nicaragua,  however,  was 
not  a  party  to  the  arbitration. 

In  191 1  France,  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and 
Italy  made  a  joint  demand  on  the  Haitian  govern- 
ment for  the  settlement  of  claims  within  three 
months  or  their  submission  to  arbitration.  Political 
conditions  then  were  and  thereafter  continued  to  be 
unsettled.  In  19 14  revolutionary  disturbances  oc- 
curred; in  January,  191 5,  American  troops  were 
landed  at  Port  au  Prince.  A  civil  war  took  place, 
and  the  ruling  president  was  compelled  to  resign  and 
leave  the  country.  Five  months  later  his  successor 
was  killed,  and  American  marines  were  again  landed 
at  Port  au  Prince.  They  remained;  reenforcements 
were  sent,  and  gradually  the  military  occupation  of 

402 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

the  United  States  was  extended  to  the  whole  republic 
and  the  customs  administration  was  taken  over. 
On  September  16,  191 5,  a  treaty  was  signed,  by 
which  the  United  States  agreed  by  its  good  offices  to 
aid  in  the  development  "of  the  agricultural,  mineral, 
and  commercial  resources"  of  the  country,  and  in 
the  establishment  of  its  finances  on  a  firm  and  solid 
basis.  The  collection  and  administration  of  the 
customs  were  to  be  committed  to  a  general  receiver 
and  to  other  persons  to  be  appointed  by  the  Presi- 
dent of  Haiti,  upon  the  nomination  of  the  President 
of  the  United  States,  while  a  financial  adviser  sim- 
ilarly appointed  was  to  be  attached  to  the  Ministry 
of  Finance,  for  the  purpose  of  devising  an  adequate 
system  of  public  accounting,  increasing  and  ad- 
justing revenues,  inquiring  into  the  validity  of  debts, 
and  making  to  the  Minister  of  Finance  such  recom- 
mendations as  might  be  deemed  necessary  for  the 
welfare  and  prosperity  of  the  country.  Further- 
more, the  Haitian  government  engaged  to  create  an 
efficient  constabulary  composed  of  natives,  who 
should,  in  the  first  instance,  be  organized  and  of- 
ficered by  Americans  appointed  upon  the  nomination 
of  the  President  of  the  United  States.  This  con- 
stabulary was  to  have  the  supervision  and  control 
of  arms,  ammunition,  and  military  supplies  through- 
out the  country.  Haiti  also  agreed  not  to  surrender 
any  of  her  territory  or  jurisdiction  by  lease  or  other- 
wise to  any  foreign  power  nor  to  enter  into  any  treaty 
or  contract  such  as  would  impair  her  independence, 

4°3 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

She  further  undertook  to  carry  out  measures  of 
sanitation.  The  United  States  engaged  to  lend  ef- 
ficient aid  for  the  preservation  of  Haitian  inde- 
pendence and  "the  maintenance  of  a  government 
adequate  for  the  protection  of  life,  property,  and 
individual  liberty. "  The  Senate  approved  the  treaty 
on  February  28,  1916;  on  May  3d  the  ratifications 
were  exchanged. 

We  have  elsewhere  discussed  the  treaty  concluded 
with  Santo  Domingo  in  1907  in  relation  to  the  col- 
lection of  the  Dominican  customs  and  the  discharge 
of  the  government's  outstanding  financial  obliga- 
tions. The  results  of  this  voluntary  arrangement 
were  highly  beneficial  to  Santo  Domingo  as  well  as 
to  her  creditors.  For  some  time  it  also  exerted  a 
tranquillizing  influence  on  Dominican  politics,  but 
the  tendency  to  unrest  eventually  reappeared;  and 
in  October,  191 2,  when  relations  between  Haiti  and 
Santo  Domingo  were  disturbed  over  their  unsettled 
boundary,  a  force  of  American  marines  was  sent  to 
protect  the  customs-houses  along  the  Haitian  fron- 
tier. 

Towards  the  end  of  19 13  a  step  somewhat  dif- 
ferent and  somewhat  in  advance  was  taken,  when  it 
was  announced  that,  in  view  of  the  turbulence  pre- 
vailing in  Santo  Domingo,  the  United  States  would 
send  thither  commissioners  to  supervise  the  elections 
then  about  to  be  held.  This  did  not  fall  within  the 
terms  of  the  existing  treaty,  but  seemed  rather  to  be 
a  development  of  President  Wilson's  statement  to 

404 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

Latin  America  of  the  12th  of  the  preceding  March, 
and  the  Mobile  address.     The  persons  to  perform 
the    supervisory    task    were    detailed    chiefly   from 
Porto   Rico.     To   the   protests   of   the    Dominican 
government,  Mr.  Bryan,  then  Secretary  of  State  of 
the  United  States,  replied  that  the  commissioners 
would  act  "as  a  body  of  friendly  observers."     But 
in  the  course  of  time  measures  of  another  kind  were 
adopted,  when  forces  were  landed  for  the  purpose 
of  opposing  a  revolutionary  change  in  the  Dominican 
government  and  restoring  order  under  the  super- 
vision of  the  United  States.     In  a  proclamation  is- 
sued in  June,  19 16,  by  the  admiral  in  command  of 
the  intervening  forces,  it  was  declared  that  they  had 
entered  the  republic  "for  the  purpose  of  supporting 
the  constituted  authorities  and  of  putting  a  stop 
to  revolutions  and  consequent  disorders  impeding 
the  progress  and  prosperity  of  the  country."     Any 
purpose  on  the  part  of  the  United  States  to  ' '  acquire 
by  conquest"  Dominican  territory  or  to  "attack" 
the  republic's  "sovereignty"   was  disclaimed;    but 
it  was  declared  that  the  troops  would  remain  "until 
all  revolutionary  movements"  had  been  "stamped 
out,"  and  such  ' '  reforms  "  as  were  ' '  deemed  necessary 
to  insure  the  future  welfare  of  the  country  "  had  been 
initiated  and  were   "in  effective  operation."     The 
hope  was  expressed  that  "all  this"  might  be  "ac- 
complished peacefully  and  without  bloodshed,"  and 
"all   true  Dominican   patriots  both  in  public  and 
private  life"  were  called  upon  to  "co-operate  ...  to 

405 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  fullest  extent"  in  the  accomplishment  of  the 
objects  of  the  intervention. 

In  the  winter  of  191 4-1 5  the  representatives  of 
some  of  the  South  American  countries  at  Washington 
were  sounded  as  to  the  conclusion  with  the  United 
States  of  a  treaty  for  the  "mutual  guarantee  of 
territorial  integrity  and  of  political  independence 
under  republican  forms  of  government"  and  for 
other  purposes.  Steps  were  afterwards  taken  to 
make  the  proposal  Pan  American. 

President  Wilson,  addressing  the  Second  Pan 
American  Scientific  Congress,  January  6,  191 6, 
observed  that,  while  the  Monroe  Doctrine  placed 
an  inhibition  on  European  governments,  it  did  not 
disclose  what  the  United  States  would  do  "with  the 
implied  and  partial  protectorate  which  she  appar- 
ently was  trying  to  set  up  on  this  side  of  the  water" ; 
and  that  "fears  and  suspicions  on  this  score"  had 
prevented  greater  intimacy,  confidence  and  trust 
between  the  Americas.  Latterly  there  had,  he  said, 
been  an  "interchange  of  views"  between  the  au- 
thorities at  Washington  and  the  representatives  of  the 
other  American  states,  an  interchange  "charming 
and  hopeful,"  because  of  an  "increasingly  sure  ap- 
preciation of  the  spirit"  in  which  it  was  undertaken; 
and  those  representatives  had  seen  that  if  America 
was  "to  come  into  her  own  ...  in  a  world  of 
peace  and  order,  she  must  establish  the  foundations 
of  amity  so  that  no  one  will  hereafter  doubt  them." 
Summarizing  then,  as  the  means  to  that  end,  the 

406 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

provisions  of  the  proposal  above  mentioned,  he 
stated  that  his  thought  was  not  only  the  "inter- 
national" but  also  the  "domestic"  peace  of  America; 
that  if  the  American  states,  or  any  of  them,  were 
"constantly  in  ferment,"  there  would  be  a  "stand- 
ing threat  to  their  relations  with  one  another,"  and 
that  "it  is  just  as  much  to  our  interest  to  assist 
each  other  to  orderly  processes  within  our  own 
borders  as  it  is  to  orderly  processes  in  our  con- 
troversies with  one  another." 

A  number  of  the  American  governments  accepted 
the  proposal  "in  principle."  Some  indicated  a  will- 
ingness to  go  further,  but  none  of  them  in  fact  signed 
the  treaty.  An  unfavorable  influence  seems  to  have 
been  exerted  by  the  feeling,  which  found  expression 
in  certain  quarters,  that  the  proposal,  though  strictly 
reciprocal  in  terms,  involved  unequal  responsibilities 
and  opportunities.  Some,  while  doubting  the  dis- 
position of  the  United  States  to  accept  suggestions 
from  other  American  countries  in  such  matters, 
seemed  to  dread  lest  the  treaty  might  lead  to  dis- 
cussions as  to  whether  particular  constitutions  of 
government,  or  even  particular  administrations,  sat- 
isfied the  condition  of  republicanism,  thus  opening 
the  door  to  constant  foreign  intrusions  into  internal 
affairs.  Especially  was  this  the  case  with  those 
who,  while  fundamentally  questioning  the  wisdom 
or  the  feasibility  of  undertaking  to  establish  in  the 
Americas  a  static  condition  by  international  action, 
believed  that  the  attempt  to  do  so  would  necessarily 

407 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

involve  the  exercise  over  governments  of  a  certain 
measure  of  foreign  supervision  and  control;  while 
others  yet,  holding  the  opinion  that  no  international 
need  at  the  moment  existed  for  such  a  treaty  or 
made  its  signature  urgent,  thought  that  it  should 
not  be  pressed  upon  reluctant  governments.1 

No  doubt  one  of  the  chief  impediments  to  the  de- 

1  For  an  account  of  this  proposal  and  its  reception,  including  the 
draft  of  the  proposed  treaty,  see  an  article  by  David  Lawrence,  in  the 
New  York  Evening  Post  of  April  i,  191 6.     The  draft  reads  as  follows: 

"Article  I.  That  the  high  contracting  parties  to  this  solemn 
covenant  and  agreement  hereby  join  one  another  in  a  common  and 
mutual  guarantee  of  territorial  integrity  and  of  political  independence 
under  republican  forms  of  government. 

"Article  II.  To  give  definite  application  to  the  guarantee  set 
forth  in  Article  I  the  high  contracting  parties  severally  covenant  to 
endeavor  forthwith  to  reach  a  settlement  of  all  disputes  as  to 
boundary  or  territory  now  pending  between  them  by  amicable 
agreement  or  by  means  of  international  arbitration. 

"Article  III.  That  the  high  contracting  parties  further  agree: 
First,  that  all  questions,  of  whatever  character,  arising  between 
two  or  more  of  them  which  cannot  be  settled  by  the  ordinary  means 
of  diplomatic  correspondence  shall,  before  any  declaration  of  war  or 
beginning  of  hostilities,  be  first  submitted  to  a  permanent  inter- 
national commission  for  investigation,  one  year  being  allowed  for 
such  investigation;  and  second,  that,  if  the  dispute  is  not  settled 
by  investigation,  to  submit  the  same  to  arbitration,  provided  the 
question  in  dispute  does  not  affect  the  honor,  independence  or  vital 
interests  of  the  nations  concerned  or  the  interests  of  third  parties. 

"Article  IV.  To  the  end  that  domestic  tranquillity  may  prevail 
within  their  territories  the  high  contracting  parties  further  severally 
covenant  and  agree  that  they  will  not  permit  the  departure  from 
their  respective  jurisdictions  of  any  military  or  naval  expedition 
hostile  to  the  established  government  of  any  of  the  high  contracting 
parties,  and  that  they  will  prevent  the  exportation  from  their  re- 
spective jurisdictions  of  arms,  ammunition  or  other  munitions  of 
war  destined  to  or  for  the  use  of  any  person  or  persons  notified  to 
be  in  insurrection  or  revolt  against  the  established  government 
of  any  of  the  high  contracting  parties." 

408 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

velopment  and  preservation  of  relations  of  amity 
and  intimacy  between  the  United  States  and  the 
other  independent  nations  of  this  hemisphere  is  the 
want  of  information  as  to  the  conditions  which 
actually  exist  in  the  various  countries  and  the  con- 
sequent prevalence  of  erroneous  impressions  in  re- 
gard to  those  conditions.  As  the  result  of  the  fact 
that  the  countries  to  the  south  of  the  United  States 
have  not  all  a  common  origin,  and  that,  while  all 
but  one  formerly  belonged  to  Spain,  the  largest  of 
them  all,  Brazil,  was  once  a  colony  of  Portugal,  it  has 
become  the  fashion  to  group  them  indiscriminately 
as  "Latin  America."  The  employment  of  this 
phrase,  although  it  may  be  necessary,  has  tended  to 
confirm  two  radically  erroneous  impressions,  one 
being  that  all  the  countries  called  Latin  are  really 
Latin;  and  the  other,  that  all  the  countries  called 
Latin  are  alike.  In  saying  this  I  do  not  advert  to 
the  fact  that  the  supposition  seems  widely  to  prevail 
that  Spanish,  and  not  Portuguese,  is  the  language  of 
Brazil.  What  I  mean  is  that  it  seems  to  be  generally 
supposed  that  in  population,  in  institutions,  and  in 
administration  they  are  all  alike.  In  reality,  in 
these  respects,  and  particularly  in  the  constituents  of 
their  population,  they  exhibit  as  between  themselves 
differences  more  pronounced  than  those  that  exist 
between  the  United  States  and  some  of  them. 
The  circumstance  has  already  been  mentioned  that 
Brazil,  on  severing  her  connection  with  Portugal, 
continued,  till  1889,  under  a  monarchical  form  of 

409 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

government — a  fact  that  constituted  not  the  slightest 
hindrance  to  the  maintenance  of  the  most  cordial 
relations  with  that  country. 

As  a  result  of  the  misapprehensions  to  which  I 
have  adverted  little  has  been  understood  in  the 
United  States  of  the  causes  of  the  internal  disorders 
by  which  some  of  the  American  republics  have  been 
afflicted.  Regarding  all  Latin-American  countries 
as  one,  a  tendency  has  existed  to  assume  that  govern- 
ment in  all  of  them  is  equally  unstable.  That  this 
impression  is  inaccurate  may  be  demonstrated  by  a 
few  examples.  In  more  than  one  of  the  states  of 
Central  America,  for  instance,  revolutions  have  been 
frequent  and  have  seemed  at  times  to  be  chronic, 
but  the  very  opposite  is  the  case  in  Costa  Rica, 
sometimes  called  the  "Athens  of  Central  America." 
Till  the  recent  sudden  change  of  government  in  that 
country  no  revolution  had  taken  place  since  1870. 
Habits  of  statesmanship  had  developed  there,  and 
when,  in  1913,  a  question  arose  under  their  local  law 
as  to  the  presidential  succession,  the  problem  was 
solved  in  a  manner  that  would  have  done  credit  to 
any  country.  Her  people  are  intensely  devoted  to 
the  maintenance  of  their  national  independence  and 
are  proud  of  the  skill  which  they  have  achieved  in 
government.  In  Chile  there  has  been  but  one  serious 
civil  disturbance  in  a  long  stretch  of  years — namely, 
the  Balmacedist  or  Congressional  Revolution  in 
1 89 1.  Chile  has  justified  the  prediction  of  Bolivar 
that  the  spirit  of  liberty  there  would  never  be  extin- 

410 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

guished.  In  Argentina  one  government  has  now  for 
many  years  followed  another  in  orderly  succession. 
Her  capital  is  one  of  the  world's  finest  cities  and 
boasts  of  a  press  which  may  well  share  our  admira- 
tion with  that  of  Rio  de  Janeiro.  In  Brazil,  since 
the  sudden  governmental  change  of  1889,  there  has 
been  but  one  civil  disturbance  of  serious  proportions, 
and  this  lasted  only  a  little  more  than  six  months. 
Nor  should  we  forget  that  there  is  no  country  that 
can  boast  a  constant  and  assured  immunity  from 
disturbances,  either  domestic  or  foreign. 

I  have  already  adverted  to  the  bloodless  character 
of  the  transition  in  Brazil  from  monarchical  to  re- 
publican government.  This  fortunate  issue  may 
largely  be  ascribed  to  the  element  of  idealism  which 
has  so  often  distinguished  the  political  conduct  of 
American  statesmen,  an  idealism  which  can  be  fully 
appreciated  only  when  we  reflect  upon  the  struggles 
in  which  they  at  times  have  been  compelled  to  en- 
gage, in  their  efforts  to  maintain  liberal  institutions 
such  as  exist  in  the  United  States.  The  same  ten- 
dency accounts  for  the  peaceful  abolition  of  slavery 
in  South  America,  and  particularly  in  Brazil,  where 
the  system,  having  gained  a  strong  foothold,  tended 
to  linger,  but  where  it  was  eventually  destroyed 
without  forcible  resistance.  While  it  would  be  going 
too  far  to  say  that  those  whose  material  interests 
were  directly  injured  accepted  emancipation  with 
universal  gratitude,  they  at  any  rate  accepted  it 
intelligently  as  a  duty  to  country  and  to  humanity. 

411 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Another  misconception  that  more  or  less  prevails 
in  regard  to  the  countries  of  Latin  America  is  that 
which  relates  to  the  personal  integrity  of  their 
statesmen.  Certain  bad  examples,  which  it  is  un- 
necessary to  enumerate,  have  served  to  spread  the 
supposition  that  the  chief  cause  of  revolutions  in 
those  countries  is  the  desire  for  the  possession  of  the 
custom-houses.  Here,  as  elsewhere,  it  is  necessary 
to  exercise  discrimination.  Perhaps  there  is  no 
country  in  which  the  desire  for  the  emoluments  of 
office  does  not  influence  the  conduct  of  individuals  or 
where  the  desire  even  for  illicit  gains  does  not  furnish 
an  occasional  motive.  The  existence  of  such  condi- 
tions and  the  extent  to  which  they  prevail  neces- 
sarily depend  upon  the  character  of  the  society  and 
the  general  state  of  the  population.  The  supposi- 
tion, however,  that  in  the  countries  of  Latin  America 
a  want  of  integrity  in  public  officials  is  general 
involves  an  error  of  fact  and  a  serious  injustice. 
Personal  integrity  is  the  rule,  and  not  the  exception, 
among  the  statesmen  of  the  American  republics, 
even  outside  the  United  States.  I  have  often 
thought  of  one  of  my  colleagues  in  the  Fourth 
International  American  Conference,  Serior  Gonzalo 
Ramirez,  as  one  of  the  finest  examples  I  have  ever 
known  of  public  integrity;  and  I  feel  at  liberty  par- 
ticularly to  mention  him  because  he  has  since  passed 
away.  A  jurist,  a  professor  in  the  University  of 
Montevideo,  and  also  a  diplomatist,  he  spent  his  life 
largely  in  public  service,  holding  at  the  end  the  im- 

412 


PAN   AMERICANISM 

portant  and  responsible  position  of  Uruguayan  min- 
ister at  Buenos  Aires.  I  saw  his  modest  home  at 
Montevideo,  whose  dimensions  betokened  a  life  in 
which  fortune  had  been  sacrificed  to  fame,  and 
private  interest  to  public  duty.  At  the  conference 
at  Buenos  Aires  he  was  appointed  chairman  of  the 
committee  on  the  renewal  of  the  treaties  between  the 
American  republics  for  the  arbitration  of  pecuniary 
claims.  At  that  time  he  was  in  the  last  stage  of  his 
fatal  illness.  In  consequence  of  his  infirm  physical 
condition,  regular  sessions  of  the  committee  could 
not  be  held,  and  it  was  agreed  among  the  members 
that  its  meetings  should  take  place  at  his  lodgings 
at  any  time  during  the  day  or  evening  when  he  might 
notify  us  that  he  should  be  able  to  preside.  He  did 
his  share,  and,  indeed,  more  than  his  share  of  the 
work  of  the  committee,  making  himself  the  first 
draft  of  its  report.  I  can  see  him  before  me  now, 
seated  in  an  invalid's  chair,  his  mind  alert,  his  inter- 
est eager,  his  sense  of  duty  supreme,  devoting  the 
last  efforts  of  his  fast-ebbing  life  to  the  promotion 
of  justice,  mutual  respect,  and  friendship  among  the 
American  nations. 

Many  other  illustrations  might  be  given,  but  I 
will  mention  only  one — the  case  of  the  late  Baron 
Rio  Branco,  of  Brazil,  who  died  in  February,  191 2, 
after  having  held  the  post  of  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs  for  a  longer  period  than  a  similar  position  has 
been  held  by  any  other  person  in  this  hemisphere. 
At  the  time  of  his  decease  he  was  serving  under  his 

413 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

fourth  President.  Having  passed  many  years  in  the 
public  service,  it  was  a  well-known  fact  that,  al- 
though he  was  the  son  of  another  eminent  Brazilian 
statesman,  he  was  destitute  of  private  fortune  and 
depended  for  his  support  upon  the  rewards  which 
had  been  voted  by  a  grateful  nation.  After  his 
death  his  library  was  purchased  by  the  government 
for  the  benefit  of  his  family,  as  an  additional  mark  of 
the  national  gratitude. 

Lastly,  I  desire  to  refer  to  the  misapprehensions 
which  have  existed  in  regard  to  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
The  Third  International  American  Conference, 
which  sat  at  Rio  de  Janeiro,  was  held  in  what  is 
known  as  the  Monroe  Palace,  named  in  honor  of  the 
enunciator  of  the  famous  American  policy.  Brazil 
was  one  of  the  first,  perhaps  the  first,  of  the  American 
nations  to  applaud  that  doctrine.  The  Baron  Rio 
Branco,  of  whom  I  have  just  spoken,  was  a  strenuous 
asserter  of  it.  But  he  asserted  it,  not  as  the  exclu- 
sive concern  of  any  one  nation,  but  as  the  direct  and 
immediate  concern  of  all  the  American  nations. 
When,  therefore,  a  so-called  Anglo-American  syn- 
dicate, incorporated  in  one  of  the  States  of  the 
United  States,  proposed,  in  the  exercise  of  extraor- 
dinary political  powers  and  commercial  privileges 
granted  by  a  neighbor  of  Brazil,  to  introduce  Euro- 
pean colonists  into  the  upper  reaches  of  certain 
affluents  of  the  Amazon,  he  protested  against  what 
he  called  "the  first  attempt  to  introduce  in  our 
continent  the  African  and  Asiatic  system  of  chartered 

414 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

companies,"  or  government  by  foreign  "semi- 
sovereign  entities,"  and  took  the  necessary  measures 
to  obtain  from  the  syndicate  the  renunciation  of  all 
rights  and  claims  under  its  concession,  the  effect  of 
which  was  thus  completely  nullified. 

So  far  as  the  Monroe  Doctrine  is  held  to  guard  the 
political  system  of  this  hemisphere  against  external 
subversion  or  attack,  the  American  nations  cordially 
accept  it  and  look  to  the  United  States  as  its  author 
and  mainstay.  In  this  sense  it  is  eulogized  by  the 
statesmen  of  Latin  America.  In  closing  the  Fourth 
International  American  Conference  in  iqio,  one  of 
Argentina's  great  orators,  who,  as  Minister  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  presided  as  honorary  president  at  the  final 
session,  paid  an  eloquent  tribute  to  American  solidar- 
ity and  to  the  United  States  as  the  proponent  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine.  "In  this  year,"  said  Dr.  Rod- 
riguez Larreta,  "the  majority  of  our  republics  com- 
plete a  century  of  independent  life.  We  can  now  say, 
with  Washington,  'America  for  humanity,'  because 
we  are  sovereign  nations  and  the  place  we  occupy 
in  the  world  we  owe  to  the  strength  of  our  own 
arms  and  our  blood  heroically  shed.  But  let  my  last 
words  be  to  send  a  message  of  acknowledgment  to  the 
great  nation  which  initiated  these  conferences,  which 
preceded  us  in  the  struggle  for  independence,  which 
afforded  us  the  example  of  a  fruitful  people  organized 
as  a  republican  nation,  which,  on  a  day  memorable 
in  history,  declared  'America  for  Americans,'  and  cov- 
ered as  with  a  shield  our  hard-won  independence." 

4i5 


A  M  E  R I C  A  N    D  I  P  L  O  M  A  C  Y 

In  this  sense  the  Monroe  Doetrine  is  received  in 
South  America  with  sentiments  of  the  most  friendly 
and  cordial  concurrence.  <  But  there  is  another 
sense  in  which  the  other  independent  nations,  and 
especially  such  powerful  states  as  Argentina,  Brazil, 
and  Chile,  find  themselves  unable  to  accept  it. 
This  sense,  which  is  said  to  represent  the  view  of 
the  "man  in  the  street,"  has  been  editorially  ex- 
pressed in  these  terms:  "Whatever  its  interest  at 
stake  or  wrong  suffered  in  Latin  America,  we  sternly 
enjoin  every  European  power  to  keep  its  hands  off  of 
what  we  make  our  international  business  and  what 
we  decree  must  be  the  business  of  nobody  else."  In 
other  words,  the  United  States  is  said  in  effect  to 
have  decreed  that  other  American  countries  are  so 
far  subject  to  its  control  that  non-American  powers 
cannot  even  demand  from  them  the  redress  of 
grievances. 

Of  this  view  it  is  to  be  observed  that  it  must,  in 
the  first  place,  arouse  resentment  in  the  independent 
countries  of  America,  since  it  places  them  all  in  the 
subordinate  position  of  protectorates,  subject  to 
external  dictation.  And  it  must,  in  the  second  place, 
provoke  the  opposition  of  non-American  powers, 
since  they  find  it  difficult  to  admit  that  they  cannot 
conduct  their  affairs  directly  with  states  which  are 
professedly,  and  in  law  and  in  fact,  independent. 

Considered  in  its  practical  aspects,  the  conception 
appears  to  be  equally  superficial  and  extravagant. 
The  area  of  the  United  States  embraces  less  than 

416 


PAN   AMERICANISM 

three  million  square  miles;  and  within  these  limits 
the  national  and  local  governments  combined  often 
have  difficulty  in  preserving  order  and  insuring  the 
protection  of  foreigners,  although  the  territory  is 
within  their  exclusive  legal  control.  The  countries 
of  Latin  America  comprise  an  area  of  more  than 
eight  million  square  miles,  or  almost  three  times  as 
much;  and  over  these  more  than  eight  million 
square  miles  the  United  States  exercises  no  govern- 
mental control.  And  yet,  within  this  vast  area,  it  is 
asserted  that  the  protection  of  aliens  and  the  redress 
of  their  grievances  is  a  matter  that  concerns  the 
United  States  alone,  to  the  exclusion  of  any  and  all 
of  the  governments  on  whose  diplomatic  protection 
such  aliens  would  normally  rely.  The  responsibility 
thus  proposed  to  be  thrust  upon  the  United  States  is 
unexampled. 

Examined  historically,  the  assumption  that  the 
American  nations  are  in  effect  protectorates,  with 
which  non-American  powers  have  been  denied  the 
right  to  conduct  relations  directly,  is  equally  unjus- 
tified. In  numerous  instances,  indeed,  force  has 
been  employed — a  contingency  to  which  even  the 
United  States  might  itself  be  exposed.  In  the  fourth 
decade  of  the  nineteenth  century  France  and  Great 
Britain  blockaded  the  ports  of  Buenos  Aires  and 
Uruguay.  France  resorted  to  reprisals  against  Mex- 
ico in  the  same  decade.  From  1846  to  1848  the 
United  States  was  at  war  with  Mexico  for  the  redress 
of  its  own  grievances.  In  1861,  France,  Great 
27  417 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Britain,  and  Spain  resorted  to  reprisals  against 
Mexico  without  protest.  Later,  when  France  (Great 
Britain  and  Spain  having  withdrawn)  essayed  to  set 
up  and  maintain  a  monarchy  in  Mexico,  the  United 
States  protested  and  eventually  brought  the  attempt 
to  an  end.  The  war  between  Spain  and  the  republics 
on  the  west  coast  of  South  America  has  heretofore 
been  mentioned.  In  1894  Great  Britain  seized  the 
port  of  Corinto,  in  Nicaragua,  to  collect  an  in- 
demnity. In  1903  Germany,  Great  Britain,  and 
Italy  blockaded  the  ports  of  Venezuela,  with  the 
acquiescence  of  the  United  States,  it  being  expressly 
understood  that  there  should  be  no  permanent  occu- 
pation or  acquisition  of  Venezuelan  territory.  These 
incidents  are  recalled  not  for  the  purpose  of  advocat- 
ing or  justifying  the  employment  of  force  in  any 
particular  instance,  or  of  intimating  that  the  United 
States  is  not  justified  in  exhibiting  special  concern  in 
regard  to  what  may  tend  to  jeopardize  the  inde- 
pendence of  states  for  whose  preservation  it  has 
assumed  a  contingent  responsibility.  They  are  cited 
only  for  the  purpose  of  demonstrating  that  the 
Monroe  Doctrine  has  not  been  understood  to  involve 
the  denial  by  the  United  States  to  other  American 
nations  of  the  primary  rights  and  liabilities  of 
independent  states. 

The  establishment  of  the  relations  between  in- 
dependent American  states  on  the  basis  of  mutual 
confidence,  respect,  and  co-operation  is,  as  has  been 
seen,  an  aspiration  long  cherished  by  generous  minds. 

418 


PAN    AMERICANISM 

But,  although  this  aspiration  forms  the  central 
thought  of  Pan  Americanism,  it  is  not  easily  realized. 
On  the  contrary,  its  realization  is  a  highly  difficult 
task  beset  with  complicated  problems  and  intricate 
obstructions.  Nor  will  the  time  ever  come  when  it 
will  not  afford  ample  opportunity  for  the  exercise 
of  an  informed  and  discriminating  judgment,  of  well- 
directed  and  intelligent  helpfulness,  and  of  considera- 
tion for  the  opinions  and  feelings  of  others,  to  say 
nothing  of  the  reciprocal  recognition  of  rights  and 
occasional  forbearance.  These  qualities,  so  vital 
to  the  preservation  of  amity  and  confidence  else- 
where, are  no  less  essential  in  the  Western  Hemi- 
sphere. 

References : 

Reports  of  the  four  International  American  Conferences, 
and  particularly  the  Historical  Appendix  (Vol.  IV)  to 
the  report  of  the  first  conference;  the  works  of  Bolivar; 
Henry  Clay  and  Pan  Americanism,  Columbia  University 
Quarterly,  Sept.,  1915;  Latanc's  Diplomatic  Relations  of  Un- 
united States  and  Spanish  America. 

The  relations  between  the  United  States  and  the  other  Amer- 
ican countries  are  comprehensively  presented  in  Moore's 
Digest  of  International  Law. 


XI 

INFLUENCE    AND   TENDENCIES 

Nothing  could  have  been  further  from  the 
thoughts  of  the  wise  statesmen  who  guided  the 
United  States  through  the  struggle  for  independence 
and  laid  the  foundations  of  the  government's  foreign 
policy  than  the  institution  of  a  philosophical  prop- 
agandism  for  the  dissemination  of  political  princi- 
ples of  a  certain  type  in  foreign  lands.  Although 
the  Declaration  of  Independence  loudly  proclaimed 
the  theory  of  the  natural  rights  of  man,  they  gave  to 
this  theory,  in  its  application  to  their  own  concerns, 
a  qualified  interpretation,  and,  as  practical  men, 
forbore  to  push  it  at  once  to  all  its  logical  conse- 
quences. On  the  continent  of  Europe,  the  apostles 
of  reform,  directing  their  shafts  against  absolutism 
and  class  privileges,  spoke  in  terms  of  philosophical 
idealism,  while  the  patriots  of  America,  though  they 
did  not  eschew  philosophy,  debated  concrete  ques- 
tions of  constitutional  law  and  commonplace  prob- 
lems of  taxation.  In  Europe,  the  revolution  meant 
first  of  all  a  destructive  upheaval;  in  America,  where 
the  ground  was  clear,  it  meant  a  constructive  de- 

420 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

velopment.  And  yet,  in  spite  of  this  difference, 
the  American  Revolution  operated  as  a  powerful 
stimulus  to  political  agitation  in  Europe.  There 
was  in  the  very  existence  of  American  indepen- 
dence, permeated  as  it  was  with  democratic  repub- 
licanism, a  force  that  exerted  a  world-wide  influence 
in  behalf  of  political  liberty.  Of  this  fact  Euro- 
pean statesmen  betrayed  their  appreciation  when 
they  deprecated  the  course  of  the  King  of  France  in 
subordinating  what  appeared  to  them  to  be  a  per- 
manent general  interest  to  the  gratification  of  a 
feeling  of  enmity  towards  Great  Britain.  Spanish 
diplomatists  were  not  alone  in  expressing  this  senti- 
ment. The  Emperor  Joseph  II.  of  Austria,  in  a  letter 
to  his  minister  in  the  Netherlands,  in  1787,  remarked 
that  "  France,  by  the  assistance  which  she  afforded 
to  the  Americans,  gave  birth  to  reflections  on  free- 
dom." That  the  assistance  thus  given  hastened  her 
own  revolution,  there  can  be  no  doubt.  Nor  did  the 
visible  effect  of  the  example  of  the  United  States 
end  here.  It  has  been  manifest  in  every  European 
struggle  for  more  liberal  forms  of  government  dur- 
ing the  past  hundred  years  —  in  Spain,  in  Italy,  in 
Germany,  and  in  Hungary.  It  penetrated  even  to 
Russia,  where  there  was  found  among  the  papers  of 
one  of  the  leaders  who  planned  a  revolution  for  1826 
a  constitution  for  that  country  on  the  model  of  the 
Constitution  of  the  United  States.  And  it  may  also 
be  traced  in  the  lives  of  those  who  have  striven  to 

421 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

advance,  sometimes  under  adverse  and  discourag- 
ing conditions,  the  cause  of  self-government  on  the 
American  continents. 

While  the  United  States  refrained  from  aggressive 
political  propagandism,  the  spirit  of  liberty  that  re- 
sulted from  its  independence  was  necessarily  reflect 
ed  in  its  diplomacy.  It  is  true  that  the  attitude  of 
the  government  on  certain  special  questions  was  for 
a  long  while  affected  by  the  survival  in  the  United 
States  of  the  institution  of  African  slavery.  It  was 
for  this  reason  that  the  recognition  of  Hayti,  Santo 
Domingo,  and  Liberia  as  independent  states  did  not 
take  place  till  the  administration  of  Abraham  Lin- 
coln, although  such  recognition  had  long  before  been 
accorded  by  European  powers.  But  the  attitude 
of  the  United  States  towards  those  countries  was 
exceptional,  and  was  governed  by  forces  which 
neither  diverted  nor  sought  to  divert  the  govern- 
ment from  the  general  support  of  the  principles  on 
which  it  was  founded. 

The  influence  of  the  United  States  in  behalf  of 
political  liberty  was  clearly  exhibited  in  the  estab- 
lishment of  the  principle,  to  which  we  have  here- 
tofore adverted,  that  the  true  test  of  a  government's 
right  to  exist,  and  to  be  recognized  by  other  govern- 
ments, is  the  fact  of  its  existence  as  the  exponent  of 
the  popular  will.  This  rule,  when  it  was  announced, 
appeared  to  be  little  short  of  revolutionary,  since  it 
was  in  effect  a  corollary  of  the  affirmation  made  in 

4.22 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

the  Declaration  of  Independence,  that  governments 
Cerive  their  just  powers  from  the  consent  of  the 
governed,  and  that,  whenever  any  form  of  govern- 
ment becomes  destructive  of  the  ends  for  which 
governments  are  instituted,  it  is  the  right  of  the 
people  to  alter  or  abolish  it  and  to  institute  a  new 
government,  laying  its  foundation  on  such  principles 
and  organizing  its  affairs  in  such  form  as  to  them  shall 
seem  most  likely  to  effect  their  safety  and  happiness. 
Nor  was  the  free  spirit  of  American  diplomacy  less 
manifest  in  its  opposition  to  the  system  of  commercial 
monopoly;  in  its  espousal  of  the  principles  of  the 
Monroe  Doctrine ;  or  in  its  advocacy  of  the  freedom 
of  the  seas,  of  the  rule  that  free  ships  make  free  goods, 
and  of  the  exemption  of  private  property  at  sea  from 
capture.  The  weight  of  its  influence  was  also  con- 
stantly lent  in  favor  of  the  maintenance  of  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  countries  of  the  Far  East.  In  the 
treaty  with  China  of  June  18,  1858,  made  at  a  time 
when  the  Chinese  government  appeared  to  be  pecul- 
iarly friendless,  we  find  the  remarkable  stipulation 
that  "if  any  other  nation  should  act  unjustly  or  op- 
pressively" towards  that  country,  the  United  States 
would  "exert  its  good  offices,  on  being  informed  of 
the  case,  to  bring  about  an  amicable  arrangement 
of  the  question,  thus  showing  their  friendly  feelings." 
But,  besides  exerting  an  influence  in  favor  of  liberty 
and  independence,  American  diplomacy  was  also  em- 
ployed in  the  advancement  of  the  principle  of  legality. 

423 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

American  statesmen  sought  to  regulate  the  relations 
of  nations  by  law,  not  only  as  a  measure  for  the  pro- 
tection of  the  weak  against  the  aggressions  of  the 
strong,  but  also  as  the  only  means  of  assuring  the 
peace  of  the  world.  The  conception  of  legality  in 
international  relations  lay  at  the  foundation  of  the 
system  of  neutrality,  which  was  established  during 
the  administration  of  Washington.  It  also  formed 
the  basis  of  the  practice  of  arbitration,  which  was  so 
auspiciously  begun  at  the  same  time.  Half  a  century 
later  it  received  an  accession  of  strength  in  the  de- 
velopment of  the  process  of  extradition.  It  is  true 
that  in  the  development  of  this  process  in  modern 
times  the  credit  of  the  initiative  belongs  to  France; 
but,  beginning  with  the  Webster-Ashburton  treaty 
of  August  9,  1842,  the  United  States,  at  an  important 
stage  in  the  history  of  the  system,  actively  contrib- 
uted to  its  growth  by  the  conclusion  of  numerous 
conventions.  The  twenty-seventh  article  of  the  Jay 
treaty  provided  for  the  surrender  of  fugitives  charged 
with  murder  or  forgery ;  but  it  proved  to  be  for  the 
most  part  ineffective,  and  expired  by  limitation  in 
1808.  The  Webster-Ashburton  treaty  provided  for 
the  extradition  of  fugitives  for  any  of  seven  offences, 
and  proved  to  be  efficacious.  Similar  treaties  with 
other  countries  were  soon  afterwards  made,  ten  being 
concluded  while  William  L.  Marcy  was  Secretary  of 
State,  during  the  administration  of  Pierce.  Since 
that  time  our  extradition  arrangements  have  grown 

424 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

both  in  number  and  in  comprehensiveness.  We 
cannot  afford,  however,  to  rest  on  our  laurels.  In 
recent  times  other  nations,  and  especially  Great 
Britain  since  1870,  observing  the  propensity  of  crim- 
inals to  utilize  improved  facilities  of  travel,  have 
by  legislation  as  well  as  by  negotiation  vastly  in- 
creased the  reach  and  efficiency  of  the  system.  It 
will  therefore  be  necessary,  if  we  would  fulfil  the 
promise  of  our  past  and  retain  a  place  in  the  front 
rank,  steadily  to  multiply  our  treaties  and  enlarge 
their  scope.  No  innovation  in  the  practice  of  nations 
has  ever  more  completely  discredited  the  woful  pre- 
dictions of  its  adversaries  than  that  of  surrender- 
ing fugitives  from  justice.  The  Webster-Ashburton 
treaty  was  loudly  denounced  as  a  mere  trap  for  the 
recovery  of  political  offenders.  Other  treaties  en- 
countered similar  opposition.  In  no  instance  have 
these  direful  forebodings  been  justified  by  the  event. 
American  diplomacy  has  also  been  characterized 
by  practicality.  It  has  sought  to  attain  definite  ob- 
jects by  practical  methods.  Even  in  its  idealism, 
as  in  the  advocacy  of  the  exemption  of  private  prop- 
erty at  sea  from  capture,  it  has  shown  a  practical 
side.  The  same  disposition  has  been  exhibited  in  the 
American  consular  service.  Consuls  have  been  de- 
scribed by  publicists  as  agents  of  commerce ;  but  for 
a  long  while  their  functions  were  passive  rather  than 
active,  and  to  some  extent  were  ornamental.  The 
government  of  the  United  States  conceived  the  idea 

425 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

of  employing  its  consuls  not  only  for  the  protection 
of  commerce,  but  also  for  its  extension.  In  1880, 
while  Mr.  Evarts  was  Secretary  of  State,  there  was 
begun  the  monthly  publication  of  consular  reports, 
which  has  been  continued  with  useful  results  up  to 
the  present  time.  The  example  thus  set  has  been 
followed  in  other  countries,  so  that  we  find  to-day 
among  the  publications  of  the  British,  French,  and 
German  governments  consular  reports  on  the  com- 
merce and  industries  of  foreign  countries.  In  1897, 
on  the  recommendation  of  Mr.  Frederic  Emory,  then 
chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Foreign  Commerce  of  the 
Department  of  State,  the  usefulness  of  the  American 
series  was  greatly  enhanced  by  the  establishment  of 
the  system  of  publishing  daily  advance  sheets  of  the 
monthly  issues.  It  is  obvious  that  this  develop- 
ment constituted  a  highly  important  step  towards 
making  the  consular  service  of  practical  value  to  the 
business  interests  of  the  country. 

American  diplomacy  has  also  exerted  a  potent  in- 
fluence upon  the  adoption  of  simple  and  direct 
methods  in  the  conduct  of  negotiations.  Observant 
of  the  proprieties  and  courtesies  of  intercourse,  but 
having,  as  John  Adams  once  declared,  "no  notion  of 
cheating  anybody,"  American  diplomatists  have  usu- 
ally relied  rather  upon  the  strength  of  their  cause, 
frankly  and  clearly  argued,  than  upon  a  subtle  diplo- 
macy, for  the  attainment  of  their  ends.  Indeed  the 
framework  of  government  adopted  in  the  United 

426 


INFLUENCE   AND   TENDENCIES 

States,  by  which  important  powers  affecting,  both 
directly  and  indirectly,  the  control  of  foreign  affairs 
were  confided  to  the  Senate  and  to  the  Congress,  was 
not  understood  to  admit  of  the  practice  of  secrecy  and 
reserve,  such  as  characterized  the  diplomacy  of  mon- 
archs  whose  tenure  was  for  life  and  who  were  unvexed 
by  popular  electorates  and  representative  assemblies. 
Hence,  as  it  was  in  the  beginning,  so  American  diplo- 
macy in  the  main  continued  to  be  a  simple,  direct, 
and  open  diplomacy,  the  example  of  which  has  had 
much  to  do  with  shaping  the  development  of  modern 
methods.  Nor  should  we  forbear  to  remark  that 
while  it  has,  by  reason  of  the  directness  with  which 
it  expresses  its  sentiments,  sometimes  been  disre- 
spectfully dubbed  "shirt-sleeves"  diplomacy,  it  may 
confidently  invite  a  comparison  as  to  the  propriety 
of  its  speech  and  conduct  with  the  diplomacy  of  other 
nations. 

In  at  least  one  instance,  however,  the  attempt  at 
simplicity  was  carried  further  than  in  the  end  proved 
to  be  practicable.  Washington,  while  President, 
once  observed  that,  although  he  was  not  accustomed 
to  impede  the  dispatch  of  business  ' '  by  a  ceremonious 
attention  to  idle  forms,"  it  would  not  be  prudent  for 
a  young  state  to  dispense  altogether  with  rules  of 
procedure  which  had  "originated  from  the  wisdom 
of  statesmen"  and  were  "sanctioned  by  the  com- 
mon consent  of  nations."  But  Jefferson,  late  in  his 
first  administration,  sought  to  abolish  all  social 
forms  and  precedence.     The  occasion  of  this  action 

427 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

was  the  claim  of  Mrs.  Merry,  the  wife  of  the  British 
minister,  of  the  right  to  be  taken  in  to  dinner  by  the 
President.  In  order  to  avoid  this  claim,  Jefferson 
adopted  what  he  called  the  rule  of  pell-mell,  the 
meaning  of  which  was  that  no  particular  place  was  to 
be  assigned  to  anybody,  but  that  each  was  to  take 
what  was  at  hand;  and  he  sought  to  enforce  this 
measure  not  only  at  his  own  entertainments,  but 
also  on  all  public  occasions,  such  as  inaugurations. 
This  innovation  was  hotly  resented  by  certain  mem- 
bers of  the  diplomatic  corps,  and  gave  rise  to  con- 
troversies which,  by  reason  of  their  spicy  and  enter- 
taining quality,  have  enjoyed  a  prominence  out  of 
proportion  to  their  historical  importance.  Experi- 
ence soon  demonstrated  that  social  equality  was  not 
always  best  assured  by  committing  the  determina- 
tion of  questions  of  etiquette  to  individual  inclina- 
tion and  enterprise,  which  perchance  might  seek  in 
confusion  an  undue  exaltation.  No  one  could  have 
more  fully  exemplified  simplicity  in  character  and  in 
bearing  than  did  President  Madison;  but  on  enter- 
taining the  new  British  minister,  F.  J.  Jackson,  in 
1809,  he  settled  the  question  of  procedure  by  es- 
corting Mrs.  Jackson  to  dinner,  while  Jackson  took 
in  Mrs.  Madison.  Nothing  could  better  illustrate 
Madison's  indifference  to  forms  than  his  official  re- 
ception of  Jackson  on  the  latter's  presentation.  The 
affair  was  conducted  in  the  same  manner  as  a  private 
meeting  between  gentlemen.  After  Jackson  was  in- 
troduced, Madison  asked  him  to  have  a  chair,  and, 

428 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

says  Jackson,  while  they  were  talking  a  negro 
brought  them  "some  glasses  of  punch  and  a  seed- 
cake." 

The  effect  of  democratic  tendencies  on  American 
diplomacy  is  seen  in  the  course  of  the  government  of 
the  United  States  with  regard  to  diplomatic  uniform. 
As  early  as  1817  American  ministers  had  a  prescribed 
dress  which  was  fixed  by  the  mission  at  Ghent.  This 
dress  consisted  of  a  blue  coat  lined  with  white  silk; 
a  straight  cape,  embroidered  with  gold,  and  single- 
breasted;  buttons  plain,  or,  if  they  could  be  had,  with 
the  artillerist's  eagle  stamped  upon  them;  cuffs  em- 
broidered in  the  same  manner  as  the  cape;  white 
cashmere  breeches;  gold  knee-buckles;  white  silk 
stockings,  and  gold  or  gilt  shoe-buckles;  a  three- 
cornered  chapeau  bras,  not  so  large  as  that  used  by 
the  French  nor  so  small  as  that  used  by  the  English; 
a  black  cockade  with  an  eagle  attached,  and  a  sword. 
On  gala-days  and  other  occasions  of  extraordinary 
ceremony  the  American  ministers  were  allowed  to 
wear  more  embroidery,  as  well  as  a  white  ostrich- 
feather,  not  standing  erect,  but  sewed  around  the 
brim,  in  their  hats.  A  description  of  the  costume, 
together  with  a  plate,  was  given  to  the  minister  as  a 
part  of  his  instructions.  At  the  beginning  of  the 
administration  of  President  Jackson  the  prescribed 
uniform  was  changed  so  that  it  consisted  of  a  black 
coat,  with  a  gold  star  on  each  side  of  the  collar  near 
its  termination ;  underclothes  of  black,  blue,  or  white, 
at  the  option  of  the  wearer;  a  three-cornered  chapeau 

429 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

bras ;  a  black  cockade  and  eagle ;  and  a  steel-mounted 
sword  with  a  white  scabbard.  This  dress,  which  was 
supposed  to  correspond  with  the  simplicity  of  Amer- 
ican institutions,  was  recommended  but  not  pre- 
scribed. These  instructions  were,  however,  done 
away  with  by  a  circular  issued  by  William  L.  Marcy, 
as  Secretary  of  State,  on  June  r,  1853,  by  which 
American  ministers  were  desired,  as  far  as  practica- 
ble without  impairing  their  usefulness,  to  appear  at 
court  "in  the  simple  dress  of  an  American  citizen." 
If  this  could  not  be  done  without  detriment  to  the 
public  interest,  the  nearest  approach  to  it,  com- 
patible with  the  requisite  performance  of  duties, 
was  earnestly  recommended.  ' '  The  simplicity  of  our 
usages  and  the  tone  of  feeling  among  our  people  is," 
said  Marcy,  "much  more  in  accordance  with  the 
example  of  our  first  and  most  distinguished  rep- 
resentative at  a  royal  court  than  the  practice  which 
has  since  prevailed.  It  is  to  be  regretted  that  there 
was  ever  any  departure  in  this  respect  from  the 
example  of  Dr.  Franklin."  Wharton,  in  his  Inter- 
national Law  Digest,  states  that  the  dress  worn  by 
Franklin  "was  Quaker  full  dress,  being  court  dress 
in  the  time  of  Charles  II." ;  it  was,  at  any  rate,  com- 
paratively simple.  The  experiences  of  the  American 
ministers  in  carrying  out  Marcy' s  instructions  were 
varied.  The  greatest  difficulty  was  encountered  by 
Buchanan,  at  London,  where  his  proposal  to  ap- 
pear at  court  without  some  mark  indicative  of  his 
rank  was  the  subject  of  peremptory  objection.     He 

430 


INFLUENCE    AND   TENDENCIES 

finally  compromised  upon  appearing  in  the  dress 
which  he  wore  at  the  receptions  of  the  President  of 
the  United  States,  with  the  addition  of  a  very  plain 
black-handled  and  black-hilted  dress  sword.  With 
this  addition,  he  declared  that  he  never  felt  prouder 
as  a  citizen  of  his  country  than  when  he  stood  amid 
the  brilliant  circle  of  foreign  ministers  and  other 
court  dignitaries  "in  the  simple  dress  of  an  American 
citizen."  At  Paris,  Henry  S.  Sanford,  who  was  then 
acting  as  charge-  d'affaires  ad  interim  of  the  United 
States,  was  permitted  to  appear  at  the  Tuileries  in 
citizen's  dress.  When,  however,  the  new  minister, 
John  Y.  Mason,  arrived,  he  decided,  after  consul- 
tation with  the  French  officials,  to  adopt  a  uniform, 
and  had  a  costume  devised  which  was  described 
by  Sanford  as  "a  coat  embroidered  with  gilt  tinsel, 
a  sword  and  cocked  hat,  the  invention  of  a  Dutch 
tailor  in  Paris,  borrowed  chiefly  from  the  livery  of  a 
subordinate  attache  of  legation  of  one  of  the  petty 
powers  of  the  Continent."  Sanford,  conceiving  Ma- 
son's conduct  to  involve  an  oblique  censure  of  his  own 
course,  resigned  his  position  as  secretary  in  disgust. 
At  The  Hague,  August  Belmont  was  permitted  to 
appear  in  citizen's  dress,  although  it  was  stated  that 
his  appearance  in  uniform  "would  have  been  better 
liked."  At  Lisbon,  John  L.  O'Sullivan  appeared  at 
court  in  "an  ordinary  evening  suit,"  consisting  of  a 
blue  coat  and  black  trousers,  with  "a  simple  Amer- 
ican button"  indicating  his  representative  capacity. 
At  Berlin  it  was  declared  that  the  King  "would  not 

43i 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

consider  an  appearance  before  him  without  costume 
respectful";  and  the  American  minister  thereupon 
provided  himself  with  a  court  dress  which  he  de- 
scribed as  "very  plain  and  simple."  At  Stockholm, 
the  King  expressed  his  willingness  to  receive  the  rep- 
resentative of  the  United  States  in  an  audience  for 
business  in  any  dress  his  government  might  prescribe, 
but  added,  ' '  In  the  society  of  my  family  and  on  occa- 
sions of  court  no  one  can  be  received  but  in  court 
dress,  in  conformity  with  established  custom."  The 
minister  therefore  appeared  at  court  in  the  costume 
which  he  had  previously  worn.  By  a  joint  resolu- 
tion, approved  March  27,  1867,  Congress  prohibited 
persons  in  the  diplomatic  service  of  the  United  States 
"from  wearing  any  uniform  or  official  costume  not 
previously  authorized  by  Congress."  By  Section  34 
of  the  act  of  July  28, 1866,  however,  officers  who  have 
served  in  the  Civil  War  as  volunteers  in  the  armies  of 
the  United  States  are  authorized  to  bear  their  official 
title,  and  upon  occasions  of  ceremony  to  wear  the 
uniform  of  the  highest  grade  they  have  held,  by 
brevet  or  other  commissions,  in  the  volunteer  service. 
In  spite  of  these  statutes,  diplomatic  officers  of  the 
United  States,  while  not  adopting  what  might  be 
called  a  uniform,  have  often  worn,  as  Buchanan  did 
in  London,  some  article  of  apparel  suggestive  of 
their  official  station  and  rank. 

The  subject  of  diplomatic  dress  has  been  intro- 
duced, not  because  it  was  in  itself  of  great  moment, 
but  because  it  illustrates  the  development  of  that 

43^ 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

democratic  spirit,  often  described  in  contemporary 
writings  as  "American  feeling,"  which  was  perhaps 
most  ebullient  in  the  middle  of  the  last  century.  Since 
that  time  great  changes  have  taken  place,  and  with 
the  increased  complexity  of  social  activities,  the 
extraordinary  growth  of  private  fortunes,  and  the 
wonderful  advance  of  the  nation  as  a  whole  in 
wealth  and  power,  simplicity  has  become  less  and 
less  a  distinctive  trait  of  the  life  of  the  Republic, 
either  at  home  or  abroad.  On  the  other  hand, 
there  has  grown  up  a  visible  tendency  towards  con- 
formity to  customs  elsewhere  established,  and  the 
progress  of  this  tendency  has  been  accelerated  by 
the  natural  drift  of  a  great  and  self-conscious  peo- 
ple towards  participation  in  what  are  called  world- 
affairs. 

The  first  joint  international  treaty,  with  reference 
to  a  question  not  distinctively  American,  to  which 
the  government  of  the  United  States  became  a  party, 
was  the  convention  concluded  on  October  22,  1864, 
jointly  with  Great  Britain,  France,  and  the  Nether- 
lands, in  relation  to  the  payment  by  Japan  of  the 
Shimonoseki  indemnity.  Three  years  later  a  joint 
convention  was  concluded  between  the  same  powers 
and  Japan  for  the  establishment  of  tariff  duties  in 
the  latter  country.  By  reason  of  a  common  interest, 
the  United  States  was  thus  led  in  the  Far  East  to 
depart  from  its  usual  policy  of  making  only  separate 
or  independent  agreements  with  other  nations.  No 
similar  departure  had  then  been  made  in  China,  but 
28  433 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  policy  of  concerted  action  with  other  powers  had 
already  been  entered  upon  in  that  country  as  well 
as  in  Japan — a  policy  which  has  eventuated  in  the 
allied  march  to  Peking  in  1900  and  in  the  conclusion 
of  the  convention  of  September  7,  1901,  between  the 
allies  and  China.  This  convention,  which  embraces 
questions  of  politics  as  well  as  of  commerce,  is  the 
most  comprehensive  joint  arrangement  to  which  the 
United  States  has  ever  become  a  signatory.  The 
United  States  has,  however,  as  a  member  of  the 
great  family  of  nations,  become  a  party  to  other 
joint  international  agreements,  such  as  the  Geneva 
convention  for  the  amelioration  of  the  condition 
of  the  wounded  in  the  field;  the  convention  for 
the  protection  of  submarine  cables  outside  territorial 
waters ;  the  Madrid  convention  with  reference  to  the 
protege  system  in  Morocco;  the  international  union 
for  the  protection  of  industrial  property;  the  inter- 
national postal  union;  and  the  treaties  concluded  at 
The  Hague  with  reference  to  the  laws  and  customs  of 
war  on  land,  the  adaptation  to  maritime  warfare  of 
the  principles  of  the  Geneva  convention,  and  the 
pacific  adjustment  of  international  disputes. 

Intimacy  of  association,  though  it  does  not  destroy 
the  spirit  of  emulation,  tends  to  produce  uniformity 
in  manners  and  customs.  Of  the  operation  of  this 
rule,  a  striking  example  may  be  seen  in  the  act  of 
Congress  by  which  provision  was  made  for  the  ap- 
pointment of  ambassadors.  Prior  to  the  passage  of 
this  act  it  had  been  assumed  to  be  undesirable  to  in- 

434 


INFLUENCE    AND   TENDENCIES 

troduce  into  the  American  diplomatic  service  a  grade 
of  officials  deriving  extraordinary  ceremonial  privi- 
leges from  the  fact  that  they  were  supposed  in  a 
peculiar  sense  to  represent  the  "person"  of  the 
"sovereign."  William  L.  Marcy,  when  Secretary  of 
State,  naturally  declined  to  recommend  the  creation 
of  such  a  class.  Secretary  of  State  Frelinghuysen, 
viewing  the  matter  in  a  practical  light,  thought  it 
would  be  unjust  to  American  ministers  to  increase 
their  rank  without  raising  their  salaries,  and  that 
Congress  could  not  with  propriety  be  asked  to  make 
them  "an  allowance  commensurate  with  the  neces- 
sary mode  of  life  of  an  ambassador."  Mr.  Bayard, 
who  was  afterwards  to  become  the  first  American  am- 
bassador, declared,  when  Secretary  of  State,  that 
"the  benefits  attending  a  higher  grade  of  ceremonial 
treatment"  had  not  "been  deemed  to  outweigh  the 
inconveniences  which,  in  our  simple  social  democracy, 
might  attend  the  reception  in  this  country  of  an 
extraordinarily  foreign  privileged  class."  Neverthe- 
less, in  1893  the  higher  grade  was  introduced.  For 
this  measure  it  will  scarcely  be  claimed  that  there  was 
any  necessity.  In  the  days  before  American  am- 
bassadors existed,  a  visitor  to  London  sought  to  learn 
who  was  the  most  important  "ambassador"  at  the 
English  court.  A  European  member  of  the  diplo- 
matic corps,  to  whom  the  inquiry  was  addressed, 
promptly  responded,  "the  American  minister." 
From  time  to  time,  however,  American  representa- 
tives abroad,  wishing  to  enjoy  the  ceremonial  privi- 

435 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

leges  of  the  ambassadorial  rank,  recommended  its 
creation;  and  eventually  their  recommendation  was 
adopted.  But  it  was  done  without  any  increase  of 
compensation,  so  that  to-day  none  but  a  man  of 
fortune  can  afford  to  be  an  American  ambassador. 
When  we  scan  the  list  of  those  who  have  thus  far 
held  the  position,  it  is  not  difficult  to  believe  that  the 
Republic  has  as  yet  suffered  no  detriment  by  reason 
of  this  moral  limitation  upon  the  choice  of  its  agents; 
but  the  creation  of  conditions  under  which  persons 
of  moderate  means  are  excluded  from  the  highest 
public  employments,  except  at  a  sacrifice  which  they 
can  ill  afford  to  make  or  cannot  make  at  all,  is  not 
in  harmony  with  what  have  been  conceived  to  be 
American  ideals. 

To  this  incongruity  it  is  within  the  power  of  Con- 
gress at  any  time  to  apply  a  corrective;  but  there 
is  yet  another  innovation  the  remedy  for  which 
lies  with  the  executive  branch  of  the  government. 
Among  the  extraordinary  privileges  commonly  said 
to  belong  to  the  ambassador,  by  reason  of  his  rep- 
resenting the  "person"  of  the  "sovereign,"  is  that 
of  personal  audience  on  matters  of  business  with 
the  head  of  the  state.  In  Europe,  with  the  substitu- 
tion of  constitutional  governments  for  absolute  mon- 
archies, this  privilege  had  become  merely  nominal, 
but  in  Washington  it  was  revived  in  something 
like  its  pristine  rigor,  direct  intercourse  with  the 
President,  without  regard  to  the  Secretary  of  State, 
having  frequently  been  demanded  and  practised.     In 

436 


INFLUENCE   AND   TENDENCIES 

the  days  when  the  highest  rank  was  that  of  envoy  ex- 
traordinary and  minister  plenipotentiary,  the  privi- 
lege of  transacting  diplomatic  business  directly  with 
the  President  was  rarely  accorded  to  a  foreign  min- 
ister, not  only  because  the  time  of  the  President  was 
supposed  to  be  already  sufficiently  occupied,  but  also 
because  the  White  House  is  not  an  office  of  record, 
the  custodian  of  the  diplomatic  archives  being  the 
Secretary  of  State,  who  is  the  legal  organ  and  ad- 
viser of  the  President  in  foreign  affairs,  and  who,  by 
reason  of  his  preoccupation  with  the  business  of  his 
own  department,  is  supposed  to  possess  that  mas- 
tery of  its  details  which  is  so  essential  to  the  care  of 
public  as  well  as  of  private  interests.  The  Presi- 
dent, with  his  multifarious  duties  and  responsibili- 
ties, is  certainly  entitled  to  all  the  freedom  of  dis- 
cretion which  the  rulers  of  other  countries  enjoy 
with  regard  to  the  direct  management  of  diplomatic 
business. 

But  without  regard  to  methods,  which  from  time 
to  time  may  change,  there  is  no  doubt  that  the 
importance  of  the  United  States  as  a  factor,  not  in 
the  "concert  of  Europe,"  but  in  that  wider  concert 
which  embraces  all  civilized  powers,  Eastern  as  well 
as  Western,  is  destined  to  grow.  In  187 1  a  con- 
ference at  Washington,  presided  over  by  the  Secre- 
tary of  State,  resulted  in  the  conclusion  of  a  per- 
manent truce  between  Spain  and  the  allied  republics 
on  the  west  coast  of  South  America,  thus  formally 
ending    an    unfortunate    conflict    in    the    Western 

437 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

Hemisphere.  In  1905  the  whole  world  rang  with 
praise  of  the  President  of  the  United  States,  who  lent 
his  good  offices  for  the  opening  of  negotiations  to 
terminate  the  titanic  struggle  between  Russia  and 
Japan  in  the  Far  East.  From  his  fortunate  sta- 
tion as  the  head  of  a  great  power  holding  itself 
aloof  from  any  connection  with  the  political  issues 
involved  he  was  able  to  speak  with  an  impartial  and 
authoritative  benevolence  which  no  other  ruler  could 
invoke. 

Judged  by  phrases  current  at  the  time,  there  pre- 
vailed, after  the  war  with  Spain,  a  disposition  to 
assume  that  the  United  States  would,  as  the  result 
of  that  conflict,  break  with  its  past  and  enter  upon 
a  new  career  in  which  previous  guides  and  limitations 
would  be  discarded.  This  hasty  supposition  was  by 
no  means  strange.  On  the  contrary,  it  was  merely 
an  illustration  of  a  common  phase  of  thought, 
which  is  constantly  manifested  in  the  tendency  to 
regard  existing  things,  no  matter  how  lacking  in 
essential  novelty  they  may  be,  as  wholly  new,  and, 
as  a  natural  consequence,  to  estimate  them  in  an 
absolute  rather  than  in  a  relative  sense.  But,  in  the 
acquisition  of  Porto  Rico  and  the  establishment  of  a 
virtual  protectorate  over  Cuba,  there  was  nothing  to 
jar  the  nerves  of  even  the  most  cursory  reader  of 
American  history,  while  the  acquisition  of  the  Philip- 
pines could  not  be  altogether  startling  to  one  who 
had  reflected  upon  the  detached  situation  of  remote 
Alaska,  with  its  chain  of  islands  flung  across  the 

438 


INFLUENCE    AND    TENDENCIES 

Pacific,  or  upon  the  incongruous  condominium  which 
had  for  a  number  of  years  been  attempted  in  the 
Samoan  group  in  the  distant  South  Pacific.  It  is, 
therefore,  not  surprising  that  abnormal  vaticinations 
and  proposals  due  to  excitement  or  to  a  want  of 
information  gradually  faded  away,  while  realities, 
with  the  aid  of  a  certain  continuity  in  thought 
and  in  temper  on  the  part  of  the  less  vocal  element 
of  the  population,  eventually  regained  their  normal 
sway. 

In  the  relations  of  the  United  States  with  Europe 
after  1898  there  were,  if  we  except  acts  such  as  the 
termination  of  the  commercial  treaty  with  Russia 
in  191 2  because  of  the  Jewish  question,  and  the  ad- 
justment of  questions  relating  to  Liberia  with  France, 
Germany,  and  Great  Britain,  few  striking  develop- 
ments prior  to  19 14.  In  the  Anglo-Boer  war 
neutrality  was,  as  usual,  maintained.  At  the  Peace 
Conference  at  The  Hague  in  1899  the  United  States 
delegation,  in  signing  the  Convention  for  the  Pacific 
Settlement  of  International  Disputes,  made,  as  has 
been  seen,  the  express  reservation  that  the  treaty 
was  not  to  be  construed  as  requiring  the  United 
States  "to  depart  from  its  traditional  policy  of  not 
intruding  upon,  interfering  with,  or  entangling  itself 
in  the  political  questions  or  policy  or  internal  ad- 
ministration of  any  foreign  state,"  or  to  relinquish 
"its  traditional  attitude  towards  purely  American 
questions."  When,  in  1907,  the  convention  was 
renewed,  the  Senate  reaffirmed  this  reservation  in  its 

439 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

original  terms.     Likewise,  in  approving  the  Act  of 
Algeciras  (1906)  in  relation  to  Morocco,  the  Senate 
declared  that  it  was  done  solely  for  "commercial 
and  friendly  purposes,"  and  without  any  purpose 
"to  depart  from  the  traditional  American  foreign 
policy  which  forbids  participation   by   the   United 
States  in  the  settlement  of  political  questions  which 
are  entirely  European  in  their  scope."     Had  The 
Hague  Convention  of   1907,   respecting  the  rights 
and  duties  of  neutral  powers  and  persons  in  case  of 
war  on   land,   required   the   contracting  parties   to 
resist  by  force  any  attempt  to  violate  its  provisions, 
it   would   have  received   few,  if   any,  votes   in   the 
United  States  Senate.     Unlike  the  treaty  of  1839, 
by  which  certain  European  powers  undertook  to 
assure  the  neutrality  of  Belgium,  it  is  a  concurrent 
declaration  of  general  principles,  not  savoring  of  an 
alliance  to  compel  their  observance.     While  it  de- 
clares that  "a  neutral  power  resisting,  even  by  force, 
attempts  to  violate  its  neutrality,"  cannot  be  re- 
garded as  committing  a  hostile  act,  yet  it  does  not 
purport  to  give  to  a  state  desirous  to  remain  neutral 
an  assurance  of  protection  against  a  declaration  of 
war.     Colonel  Roosevelt,  under  whose  administra- 
tion as  President  the  treaty  was  ratified  by  the 
United  States,  was,  therefore,  altogether  justified  in 
declaring,    in    September,    19 14,    that    the    United 
States  had   not    "the   smallest   responsibility"   for 
what  had  befallen  Belgium.     The  situation  of  the 
United  States  in  this  regard  was,  as  he  pointed  out, 

440 


INFLUENCE    AND   TENDENCIES 

essentially  different  from  that  of  England,  one  of  the 
parties  to  the  treaty  of  1839.1 

Since  19 14,  however,  various  proposals,  inspired 
by  the  horrors  attending  the  great  conflict  which 
broke  out  in  Europe  in  that  year,  have  been  put 
forward  for  the  formation  of  leagues  or  alliances 
with  the  design  ot  preventing  the  recurrence  of  such 
a  calamity.  These  proposals  differ  in  their  state- 
ment of  details,  but  are  to  a  great  extent  alike  in  sug- 
gesting an  international  combination  for  the  use  of 
force  for  the  accomplishment  of  the  end  in  view. 
This  conception  is  enlarged  in  President  Wilson's 
peace  proposal  of  December  18,  19 16,  in  which  he 
suggests  "the  formation  of  a  league  of  nations  to 

1  While  declaring  that,  when  Belgium  was  invaded,  "every  cir- 
cumstance of  national  honor  and  interest  forced  England  to  act 
precisely  as  she  did  act,"  and  quoting  in  this  relation  passages  re- 
ferring to  England's  position  as  a  party  to  the  neutralization  of 
Belgium  under  the  treaty  of  1839,  Colonel  Roosevelt  said: 

"A  deputation  of  Belgians  has  arrived  in  this  country  to  invoke 
our  assistance  in  the  time  of  their  dreadful  need.  What  action  our 
government  can  or  will  take  I  know  not.  It  has  been  announced 
that  no  action  can  be  taken  that  will  interfere  with  our  entire 
neutrality.  It  is  certainly  eminently  desirable  that  we  should 
remain  entirely  neutral,  and  nothing  but  urgent  need  would  warrant 
breaking  our  neutrality  and  taking  sides  one  way  or  the  other.  .  .  . 
We  have  not  the  smallest  responsibility  for  what  has  befallen  her 
(Belgium),  and  I  am  sure  that  the  sympathy  of  this  country  for  the 
suffering  of  the  men,  women,  and  children  of  Belgium  is  very  real. 
Nevertheless,  this  sympathy  is  compatible  with  full  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  unwisdom  of  our  uttering  a  single  word  of  official  protest 
unless  we  are  prepared  to  make  that  protest  effective;  and  only 
the  clearest  and  most  urgent  national  duty  would  ever  justify  us 
in  deviating  from  our  rule  of  neutrality  and  non-interference" 
("The  World  War:  its  Tragedies  and  its  Lessons,"  The  Outlook, 
Sept.  23,  1914,  pp.  169-170,  173). 

441 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

insure  peace  and  justice  throughout  the  world"; 
and  in  his  address  to  the  Senate  of  January  22,  1917, 
in  which  he  declares  that  the  people  of  the  United 
States  desire  and  are  in  honor  bound  to  render  a 
"service"  to  mankind,  "nothing  less  than  this,  to 
add  their  authority  and  their  power  to  the  authority 
and  force  of  other  nations  to  guarantee  peace  and 
justice  throughout  the  world."1 

The  plans  and  proposals  put  forward  since  191 4, 
like  those  published  from  time  to  time  in  previous 
years,  present,  so  far  as  concerns  their  central 
thought,  nothing  to  surprise  the  student  of  such 
subjects.  The  assurance  of  peace  by  means  of  a 
concert  of  nations,  designed  to  moderate  or  to  con- 
trol the  propensity  of  men  in  the  mass  to  gain  their 
ends  by  violence,  has  stimulated  the  speculations  of 
philosophers  and  baffled  the  skill  of  statesmen  since 
the  dawn  of  international  relations.  The  general 
statement  of  such  a  design  offers  no  difficulties; 
but  the  definite  formulation  of  a  plan  to  render  the 
design  effective  would  involve,  no  less  than  hereto- 
fore, the  consideration  of  questions  both  numerous 
and  varied,  concerning  which  it  would  be  as  unsafe 
to  count  upon  a  ready  unanimity  of  sentiment  and 
of  opinion  as  to  presuppose  the  sudden  cessation  of 
the  human  wants  and  human  passions  in  which 
wars  have  immemorially  originated.  The  extent  to 
which  divisions  of  sentiment  and  of  opinion  would 
occur  probably  would  bear  an  appreciable  relation 

1  Supra,  pp.  83-86. 
442 


INFLUENCE    AND   TENDENCIES 

to  the  extent  to  which  it  was  proposed  to  deal  with 
questions  of  a  contentious  nature,  such  as  national 
and  racial  groupings  and  other  political  arrange- 
ments, and  above  all  that  prolific  and  continuing 
source  of  strife — commercial  and  industrial  com- 
petition. Moreover,  when  we  remember  that  force 
and  its  effective  exercise  are  subject  to  physical 
limitations,  and  that  proximity  and  remoteness,  by 
which  all  human  relations  are  so  profoundly  affected, 
have  often  been  recognized  as  furnishing  the  test 
and  the  measure  of  political  and  other  interests,  it 
is  not  strange  that  the  readiness  to  assume  and  even 
more  to  perform  responsibilities,  or  to  admit  others 
to  share  them,  has  not  infrequently  been  found  to 
depend  upon  considerations  of  that  character,  as 
well  as  upon  other  conceptions,  in  regard  to  which 
habits  of  thought  have  more  or  less  been  formed  and 
preserved.  Even  in  the  United  States,  where  "so- 
ciety" is  sometimes  slightingly  said  to  "lack  tradi- 
tions," such  habits  are  not  unknown  in  public  af- 
fairs. We  have  seen  that  when  the  Executive 
Council  of  France,  during  the  turbulent  aftermath 
of  the  great  revolution,  proposed  through  Genet  to 
replace  the  then  existing  alliance  with  the  United 
States  with  an  agreement  "to  defend  the  empire  of 
liberty  wherever  it  may  be  embraced,"  and  "to 
guaranty  the  sovereignty  of  the  people,"1  the  pro- 
posal was  not  entertained.  In  the  circumstances 
the  proposal  was  not  inexplicable.     In  making  it 

1  American  State  Papers,  Foreign  Relations,  folio,  I,  705,  708-709. 

443 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

the  Executive  Council  frankly  stated  that,  besides 
"the  advantages  which  humanity  in  general"  would 
draw  from  such  a  measure,  France  had  a  "particular 
interest"  in  preparing  to  act  against  England  and 
Spain,  who  were  believed  to  be  about  to  attack  her, 
because  of  what  Gouverneur  Morris  called  "those 
general  declarations  against  all  kings,  under  the 
name  of  tyrants,"  which  the  National  Assembly  had 
enunciated.  Nor  did  the  Executive  Council  lose 
sight  of  the  restrictions  to  which  the  then  prevailing 
system  of  colonial  monopoly  subjected  the  foreign 
trade  of  both  countries,  when,  in  order  to  reenforce 
its  proposal,  it  included  in  it  the  suggestion  that 
France  and  the  United  States,  by  excluding  from 
their  ports  the  ships  of  powers  that  still  maintained 
"an  exclusive  colonial  and  commercial  system," 
would  "quickly  contribute  to  the  general  emancipa- 
tion of  the  new  world,"  even  though  it  coupled  with 
the  suggestion  an  appeal  to  the  United  States  to 
make  "common  cause"  with  France  in  taking  such 
steps  as  exigencies  might  require  ' '  to  serve  the  cause 
of  liberty  and  the  freedom  of  the  people." 

The  attitude  of  the  United  States  towards  ques- 
tions of  this  character,  as  expressed  by  successive 
administrations,  assumed  in  the  popular  as  well  as 
in  the  official  mind  the  form  of  an  established  rule 
of  policy.  Especially  was  this  the  case  in  regard 
to  the  political  arrangements  of  Europe,  which,  as 
we  have  seen,  were  treated  as  belonging  to  what  was 
called   the   European   system,    while   those   of   the 

444 


INFLUENCE    AND   TENDENCIES 

independent  nations  of  America  were  jealously 
guarded  as  belonging  to  the  "American  system." 
This  distinction  the  United  States,  as  its  author, 
proponent,  and  champion,  sought  not  to  efface,  but 
to  impress  upon  the  world  as  a  derivative  of  the 
principle  of  political  non-intervention  and  a  pledge 
of  its  consistent  observance.  No  other  principle 
has  so  distinguished  the  foreign  policy  of  the 
United  States;  and  while  policies  are  proverbially 
subject  to  mutation,  it  is  probable  that  the  ramifica- 
tions of  that  principle  will  not  be  wholly  overlooked 
in  the  consideration  of  any  future  plan  of  concert. 

References : 

Bacourt's  Souvenirs  (Tun  Diplomate; 
As  to  etiquette,  "uniform,"  etc.,  see 

Moore's  Digest  of  International  Law,  IV,  430-678. 
As  to  the  question  of  a  League  for  Peace,  see 
Goldsmith's  (Robert)  A  League  to  Enforce  Peace; 
Phillips's  (W.  A.)  Confederation  of  Europe; 
Phillips's  (W.  A.)  President  Wilson's  Peace  Programme  and 

the   British  Empire  {The  Edinburgh  Review,  April,  1917); 

National  Federations  and  World  Federation  (Id.,  July,  1917); 
Articles  by  Sir  Herbert  Stephen,  Bart.,  and  Sir  Francis  Piggott, 

in  The  Nineteenth  Century,  April,  191 7; 
Chabrun  (Cesar),  Kant  et  M.  Wilson  (Revue  des  Deux  Mondes, 

Feb.,  1917,  p.  53); 
The  Peace  Problem   (Columbia    University  Quarterly,  June, 

1916;    reprinted  in  North  American  Review,  July,  1916). 


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Richardson,  James  D.,  compiler,  A  Compilation  of  the 

Messages  and  Papers  of  the  Presidents,   ij8q-i8qj. 

10  volumes,  Washington,  1896-1899. 
Roberts,  Edmund,  Embassy  to  the  Eastern  Courts.     New 

York,  1837. 
P.oosevelt,  Theodore,  The  Winning  of  the  West,  1769- 

1807.     4  volumes,  Washington,  1889-1896. 
Rush,  Richard,  Memoranda  of  a  Residence  at  the  Court 

of  London,  1817-1819.     Philadelphia,  1833.     Second 

series,  1819-1825.     Philadelphia,  1845.     Also  edited 

by  Benjamin  Rush  under  the  title  of  The  Court  of 

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Trescot,  William  Henry,  The  Diplomacy  of  the  Revo- 
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Washington,  George.     See  Ford,  Worthington  C. 

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York,  1905,  1914. 

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AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 

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Winsor,  Justin,  The  Mississippi  Basin:   the  Struggle  in 

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The   Westward  Movement:    the   Colonies   and   the 

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Narrative    and    Critical    History    of   America.     8 


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Woolsey,     Theodore     Salisbury,     America's    Foreign 
Policy:    Essays  and  Addresses.     New  York,  1898. 


INDEX 


ABC  mediation  in  Mexico,  225. 

Aberdeen,  Lord,  proposal  as  to 
Venezuelan  boundary,  246,  247. 

Adams,  Charles  Francis,  minister 
to  England,  287;  arbitrator  at 
Geneva,  316. 

Adams,  John,  voyages  to  Europe, 
16;  negotiations  in  the  Neth- 
erlands, 24,  27;  peace  com- 
missioner, 27-29,  33;  demands 
as  to  fisheries,  28,  29,  136-138; 
attitude  toward  France,  29, 
30;  advocates  payment  of 
debts,  29;  upholds  policy  of 
non-intervention,  198,  199; 
minister  to  England,  34;  com- 
missioned to  treat  with  Bar- 
bary  powers,  104;  seeks  to 
negotiate  with  France,  57-59; 
declaration  as  to  honest  deal- 
ing, 426. 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  Secretary 
of  State,  xiii;  outlines  Monroe 
Doctrine,  242-246;  position  as 
to  Cuba,  361;  recognition  of 
South  American  independence, 
368;  Panama  Congress,  370, 
375-376;  acquisition  of  Flori- 
das,  348;  attempts  to  acquire 
Texas,  349;  on  policy  of  reci- 
procity, 161;  opposes  com- 
mercial restrictions,  167,  168, 
172;  maintains  claims  as  to 
the  fisheries,  139;  supports 
policy  of  non-intervention,  201 ; 
opposes  claim  of  visit  and 
search,  116,  117;  advocates 
exemption  of  private  property 
at  sea  from  capture,  61. 


Aguascalientes,  convention  at, 
225-226. 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  Congress  of,  238. 

Alabama,  the  Confederate  cruis- 
er, story  of  escape,  50,  52. 

Alabama  claims,  arbitration,  315- 
318;  payment,  49-51. 

Alaska,  cession,  148,  352;  seal 
question,  148;  boundary,  joint 
commission,  319-320,  325. 

Alexander  I.  of  Russia,  ukase  of 
1821,  148,  244. 

Algiers,  regency  of,  104,  105; 
treaty  of  1795,  108;  capture  of 
American  vessels,  106,  107; 
war  with  United  States,  in. 

Aliens,  removal  of  disabilities  of, 
33. 

Allegiance,  indelible,  113,  273, 
280,  288,  292,  293.  See  Ex- 
patriation. 

Allianca,  American  steamer,  fired 
on,  120,  121. 

Alliance,  with  France,  12,  13,  14, 
340;  Anglo-Japanese,  192-195. 

Alverstone,  Lord,  decision  on 
Alaska  boundary,  320. 

Amazon  River,  free  navigation, 

Ambassadors,  appointment  of, 
434-436.  _     _ 

American  diplomacy,  beginnings, 
1,  5,  9,  14;  "Committee  of 
Secret  Correspondence,"  5; 
"department  of  foreign  af- 
fairs," 5  n.\  "Secretary  of 
Foreign  Affairs,"  5  «.;  plan  of 
treaty  with  France,  6;  first 
diplomatic  communication,  10, 


455 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


II;  hardships  of  early  repre- 
sentatives, 14-17;  treaty  of 
1782,29;  foundation  of  system 
of  neutrality,  49;  struggle  for 
neutral  rights,  53;  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance,  192-195; 
peace  of  Portsmouth,  195;  ab- 
sorption of  Korea  by  Japan, 
196;  policy  of  non-interven- 
tion, 197;  principle  of  religious 
liberty,  199-201;  recognition 
of  states  and  governments,  210; 
revolutionary  government  in 
France  (1848),  210;  Walker- 
Rivas  government  in  Nicara- 
gua, 211;  Mr.  Seward's  atti- 
tude on  recognition,  21 1-2 12; 
Diaz  government  in  Mexico, 
212-213;  President  Wilson's 
statement,  213;  revolution  in 
Peru,  214-215;  refusal  to 
'  recognize  Huerta  in  Mexico, 
217;  intervention,  218-225; 
recognition  of  Carranza,  227; 
border  raids  and  occupation  of 
Mexican  territory,  229  et  seq.; 
influence  and  tendencies,  420; 
opposition  to  monopoly,  423; 
principle  of  legality,  423 ;  prac- 
ticality, 425;  simplicity  and 
directness,  426-428;  tendency 
toward  conformity,  433;  co- 
operation for  common  ends, 
433  >  434!  democratic  tenden- 
cies, 429;  diplomatic  dress, 
429-433;  joint  engagements 
and  action,  433-434;  creation 
of  ambassadorial  office,  434- 
436;  extension  of  concert,  437; 
growth  of  influence,  437,  438; 
good  offices  between  Russia 
and  Japan,  438;  political  ques- 
tions, 439-440,  443-445;  pro- 
posed leagues,  441-443;  habits 
of  thought,  443-445. 
American  Revolution,  signifi- 
cance, 2,  3,  7,  420,  421;  atti- 
tude of  European  powers,  7, 
17-19. 


American  statesmen,  practicality, 

37,  44- 

Amiens,  Peace  of,  59. 

Anarchists  excluded  from  natu- 
ralization, 297. 

Ancona,  Italian  ship,  sunk  by 
Austrian  submarine,  82. 

Anderson,  Richard  C,  delegate 
to  Panama  Congress,  370. 

Anglo-Japanese  alliance,  192-195. 

Annexation.  See  Expanison,  Ter- 
ritorial. 

Anstey,  John,  arbitrator  under 
Jay  treaty,  311. 

Arabic,  sinking  of,  72. 

Aran  da,  Count  d',  Spanish  am- 
bassador at  Madrid,  18. 

Arbitration,  international.  See 
International  arbitration. 

Arbitrators,    mode   of    choosing, 

3"- 

Argentina,  mediation  in  Mexico, 

225. 

Argentine  Confederation,  explor- 
ation of  rivers,  133. 

Armed  merchantmen,  contro- 
versy concerning,  73-74. 

Armed  neutrality,  55. 

Armistice,  Spain  and  the  West- 
coast  republics,  384. 

Arredondo,  Mexican  diplomatic 
representative,  237. 

Articles  of  Confederation,  340. 

Ashburton,  Lord,  negotiations 
with  Webster,  114. 

Asia,  Anglo-Japanese  alliance, 
192-195. 

Astor,  John  Jacob,  settlement  at 
Astoria,  351. 

Atherton,  Sir  W.,  opinion  as  to 
the  Alabama,  52. 

Aulick,  Commodore,  empowered 
to  negotiate  with  Japan,   187. 

Austria,  attitude  toward  Ameri- 
can Revolution,  19;  mission 
of  William  Lee,  14,  15;  sever- 
ance of  relations,  99;  case  of 
Martin  Koszta,  301-305. 

Award,  waiver  of,  314. 


456 


INDEX 


Bacon,  Robert,  Secretary  of 
State,  xv. 

Bahia  Honda,  358. 

Bainbridge,  Commodore,  war 
with  Algiers,  ill. 

Bancroft,  George,  minister  to 
England,  276;  special  mission 
to  Spain,  363;  conclusion  of 
naturalization  treaties,  290. 

Banks,  N.  P.,  report  on  expatria- 
tion, 288. 

Barbary  powers,  depredations  of 
corsairs,  104-112;  abolition  of 
tribute,  1 1 1 ;  declarations  as 
to  religious  liberty,  200. 

Barbe"  Marbois,  the  Louisiana 
cession,  345. 

Barra,  Francisco  de  la,  President 
ad  interim  of  Mexico,  216. 

Bates,  Joshua,  arbitrator  under 
treaty  of  1853,  315. 

Bathurst,  Lord,  position  as  to  the 
fisheries,   139. 

Bayard,  Thomas  F.,  Secretary  of 
State,  xv ;  fisheries  treaty, 
144,147;  proposal  of  co-opera- 
tion for  protection  of  fur-seals, 
149;  Samoan  conference,  356; 
first  American  ambassador, 
247,  435;  declines  to  recom- 
mend appointments  of  am- 
bassadors, 435. 

Bays,  meaning  of,  in  convention 
of  1818,  141,  143,  144. 

Beaumarchais,  9. 

Belgium,  the  Hague  treaties, 
440. 

Belligerent  rights,  efforts  to  limit, 

34- 

Belmont,  August,  minister  to 
the  Netherlands,  431. 

Bering  Sea  controversy,  147-154; 
cession  of  Alaska,  148;  seizure 
of  Canadian  sealers,  149;  sug- 
gestion of  Mr.  Phelps,  149; 
contentions  of  Mr.  Blaine,  150; 
treaty  of  arbitration,  150,  318; 
award,  151,  318,  319-320; 
damages,  154;   agreement  with 


Great  Britain,  Japan,  and 
Russia,  for  protection  of  fur- 
seals  and  sea-otter,  154-158. 

Berlin  decree,  57,  60. 

Bermuda  Islands,  renunciation  of 
France,  13. 

Bernard,  Mountague,  member  of 
joint  high  commission  of  1871, 
316;  assistant  British  counsel 
at  Geneva,  317. 

Biddle,  Commodore,  visit  to 
Japan,  186. 

Bismarck,  friendly  attitude  on 
naturalization  question,  290; 
Samoan  policy,  356,  357. 

Black,  Jeremiah  S.,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiv;  on  expatriation, 
281. 

Blacklisting,  80-81. 

Blaine,  James  G.,  Secretary  of 
State,  xv ;  Bering  Sea  con- 
tentions, 150;  invitation  to 
American  nations  for  Peace 
Congress  at  Washington,  386; 
president  of  International 
American  Conference,  387. 

Blanco,  General,  succeeds  Gen- 
eral Weyler  in  Cuba,  207. 

Bland,  Theodoric,  commissioner 
to  South  America,  367. 

Blockade,  British  "blockade" 
measures  (191 5),  69;  law  as 
to  blockades,  53,  60,  61;  in- 
structions to  delegates  to  Pana- 
ma Congress,  372. 

Blodgett,  Henry  W.,  counsel  in 
Bering  Sea  arbitration,  319. 

Bolivar,  Simon,  "prophetic  let- 
ter," 367;  Panama  Congress, 
369;  prediction  as  to  Chile, 
410. 

Bolivia  concedes  free  navigation 
of  Amazon  and  La  Plata,  131, 
132;  recognition  of  revolu- 
tionary government,  212. 

Bond  claims,  arbitration,  333. 

Boundary  waters,  preservation  of 

navigability,  146. 
Brazil,  independence,  166;  navi- 


457 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


gation  of  Amazon  and  Para- 
guay, 131,  133;  break  with 
Germany,  99-101;  mediation 
in  Mexico,  225;  becomes  re- 
public, 389,  409,  411 ;  constitu- 
tional provisions  against  war 
of  conquest,  389;  political 
stability,  411;  abolition  of 
slavery,  411. 

Brewer,  Mr.  Justice,  president 
of  Venezuelan  boundary  com- 
mission, 250. 

Brillon,  Madame,  introduces 
Lord  Cholmondeley  to  Frank- 
lin, 25. 

British  West  Indies,  trade  with, 
160,  163-165,  167. 

Brooks  or  Midway  Islands,  ac- 
quisition of,  360. 

Bryan,  William  Jennings,  Sec- 
retary of  State,  xv ;  resigna- 
tion, 71;   peace  proposal,  335- 

337- 

Bryant,  William  Cullen,  descrip- 
tion of  Genet,  48. 

Buchanan,  James,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiv;  proposals  for  an- 
nexation of  Cuba,  361 ;  ad- 
vanced position  as  to  expatria- 
tion, 276;  recommends  occu- 
pation of  Northern  Mexico 
(x858),  382;  controversy  as 
to  diplomatic  dress,  430,  432. 

Buenos  Aires,  State  of,  reaction- 
ary policy,  132;  declaration  of 
independence,  367. 

Bulwer,  Sir  Henry  Lytton.  See 
Clayton,  John  M.;  Inter- 
oceanic  canal. 

Bureau  of  American  Republics, 
388. 

Bureau  of  naturalization,  300. 

Burgoyne,  effect  of  surrender  at 
Saratoga,  9. 

Burlingame,  Anson,  career  in 
China,  178. 

Cables,  submarine,  convention 
for  protection,  434. 


Calhoun,  John  C,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiv;  views  on  Canning- 
Rush  correspondence,  242. 

California,  Japanese  question, 
191. 

Canada,  acquired  by  Great  Brit- 
ain, 7;  question  as  to  annexa- 
tion by  United  States,  27,  28, 
340,  360;  sentiment  of  "nation- 
ality," 147;  case  of  the  Caro- 
line, 228. 

Canal.    See  Interoceanic  canal. 

Canning,  George,  attitude  tow- 
ard Holy  Alliance,  240;  pro- 
posals to  Rush,  240,  241. 

Canton,  trade  with,  173,  175, 
176. 

Cape  Breton,  island  of,  7. 

Capture,  exemption  of  private 
property  at  sea,  61-65,  372- 

Caramanly,  Jusuf,  Bashaw  of 
Tripoli,  character  and  policy, 
108,  109. 

Carbajal,  Francisco,  makeshift 
administration  in  Mexico,  225. 

Carmichael,  William,  service  in 
France,  19,  20;  mission  to 
Spain,  14. 

Caroline,  case  of,  228. 

Carranza,  Venustiano,  protests 
against  American  intervention, 
225;  convention  at  Aguas- 
calientes,  225,  226;  protest 
against  American  occupation, 
229-232;  charge  as  to  support 
given  to  Villa,  231;  Mr. 
Lansing's  reply,  234-235;  pro- 
claims revolts,  217;  recognized 
by  President  Wilson  as  Presi- 
dent of  Mexico,  227;  proposal 
of  mediation  to  end  European 
war,  90. 

Carrizal,  collision  at,  237. 

Carter,  James  C,  counsel  before 
Bering  Sea  tribunal,  319. 

Cass,  Lewis,  Secretary  of  State, 
xiv;  declaration  as  to  religious 
liberty,  201 ;  instructions  as  to 
expatriation,  284,  285. 


458 


INDEX 


Castlereagh,  Lord,  attitude  tow- 
ard Holy  Alliance,  240;  com- 
mercial proposals,  167. 

Castro,  Cipriano,  refusal  of  ar- 
bitration, 253-254. 

Catherine  II.  of  Russia,  dismissal 
of  Genet,  38;  declaration  of 
neutral  rights,  54,  55. 

Central  America,  tour  of  Mr. 
Knox,  267. 

Central  American  Court  of  Jus- 
tice, 401-402. 

Chacabuco,  battle  of,  367. 

Chamberlain,  Joseph,  fisheries 
treaty,  144. 

Chile,  question  of  recognition, 
367;   political  stability,  413. 

China,  trade  with,  173,  176; 
treaty  of  1844  with  United 
States,  177,  178;  American 
policy,  177-185;  Burlingame 
mission,  178;  "  open  door  "  cir- 
cular of  Sept.  6.  1899,  179; 
relinquishment  of  consular  jur- 
isdiction in  leased  territories, 
180;  Boxer  rebellion  and  Hay 
circular  of  July  3,  1900,  180; 
international  claims,  181;  Korea 
and  Manchuria,  1 81-182;  boy- 
cott against  United  States, 
182;  "  neutralization ' '  of  Man- 
churian  railways,  183;  over- 
throw of  Manchu  dynasty,  183 ; 
republic,  183;  "six-power" 
loan,  183-184;  Lansing-Ishii 
agreement,  184-185;  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance,  192-195; 
claim  of  suzerainty  over  Korea, 
195;  co-operation  of  powers, 
434;   support  of  independence, 

423- 

Cholmondeley,  Lord,  intermedi- 
ary between  Franklin  and  Shel- 
burne,  25. 

Citizenship.  See  Expatriation ; 
also  Allegiance,  Indelible. 

Clay,  Henry,  Secretary  of  State, 
xiii ;  exemption  of  private  prop- 
erty at  sea,  61;  position  as  to 


interoceanic  canal,  122;  navi- 
gation of  rivers  ana  canals,  122, 
131 ;  answer  to  Kossuth's  ap- 
peal, 204;  recognition  of  South 
American  States,  367,  368; 
Panama  Congress,   369,   370- 

375- 

Clayton-Bulwer  treaty,  122.  See 
Clayton,  John  M.;  also  Inter- 
oceanic Canal. 

Clayton,  John  M.,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiv;  treaty  as  to  inter- 
oceanic canal,  122-124;  its 
supersession,  126;  fortification 
of  canal,  128. 

Cleveland,  Grover,  retaliatory 
proposal  as  to  fisheries,  145; 
order  for  release  of  Canadian 
sealers,  149;  invocation  of 
Monroe  Doctrine  in  Vene- 
zuelan boundary  dispute,  246- 
251;  suggestion  of  intervention 
in  Cuba,  206. 

Cockburn,  Sir  Alexander,  arbi- 
trator at  Geneva,  316. 

Codification.  See  International 
Commission  of  Jurists. 

Cohen,  Arthur,  assistant  counsel 
at  Geneva,  317. 

Colombia,  treaty  as  to  isthmian 
transit  (1846),  124,  127;  al- 
leged designs  on  Cuba,  374; 
arbitrations  with,  322. 

Colonial  monopoly,  contest  with, 
2,  3,  12,  159,  166,  167,  339,  340. 

Colonization,   meaning  of  term, 

245- 

Columbia    River,    discovery    of, 

173.  174.  350- 

Columbus,  N.  M.,  raid  on,  227. 

Commerce,  pursuit  of,  103,  105; 
restrictions  upon,  159-190;  pol- 
icy of  reciprocity,  160,  161; 
most-favored-nation  principle, 
12. 

Commercial  intercourse  with 
Canada,  27,  31,  32. 

Commercial  restrictions,  contest 
with,  159-190. 


459 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


"Committee  of  Secret  Corre- 
spondence," xi,  5,  24. 

"Committee  of  Foreign  Affairs," 
xii,  5  n. 

Concert,  international,  437. 

Confederate  cruisers,  49,  50. 

Confederation,    inefficiency,    34, 

35- 

Congress,  Continental.  See  Con- 
tinental Congress. 

Congress,  United  States,  resolu- 
tion of  1890  in  favor  of  inter- 
national arbitration,  324. 

Conscience,  liberty  of,  33. 

"Constitutionalists,"  Mexico, 
218. 

Consular  service,  American,  use- 
fulness in  extension  of  com- 
merce, 425,  426. 

Continental  Congress,  manage- 
ment of  foreign  affairs,  5; 
plan  of  treaties,  6;  drawing  of 
bills  on  Jay,  18. 

Continuous  voyages,  doctrine  of, 
60. 

Contraband,  law  of,  53,  54,  61, 
62;  provisions,  54;  decree  of 
French  convention,  55,  56; 
British  orders  in  council,  56, 
66;  controversy  with  Austria, 
82;  prohibition  of  exports  to 
Mexico,  216;  President  Wil- 
son's declaration  as  to  "best 
practice,"  220;  instructions  to 
delegates  to  Panama  Congress, 
372. 

Corinto,  seizure  by  Great  Brit- 
ain, 418. 

Corn  Islands,  leased  by  Nicara- 
gua to  United  States,  401; 
claimed  by  Colombia,  402. 

Correspondence,  Committee  of 
Secret.  See  "Committee  of 
Secret  Correspondence." 

Costa  Rica,  arbitrations  with, 
322 ;  aids  in  expelling  Walker- 
Rivas  government  from  Nica- 
ragua, 211,  381 ;  comments  on 
Lincoln    administration,    383- 


384;  protests  against  treaty 
between  United  States  and 
Nicaragua,  401-402;  political 
stability,  410. 

Costello  and  Warren,  case  of,  286. 

Courcel,  Baron  Alphonse  de,  Ber- 
ing Sea  arbitrator,  319. 

Creole,  case  of,  315. 

Crespo,  General,  recognition  as 
President  of  Venezuela,  213. 

Criminals,  conveyance  in  cus- 
tody, 146. 

Cuba,  views  of  Jefferson,  259; 
attempts  at  annexation,  361, 
362;  intervention  in,  205,  208; 
instructions  to  delegates  to 
Panama  Congress,  374;  special 
position  in  Pan  Americanism, 
400. 

Culebra  and  Culebrita,  attempt 
to  annex,  363. 

Curzon,  Lord,  status  of  Suez 
Canal,  126. 

Gushing,  Caleb,  envoy  to  China, 
176;  views  on  expatriation, 
278;   counsel  at  Geneva,  316. 


Da  Gama,  Domicio,  Brazilian 
ambassador,  note  as  to  rupture 
with  Germany,  100-101. 

Dana,  Francis,  mission  to  Russia, 

15,  19- 
Danish  West  Indies,  attempts  to 
annex,  358,  359;    annexation, 

359- 

Dauphin,  American  ship  seized 
by  Algerine  cruiser,  106. 

Davis,  J.  C.  B.,  American  agent 
at  Geneva,  316. 

Day,  William  R.,  Secretary  of 
State,  xv. 

Deane,  Silas,  secret  agent  to 
France,  5,  6;  surrender  as  a 
rebel  demanded,  15;  com- 
missioner to  France,  8. 

Debts,  confiscated,  engagement 
to  pay,  28,  29,  34. 

Decatur,  Commodore,  dealings 
with  Barbary  powers,  1 10,  u  I. 

460 


INDEX 


Declaration  of  Independence,  2, 
6,  270,  420,  422,  423. 

Declaration  of  intention.  See 
Naturalization. 

Declaration  of  London,  66-67, 
68. 

Declaration  of  Paris,  61,  64. 

Democratic  National  Conven- 
tion, 19 1 6,  declaration  concern- 
ing Mexico,  233. 

Denmark,  abolition  of  sound 
dues,  1 21-122;  claim  to  mo- 
nopolize fisheries,  135;  question 
of  ceding  West  India  posses- 
sions, 359;  arbitrations,  322. 

"  Department  of  Foreign  Affairs," 
xii,  5  n. 

Diaz,  Felix,  revolt  in  Mexico, 
216. 

Diaz,  Porfirio,  recognition  by 
United  States,  212-213;  final 
overthrow,  215. 

Dickinson,  John,  member  of 
"Committee  of  Secret  Corre- 
spondence," 6. 

Diplomacy,  American.  See  Amer- 
ican diplomacy. 

Diplomacy,  element  of  chance, 
25;   questionable  practices,  19. 

Diplomatic  dress,  controversies 
concerning,  429-433. 

Diplomatic  life,    15. 

Directory,  French,  refusal  to  re- 
ceive  Pinckney,    57-59. 

Discriminating  duties,  abolition 
of,  12,  171-173. 

Divine  right,  principle  of,  4. 

Dogger  Bank  incident,  327. 

"Dollar  Diplomacy,"  267. 

Dolphin,  U.S.S.,  Tampico  inci- 
dent, 223. 

Dominican  republic.  See  Santo 
Domingo. 

Dress,  diplomatic.  See  Diplo- 
matic dress. 

"Due  diligence,"  test  of  neutral 
duty,  50. 

Dumas,  C.  W.  F.,  his  services  to  I 
the  United  States,  21-25. 

46 


Dumba,  Dr.,  Austrian  ambassa- 
dor, dismissal,  82. 

Dupuy  de  L6me,  Senor,  Spanish 
minister,  his  withdrawal,  207. 

Duties,  discriminating.  See  Dis- 
criminating duties. 

Eaton,  General  William,  cap- 
ture of  Derne,  no. 

Ecuador,  arbitrations  with,  322. 

Elgin,  Lord,  reciprocity  and  fish- 
eries treaty,  141,  142. 

Elliot,  Hugh,  British  minister  at 
Berlin,  theft  of  Arthur  Lee's 
papers,  19-23. 

Embargoes,  61. 

Emory,  Frederic,  development  of 
consular  reports,  426. 

Empress  of  China,  American  ship, 
arrival  at  Canton  1784,  173. 

England.     See  Great  Britain. 

Etiquette,  diplomatic,  contro- 
versies as  to,  427-433. 

European  powers,  attitude  tow- 
ards American  Revolution, 
17-19. 

European  system,  abstention 
from  participation  in,  viii. 

Eustis,  William,  captured  on  the 
Trent,   114. 

Evarts,  William  M.,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiv;  counsel  at  Geneva, 
316;  establishment  of  consular 
reports,  426. 

Everett,  A.  H.,  empowered  to 
negotiate  with  Japan,  186. 

Everett,  Edward,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiv;  views  on  expatria- 
tion, 277. 

Expansion,  territorial,  of  the 
United  States,  13,  339-364; 
Alaska,  352;  California  and 
New  Mexico,  351;  Floridas, 
348;  Texas,  347,  348;  Louisi- 
ana, 341-347:  Oregon,  350; 
Mesilla  Valley,  352;  Hawaii, 
353;  Philippines  and  Porto 
Rico,  354,  355;  Tutuila,  355, 
356,357;  Panama  Canal  Zone, 

1 


A  M  E  R  I  C  A  N    DIPLOMACY 


357-358;  Cuban  harbors,  358; 
Corn  Islands,  358;  naval  base 
on  Gulf  of  Fonseca,  358;  Dan- 
ish West  Indies,  359;  Horse- 
Shoe  Reef,  359;  Brooks  or 
Midway  Islands,  360;  Wake 
Island,  360;  Guano  Islands, 
360;  Culebra  and  Culebrita, 
363 ;  Unsuccessful  attempts, 
360-364;  Canada,  360;  Sal- 
vador, 360;  Cuba,  361;  Yuca- 
tan, 362;  Santo  Domingo,  and 
Samana  Bay,  362-363;  Mole 
St.  Nicolas,  364. 

Expatriation,  doctrine  of,  270; 
meaning  of,  271,  293,  294, 
299-300;  attitude  of  courts, 
273;  of  Secretaries  of  State, 
274;  Buchanan's  innovation, 
276,  277,  283,  284;  views  of 
Webster,  Everett,  and  Marcy, 
277;  Cushing's  opinion,  278; 
case  of  Christian  Ernst,  281- 
284;  Black's  opinion,  281,  295; 
Seward's  action,  285;  case  of 
Warren  and  Costello,  286; 
agitation  for  legislation,  287; 
act  of  July  27,  1868,  288-290; 
treaties,  290,  291;  subsequent 
action,  294-300;  naturalization 
act  of  June  29,  1906,  296;  ex- 
patriation act  of  March  2, 
1907,  297;  married  women, 
298;  declarants'  passports,  298; 
Koszta  case,  300. 

Extradition,  practice  of,  424. 

Falkland  Islands,  occupation 
by  Great  Britain,  379. 

Far  East,  trade  with,  1 73 ;  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance,  192-195. 

Ferdinand  VII.  of  Spain,  restora- 
tion by  France,  240. 

"Fifty-four  forty  or  fight,"  351. 

Fillmore,  Millard,  reception  of 
Kossuth,  204. 

Fish,  Hamilton,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiv;  treaty  of  May  8, 
1 87 1,  316;    opposes  intcrven- 

46 


tion  in  Cuba,  206;  advocates 
immunity  of  private  property 
at  sea,  61;  president  of  peace 
conference  (1870),  384. 

Fisheries,  northeastern,  27,  28, 
30;  treatyof  1782-83,  136-138; 
negotiations  at  Ghent,  138; 
seizures  of  vessels,  139; 
"rights"  and  "liberties,"  137- 
141;  convention  of  1818,  140, 
141;  legislation  and  disputes, 
141 ;  reciprocity  treaty  of  1854, 
141,  142;  treaty  of  1871,  142; 
Halifax  commission,  142,  143; 
modus  vivendi  of  1885,  143; 
headland  theory,  141,  143; 
meaning  of  "bays,"  141,  143, 
144;  act  of  March  3,  1887,  144; 
modus  vivendi,  145;  arbitration 
at  The  Hague,  146;  Bayard- 
Chamberlain  treaty,  144,  147, 
149;  award  of  Hague  Court, 
320. 

Fisheries,  propagation  of  food- 
fishes  in  contiguous  waters, 
146. 

Fisheries  questions,  135-158. 

Flag,  misuse  of,  67,  68. 

Fletcher,  Rear-Admiral,  occupa- 
tion of  Vera  Cruz,  223. 

Florida,  Confederate  cruiser,  50. 

Floridas,  acquisition,  260,  341- 
348. 

Fonseca,  Gulf  of,  protest  by 
Costa  Rica,  Honduras,  and  Sal- 
vador, against  grant  of  naval 
station  by  Nicaragua  to  United 
States,  401-402. 

Foodstuffs.    See  Provisions. 

Foreign  affairs,  committee  for, 
5  n. ;  department  of,  5  n.\ 
secretary  of,  5  n. 

Foreign  Policy,  local  influences, 
vii. 

Forsyth,  John,  Secretary  of  State, 
xiii. 

Foster,  John  W.,  Secretary  of 
State,  xv ;  agent  in  Bering 
Sea  Arbitration,  319. 


INDEX 


Fox,  Charles  James,  26. 

France,  secret  mission  of  Deane, 
5,  6;  proposed  treaty,  6,  7; 
obligations  to,  7;  attitude 
towards  American  Revolution, 
7,  9 ;  treaties  of  commerce  and 
alliance,  12-14,  33,  198,  202; 
proposal  of  new  alliance,  43, 
199;  question  as  to  effect  of 
alliance,  42-44;  violations  of 
neutrality,  39-42,  56,  59-6J ; 
recall  of  Genet,  Morris,  and 
Monroe,  47-49,  57;  refusal  to 
receive  Pinckney,  57;  X.  Y.  Z. 
negotiations,  57-59;  rupture 
of  relations,  59;  reacquisition 
of  Louisiana,  341;  opposition 
to  claim  of  visit  and  search, 
116;  invasion  of  Spain,  239; 
indisposed  to  exempt  private 
property  at  sea  from  capture, 
63 ;  Anglo- Japanese  alliance, 
192-195;  position  on  expatria- 
tion, 292;  arbitrations,  321, 
322. 

Franklin,  Benjamin,  member  of 
"Committee  of  Secret  Corre- 
spondence," 6;  solicits  aid  of 
C.  W.  F.  Dumas,  24;  com- 
missioner to  France,  8;  voy- 
age to  France,  15;  correspon- 
dence with  Shelburne,  25,  26; 
proposals  for  peace,  2"j;  op- 
position to  claims  of  loyalists, 
28;  position  as  to  confiscated 
debts,  28;  attitude  towards 
France,  29-3 1 ;  commissioned 
to  treat  with  Barbary  powers, 
105;  negotiator  of  treaties,  33 ; 
advocates  immunity  of  private 
property  at  sea,  61,  372;  dip- 
lomatic dress,   430. 

Frederick  the  Great,  21. 

Freedom,  principle  of,  2,  6. 

Free  port  acts,  167. 

"Free  ships  free  goods,"  54; 
instructions  to  delegates  to 
Panama  Congress,  372. 

Frelinghuysen,  F.  T.,  Secretary 


of  State,  xv ;    views  as  to  am- 
bassadorial rank,  435. 
French    consuls,    assumption    of 

admiralty  powers,  44,  45. 
French   Revolution,   attitude  of 

United    States,    35,    36,    209; 

course  of  Gouverneur  Morris, 

37.  38. 
Funston,  General,  occupation  of 

Vera  Cruz,  225;    negotiations 

in  Mexico,  229. 
Fur-seal  arbitration.    See  Bering 

Sea  Controversy. 
Fur-seals,  protection.    See  Bering 

Sea  Controversy. 

Gallatin,  Albert,  effort  to 
abolish  commercial  restrictions, 
167,  170. 

Gamboa,  F.,  on  Lind  mission  to 
Mexico,  220. 

Genet,  Edmond  C,  French  minis- 
ter to  United  States,  38-41,  43, 
44;    recall,  44,  48. 

Geneva  arbitration,  313,  316,  317. 

Geneva  convention,  434. 

George  III.  advised  to  recognize 
American  independence,  25. 

Germany,  acceptance  of  Monroe 
Doctrine,  252,  261 ;  Venezue- 
lan blockade,  253-255;  Samoan 
policy,  356;  violations  of  neu- 
tral rights,  67-72,  74-77,  88, 
94;  rupture  of  relations,  89; 
proposed  arrangement  with 
Japan  and  Mexico,  91;  effect 
of  war-zone  decrees,  94;  rup- 
ture with  Brazil,  99-101. 

Gerry,  Elbridge,  envoy  to  France, 

57-59- 

Ghent,  treaty  of,  stipulation 
against  slave-trade,  1 18;  ar- 
bitrations, 314. 

Gibraltar,  Strait  of,  navigation, 
104,  105,  in,  112. 

Glenn  Springs,  raid,  229. 

Glynn,  Commander,  visit  to 
Japan,  186. 

Good  offices,  Hague  treaty,  326. 


463 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


Gore,  Christopher,  arbitrator  un- 
der Jay  treaty,  310. 

Government,  acts  of,  4. 

Graham,  John,  commissioner  to 
South  America,  367. 

Gram,  Gregers,  Bering  Sea  ar- 
bitrator, 319. 

Grant,  U.  S.,  attitude  towards 
Cuba,  206;  attempts  to  annex 
Santo  Domingo,  363. 

Gray,  Captain  Robert,  discovery 
of  Columbia  River,  350. 

Great  Britain,  acquisition  of 
Canada  and  the  Island  of  Cape 
Breton,  7;  maritime  suprem- 
acy, 15;  ubiquitous  agencies 
for  obtaining  information,  19; 
war  against  the  Netherlands, 
17;  rule  of  war  of  1756,  59; 
peace  of  1782,  29;  treaties 
with,  33;  retention  of  northern 
posts,  34;  Jay  treaty,  56;  vio- 
lations of  neutral  rights,  56, 
59-61,  66,  67,  69,  77-81,  86, 
91-92;  opposes  exemption  of 
private  property  at  sea  from 
capture,  63;  trade  with  the 
Mediterranean,  105;  trade  ex- 
cluded from  Hanover,  60;  ef- 
forts to  suppress  slave-trade, 
116;  protection  of  fur-seals  and 
sea-otters,  155;  Hay-Paunce- 
fote  treaties  as  to  interoceanic 
canal,  125-126;  treaty  with 
China,  176;  alliance  with 
Japan,  192-195;  attitude  tow- 
ards Holy  Alliance,  239;  ac- 
ceptance of  Monroe  Doctrine, 
251,  253;  Venezuelan  block- 
ade, 253-255 ;  law  of  allegiance, 
280,  281,  286;  naturalization 
treaty  with  United  States, 
290,  291;    extradition,  424. 

Greeks,  struggle  for  indepen- 
dence, 202. 

Grenville,  Lord,  negotiations  with 
Jay,  164,  308. 

Gresham,  Walter  Q.,  Secretary 
of  State,  xv 


Grey  and  Ripon,  Earl  de,  mem- 
ber of  joint  high  commission 
of  1871,  316. 

Grotius,  principle  of  equality  of 
nations,  197;  classification  of 
contraband,  54. 

Guadalupe,  Plan  of,  217. 

Guadalupe-Hidalgo,  treaty  of, 
230,  351- 

Guano  Islands,  360. 

Guantanamo,  358. 

Gutierrez,  General,  proclaimed 
provisional  president  of  Mexi- 
co, 226. 

Hague  conferences,  arbitration 
and  mediation,  325-326;  con- 
ventions, 434;  proposal  to 
exempt  private  property  at 
sea  from  capture,  61-65;  call- 
ing of  second  conference,  63; 
reservation  by  United  States 
of  American  political  ques- 
tions, 439,  440. 

Hague  Court,  North  Atlantic 
fisheries  arbitration,  146; 
award  on  Venezuelan  blockade 
and  preferential  claims,  254. 

Haiti,  intervention  in,  xi;  ar- 
bitrations with,  322;  Mdle 
St.  Nicolas,  364;  instructions 
to  delegates  to  Panama  Con- 
gress, 374;  special  position  in 
Pan  Americanism,  402;  occu- 
pation by  United  States,  402- 
404;  recognition  of,  422. 

Ilakan,  case  of,  as  to  "block- 
ade,"  78-79. 

Halifax  commission,  318. 

Hall,  W.  E.,  on  American  neu- 
trality, 46. 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  position 
as  to  Genet's  reception,  39, 
40;    neutrality  circular,  46. 

Hannen,  Lord,  Bering  Sea  ar- 
bitrator, 319. 

Hanover,  law  as  to  allegiance, 
28  r,  284;  exclusion  of  British 
trade,  60. 


464 


INDEX 


Harding,  Sir  John  Dorney,  es- 
cape of  the  Alabama,  52. 

Harlan,  John  M.,  Bering  Sea 
arbitrator,  318. 

Harris,  Townsend,  consul-gen- 
eral and  minister  to  Japan,  189. 

Harrison,  Benjamin,  on  "Com- 
mittee of  Secret  Correspon- 
dence," 6. 

Hay,  John,  Secretary  of  State, 
xv ;  interoceanic  canal  treat- 
ies, 125-126;  memorandum 
on  Monroe  Doctrine,  253;  cir- 
cular of  July  3,  1900,  as  to 
China,  180. 

Headland  theory,  141,  143. 

Hise,  Elijah,  treaty  as  to  inter- 
oceanic canal,  123. 

Hoar,  E.  R.,  on  joint  high  com- 
mission of  1 87 1,  316. 

Holy  Alliance,  238-240. 

Honduras,  protests  against  treaty 
between  United  States  and 
Nicaragua,  401-402. 

Hongkong,  acquired  by  England, 
176. 

Honor,  national,  and  arbitra- 
tion, 330,  337-338. 

Horse-shoe  Reef,  acquisition,  359. 

House  of  Commons,  censure  of 
Shelburne,  29;  resolution  on 
arbitration,  324-325. 

Hudson's  Bay  Company,  arbi- 
tration of  claims,  315. 

Huerta,  Victoriano,  abandons 
Madero,  216;  President  Wil- 
son's refusal  to  recognize,  217- 
225. 

Hungary,  struggle  for  inde- 
pendence, 202. 


Immigration,  Chinese,  182;  Jap- 
anese, 191-192. 

Impressment,  61,  112-115,275. 

Independence  of  United  States, 
I,  2,  6,  13,  14,  36. 

Indians,  pursuit  of,  229. 

Indirect  claims,  317. 

Industrial  property  union,  434.    | 

30  46 


Ingraham,  Captain,  demand  for 
release  of  Martin  Koszta,  302. 

Intercontinental  railway,  389. 

International  American  Confer- 
ence, First,  323,  386-389; 
plan  of  arbitration,  387-388; 
Bureau  of  American  Republics, 
388;  Intercontinental  railway, 
389;  Republic  of  Brazil,  389; 
Second  Conference,  327,  390; 
Third,  390-392;  Fourth,  392; 
Fifth  postponed,  387. 

International  arbitration,  306- 
348;  meaning  of  "arbitra- 
tion," 306,  326-327;  arbi- 
trations with  Great  Britain, 
307-319;  neutral  rights  and 
duties,  310-313,  332;  power 
to  determine  jurisdiction,  311, 
312;  treaty  of  Ghent,  314; 
Geneva  tribunal,  316;  Halifax 
commission,  318;  fur-seal  ar- 
bitration, 318,  319,  320;  Alas- 
kan boundary  commission, 
319-320,325;  arbitrations  with 
Spain,  321;  France,  321;  Mexi- 
co, 32 1 ;  Colombia,  Costa  Rica, 
Denmark,  Ecuador,  Haiti,  Nic- 
aragua, Paraguay,  Peru,  Por- 
tugal, Salvador,  Santo  Do- 
mingo, Siam,  Venezuela,  322; 
summary,  322;  public  senti- 
ment, 323;  Pan-American  con- 
ference, 323-324;  resolution 
of  Congress  (1890),  324;  of 
House  of  Commons  (1893), 
324;  Olney-Pauncefote  treaty, 
325;  Hague  conferences,  325, 
326,  329;  Second  Pan-Ameri- 
can Conference,  327;  errone- 
ous impressions  as  to  general 
progress,  329-335;  Taft-Knox 
treaties,  334;  future  and  limi- 
tations, 337;  instructions  to 
delegates  to  Panama  Con- 
gress, 375;  Chile-Colombian 
treaty  (1880),  385;  plan  adopt- 
ed by  first  International  Amer- 
ican Conference,  387-388;  pe- 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


cuniary  claims,  328-329,  331, 
390,  391,  392;  North  Atlantic 
fisheries,  146;  Art.  I,  treaty  of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo,  230. 

International  Commission  of  Jur- 
ists, 390. 

International  law,  principle  of 
equality  of  nations,  197. 

Interoceanic  canal,  neutralization 
and  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty, 
122-125;  demand  for  American 
control,  125;  Hay-Pauncefote 
treaties,  126;  tolls  question, 
128-130;  instructions  to  dele- 
gates to  Panama  Congress,  373. 

Intervention,  policy,  13,  197; 
advocated  by  Kossuth,  202; 
Cuba,  205-208;  Mexico,  216 
et  seq.;  Nicaragua,  400;  Haiti, 
402;    Santo  Domingo,  404. 

Ishii,  Viscount,  agreement  as 
to  China,  184-185. 

Itajuba,  Viscount,  arbitrator  at 
Geneva,  316. 

Italy,  position  on  expatriation, 
292;  Venezuelan  blockade,  253. 

Izard,  Ralph,  mission  to  Tus- 
cany, 14,  19. 

Jackson,    Andrew,    169,    170; 

appointment  of  Edmund  Rob- 
erts, 174;  attempts  to  acquire 
Texas,  349;  recognition  of 
Dom  Miguel,  210. 

Jackson,  F.  J.,  British  minister, 
428. 

Japan,  opening  to  trade,  186-190; 
Shimonoseki  indemnity,  433 ; 
tariff  duties,  433;  peace  of 
Portsmouth,  438;  disinclined 
to  exempt  private  property  at 
sea  from  capture,  63;  protec- 
tion of  fur-seals  and  sea-otters, 
155;  war  with  Russia,  181; 
treaty  of  peace,  1 81-182;  im- 
migration question  in  United 
States,  191;  California  land 
legislation,  191-192;  agreement 
with  United  States  as  to  China, 


184-185;  alliance  with  Great 
Britain,  192-195;  absorption 
of  Korea,  195. 

Java,  visited  by  Edmund  Rob- 
erts,   175. 

Jay,  John,  Secretary  of  Foreign 
Affairs,  xii;  member  of  "Com- 
mittee on  Secret  Correspon- 
dence," 6;  mission  to  Spain, 
14,16,18;  peace  commissioner, 
27-29;  attitude  towards 
France,  29,  30;  treaty  of  1794, 
56,  308;  treaties  signed  by,  33. 

Jay  treaty,  French  resentment, 
56,  57;  amendments  by  Sen- 
ate, 165,  166;  arbitrations, 
308-313. 

Jeffers,  Lieutenant,  case  of  the 
Water  Witch,  133,   134. 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  Secretary  of 
State,  xii,  xiii;  injunction 
against  intermeddling  in  Eu- 
ropean affairs,  ix;  declines 
mission  to  France,  8;  attitude 
towards  Barbary  powers,  105, 
107-110;  position  as  to  Gen^t, 
40,  44;  exposition  of  neutral 
duties,  45;  doctrine  of  recog- 
nition, 209;  policy  of  non- 
intervention, 199;  position  as 
to  Cuba  and  Mexico,  259,  361 ; 
as  to  Louisiana  and  Floridas, 
342;  impressment,  113,  114; 
expatriation, 274;  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 242;  signer  of  treaties, 
33;  etiquette,  inattention  to 
formalities,  427;  talks  with 
Brazilian   students  in  France, 

389-  .    . 

Joint  high  commission  of  187 1, 
316. 

Joseph  II.  of  Austria  on  Ameri- 
can independence,  421. 

Kent,  James,  on  expatriation, 
273,  274,  286. 

Knox,  General,  views  as  to  re- 
ception of  Gen6t,  39. 

Knox,    Philander    C,   Secretary 


466 


INDEX 


of  State,  xv;  note  on  canal 
tolls  question,  129;  six-power 
Chinese  loan,  183;  notice  of 
withdrawal  of  recognition  from 
Zelaya,  265;  loan  convention 
with  Honduras,  267;  Central 
American  tour,  267. 

Korea,  opening  to  trade,  190; 
subject  of  dispute  between 
Japan  and  Russia,  181;  Anglo- 
Japanese  alliance,  192-195; 
treaty  with  United  States,  195; 
timber  concessions  and  Russo- 
Japanese  war,  195;  absorption 
by  Japan,  196;  acquiescence  of 
United  States,  196. 

Kossuth,  Louis,  visit  to  United 
States,  202-205. 

Koszta,  Martin,  seizure  at  Smyr- 
na, 300. 

Lammasch,  Dr.  H.,  northeastern 
fisheries  arbitrator,  146. 

Lansing,  Robert,  proposal  as  to 
armed  merchantmen,  73;  Ishii 
agreement  as  to  China,  184- 
185;  reply  to  Carranza  pro- 
test, 234;  on  the  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 268. 

Laurens,  Henry,  mission  to  the 
Netherlands,  15,  16;  capture 
and  imprisonment,  16;  peace 
signer,  27,  29. 

Laybach,  Congress  of,  238. 

Leagues  for  Peace,  441-445. 

Lee,  Arthur,  mission  to  Prussia, 
15;  theft  of  his  papers  at  Ber- 
lin, 19-23. 

Lee,  William,  mission  to  Vienna, 
14,  15,  19;  plan  of  treaty  with 
the  Netherlands,  17. 

Lewis  and  Clark,  expedition  of, 

35i-  ... 

Liberia,  recogmtion  of,  422;  ad- 
justment of  questions  with 
France,  Germany  and  Great 
Britain,  439. 

Li  Hung-Chang,  treaty  between 
United  States  and  Korea,  195. 


Lind,    John,    special    agent    to 

Mexico,  218;  failure  of  mission, 

219,  220,  223. 
Livingston,  Edward,  Secretary  of 

State,  xiii. 
Livingston,  Robert  R.,  Secretary 

of   Foreign  Affairs,   xii,  5  n. ; 

Louisiana  purchase,  342-346. 
Loubet,     President,     award     of 

Corn  Islands  to  Colombia,  402. 
Loughborough,  Lord  Chancellor, 

opinion    on    treaty    question, 

312. 
Louis  XVI.  of  France,  counselled 

by    Gouverneur    Morris,    38; 

treaties,  40. 
Louisiana  purchase,  341-347. 
Loyalists'  claims  for  compensa- 
tion, 27,  28,  136. 
Lusitania,  use  of  American  colors, 

68;   sinking,  70-71,  72. 

Macdonald,  Sir  John  A.,  mem- 
ber of  joint  high  commission  of 
1871,  316. 

Macdonald,  Thomas,  arbitrator 
under  Jay  treaty,  309. 

McClellan,  Captain  George  B., 
report  on  Samana  Bay,  362. 

McFarland,  Mr.,  captured  on  the 
Trent,  114. 

McKinley,  William,  demands 
restoration  of  order  in  Cuba, 
207;  advocates  immunity  of 
private  property  at  sea,  6 1 ; 
statement  concerning  expatria- 
tion, 293. 

McLean,  Louis,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiii. 

Madero,  Francisco,  revolution  in 
Mexico,  215;  becomes  Presi- 
dent, 216;  overthrow  and 
death,  216-217. 

Madison,  James,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiii;  war  message  of 
1812,  114,  275;  importance  of 
the  Mississippi,  341;  instruc- 
tions as  to  New  Orleans  and 
the  Floridas,  344;  the  Monroe 


467 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


Doctrine,  242;  simplicity  of 
manners,  428. 

Mails,  interference  with  at  sea,  80. 

Maine,  destruction  at  Havana, 
207,  208. 

Malvinas  Islands.  See  Falkland 
Islands. 

Manchuria,  subject  of  dispute 
between  Japan  and  Russia, 
181-182;  railways,  183. 

Manila,  visited  by  Edmund  Rob- 
erts, 175;  captured  by  Ameri- 
can forces,  354. 

Mann,  A.  Dudley,  agent  to  Hun- 
gary, 202. 

Marcy,  William  L.,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiv;  treaty  as  to  reci- 
procity and  fisheries,  141 ;  ex- 
tradition treaties,  424;  case 
of  Martin  Koszta,  300;  at- 
tempt to  annex  Hawaii,  353; 
views  on  expatriation,  277; 
advocates  immunity  of  private 
property  at  sea,  61;  circular 
as  to  diplomatic  dress,  430; 
declines  to  recommend  ap- 
pointment of  ambassadors,  435. 

Mare  clausum,  doctrine  of,  151, 

x52- 

Maria,  American  schooner  cap- 
tured by  Algerime  cruiser,  106. 

Maritime  law,  controversy  as  to 
armed  merchantmen,  73-74; 
exemption  of  private  property 
from  capture,  61-65. 

Marshall,  John,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiii;  envoy  to  France, 
57~59;  views  as  to  effect  of 
naturalization,  275;  principle 
of  equality  of  nations,  198. 

Mason,  James  M.,  capture  on  the 
Trent,  114. 

Mason,  John  Y.,  diplomatic 
dress,  431. 

Massachusetts,  legislative  reso- 
lution in  favor  of  arbitration, 

323- 
Mayo,    Rear-Admiral,    Tampico 
incident,  223. 


Mediation,  distinguished  from  ar- 
bitration, 306, 307;  Hague  con- 
vention, 326. 

Mediterranean,  early  trade,  104, 
105. 

Mercury,  captured  by  the  Brit- 
ish, 16. 

Merry,  Mr.,  British  minister,  428. 

Mexico,  Gulf  of,  islands  in,  13. 

Mexico,  views  of  Jefferson,  259; 
alleged  designs  on  Cuba,  374; 
war  of  1846,  351;  recognition 
of  Diaz,  212-213;  revolution 
of  191 1,  215-216;  refusal  to 
recognize  Huerta,  213-225; 
ABC  mediation,  225;  con- 
vention at  Aguascalientes, 
225;  recognition  of  Carranza, 
227;  Columbus,  N.  M.,  raid, 
227;  occupation  of  Mexican 
territory,  229,  234-237;  joint 
commission,  and  withdrawal  of 
American  forces,  237;  arbitra- 
tions, 351. 

Midway  Islands.  See  Brooks  or 
Midway  Islands. 

Miguel,  Dom,  recognition  by 
United  States,  210. 

Milan  decree,  57,  60. 

Military  area,  declared  by  Great 
Britain,  66.    See  War  Zone. 

"Millions  for  defence,  but  not  a 
cent  for  tribute,"  59. 

Mines,  use  of,  in  the  sea,  66- 
68. 

Mississippi  River,  navigation  of, 

138,  341,  343- 

Mdle  St.  Nicolas,  attempt  to 
annex,  364. 

Monopolies,  commercial  and  co- 
lonial, 2-4,  159,  166,  167. 

Monroe  Doctrine,  x-xi,  7; 
Holy  Alliance,  238;  European 
congresses,  238,  239;  Canning- 
Rush  correspondence,  240; 
Monroe's  message  of  1823,  243- 
246 ;  instructions  to  delegates  to 
Panama  Congress,  373;  Presi- 
dent Polk's  message  of   1845, 


468 


INDEX 


245,  246;  Mr.  Seward's  posi- 
tion, 257 ;  Venezuelan  boundary, 
246-251;  exposition  by  Presi- 
dent Roosevelt,  251;  accep- 
tance by  Germany  and  Great 
Britain,  252,  253;  Venezuelan 
blockade,  253-255;  pecuniary 
claims,  256;  "Drago  doctrine," 
258-259;  Hague  declarations, 
261,439;  Santo  Domingo,  261; 
Nicaragua,  265 ;  Honduras, 
267;  Mr.  Knox's  declarations, 
267;  addresses  of  President 
Wilson  and  Mr.  Lansing,  268; 
Latin-American  interpretation, 
414,  415;  particular  phrases, 
258;  popular  distortions,  416- 
418. 

Monroe,  James,  minister  to 
France,  49,  57 ;  Louisiana  pur- 
chase, 344-346;  negotiations 
with  England,  167;  Secretary 
of  State,  President,  xiii;  policy 
of  non-intervention,  231 ;  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  238  et  stq.  See 
Monroe  Doctrine. 

Morgan,  John  T.,  Bering  Sea 
arbitrator,  319. 

Morocco,  early  relations  with, 
104,  106;  system  of  protec- 
tion, 434;  attitude  of  United 
States,  440. 

Morris,  Gouverneur,  agent  to 
London,  163,  164;  minister 
to  France,  37,  38,  47,  49. 

Morris,  Robert,  member  of 
"Committee  of  Secret  Corre- 
spondence," 6. 

Most-favored-nation  clause,  12, 
373. 

Muscat,  treaty  with,  1833,  175. 

Naples,  popular  movement  in, 

239- 

Napoleon,  cession  of  Louisiana, 
343.345;  Berlin  and  Milan  de- 
crees, 57,  60. 

National  Convention  of  France, 
provision  decree,  55. 


Nationality.     See  Expatriation. 

Natural  rights,  theory  of,  4,  270, 
420. 

Naturalization,  effect  of,  275, 
276,  293,  294;  treaties,  290, 
291 ;  conditions  under  act  of 
June  29,  1906,  296;  declara- 
tion of  intention,  298-301;  re- 
nunciation of  naturalization, 
297. 

Navigation,  boundary  waters, 
146. 

Navigation  Acts,  32,  161. 

Navy,  early  need  of,  107. 

Nelson,  Samuel,  member  of  joint 
high  commission  of  1 871,  316. 

Netherlands,  mission  of  Laurens, 
15,  16;  treaties,  14,  17,  33; 
war  with  England,  17;  award 
of  King  on  Northeastern  boun- 
dary, 314. 

Neutral  rights,  struggle  for,  53, 
308,  310-313;  armed  neu- 
trality, 54,  55;  rule  of  war  of 
I756,  59;  "continuous  voy- 
ages," 60;  Berlin  and  Milan 
decrees,  60;  orders  in  council, 
60;  blockade,  53,  54,  69,  78- 
79;  contraband,  54,  66;  vio- 
lations by  France,  55,  57,  59- 
61;  by  Great  Britain,  56,  59- 
61,  66,  67,  69,  77-81,  86,  91-92; 
by  Germany,  67-72,  74-77, 
88,  94;  armed  merchantmen, 
73-74;  mines,  66,  68;  sub- 
marines, 67,  68,  69,  72,  74- 
77,  88,  92-94,  94-96,  96-98, 
99-101;  immunity  of  private 
property  at  sea,  61,  102;  free- 
dom of  navigation,  103;  "free 
ships  free  goods,"  54. 

Neutrality,  system  of,  33,  35; 
proclamation  of  1 794, 39-42, 44 ; 
duties,  45-46,  310-313;  legisla- 
tion, 49;  Alabama  claims,  49, 
50;  due  diligence,  50;  proc- 
lamation of  1914,  66;  con- 
troversies with  Germany  and 
Great   Britain,   67-94,   96-98, 


469 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


See  Armed  neutrality;  Neutral 
rights. 

Neutralization  of  ways  of  com- 
munication, 122. 

New  Orleans,   right   of   deposit, 

343- 

Nicaragua,  arbitrations,  322; 
Rivas  -  Walker  government, 
210-21 1 ;  interoceanic  canal 
route,  123,  127,  401;  inter- 
vention, xi;  fall  of  Zelaya, 
265;  landing  of  marines,  267; 
concessions  to  United  States, 
401;  special  position  in  Pan 
Americanism,  400. 

Nicholl,  Sir  John,  arbitrator 
under  Jay  treaty,  311. 

Non-intercourse,  61. 

Non-intervention,  policy  of,  viii, 
197-205,  208;  instructions  to 
delegates  to  Panama  Congress, 
375;  views  of  United  States 
Congress,  376;  intervention 
in  Mexico  218  et  seq.;  Nicara- 
gua, 400;  Haiti,  402;  Santo 
Domingo,   404. 

Northcote,  Sir  Stafford,  mem- 
ber of  joint  high  commission 
of  1871,  316. 

Northeastern  boundary,  314. 

Olney,  Richard,  Secretary  of 
State,  xv ;  exposition  of  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  247-250;  gen- 
eral arbitration  treaty,  325. 

"Open  door"  policy,  179. 

Orders  in  council,  British,  56,  60, 
69,  78,  80,  86,  92. 

Oregon,  boundary  settlement, 
3507352. 

O'wSullivan,  John  L.,  minister  to 
Portugal,  431. 

Oswald,  Richard,  peace  negotia- 
tion, 26,  2j,  29. 

Ottoman  Empire,  trade  with, 
173;  expatriation,  293. 

Pacific  Ocean,  meaning  of  term, 
148,  153- 


Page,  Lieutenant,  exploring  ex- 
pedition, 132,  133. 

Pago-Pago,  Bay  of,  in  Samoa, 
355,  357- 

Palmer,  Sir  Roundel!,  opinion 
on  Alabama  case,  52.  See  also 
Selborne,  Lord. 

Panama,  Republic  of,  recogni- 
tion, 210,  238;  canal  treaty, 
127;  special  position  in  Pan 
Americanism,  400. 

Panama  Congress,  369-378. 

Pan-American  conference.  See 
International  American  Con- 
ference. 

Pan-American  Financial  Con- 
ference, 392-397. 

Pan-American  Union.  See  Bu- 
reau of  American  Republics. 

Pan  Americanism,  x;  countries 
comprehended,  365 ;  revolt 
against  colonial  system,  365- 
366;  Bolivar's  "prophetic  let- 
ter," 367;  Henry  Clay,  367, 
368;  mission  of  Rodney,  Gra- 
ham, and  Bland,  367-368; 
recognition  of  independence, 
368;  Monroe  Doctrine,  368; 
Panama  Congress,  369-378; 
Falkland  Islands  question,  379; 
Mexican  war,  379;  Lima  Con- 
gress (1847),  380;  "Conti- 
nental Treaty"  (1856),  381; 
Walker  and  other  filibusters, 
381;  conditions  in  Mexico 
(1858-1861),  382;  Civil  War 
in  United  States,  383;  Spanish 
peace  conference  (1870),  384; 
War  of  the  Pacific,  385;  in- 
vitation by  Colombia  to  con- 
ference at  Panama,  386;  in- 
vitation by  Blaine  for  peace 
congress  at  Washington,  386; 
International  American  Con- 
ference, 386-389;  Second  Con- 
ference, 390;  Third,  390-392; 
Fourth,  392;  International 
Commission  of  Jurists,  390; 
Pan-American  Financial  Con- 


470 


INDEX 


ference,  392-397;  ABC 
mediation  in  Mexico,  225;  con- 
sultations as  to  recognition  of 
Carranza,  227;  President  Wil- 
son's Mobile  address,  398; 
Second  Pan-American  Scien- 
tific Congress,  397-399 ;  special 
position  of  Cuba,  Panama, 
Nicaragua,  Haiti,  and  Santo 
Domingo,  400-405 ;  Central 
American  Court  of  Justice, 
401-402;  proposed  mutual 
guarantee  of  territory  and  in- 
dependence "under  republican 
forms  of  government,"  406- 
408;  want  of  information,  409; 
phrase  "Latin  America,"  409; 
differences  in  population,  ante 
cedents,  and  conditions,  409 
integrity  of  statesmen,  412 
Monroe  Doctrine,  414-418 
mutual  confidence,  respect,  and 
co-operation,  418-419. 

Paraguay,  Republic  of,  case  of 
the  Water  Witch,  133,  134; 
arbitrations,  322. 

Paraguay  River,  navigation  of, 
132-134. 

Parana,  Brazilian  ship,  torpe- 
doed, 99. 

Parana,  River,  132-134. 

Paris,  Declaration  of.  See  Dec- 
laration of  Paris. 

Passamaquoddy  Bay,  arbitration 
as  to  islands  in,  314. 

Passports,  declarants',  298-300. 

Paul  I.  of  Russia,  ukase  of  1799, 

145- 

Pauncefote,    Lord,    interoceanic 

canal  treaties,  125-126,  325. 
Peace,  plans  for  preservation  of, 

437-445- 
Peace  Conferences  at  The  Hague. 

See  Hague  Conferences. 
Peace  proposals,  Central  Powers, 

83;      President     Wilson,     83; 

responses,  84-86. 
Peacock,    U.S.S.,     voyage     with 

Edmund  Roberts,  174. 


Pecuniary  claims,  arbitration, 
328,  390-392. 

Perry,  Commodore,  treaty  with 
Japan,  187-189. 

Pershing,  General,  occupation  of 
Mexican  territory,  229-238. 

Peru,  recognition  of  revolution 
in,  214-215;  arbitrations,  322. 

Peter  the  Great,  54,  55. 

Petrolite,  American  tanker,  at- 
tacked by  submarine,  83. 

Phelps,  E.  J.,  fur-seal  arbitration, 

1.49,  319- 

Philippines,  "open  door"  policy, 

179. 
Pickering,  Timothy,  Secretary  of 

State,  xiii. 
Piedmont,   popular  uprising   in, 

239- 

Pierce,  Franklin,  desires  annexa- 
tion of  Cuba,  361. 

Pinckney,  Charles,  minister  to 
Spain,  344. 

Pinckney,  Charles  Cotesworth, 
minister  to  France,  57-59; 
"millions  for  defence,"  59. 

Pinkney,  William,  arbitrator  un- 
der Jay  treaty,  311;  negotia- 
tions with  England,  167. 

Pious  Fund,  arbitration,  332. 

Piracy,  103,  104,  112,  115;  Bar- 
bary  powers,  104,  105;  attempt 
to  declare  slave-trade  to  be 
piracy,  117;  charge  in  Virgin- 
ins  case,  119,  120. 

Plate  River,  free  navigation,  132. 

Poinsett,  Joel  R.,  agent  at 
Buenos  Aires,  report,  367. 

Polk,  James  K.,  expands  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  246,  260. 

Polygamists,  excluded  from  natu- 
ralization, 296. 

Porcupine  River,  free  navigation, 

131- 

Portsmouth,  peace  of,  1 81-182, 
438;  absorption  of  Korea,  195. 

Portugal,  offer  of  subjugation,  9; 
arbitrations,  322. 

Postal  Union,  434. 


4/1 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


Preble,  Commodore,  in  war  with 

Tripoli,    no. 
Prescription,     principle     of,     in 

Venezuela  boundary  case,  250, 

251. 

Private  property.    See  Capture. 

Privateering,  34,  39,  40,  42,44,46, 
64. 

Proclamation  of  neutrality,  39- 
42,  44. 

Provisions.    See  Contraband. 

Prussia,  attitude  towards  Ameri- 
can Revolution,  19;  misfor- 
tunes of  Arthur  Lee,  15,  20- 
23;  treaty,  61;  exclusion  of 
British  trade  from  Hanover, 
60;  invites  co-operation  against 
Chinese  pirates,  112;  law  of 
allegiance,  280. 

Puget's  Sound  Agricultural  Com- 
pany, arbitration  of  claims, 
315- 

Quebec  commission  of  1898, 145. 

Ramirez,  Gonzalo,  412. 

Randolph,  Edmund,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiii;  views  as  to  Genet's 
reception,  40. 

Rayneval,  visit  to  England,  30. 

Reciprocity,  policy  of,  160,  161; 
with  Hawaii,  353;  failure  with 
Canada,   147. 

Recognition  of  governments,  rule 
as  to,  209,  210,  422;  Rivas- 
Walker  government  in  Nicara- 
gua, 210-21 1 ;  Air.  Seward  and 
the  American  civil  war,  211; 
Diaz  government  in  Mexico, 
212-213;  Crespo  in  Vene- 
zuela, 213;  revolutionary  junta 
in  Peru,  214-215;  Huerta  in 
Mexico,  213-225;  Carranza, 
227. 

Red  Cross,  434.  See  also  Geneva 
convention. 

Religious  liberty,  199-200;  in- 
structions to  delegates  to  Pana- 
ma Congress,  374~375- 


Reprisal,  frigate,  15,   16. 

Republican  National  Convention 
of  1916,  declaration  concerning 
Mexico,  232. 

Revolution.  See  American  Revo- 
lution;   French  Revolution. 

Reyes,  General,  revolt  in  Mexico, 
216;    death,  217. 

Rights  of  man,  4,  5.  See  Natural 
rights. 

Rio  Branco,  Baron,  personal  in- 
tegrity,  413. 

Rivas,  Patricio,  political  partner 
of  Walker  in  Nicaragua,  210- 
211. 

Rivers,  130-134. 

Roberts,  Edmund,  agent  to  Far 
East,  174,  175,  185;  treaty 
with  Siam,  175;   with  Muscat, 

175- 

Robinson,  Christopher,  counsel 
in  fur-seal  arbitration,  319. 

Robinson,  W.  E.,  advocates  doc- 
trine of  expatriation,  287. 

Rockingham,  Lord,  forms  British 
cabinet,  25,  26. 

Rodney,  Caesar  A.,  commissioner 
to  South  America,  367. 

Rodriguez  Larreta,  Dr.,  on  the 
Monroe  Doctrine,  415. 

Roosevelt,  Theodore,  exposition 
of  Monroe  Doctrine,  251,  254, 
257;  application  to  Santo 
Domingo,  261;  recognition  of 
Panama,  238;  immunity  of 
private  property  at  sea,  62 ; 
good  offices  between  Russia 
and  Japan,  181,  438;  Belgium 
and  The  Hague  treaties,  440- 

Root,  Elihu,  Secretary  of  State, 
xv;  tour  of  South  America, 
391;  absorption  of  Korea  by 
Japan,  196. 

Rule  of  the  war  of  1756,  59. 

Rush,  Richard,  contest  with 
commercial  restrictions,  167; 
Monroe  Doctrine,  240-242 ; 
character  as  diplomatist,  241. 


47.2 


INDEX 


Russborough,    Lord,    at    Berlin, 

22. 

Russell,  Earl,  demand  for  re- 
lease of  Mason  and  Slidell,  1 14; 
orders  for  detention  of  the 
Alabama,  52,  53. 

Russell,  Sir  Charles,  counsel  in 
fur-seal  arbitration,  319. 

Russia,  attitude  towards  Ameri- 
can Revolution,  19;  mission 
of  Francis  Dana,  15;  aspira- 
tions to  become  a  commercial 
power,  55 ;  arbitration  of  slave 
question,  314;  cession  of  Alas- 
ka, 352;  peace  conference  at 
The  Hague,  325;  position  on 
expatriation,  293;  war  with 
Japan,  181,  195;  peace  of 
Portsmouth,  181-182;  disin- 
clined to  exempt  private  prop- 
erty at  sea  from  capture,  63; 
Anglo- Japanese  alliance,  192- 
J95;  protection  of  fur-seals 
and  sea-otters,  155;  Jewish 
questions,  439. 

St.  Croix  River,  arbitration, 
308,  309. 

St.  Lawrence  River,  free  naviga- 
tion, 131. 

St.  Thomas,  Island  of.  See 
Danish  West  Indies. 

Salisbury,  Lord,  attitude  as  to 
Venezuelan  boundary,  248. 

Salvador,  proposal  of  annexa- 
tion, 360-361 ;  arbitrations, 
322;  accepts  Bryan  peace 
plan,  336;  protests  against 
treaty  between  United  States 
and  Nicaragua,  401-402. 

Samana  Bay,  efforts  to  acquire, 
362. 

Samoa,  policy  towards,  355 ;  gen- 
eral act  of  Berlin,  356;  di- 
vision of  group,  357. 

Sanford,  Henry  S.,  diplomatic 
dress,  431. 

San  Jacinto,  the,  capture  of  the 
Trent,  114. 


San  Juan  water  boundary,  ar- 
bitration, 315,  318. 

Santa  Cruz.  See  Danish  West 
Indies. 

Santo  Domingo,  recognition  of, 
422;  attempts  to  annex,  422; 
arbitrations,  322;  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 261;  debts  and  customs 
administration,  262-265;  spe- 
cial position  in  Pan  American- 
ism, 404;  military  occupation 
by  United  States,  xi,  404-406. 

Sayre,  Stephen,  companion  of 
Arthur  Lee,  20,  22. 

Schenck,  Robert  C,  member  of 
joint  high  commission  of  1871, 
316. 

Schulenburg,  Count,  Prussian 
minister  of  foreign  affairs,  20. 

Sclopis,  Count  Frederic,  arbi- 
trator at  Geneva,  316. 

Scott,  General,  relations  with 
Villa,  231. 

Scott,  James  Brown,  technical 
delegate  to  Second  Hague  Con- 
ference, 63. 

Seals.    See  Fur-seal  arbitration. 

Sea-otters,  protection  of,  155. 

Search,  right  of,  103.  See  Visit 
and  Search. 

Seas,  freedom  of,  103,  112-121. 

Secret  Correspondence.  See  Com- 
mittee of. 

Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  xiv. 

Secretaries  of  State,  xiii-xv. 

Selborne,  Lord,  counsel  at  Gen- 
eva, 316.  See  Palmer,  Sir 
Roundell. 

Seminole  War,  348. 

Senate,  United  States,  amends 
Jay  treaty,  165;  opposition  to 
visit  and  search,  117,  118;  de- 
bates fisheries  treaty  in  open 
session,  145. 

Sergeant,  John,  delegate  to  Pana- 
ma Congress,  373. 

Seven  Years'  War,  7. 

Seward,  F.  W.,  mission  to  Santo 
Domingo,  362, 


473 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


Seward,  William  H.,  Secretary 
of  State,  xiv;  release  of  Mason 
and  Slidell,  115;  Monroe  Doc- 
trine, 257,  260. 

Shclburne,  Lord,  friendly  dis- 
position towards  America,  25- 
27,  29;  censured  for  peace 
treaty,  29. 

Shenandoah,  Confederate  cruiser, 
50. 

Sherman,  John,  Secretary  of 
State,  xv. 

Shimonoseki  indemnity,  433. 

"Shirt-sleeves"  diplomacy,  427. 

Shufeldt,  Commodore,  treaty 
with  Korea,  195. 

Siam,  treaty  with,  121;  arbitra- 
tion, 322. 

Slavery,  effect  on  diplomatic 
action,  422;  claims  for  carry- 
ing away  of  slaves,  314;  ef- 
forts to  suppress  slave-trade, 
1 1 5-1 19;  abolition  in  South 
America,  411. 

Slidell,  John,  captured  on  the 
Trent,   114. 

Smith,  Robert,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiii. 

Somers,  fate  of,  no. 

Sound  Dues.     See  Denmark. 

South  America,  question  of  recog- 
nition, 367. 

Spain,  attitude  towards  American 
Revolution,  17,  18;  navigation 
of  the  Mississippi,  18,  341; 
efforts  to  obtain  her  alliance, 
14,  15;  cession  of  Louisiana 
to  France,  341;  relations  with 
Barbary  powers,  105,  106;  in- 
vasion by  France,  239,  240; 
cases  of  Virginius  and  AUianca, 
119-121;  arbitrations,   321. 

Spanish  America,  revolt  in,  166. 

Spanish  peace  conference  of 
1870-71,  437. 

Staempfli,  Jacques,  arbitrator  at 
Geneva,  316. 

Steinberger,    A.    13.,    agent    to 

■■"•;i.    ,ss 


Stikine   River,    free   navigation, 

131- 
Story,  Joseph,  on  expatriation, 
273,  286. 

Stowcll,  Lord,  on  visit  and 
search,  116. 

"  Strict  accountability,"  sub- 
marine controversy,  67. 

Suarez  Mujica,  Eduardo,  Chilean 
ambassador,  president  of  Sec- 
ond Pan-American  Scientific 
Congress,  398. 

Submarines,  controversy  con- 
cerning, 67,  68;  sinking  of 
Lusitania,  69;  assurances  as 
to  "liners,"  72;  case  of  the 
Sussex,  74-75;  orders  in  the 
Mediterranean,  81,  82;  new 
German  war-zone  decree,  88; 
rupture  of  relations,  89;  dis- 
cussion with  Austria,  92-94; 
relations  with  Germany,  94- 
96;  "overt  acts"  and  war, 
96-98. 

Suez  canal,  status,   126. 

Suffolk,  Earl  of,  British  foreign 
secretary,  19. 

Sumner,  Charles,  amendment  of 
expatriation  bill,  289. 

Sussex,  French  ship,  torpedoed, 

74-75,  89.  90. 

Swabey,  Maurice,  arbitrator  un- 
der Jay  treaty,  311. 

Switzerland,  position  on  ex- 
patriation, 292. 

Talleyrand,  treatment  of  Ameri- 
can envoys,  57-59;  Louisiana 
cession,  342-346. 

Tampico,  case  of  U.S.S.  Dol- 
phin, 223. 

Tenterden,  Lord,  British  agent 
at  Geneva,  316. 

Texas,  annexation,  348,  349. 

Tezkereh,  travel-pass  in  Turkey, 

304-  . 

Thompson,  Sir  John,  Bering  Sea 

arbitrator,  319. 
Thornton.   Sir   Ivhwml,   negoti^» 


74 


INDEX 


tor  of  treaty  of  Washington, 
316. 
Tijuca,  Brazilian  ship,  torpedoed, 

99- 

Tolls.     See  Interoceanic    canal, 

Tornado,  the,  capture  of  the  Vir- 
ginius,  119. 

Treaties,  plan  of  Continental 
Congress,  6,  8,  9;  prior  to 
Constitution,  33 ;  most-favored 
nation  principle,  12;  change 
of  government,  40;  Algiers, 
108,  in;  Bolivia,  131,  132; 
China:  1844, 177;  1858, 1868, 
200,  201,  423;  France:  com- 
merce and  alliance  of  1778, 
12-14,  35,  39,  40,  42,  44,  161, 
162;  Germany,  as  to  Samoan 
Islands,  356;  Great  Britain: 
peace  of  1782-83,  29-31,  136- 
x38;  Jay  treaty,  56-57,  164, 
165,  308,  424;  of  1802,  310; 
of  Ghent,  118;  of  commerce, 
1815,  172;  convention  of  181 8, 
140,  141 ;  Webster- Ashbur- 
ton,  118,  424,  425;  reciprocity 
and  fisheries  of  1854,  131,  141; 
of  Washington,  1871,  131,  142, 
316;  arbitration  as  to  fur- 
seals,  150,  154-155;  Hawaii, 
353;  Japan,  188,  189,  201; 
Korea,  190;  Mexico,  351; 
Morocco,  106,  434;  Muscat, 
175;  Netherlands,  14;  Pana- 
ma, 357-358;  Paraguay,  134; 
Prussia,  61;  Samoa,  355,  356; 
Siam,  175,  201;  Spain,  348; 
Tripoli,  108,  200;  Tunis,  108; 
Turkey,  173;  protection  of 
submarine  cables,  434;  indus- 
trial property,  ibid. ;  postal 
union,  ibid. ;  Hague  conven- 
tions, ibid. ;  naturalization, 
290,  291. 

Trent,  the,  case  of,  114. 

Trevino,  General,  orders  to  op- 
pose American  advance,  236. 

Tripoli,  relations  with,  104,  108- 
II 0,  200. 


Trist,  Nicholas  P.,  treaty  of 
Guadalupe-Hidalgo,  351. 

Troppau,  congress  of,  238. 

Trumbull,  John,  arbitrator  under 
Jay  treaty,  311. 

Tucuman,  declaration  of  inde- 
pendence of  Provinces  of  the 
Rio  de  la  Plata,  367. 

Tunis,  relations  with,  104,  108. 

Tupper,  Sir  C.  H.,  agent  in  fur- 
seal  arbitration,  319. 

Turkey,  case  of  Martin  Koszta, 
301,  303;  expatriation,  293. 
See  also  Ottoman  Empire. 

Tuscany,  14,  19. 

Tutuila,  acquisition  of,  355. 

Tuyl,  Baron,  Russian  minister, 
245. 

Ukases,  Russian,  145,  148. 

United  States,  foreign  policy, 
vii-ix;  intervention  in  Haiti, 
Nicaragua,  and  Santo  Do- 
mingo, xi;  founds  system  of 
neutrality,  35,  36,  46;  re- 
strictions, 162;  early  trade 
with  Mediterranean,  105,  106, 
109,  no;  co-operation  against 
piracy,  112;  resistance  to  claim 
of  visit  and  search,  1 15-12 1; 
abolition  of  Danish  sound 
dues,  121. 

Upshur,  Abel  P.,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiv. 

Urquiza,  General,  decrees  free 
navigation  of  Parana  and 
Uruguay,    132. 

Uruguay  River,  free  navigation 
of,  132. 

Van  Berckel,  negotiations  with 
William  Lee,  17. 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiii;  rejection  as  minister 
to  England,  169-171;  declines 
overture  for  annexation  of 
Texas,  349. 

Vattel,  principle  of  equality  of 
nations,  197, 


475 


AMERICAN    DIPLOMACY 


Venezuela,  boundary  dispute, 
246-25 1 ;  Anglo-German  block- 
ade, 251-255;  arbitrations, 
322;  recognition  of  Crespo 
government,  213;  blockade  of 
ports  in  1903,  418. 

Vera  Cruz,  seizure  by  United 
States,  223. 

Vergennes,  French  Minister  of 
Foreign  Affairs,  5,  8,  29-31, 
38. 

Verona,  congress  of,  239. 

Vestal,  the,  capture  of,  16. 

Vienna,  congress  of,  131. 

Villa,  Francisco,  Mexican  mili- 
tary leader,  218;  convention 
at  Aguascalientes,  225,  226; 
opposes  American  intervention, 
227;  raid  on  Columbus,  N.  M., 
227,  229;  American  support, 
231,  235. 

Virgin  Islands.  See  Danish  West 
Indies. 

Virginius,  the,  capture  and  re- 
lease, 119,  120;   case  of,  331. 

Visconti  Venosta,  Marquis  Emi- 
lio,  Bering  Sea  arbitrator,  319. 

Visit  and  search,  opposition  to 
claim  of,  34,  103,  11 2-1 15, 
115-118,  121. 

Waite,  Morrison  R.,  counsel  at 

Geneva,  316. 
Wake  Island,  acquisition,  360. 
Walker,  Robert  J.,  statement  as 

to  Alaska,  352. 
Walker,    William,    filibuster,    in 

Nicaragua,  210-21 1,  381. 
Walker-Rivas     government,     in 

Nicaragua,  381. 
War,  with  Algiers,   ill;    Great 

Britain,     114;      Mexico,    351; 

Seminoles,   348;    Tripoli,    109, 

no;    mitigation  of  evils,   33, 

34;   of  the  Pacific,  385;   with 

Germany,  96-98. 
War  zone,  declared  by  Germany, 

67,  88,  94.     See  Military  area. 
Warren  and  Costello,  case  of,  286. 


Washburne,  Elihu  B.,  Secretary 
of  State,  xiv. 

Washington,  George,  attitude 
towards  French  Revolution 
3°i  37.  39;  reception  of  Gen6t 
40;  proclamation  of  neutrality 
40-42 ;  instructions  to  Gouver 
neur  Morris,  163;  Jay  mission 
56,  308;  Farewell  Address 
J99»  259;  attention  to  cere- 
mony, 427. 

Water  Witch,  the,  firing  upon,  133. 

Webster,  Daniel,  Secretary  of 
State,  xiv;  views  on  impress- 
ment, 114;  case  of  the  Caroline, 
228;  expatriation,  277;  Web- 
ster-Ashburton  treaty,  424. 

West  Florida.    See  Floridas,  the. 

West  Indies  offered  to  Spain,  9. 

Weyler,  General,  policy  of  con- 
centration, 207. 

Wickes,  Captain,  commander  of 
the  Reprisal,  16. 

Wilhelmina,  provision  ship,  seized 
by  British  authorities,  67. 

Wilkes,  Captain,  seizure  of  Mason 
and  Slidell,  114. 

Williams,  George  H.,  amend- 
ment of  expatriation  bill,  290; 
member  of  joint  high  com- 
mission of  1871,  316. 

Wilson,  Henry  Lane,  ambassador 
in  Mexico,  217. 

Wilson,  Woodrow,  position  as  to 
armed  merchantmen,  73-74; 
peace  proposal,  83-86,  335; 
league  for  peace,  87,  441-442; 
rupture  of  relations  with  Ger- 
many, 89;  continued  sub- 
marine warfare,  94-96;  war 
message,  96-98;  address  of 
March  12,  1913,  to  Latin- 
America,  213;  recognition  of 
revolution  in  Peru,  214-215; 
intervention  in  Mexico,  218 
et  seq.;  export  of  arms  and 
munitions,  220;  Columbus  raid, 
228;  Carranza  protest,  229; 
address  on  canal  tolls  question, 


476 


INDEX 


128-129;  disapproval  of  six- 
power  Chinese  loan,  184;  Mon- 
roe Doctrine,  268;  address  at 
Mobile  on  Pan  Americanism, 
398;  at  Second  Pan-American 
Scientific  Congress,  407;  pro- 
posed mutual  guarantee  of 
territory  and  independence 
"under  republican  forms  of 
government,"  407-408. 
Wood-pulp,  remission  of  duties, 

J47-  .     , 

Wrecking  and  Salvage,  in  boun- 
dary waters,  146. 

X.  Y.  Z.  episode,  57-59- 


Yalu  River,  timber  concessions 
and  Russo-Japanese  war,  195. 

Yuan  Shih-kai,  provisional  presi- 
dent of  Chinese  Republic,  183. 

Yucatan,  proposal  to  occupy, 
362. 

Yukon  River,  free  navigation, 
131- 

Zapata,  activities  in  Mexico, 
216;  convention  at  Aguas- 
calientes,  225,  226. 

Zegelin,  Herr,  Prussian  diplo- 
matist, 20. 

Zelaya,  President,  withdrawal  of 
recognition,  265. 


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